Amen, brother Sabre, Amen...It's funny, whenever I hear of proposed changes (read: increases) in headquarters or intelligence personnel, I see leaders reaching for the rubber stamp that says "Approved" - REGARDLESS of the rationale. ...but when it comes to increasing combat power, it's always met with a cautious "Well, there's a lot to consider..."
It's as if increases in support are seen as the "mature" thing to do - but I don't ever see anyone saying "Enough!" We'll end up with an army composed of just one rifle squad and 500k+ of "multipliers".
Personally I have come to look at tactical headquarters expansion as a sort of TDA creep into the field force.
Tom
Amen and Amen, again.Originally Posted by Tom Odom
See a five year old argument regarding the modular BCT:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview...g05/melton.pdf
LTC Melton describes a model for modular BCTs that would have resulted in a reduction of 8 BN/BDE HHCs, instead of the increase in 10 BN/BDE HHCs in each division. Our "transformation" increased headquarters, instead of reducing them.
Interestingly, he was my tactics instructor at CSGC last year ... He also has a book, The Clausewitz Delusion. he also had a humorous in-class riff on the US Army's fascination with tents (when indoor space is available) and TOC-mahals.
Is there anything to gain by eliminating the scout platoon in the CAB and replacing one of the companies in the CAB with a Cav Troop of 6x2 M3 and 4x2 M1? The remaining three companies are: two infantry companies with three infantry platoons and one tank platoon each, the fourth company is a tank company. Also, add two more scouts to each M3. The ARS is used for pure recon while the scouts look for trouble.
A couple of questions:
1- Are you going to re-organize the troops in the ARS, too? (or will they remain 3+5)
2- Are you going to retain the scout platoon in the HHC?
Anyway you cut it, your idea is a significant increase in force structures- a platoon of tanks and at 2 platoons of M3s (plus the scouts) in each BCT.
At least part of the reason for the 3+5 platoon is lack of Bradleys- they had to take the BSFVs and convert them back to troop carriers. The conversion of 1/1AD and 3ACR might free up some vehicles, but the personnel strength
I think that your organization is fightable, but not realistic for the US Army at this juncture.
Yes, I would organize the troops in the ARS with a Stryker RSTA (I have a black check).
Yes, I would eliminate the HHC scout.
My idea would increase the number of tanks by two from the current CAB of 28. Big increase in M3 and I did not know that the 3+5 set-up was due to a lack of carriers. Sure, the M3 vehicles would become available with the conversion of the 3rd ACR to a SBCT, but additional Strykers would need to be purchased to equip all HBCTs with a Stryker RSTA. The Stryker seems to be suitable vehicle for this role - reconnaissance and surveillance, snooping in the white area while the CABs are maneuvering with the scout troops/companies out front lookin for trouble and have the firepower to deal with trouble.
I don't know that it was totally due to lack of carriers, but I do know that the BSFVs (M6?) were converted back, and that available numbers were at least part of the consideration.
I've heard that the Stryker RV (M1127) has limited eyeball capability, and limited dismount ability- the second may be to MTOE, not a capacity, issue.
I like the idea of a Stryker RSTA in the HBCT, but I would change the organization (in both BCTs): Each troop would contain 2 Recon Platoons with RVs (4 x M1127, 16 dismounts + 8 crew = 24 pax total), 1 MGS Platoon (4 x M1128, 12 pax total), 1 Rifle PLT (4 x M1126 ICV, 44 pax total). 3 line troops like this, with an HHT. Alternatively, (with a blank check) we could replace the RVs with M3s, the ICVs with M2s and the MGS with M1s in the HBCT- I am in favor of keeping the same organization between the HBCT and SBCT, with the primary difference being the platforms used.
I'm not sure of the need for the Surveillance Troop n the SBCT RSTA. In the HBCT and IBCT, these elements are part of the BSTB. Maybe instead of the Surveillance Troop (or in addition to it) the HBCT RSTA could have a fourth line troop with the Stryker platforms, or they could go into a SQDN Scout PLT in the HHT. I believe that 3-73 AR (the 82nd ABN Sheridan BN) tested a LAV-25 scout platoon, maybe even deploying it to OPN Desert Storm.
Interesting organization. Question: Why infantry in the reconnaissance platoon? The reason I ask this is based my reading on this site and linked publications about scout and recon functions. It seems to most on this site that the opinion is we do not do recon well - we would rather roll in into a fight fast and keep going. Also, a linked publication that discussed the history of reconnaissance in the U.S. Army and others and concluded with the position that general units can perform the task. So my thinking is the a scout company leads the CAB into the fight and the RSTA does reconnaissance and not rolling into or lookin for a fight.
The original design of the ACR had an IN CO in addition to the Tank CO, but it lost out to force structure. The original ACR fielded did have an IN squad in each PLT.
1- I think that the cavalry troop needs the ability to fight, not just do recon. US Cavalry has always done economy of force missions- mor successfully when organized for them (see ACR) than when not (see mechanized cavalry squadrons in WW2, the lessons learned from which led to the ACR).
2- I've heard that the Stryker RVs have situational awareness problems. By placing a PLT of ICVs in the troop, I've allowed the troop commander a number of different options he can utilize IAW METT-TC.
Overall, I think that we should minimize the different types of organizations that we have, and build larger organizations out of common building blocks.
References for past cavalry organizations:
https://www.knox.army.mil/center/oco...berOctober.pdf
http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/cs...eron_fight.pdf
http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/cs...scouts_out.pdf
Last edited by 82redleg; 09-16-2010 at 12:17 PM. Reason: Edited for fat-fingered typing
God winks and we have a perfect brigade TO&E.
Such a brigade is being sent to war, gets a rough handling ('Kasserine') and has 10-30% personnel losses after a few days or weeks of intense combat.
The losses are not even among the units, and there are also effects from material losses (both damaged and lost equipment).
Do you think this once 'perfect' brigade can go on? Or maybe the combat troops had much higher losses than 10-30% and failed, exposing the support troops and leading to the shattering of the whole formation?
Would a different balance that stresses the ability to sustain losses more yield a better TO&E?
What does this tell us about company-sized or smaller specialist units in the formation? Does it make sense to pay much attention to small specialist yet high risk units such as a dedicated recce Coy?
Would it make sense to have all vital support function duplicated, in two identical and separate units to avoid a total loss of a vital function in a single ambush on a convoy?
Once again Fuchs you have me curiously aroused.
I was thinking along the lines of three maneuver CABs, each with it's own scout coy. The Brigade would have a separate recon company similar to the third troop of the IBCT.
It's probably a good thing I don't get everything...
I was actually hinting at the idea that the battle strength doesn't need to equal the administrative formation strength.
An obvious example for this are administrative and basic training units which often stay at the garrison when the formation deploys. This might be modified for combat troops (which are the most likely candidates for heavy losses).
A deployed brigade could have several battlegroups and a support group.
Army developers might assume that this brigade would sustain heavy losses in its mission (I'm most likely not writing about an expedition cabinet war here).*
An almost obvious choice would be to add one battlegroup "too much" and keep it under corps control in a calm area until it gets exchanged with the most exhausted battle group. This would start a permanent rotation which could enable the formation to keep going at useful strength for quite long.
Another army developer might assume different, shorter missions.
He could instead add an infantry battalion as dedicated security element to the support group. The battle groups could be reinforced from this initially not very battered battalion when their own infantry is too much exhausted or if the mission (terrain) requires more than the usual battlegroup's infantry strength. This extra infantry battalion would serve as a brigade reserve, and it would take a self-disciplined Bde Cmdr to use it like this.
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Finally my reasoning about cavalry / scouts / armoured recce and the likes at Bn to Div level: This is an obsolete concept.
Scouts cannot move faster than combat troops today - unlike at the time of horse cav when cav was able to march several times as far per day as infantry or even artillery.
The armoured truck scouts of WW2 had a range, speed and maintenance needs advantage over WW2 tanks as well.
Today there's no such time difference and a well-trained formation could (if it avoids many typical but avoidable shortcomings) move many times as fast as in WW2. Today's armoured forces would not need to wait for foot march infantry forces.
This loss of a speed advantage puts the classic armoured recce approach in question.
The (AFAIK) best and most encompassing answer would be to pre-position scouts and surveillance teams up to a huge depth (~300 km). No matter which direction your Bde turns to, it would always have scouts ahead and cav for security available for its flanks.
This is obviously not practical with organic manoeuvre formation scouts.
Scouts and surveillance teams (this excludes dedicated FOs for fires) should be directly corps-attached troops.
This does btw also solve the issue how to cope with uneven cav/scout losses among Bdes. Scouts would always be available (except if the campaign sucks globally).
The security and close recce job should therefore be assigned to combat troops, as it happens in many armies of the world.
The U.S. Army sported a huge amount of talk and blather about "situational awareness". Shouldn't it be obvious that having scouts already at or close to locations which only very recently got your attention rather than to send them out when you become interested in a location?
The quite disappointing state of Operational Art today is the culprit. A look at a brigade alone cannot reveal the needs of a Corps or Threatre commander and whether the Bde is prepared to meet these needs. Sadly, a lack of corps-scale real and free-play manoeuvres means that we don't learn enough about our shortcomings on Corps level.
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About my "*":
It's perfectly fine to use all available forces (even if only as reserve) when you look at a battle (= most common and most influential training scenario for brigades).
It's different for a series of battles (campaign). The Eastern Front 1941-1945 saw man fresh or refreshed armour divisions joining the front with hundreds of tanks. They lost extreme quantities of tanks and had to make do with just a few dozen tanks for the final weeks (if not months) before they were withdrawn for rebuilding.
Paradoxically, German generals recognized that losses are smaller if available forces are smaller (the opposite was true in fighter vs. fighter air combat, such combat dynamics are really interesting!).
It would have been better to sustain a mediocre strength.
A campaign leader (Corps Cmdr) thinks even farther; he is concerned about the culminating point of attack; how far he can advance and how much he can achieve until he needs to let his forces rest and regain strength.
The culminating point of attack is a most important variable - one of the great levers for short and not terribly brutal wars.
The sustainment of combat power among the formations is of greatest interest for this.
The far culminating point of attack of German forces in 1940 explains why Germans conquered France in six weeks while the Western Allies took six months for reconquering it (despite much, much better motorization).
The quick advance in 1941/42 and slow withdrawal in 1943-1945 on the Eastern Front can be similarly attributed to the inferior Soviet preparations for long campaigns (most notoriously their lack of vehicle repair capabilities in the field).
IIRC this was exactly US army doctrine between the 60s and early 80s before their technological fetishism got the better of them...remember the LRRPs and LRSU units? Force multipliers if ever their were any. Just imagine what the Afghan theatre would look like if those old LRRP regiments were let loose covering the gaps between IBCTs/Bde groups with UAVs used to cover gaps or cued by LRS patrols ... in fact you'd be getting close to the recce-strike concept hindered only by RoE and civilian considerations. If I'm not mistaken OP Anaconda started out exactly like that. Perhaps our American collegues (if I may be so presumptious) could enlighten us further (especially if I have misunderstood the current state of affairs).
Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 09-18-2010 at 07:03 PM.
The MOST LRS we ever had in the US Army was a detachment of 4-6 (?) patrols/teams in each DIV/separate BDE, and a company of 18 (?) patrols in each Corps. I don't think this is anywhere near the ratio that would be required to execute Fuchs concept.
I'm not opposed to increasing the number of LRS elements, but I'm not sure they belong in the BCT. Heck, I can't see the utility of the 4 small mounted PLTs in the current BFSB, I think that we would be better off trading the force structure for a second (or larger) LRSC, maybe even putting a LRSC back in the DIV HHB. That would also allow us to eliminate the Recon SQDN HHT and FSC, a further savings (that could go back into the BCTs, or allow the addition of the required LRSC if we put one in each DIV). Ken or some others can speak better than I can about the # of LRS elements that can be effectively sustained in a given force structure- not every 11B is cut out to be a LRS guy, and I'd imagine that the LRS NCOs are even fewer. As a fire supporter, I'd like to see an FO on each team, if for nothing else than the ability to accurately call for precision fires, but I'm not sure that we can provide that many quality 13Fs.
I agree. A corps would probably need an impressive LRS regiment.
That - and other parts of my concept - leads to a discussion about the proper balance between reconnaissance and strike forces (budget, personnel, doctrinal attention), but I just regained my self-discipline and won't fire off yet another XXL forum reply.
On 13F JSO, I agree, also a medic would be really helpful, and maybe a 25 series guy since HF and SATCOM radio's are little complicated for us grunt types. Wait, that kinda looks like the CA equivelent if a 1/2 ODA. SOCOM would smack us into the dark ages. Many LRS limitations are in fact based on the conflict between SOCOM and DOA. I love the LRS job, but I'm about ready to give up on it, and give the LRS mission to SF and be done w/ it.
Reed
P.S. notice how Div recon went bye bye in the USMC?
Such cryptic number-number-letter conversations among Americans always look really pointless to me.
An army should develop its structure, its organization, manpower requirements and then simply train and cross-train the manpower.
That's such a self-evident and general thing that I cannot understand why the technicalities of qualifications attract so much interest.
A small team such as a LRS team cannot make do with specialists only. Everyone needs at the very least to learn the same skills the unofficial way (from the specialist, not at a school).
I tend to agree that there is too much specialization. Much of what appears to need specialization these days, radio op/signaler, weapons (any), even medical to an extent should be common to all. I would like to think that in an army where operational deployments are seldom more than a quarter of their time there is plenty of time to cross-train.
Which army are you talking about?
To Fuchs, the discussion of how to train and organize units IS the discussion of structure and organization. I have never heard of any modern military that doesn't train infantry, artillery observers/joint fires controllers, medics and signallers separately, although I am open to being corrected.
Even US SF, probably the ultimate in cross training, have all but one of those skills as a primary skill (they also have engineer and intel analysis as primary skills).
On a small team (like a LRS team), I would think that having specialist in each requisite skill would ADD to the ability to cross train the team, instead of hindering it. Having 2 NCO observers in the LRS platoon (what we have now) probably contributes to the cross training, but not nearly what having an observer on each team would. Especially with the training/certification requirements to control precision strike munitions, which I would think would be an extremely desirable capability in a LRS team, having a specialist makes sense to me. I also, from the very beginning, freely admitted my professional bias as an artilleryman.
HBCT load out
The current HBCT has:
58 tanks, 29 in each CAB. Gute's suggestion would increase the number of tank platoon per CAB from 6 to 8, total number of tanks from 29 to 37. Crew requirement would be the CAB Scout platoon of 36. Doable with 4 PAX left over.
58 M2 BFVs, 29 in each CAB
30 M3 CFV, 5 in each CAB and 20 in the ARS.
When equipped with LRAS3, the M1127 has excellent opics, just no mounted weapon. Its an either or situation. Mount LRAS or the 50cal/Mk-19.
Like the idea of standarizing the ARS in HBCT & SBCTs, addes a bit of deception from the other side of the hill (I'm I up against an HBCT or SBCT, don't know yet, have not seen any tracks...)
Like the 2X6 + 2X3 RV/MGS mix, very CAV old school. Again, three SBCT platoons of 24 (72 PAX) down to 2 platoons of 6 (6 PAX each) 36 PAX per platoon. Need 18 PAX to man your MGS, 4 from the new CAB and 14 from somewhere. Probably doable, especially if you start with 28 PAX per platton (current MTOE). 28x3 = 84, 84-72 = 12, 12+4 = 16 only 2 PAX required to field the modified SBCT recon Troop. very doable.
Really the BCT UAVs should proably all be under the command of their respective ARSs. That's who will be asking for them the most/first.
Infantry in the ARS solves the issue of robustness/sustainablity. IIRC thye "old" bundeshere recon Bns had a company of infantry mounted on Fuches.
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