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  1. #1
    Council Member gute's Avatar
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    Default Re-structuring the BCT

    I believe this may have been addressed before and if so I apologize. This topic is of great interest to me so I have continued to study it. It's my understanding that the HBCT has three major flaws: 1) two Combined Arms Battalions instead of 3-4, 2) an under armored RSTA squadron, and 3) the belief that the RSTA squadron may serve as a third maneuver element.

    I have two questions for the members with the experience with armored warfare and the HBCT. 1) Is the current structure of the HBCT sufficient for offensive operations such as what the 3ID did in the run up to Baghdad during OIF? 2) Are the criticisms of the HBCT and the IBCT based on a lack of performance during stability ops or the current structures are ill suited for offensive ops? I seemed to have the same question twice - It seems to me the major critisms of the BCT have more to do with a structure that is performing stability ops and not offensive ops or maybe it makes no difference. Thanks.

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    This article was written shortly after the modular organizations were introduced http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-135843315.html

    Based on the size of the BCT staff, I agree with the author- we should have gone for BIG (4 maneuver BN) BCTs, with comparably increased enabling/combat support assets, commanded by BG. The staff already in place can handle it. During my last rotation, my BCT had 1 BN detached, but recieved the attachment of 3 additional BNs, plus operated dispersed across Iraq. The only addition to the staff would be an aide for the CG.

    When modularity was first announced, I thought that we were going to increase the HQs while we fought for an end-strength increase, then use that increase to put the third maneuver BN back in each BCT- unfortunately, we used the 30000 strength increase to build more BCTs, instead.

    Finally, I'm not a heavy guy, but I don't think that the ARS (its not technically a RSTA) is underarmored for recon work. I think that M3s are plenty. It is anemic, with only 6 platoons. It should have at least 3 platoons per troop, if not 4 (I'd personally trade larger platoons, with a strong dismounted capability, for more smaller platoons). I certain situations (specifically enemy and terrain) tanks might be nice, but in another, infantry might be useful. Task organization of a tank or mech company is the solution, not building a bloated organization permanently, unless you know you will fight it. The ACR and the DIV CAV SQDN were appropriate to the Fulda Gap fight, but not everywhere.

    THere's been plenty of discussions on this site regarding the employment of recon and cavalry units. It should be a pretty easy search.

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    What's the current organisation of a U.S. Army brigade combat team (is it still being called unit of action?)?

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    Council Member gute's Avatar
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    Thanks for the response 82redleg. I have already the article - found it a couple of weeks ago - interesting and seems to be direction the army should go.

    Fuchs: The U.S. Army is calling the Unit of Action either a Heavy BCT, Infantry BCT or Stryker BCT. The HBCT is commanded by a Colonel, has two Combined Arms Battalions (2/M1, 2/M2 companies each), one RSTA squadron, a fires battalion (2/SP155mm Paladin battety), a Brigade Support Battalion, and a Brigade Troops Battalion. The IBCT has the same structure, but with two infantry battalions. The SBCT has three maneuver battalions and it's structure is a little different. If you go to Wikipedia - Transformation of the U.S. Army you will find a write-up on the BCT.

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    Mixed battalions in garrison - interesting. It has been tried many times and cancelled almost as often. I assume we'll have a well-founded understanding of their performance about five years after the formations returned to normal peacetime duty (after OEF/ISAF).

    - - - - -

    I think of brigades more in a mobile warfare environment than in an occupation environment. Surely a Bde HQ can handle less maneuver elements in mobile warfare than when sitting in the same place for months.

    An important constant (or variable?) is the maximum size of a directly (first hand, in person, on the spot) controllable combat team (Kampfgruppe as envisaged in the first Bundeswehr Heer structure).
    This seems to have been about 2-3 battalions historically. Battalions may be the wrong unit of measurement, though - it may be better to measure this in vehicle count (less motorcycles without sidecars) or road march length of the combat team.
    Anyway; German division leaders were apparently unable to control much more than two or three battalions as vanguard during an advance.
    We might have increased this limit with BFT and similar equipment, but then again management on LCD screens is not direct control (and leadership, especially inspiration!!!) of units and the further increased dispersion of troops was a powerful trend for decades.

    So far, I assume that a combat team should be no larger than three battalions. That's two battalions infantry & armour plus a mix of many smaller support units (mortars, combat engineers) to me.

    One such combat team is a mixed regiment to me, two are a small brigade, three a large brigade and four a division.


    Large armies might go for the large brigade, smaller armies (than US, PRC or Russia) might go for the small brigade instead to get a meaningful quantity of Bdes.
    Very small armies (Denmark, for example) should probably rather go for some kind of single combat team "not meant for the Schwerpunkt" light cavalry regiments for vanguard, rear guard, security, recce, counter-recce and raids in order to get a meaningful quantity of formations.
    We got finally rid of the division structure in many armies (based on WW2 insights that were already accepted in NATO as correct insights back in the late 50's!) and that's fine. Four combat teams per formation are great on paper (many formation possibilities...3 up+1 back, 1 up+3 back, 2-2, 2 right+1 left+1 back, ...), and rather disappointing in reality. We've had this with ideas about four Bdes per Div already.


    Looking at the small or large Bde, I'd like to propose a closer look at the support functions. Such a Bde of two combat teams could team up the support units with another light mech battalion (on APCs) that acts as reserve and security force.
    The support elements themselves (arty, log, signals, AD, medical, Bde HQ) could be sized to provide their services to much more than the own combat teams. They could create a "support aura" of about 80 km diameter (especially with arty) in support of rather cheap or very small units (non-combined arms infantry Rgts without arty or light cavalry companies, battalions).

    In addition to this, I'd add basic infantry training battalion at the home garrison (four to six months basic training).

    This would create a Bde of
    * two or three combined arms (mortars, not arty) combat teams
    * a light mech infantry-reinforced bunch of support units that provide support services in a radius of up to 80 km (not only to its combat teams)
    * a "Bn+civil services" stationary garrison element


    Brigade structures usually look as if the brigades were meant to fight as quite solid blocks, when in reality we would need many rather small units or detachments to actually have an eye on (or control of) the surrounding terrain. Those many small eyes & daggers in the landscape would benefit greatly if the Bde in the field had the surplus support capability to assist them.


    This extra capacity would also perform nicely with incomplete (non-combined arms) allied contingents attached in a campaign like the Afghan one.

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    Quote Originally Posted by gute View Post
    I believe this may have been addressed before and if so I apologize. This topic is of great interest to me so I have continued to study it. It's my understanding that the HBCT has three major flaws: 1) two Combined Arms Battalions instead of 3-4, 2) an under armored RSTA squadron, and 3) the belief that the RSTA squadron may serve as a third maneuver element.

    I have two questions for the members with the experience with armored warfare and the HBCT. 1) Is the current structure of the HBCT sufficient for offensive operations such as what the 3ID did in the run up to Baghdad during OIF? 2) Are the criticisms of the HBCT and the IBCT based on a lack of performance during stability ops or the current structures are ill suited for offensive ops? I seemed to have the same question twice - It seems to me the major critisms of the BCT have more to do with a structure that is performing stability ops and not offensive ops or maybe it makes no difference. Thanks.
    You know I always considered the old ROAD 1986 mech div to be pretty much an all-arms smorgasboard task and mission tailorable (is that even a word?) as and where required. The Div cavarly Sqn/Bn even had organic helicopters and an artillery brigade. IMO the BCT are good in principle but for their actual combat effectiveness is hampered by a logistics and CS slice that gives it a 50/50 troop to tail ratio. The old Div86 format could sustain bdes with greater oversight, IMO, and greater felxibility (especially if CS units had been made organic to Bdes, thus making the division an ad hoc HQ element much like the old Soviet WWII era Corps structure). Losing the artillery bde for a fashionable belief that precision is more important than volume merely sets one up for a bloody nose (BCT arty bns have, what, 12 tubes?) Still, the deficiencies(sp?) of the Stryker BCTs (i.e., including the need for a third manouevre bn) was diagnosed long ago. Which see;

    LtC S. J. Townsend, Alternate Organisations for Stryker Brigade Combat Teams

    Maj. A. L. Rocke, Is the Stryker Brigade Combat Team a Viable Concept

    Maj F. R. Moss, The Costs and Benefits of Adding a Third Manoeuvre Battalion to the Brigade Combat Team

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    The only catch with the Vietnam-era division cavalry squadron was that its organic air cavalry troop was often snatched by division headquarters (or higher), and the ground troops were parceled out to individual brigades on many occasions. It was a damned good, flexible organization, but it had to be allowed to operate as a unit.

    I put this out there because the 1986 ROAD division squadron was still similar to the Vietnam model.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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    Default The HBCT

    I was a part of 2/4ID staff when it did its transition to the new HBCT design from the Force XXI model and later commanded a maneuver company in the BCT, which included a tour in Iraq. Early on we identified several shortfalls to the new design but made little headway with Big Army in affecting the changes we saw as necessary. Still, there are some definite positives within the new design.

    First, the Combined Arms BNs are monsters. They have more infantry than the old tank BNs and more tanks than the old mech BNs. They also lend themselves very well to all companies task-organizing for combined arms opns.

    Second, despite how large they are, the BCT HQ have many more capabilities than the old BDE HQ. It can sometimes be very unwieldy, but having so much organic C2 under one roof provides many capabilities.

    On the other hand, the lack of a third CAB handicaps the BCT. the ARS has no ability, doctrinally or practically, to do any more than light reconnaissance and screening opns. It can't attack, defend, cover, guard, or screen. It also lacks adequate dismounts to field multiple long-term OPs. The mix of BFVs and HMMWVs wasn't the best idea either. The lack of platoons is also a problem. The ARS needs lots of external support to really make it combat capable. Now in the current fight in Iraq, one could make a credible argument that the ARS was sufficient for its tasks. However, it's very unlikely an ARS would have been able to do the same things 3-7 CAV did during the initial portion of the Iraq War.

    The FA BN is woefully inadequate. In order to field more BCTs, the Army watered down its combat power and it's clear in these two-battery FA BNs. Supporting the CABs and the ARS simultaneously is a bridge too far without external support, which makes the BCT incapable of self-reliance.

    The engineers are scattered across the BCT. Sometimes this is good, sometimes bad, but the problem is that BFV-equipped engineers get looked at like just another maneuver element instead of engineers who can maneuver if need be. Also, lacking a BDE EN limits the real visibility on the engineer situation.

    CS support is inadequate. There's a need for more MPs and other combat enablers. CSS didn't seem to be much of a problem, but that's outside of my scope.

    In the future, I wish the Army would reduce the number of BCTs in favor of making the existing ones much more robust and capable - real self-sufficient fighting forces, capable of throwing the kitchen sink at the threat. Add a 3rd CAB, make the ARS into an organization able to fight for information, field additional FS assets - both howitzers and mortars, include more dismounted scouts, and make the MP PLT an MP CO.

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    Council Member Infanteer's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by swerve1 View Post
    In the future, I wish the Army would reduce the number of BCTs in favor of making the existing ones much more robust and capable - real self-sufficient fighting forces, capable of throwing the kitchen sink at the threat. Add a 3rd CAB, make the ARS into an organization able to fight for information, field additional FS assets - both howitzers and mortars, include more dismounted scouts, and make the MP PLT an MP CO.
    Sounds like our Brigade Groups - because of our dispersed (small) Army and the need to do without a Division HQ (for now), our Army is formed around a Mechanized Brigade Group having:
    2 Mech Inf Bns
    1 Light Inf Bn
    1 Armoured Bn (mix of MBTs and LAV Armoured Recce)
    1 Combat Engineer Bn
    1 Artillery Bn (M-777 - but I think its going to 2 batteries as we don't have enough to replace the old 105mm)
    1 Support Bn (Tn, Log, Maint, etc, etc)
    1 HQ Bn (HQ, Sigs Coy, MP Pl)

    The Brigades also have light helicopter squadrons that are affiliated and based alongside them.

    Potent organizations, although we've yet to deploy one complete. We usually send mixed Battlegroups formed around an Inf Bn with a Company from each of the other Bns.

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    Default Thanks for the detailed reply...

    Quote Originally Posted by swerve1 View Post
    I was a part of 2/4ID staff when it did its transition to the new HBCT design from the Force XXI model and later commanded a maneuver company in the BCT, which included a tour in Iraq. Early on we identified several shortfalls to the new design but made little headway with Big Army in affecting the changes we saw as necessary. Still, there are some definite positives within the new design.

    First, the Combined Arms BNs are monsters. They have more infantry than the old tank BNs and more tanks than the old mech BNs. They also lend themselves very well to all companies task-organizing for combined arms opns.

    Second, despite how large they are, the BCT HQ have many more capabilities than the old BDE HQ. It can sometimes be very unwieldy, but having so much organic C2 under one roof provides many capabilities.

    On the other hand, the lack of a third CAB handicaps the BCT. the ARS has no ability, doctrinally or practically, to do any more than light reconnaissance and screening opns. It can't attack, defend, cover, guard, or screen. It also lacks adequate dismounts to field multiple long-term OPs. The mix of BFVs and HMMWVs wasn't the best idea either. The lack of platoons is also a problem. The ARS needs lots of external support to really make it combat capable. Now in the current fight in Iraq, one could make a credible argument that the ARS was sufficient for its tasks. However, it's very unlikely an ARS would have been able to do the same things 3-7 CAV did during the initial portion of the Iraq War.

    The FA BN is woefully inadequate. In order to field more BCTs, the Army watered down its combat power and it's clear in these two-battery FA BNs. Supporting the CABs and the ARS simultaneously is a bridge too far without external support, which makes the BCT incapable of self-reliance.

    The engineers are scattered across the BCT. Sometimes this is good, sometimes bad, but the problem is that BFV-equipped engineers get looked at like just another maneuver element instead of engineers who can maneuver if need be. Also, lacking a BDE EN limits the real visibility on the engineer situation.

    CS support is inadequate. There's a need for more MPs and other combat enablers. CSS didn't seem to be much of a problem, but that's outside of my scope.

    In the future, I wish the Army would reduce the number of BCTs in favor of making the existing ones much more robust and capable - real self-sufficient fighting forces, capable of throwing the kitchen sink at the threat. Add a 3rd CAB, make the ARS into an organization able to fight for information, field additional FS assets - both howitzers and mortars, include more dismounted scouts, and make the MP PLT an MP CO.
    The HMWWVs in your recon elements always intrigued me. What was the rationale (assuming there was one) for marrying them with BFVs rather than more BFVs or even MBTs?

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default The very foolish American proclivity for buying

    Quote Originally Posted by Tukhachevskii View Post
    The HMWWVs in your recon elements always intrigued me. What was the rationale (assuming there was one) for marrying them with BFVs rather than more BFVs or even MBTs?
    General Purpose (GP -- precursor for the once ubiquitous 'Jeep') equipment rather than sensibly buying designed for purpose items.

    The M3 Bradley was a political compromise purchased by the Armor and Cavalry folks to assure that the Infantry folks (who were buying the M2 Bradley) supported their buy of the M1 Tank. A part of the cost was cancellation of the XM8 Armored Gun system and of a dedicated Scout vehicle. The HMMWV is a lousy scout vehicle but is the standard, GP 'light' (???) wheeled vehicle.

    IOW, there is no rationale. Both items were and are simply available and the best of many poor solutions given a refusal to buy dedicated equipment...

    We do a lot of really dumb stuff.

    We over-Armor our Recon elements because we do not have the patience to wait for effective, time consuming reconnaissance to be completed, we just load up on Armor and go out looking for trouble. Dumb...

    We've identified a lack of effective Reconnaissance capability as a tactical and operational shortfall again and again -- we still haven't really fixed it, mostly because we're unwilling to buy dedicated equipment (or adequately train our people) and have impatient Staff Officers who are unwilling to wait for information...

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    Default BFVs and HMMWVs

    I think the original reason for such a combination was that the OPFOR at NTC had scout platoons organized with BMPs (M113s) and BRDMs (HMMWVs), and the OPFOR was pretty successful against the rotating BLUFOR. Of course they had other advantages, but I think very little thought or analysis went into part of the new BCT design. I think $$$ drove much of the decision making, not capabilities.

    Infanteer, do you have any more information on the British BDE Battle Groups? I didn't know there was such a unit in existance. I think the US Army really needs to reconsider its organization, and the DoD needs to really determine what the role of the Army will be in the future. This goes along with Sec. Gates consideration of what should the role of the USMC be. You can't talk about one without discussing the other.

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    Default HBCT Engineers

    Quote Originally Posted by swerve1 View Post
    The engineers are scattered across the BCT. Sometimes this is good, sometimes bad, but the problem is that BFV-equipped engineers get looked at like just another maneuver element instead of engineers who can maneuver if need be. Also, lacking a BDE EN limits the real visibility on the engineer situation.
    They have changed this in most of the HBCTs to include 2/4. While they have had a BDE EN (as well as a deputy and a terrain team) for a couple years, they just recently merged the two EN companies that were in the CABs and placed them in the STB.

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    Default At the risk of sounding/behaving like a librarian...

    ...…the following theses may be of interest regarding S/BCTs and the reconnaissance/third manoeuvre Bn conundrum;

    Maj. C. D. Taylor, The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who will Fight for Information on the Future Battlefield?, MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2005;
    This research seeks to determine if reconnaissance operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom required engaging the enemy in close combat in order to be effective. Qualitative examination of the interviews from the Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group yielded seven consistent themes that impact on this primary research question. Those seven themes are summarized below:

    1. Tempo drives reconnaissance

    2. The movement to contact is the most common form of the offense

    3. Adaptive enemies often do not fit doctrinal templates

    4. Commanders required human intelligence more than imagery

    5. Most useful intelligence is bottom up

    6. Lightly armoured scouts cannot support high tempo operations

    7. Divisional heavy cavalry squadrons tend to fight as independent manoeuvre units. (p.40)
    Maj. D. Mark, Effective or Efficient: The Conundrum of the Armed Reconnaissance Squadron, MMAS thesis, USMC Command and General Staff College, 2009;
    Brigade level reconnaissance units exist solely to allow the primary warfighting organization in the Army, the Brigade Combat Team, to have perfect Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding (SA/SU). However, much of the doctrine, organization, and technologies required to pursue RDO simply do not exist within the Army today. The Army's answer to the capability gap is the modular force and the centrepiece organization, the Brigade Combat Team. However, one of the primary failings of the modular
    design was that the HBCT traded a manoeuvre battalion for a cavalry squadron. Although the ARS proves far more capable than the BRT it replaced, the ARS has lost its identity and has become a poorly resourced third manoeuvre element. As a result, the ARS does not even perform
    reconnaissance missions well. Under the current construct, the ARS does not provide the brigade any unique capabilities (p. 23).

    Maj. M. A. Dooley, Ignoring History: The Flawed Effort to Divorce Reconnaissance from Security in Modern Cavalry Formations, MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006;
    For all of the optimistic discussion in the latest version of FM 3-20.96 about making contact with sensors and developing a situation out of direct fire contact, there is little difference now between the realities of brigade reconnaissance squadron techniques and the capabilities of World War II ground reconnaissance. Other than the fact that reconnaissance squadrons no longer have the organic helicopter assets or armoured firepower formerly common to division cavalry, cavalry scouts must still execute their reconnaissance and security missions much as they have for the past sixty-five years. As a result, the newest reconnaissance squadrons no longer possess the critical assets historically required to bail themselves out of trouble once it is encountered.[...]
    It seems the sensor troops that were to have sufficed as a replacement for organic combat power in the original FCS proposals are not controlled by the very reconnaissance forces that were to depend upon them. So long as the sensor systems remain controlled by brigade headquarters, the concept of sensor-to-sensor target handover, in most cases, will require constant coordination through multiple echelons of command. Without physical possession or operational control of sensor assets at the reconnaissance squadron level, the new HBCT and IBCT reconnaissance organizations technically do not even qualify to be labelled as “RSTA,” because they have no ability to acquire targets beyond the short range capabilities of normal ground recon troop assets. The much vaunted application of joint and precision fires, proclaimed in the latest version of FM 3-20.96 as a substitute for organic combat power, is thus not likely to occur efficiently if at all. (p. 72-4)
    Maj. M. R. Howell, A CRITIQUE OF THE U.S. ARMY FORCE REDESIGN OF CAVALRY FORMATIONS WITHIN THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS MMAS thesis, USMC Command and General Staff College, 2009;
    First, the new modular cavalry formations have severe flaws in their design. Second, the current mindset, doctrinal foundation and leader training focus of these cavalry formations have severe flaws in some of its key concepts. Finally, and most importantly, these new formations cannot perform the full spectrum of reconnaissance and security missions that cavalry formations doctrinally executed in the past. The combined effect of these flaws is likely to cause a serious capability gap to develop within BCT cavalry squadrons. These changes signalled a significant shift in the doctrinal roles and missions of the majority of current U.S. cavalry formations (excluding the 3d Armoured Cavalry Regiment). In sum, the transformation and modularization of the U.S. Army's BCT cavalry squadrons has had a negative impact on their effectiveness.(p. 1)

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    Council Member gute's Avatar
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    Came across this article in Army Magazine. I like the author's ideas, but we do seem to be past it now (article written in Mach 2005).

    http://www.ausa.org/publications/arm.../Lowe_0305.pdf



    If the above link does not work this one should:

    http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m.../ai_n11852055/

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    I like the nice pictures!

    I work in a Brigade with 7 subordinate units (and 2 OPCOM at times) - it is big and, in my opinion, a bit unwieldy. He's advocating Brigades with 10 subordinate units. I don't know if that is the greatest idea.

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    Default Having been in a couple Brigades that large

    (one was occasionally even a bit larger with about 15 direct subordinates at one time) that operated quite successfully, IMO it is a matter of how much autonomy is granted subordinate units. If they are trusted to perform, they will -- provided the Bde doesn't go into the overcontrol mode.

    It probably helped that both Bdes had Commanders whose philosophy echoed the words of one as he retired to his tent nightly "Wake me if all the Bns are in heavy contact."

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    IMO it is a matter of how much autonomy is granted subordinate units. If they are trusted to perform, they will -- provided the Bde doesn't go into the overcontrol mode.
    I'll agree to an extent - it depends on what the units are doing. If you're doing some sort of pacfication where the Bde gives areas A,B,C,D,E,F and G to its units, then yes it can be easy as the superior HQ is a "caretaker". This could be taken to the unit (bn) level as well. I'm sure you'll agree with me that anyone above the rank of major in a small war has a limited tactical role.

    When you start moving pieces together in a smaller battlespace it'll get a bit harder; every subordinate beyond two adds an additonal layer of friction; I guess the question is when does the difficulties outweigh the benefits?

    I'll also add my own perspective from peactime management. Training and managing 8000 people is harder than training 4000 people. Unscientifically, I'm willing to bet two Bde Comds with 50-man staffs and 4000 people will accomplish more than 1 Bde Comd with a 100-man staff and 8000 people.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default No disagreement from me on any of that.

    However, two points occur to me. First, that in combat, while the old METT-TC rules and a good commander can make most anything work, it is foolish to design for the latter factor (given mandatory democratic nation personnel policies) and too many folks, even experienced people who should know better, lose sight of the former factor...

    Secondly, we make an error, I think, in designing a lot of stuff during peace time that does not work well in combat. The bureaucratic tradeoffs necessary in organizing, funding, staffing and just getting things done in peace can -- should -- disappear in combat and thus the operational rules can and will differ. Unfortunately, I doubt there's any way around that.

    Fortunately, the troops most always make it work in spite of the impediments.

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    Default Maybe

    Quote Originally Posted by Infanteer View Post
    I'll agree to an extent - it depends on what the units are doing.

    Training and managing 8000 people is harder than training 4000 people.

    Unscientifically, I'm willing to bet two Bde Comds with 50-man staffs and 4000 people will accomplish more than 1 Bde Comd with a 100-man staff and 8000 people.
    1. Things always end up depending on the specific situation

    2. Not sure I agree with its easier to train 4K versus 8K. Once you get a training opertion/plan up and running, it get easier the biger you get. There will be thru-put issues but the same cocnept that worked for 4K will work for 8K.

    3. Well, you could use a Blue/Gold way of doing business and then I might agree. With 4K versus 8K you probably don't need the full 100% increase in staff to handle the 100% increase on BOG. More likely the 8K staff would end up being around 60-70 unless you make a shift/jump for O6/Colonel level to a GO Command. General's need/get a whole lot more staff sections that don't really get used lower down , (PAO, Military History Section) O6 commands also don't need as many folks in the S8 (funding) and S4 (CSS) sections as you will find in a G8 or G4.

    For the most part, once you carve out functional sections like scouts, mortars, medics, MPs, etc the Bn and Bde Hqs are 100-125 folks doing staff work.

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