Re-structuring the BCT

[Ski]

The Modular BCT's were a derivative of MacGregor's ACR concept. That concept was way too expensive for the Army to ever afford, so decisions were made as a compromise to capture the combined arms nature of the ACR. Even after the initial drafts of the Modular BCT's were examined, there was an issue with the costs associated with the BCT's.

Then an "either/or" scenario appeared. The Army was forced to decide between BCT's with three infantry/combined arms battalions and a recce squadron, which would result in X number of BCT's, or they could accept a two infantry/combined arms battalions and a recce squadron and have Y number of BCT's. The Y number resulted in more BCT's - which is why it was accepted.

There have been rumors floating around for a year or so now about returning to the three infantry/combined arms battalion structure. If enacted, it would reduce the number of BCT's to the X level mentioned earlier. There's no such thing as a free lunch when it comes to force structure.

[Fuchs]

The army was downsizing, so how could that concept have been too expensive? There was surplus equipment from saved formations for almost whatever structure you could think of IIRC.

[gute]

The army was downsizing, so how could that concept have been too expensive? There was surplus equipment from saved formations for almost whatever structure you could think of IIRC.

When the decisions were made the U.S. Army was growing due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. I believe the 3ID was the first division to convert when it rotated back to the U.S. after the invasion in 2003. Now with the draw down in Iraq the large numbers of BCTs are not needed so the Army is able to consolidate the BCTs into three maneuver battalion BCTs like they wanted at the beginning but could not because of the requirement for troops in Iraq. IMO the U.S. Army took the best of a bad situation and made it work.

It's my understanding that the Army is conducting a force review and we should all know in a couple of months if the modular BCT is the way forward or a passing fad.

[Cavguy]

The army was downsizing, so how could that concept have been too expensive? There was surplus equipment from saved formations for almost whatever structure you could think of IIRC.

The real $$ in our budget is personnel costs, not equipment. (IIRC around 60%).

Agree all else. Now that Iraq is over I expect a re-design of the modular BCTs within the next few years. Interestingly, Stryker units retained three maneuver BNs plus recce squadron.

[TAH]

Correct on the biggest cost is for personnel.

A bit about the Strykers.

1. They didn't really retain three battalions, they have always had three battalions.

2. They cut corners: No Bn Headquarters for the Engineer Co, AT Co, MI Co, Signal Co, they have only 4 vehicles in their recon/scout platoons as opposed to the "standard" of 6, the MGS platoons were cut down to 3 (from the standard of 4) and then they eliminated the extra/fourth crewmen, same thing happened with the AT Platoons 3 versus 4 vehicles.

In order to stay inside current troop levels, the follolwing could be done to add a third maneuver battalion to each HBCT/IBCT.

Standdown 5 HBCTs, convert total number of troops to new maneuver Bn + third FA Battery, additional Forward SPT Co, and an additional Engineer Co.

Standdown 9 IBCTs, same method as above.

Impacts at the DIV level:
1. Reduce the number of BCT per DIV from 4 to 3.
2. Increase the number of maneuver Bn per DIV from 8 to 9.
3. Same increase in FA Firing Batteries.
4. Increase the number of Engineer Co from 4 to 6
5. Reduce the number of Special Troop Bns, FA Bn, Support Bns & BCT HHCs from 4 to 3. Fewer BN Command opportunities for Engineers, MP, NBC, FA, & Log O5s.

Happy New Year BTW

[Ski]

Modularity wasn't approved until 2004 and the real effects didn't even take place until 2005.

The Active Duty Army was on the increase from 480,000 to 520,000, then up to 569,000. The Guard also transformed their BCT's from the old Limited Division XXI or Army of Excellence design to Modular formations...shedding a lot of old Armor/Mech equipment in the process.

There was NO surplus equipment. The Redlegs in IBCT's were short of howitzers to such an extent that one gun had to be taken off a ski resort in California (used for avalanche control) and a number had to be bought off the Taiwanese (we had sold them these guns well in the past) before the new howitzers (M119A2's) were introduced...which has taken years.

The BCT's also had a massive influx of ABCS equipment - III Corps and a few SBCT's were the only units to really have a full compliment of ABCS equipment. We also replaced a bunch of rolling stock, switching out 30 year old 2.5 ton and 5 ton trucks for newer versions. This was all done within increases in the budget as well.

Of course, we also suffered from the giant sucking wound known as FCS which diverted billions of dollars that could have been used on existing programs.

Modularity also had significant increases in field grade officers and senior NCO positions over the old force structure, which led to additional costs.

The costs associated with Modularity were and are enormous. I think the Guard alone has had close to $30B of equipment pumped into it over the last decade...

The army was downsizing, so how could that concept have been too expensive? There was surplus equipment from saved formations for almost whatever structure you could think of IIRC.

[Rifleman]

How is the Army any more modular now than it had been all along since getting rid of Pentomic for ROAD?

I read the idea behind going to brigade HQs in the division was to recreate the flexibility found in the combat commands of the WWII armored division. The brigade had home battalions, but I know battalions were often cross attached to other brigades within the division for operations. And I think 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Divison was OPCONNED to the 101st in Vietnam.

I thought that was modularity. Maybe it's just flexibility?

[82redleg]

How is the Army any more modular now than it had been all along since getting rid of Pentomic for ROAD?

I read the idea behind going to brigade HQs in the division was to recreate the flexibility found in the combat commands of the WWII armored division. The brigade had home battalions, but I know battalions were often cross attached to other brigades within the division for operations. And I think 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Divison was OPCONNED to the 101st in Vietnam.

I thought that was modularity. Maybe it's just flexibility?

It has to do with deployable units, or what level is modularly deployable.

In early OEF/OIF, when a division deployed a BCT, the BCT required a slice of the divisional MSCs (a BN from DIVARTY and DISCOM, and ENG if a heavy DIV, and companies from the MI BN, ADA BN, EN BN if a light DIV, SIG BN. A couple of separate platoons, too (MP and CHEM, IIRC). This offered the division the opportunity to fatten the first BCT deployed, at the expense of follow on BCTs. It also created issues with prep and training- when do you stop falling under your organic functional command and fall under the BCT you will deploy with. I can remember my BN CDR bouncing between the BDE and the DIVARTY, getting conflicting guidance. Despite a DIV directed task org effective, it was a negotiation on which DIVARTY events we would still participate in, rating changes effective, etc, etc, etc. Then, when a DIV deploys separate from its BCTs, those functional commanders have nothing to command- yeah, they are still special staff officers, but they have full time representatives for that.

There are also administrative details that are difficult when you are attached to a BCT. As a BN, its not too bad, but some things cause confusion to change over and back between the organic and attached HQ. For companies and platoons, its even worse (since they aren't set up to be administratively separate, but when deployed with their BCT are separated from their organic HQ).

I think that the BCTs are better overall- most of the training issues attributed to modularity are really attributable to a shortage of force structure and rapid turn around between deployments- than the division based force- we had 7 de facto BCTs before 2004 (only 82d, 101st and 1st CAV had all of their BCTs co-located).

[Fuchs]

Let's face it; the modern brigade is the equivalent of World War divisions. We could simply rename them divisions, for they aren't much smaller than the Russian idea of a division anyway.

You need a combined arms team including
* the capability to penetrate MBT frontal armour (AT),
* the capability to shoot building-destroying shells in direct and indirect fire (105mm HE and greater),
* the capability of electronic reconnaissance (triangulation and monitoring) and radio jamming,
* the capability to deploy enough infantry to search a large village or fight your way through a forest road,
* the capability to sustain the force itself for at least three days without major supply deliveries
of a much smaller size than a brigade or division.

The really, really interesting formation is therefore rather a mixed and reinforced battalion (battalion battle group / Kampfgruppe) with a three-digit head count
and
for missions that emphasize economy of force and reconnaissance the correct size would be a mixed company (this one would then substitute infantry with a dismount scout platoon).

I understand that the approach of "pure" administrative units is still widely preferred, but I don't get why a formation such as a brigade has even today still only one TO&E.
It should have several ones:

An early training TO&E (training within units; equipment proficiency, typical unit missions, reaction drills).

A late training TO&E (advanced training in mixed battle groups).

A Battle group / maneuver team / Kampfgruppe / fighting column type of TO&E for a combat-heavy land campaign.

An occupation / blue helmet TO&E.

A skeleton self-defence TO&E (support units serve as makeshift infantry and AT troops, original combat units down reduced by attrition down to a third by assumption).

[Rifleman]

The really, really interesting formation is therefore rather a mixed and reinforced battalion (battalion battle group / Kampfgruppe) with a three-digit head count...

Indeed it is interesting. I was fortunate enough to be in one when many considered it the choice duty in the cold war army of the '80s.

But I understand it came with it's own problems (or special considerations), although not insurmountable. For instance, I believe our battalion combat team's battery commander had a previous battery command in the 82d to learn his trade under an FA battalion commander before being considered for battery command in the battalion combat team. The engineer platoon leader might have been likewise, I remember he was a 1LT.

FWIW, the USMC MEU(SOC) is a similar concept.

[Infanteer]

I understand that the approach of "pure" administrative units is still widely preferred, but I don't get why a formation such as a brigade has even today still only one TO&E.
It should have several ones:

Sounds like the Commonwealth model - Canada employs forces in a method very similiar to your description.

[TAH]

I think that the BCTs are better overall- most of the training issues attributed to modularity are really attributable to a shortage of force structure and rapid turn around between deployments- than the division based force- we had 7 de facto BCTs before 2004 (only 82d, 101st and 1st CAV had all of their BCTs co-located).

Being on the outside, I've heard that there are training issues with the modular BCTs. Mostly revolve around low-density situations, FISTs/FOs in the maneuver Bns, Planning of fires across BCTs, collective training of MI, MP and Engineers.

TAH

[82redleg]

Being on the outside, I've heard that there are training issues with the modular BCTs. Mostly revolve around low-density situations, FISTs/FOs in the maneuver Bns, Planning of fires across BCTs, collective training of MI, MP and Engineers.

TAH

Yes, I lived in a BCT for 3 years. There are issues, but I think that most of them come from the deployment/optempo, not the organization.

How much influence does the BN staff have on individual training? Not much, its the responsibility of the PLT and CO chain of command.

How much MOS specificity do you need for, for instance, MI platoon training? Again, IMO, not much- it is integrated into manuever training, not a stand alone event.

Yes, there are some difficulties, but they are not insurmountable.