Re-structuring the BCT

[B.Smitty]

With the Stryker, I question what, precisely, the 'role' is...

I don't see a problem with the Stryker's role. It provides protected mobility for infantry in a package that's lighter, has a lower logistics footprint, and has much higher on-road mobility than the Bradley. It provides greater protection (esp. vs underbelly attacks) and a lower logistics footprint than the M113. It fills the niche between unarmored trucks and heavy units.

Future Strykers are getting a double v-shaped hull to further improve underbelly protection (up to "MRAP 2" levels).

Estimates put fuel usage of an SBCT at almost a third of that of an HBCT (~100 tonnes/day and ~300 tonnes/day, respectively). (source: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG649.pdf)

Yes, the Stryker vehicle itself does sacrifice some off-road mobility to do so.

IIRC, light infantry platoons don't have any organic Javelins right? They all come from the company. Maybe I'm misremembering.

[Ken White]

I don't see a problem with the Stryker's role... It fills the niche between unarmored trucks and heavy units.

Filling the niche in low intensity combat is beneficial. Filling the niche in peace time can lead to low intensity combat due to a capability being extant. The niche has limited value in other types of combat but if it exists, it will be used even if inappropriate. It's sort of the case my Mother warned me of; 'Be careful what you want, you might get it...'

That limited utility leads to follow on questions; should the US Army be involved in paramilitary efforts? If so, is the Stryker the best vehicle or is it excessively expensive and over armored and gunned for the role while offering inadequate mobility and protection for even low intensity combat against a moderately equipped force?

Future Strykers are getting a double v-shaped hull to further improve underbelly protection (up to "MRAP 2" levels).

Yes, I know, making them more expensive and heavier thus using more fuel and developing more mechanical problems while being even more roadbound and simply encouraging the bad guys to use more explosive...

Armor has benefits. It also has disadvantages. Two are weight and cocooning -- the protection offered leads to both a false sense of security and a reluctance to dismount (the antithesis of getting out among the populace in FID / COIN-like efforts... ). The weight impact impedes mobility and increases resupply needs and maintenance thus inducing tactical constraints.

Consider also that you can only add so much Armor and you thus confer an advantage to the feared IED user. In combat, agility almost always beats armor.

Estimates put fuel usage of an SBCT at almost a third of that of an HBCT (~100 tonnes/day and ~300 tonnes/day, respectively). (source: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG649.pdf)

That's a benefit, no question and I agree that it's important -- I also again state that you get what you pay for -- and you always pay, one way or another.

Yes, the Stryker vehicle itself does sacrifice some off-road mobility to do so

Thus providing opponents with a greater ability to predict what the force equipped with it might do, where they might appear and what will impede their actions...

It's a paramilitary vehicle with limited combat utility. It is good at what it does. For the US Army, the question remains is it what it does required or even beneficial. I'd vote no on both. YMMV.

IIRC, light infantry platoons don't have any organic Javelins right? They all come from the company. Maybe I'm misremembering.

Old light with the worthless Dragon, yeah, Co level. Today, Javelin, two per Platoon in the Light Inf Bns. Specifically to avoid being speed bumps. The light folks are also heavy on the TOWs and the kids are willing to get close to put an M4 up a tailpipe.

[Eden]

Yes, I know, making them more expensive and heavier thus using more fuel and developing more mechanical problems while being even more roadbound and simply encouraging the bad guys to use more explosive...

I was in at the birth of the Stryker - I remember at the time thinking that no organization or weapon system ever characterized as 'medium' had ever lasted very long. The irresistable urge to make it better by adding armor or lightening it up inevitably push it toward one end of the spectrum or the other.

[B.Smitty]

Filling the niche in low intensity combat is beneficial. Filling the niche in peace time can lead to low intensity combat due to a capability being extant. The niche has limited value in other types of combat but if it exists, it will be used even if inappropriate. It's sort of the case my Mother warned me of; 'Be careful what you want, you might get it...'

Don't know if I buy the notion that "Filling the niche in peace time can lead to low intensity combat due to a capability being extant".

We didn't have a medium-weight units in Kosovo, but we still went in anyway. Heavy units took way to long to get there. Light units weren't enough of a deterrence.

We need them because our nation has shown a consistent desire to intervene in LIC/COIN/paramilitary efforts. The Army can argue it should or shouldn't get involved efforts, but if the President says "go", the Army will go.

That limited utility leads to follow on questions; should the US Army be involved in paramilitary efforts? If so, is the Stryker the best vehicle or is it excessively expensive and over armored and gunned for the role while offering inadequate mobility and protection for even low intensity combat against a moderately equipped force?Yes, I know, making them more expensive and heavier thus using more fuel and developing more mechanical problems while being even more roadbound and simply encouraging the bad guys to use more explosive...

I don't see this "limited utility". SBCTs have all the MCO utility of an infantry unit, but with far greater mobility, protection and firepower than light infantry.

As an infantry company commander, you not only have your soldier's weapons, you also have 3 x MGSs, 2 x 120mm mortar vehicles, and a .50 cal or 40mm on every Stryker.

If you need to perform pure dismounted ops, you have full 3x9+7 rifle platoons, a sniper team, 60mm mortars, and a FIST to call upon.

A heavy mech inf company in the same situation has, at best, smaller 3x9 platoons, no mortars, no snipers, no fire support team.

The Stryker upgrades will include a more powerful engine (450hp vs 350hp), larger tires and an improved suspension. It will also have a lower center of gravity to reduce rollover risks. So it may end up being a net mobility gain, even though it's roughly 1 ton heavier.

In combat, agility almost always beats armor.

I don't know if i agree with the "almost always" part. In Iraq, even with all of our whiz-bang ISR technology, most engagements resulted from movements to contact. So units have to absorb the initial volley before reacting. In fact, more agile HMMWV-mounted scouts were relegate to rear-area security duties because their commanders felt they were unsurvivable.

IMHO, if Stryker units had been available for OIF MCO, they would've performed well. They have just enough armor to defeat the Iraqi's primary anti-armor system (RPG-7), and have many more dismounts than heavy units.

Clearly if you're fighting Hezbollah on their home turf, movements to contact in a Stryker will result in a lot of dead Strykers. So you don't use them that way, in that situation. Let heavy forces lead the way. (and even they may not be heavy enough)

It's a paramilitary vehicle with limited combat utility. It is good at what it does. For the US Army, the question remains is it what it does required or even beneficial. I'd vote no on both. YMMV.

It's an APC with good enough tactical mobility for most situations.

SBCTs fill a whole in the capability matrix. Infantry-centric, but not foot mobile. Armored, but not "heavy".

Just MHO.

[Fuchs]

In Iraq, even with all of our whiz-bang ISR technology, most engagements resulted from movements to contact.

This is not robust logic. We may see a repair of the sad modern armoured reconnaissance which can prevent a repetition of this poor tactical performance.

[B.Smitty]

This is not robust logic. We may see a repair of the sad modern armoured reconnaissance which can prevent a repetition of this poor tactical performance.

IMHO, it isn't flawed logic. Ken asserted that "agility almost always beats armor". Frequent movements to contact, and relegation of unarmored forces to supporting roles in OIF, stand in opposition this. The OPTEMPO did not allow for more deliberate recc (where unarmored reconnaissance units could've use their stealth and agility).

In fact, to a point, armor enables battlefield agility under fire.

[Ken White]

Don't know if I buy the notion that "Filling the niche in peace time can lead to low intensity combat due to a capability being extant".

Well, I've been to several LIC efforts, all because we could do that and really for little more reason -- all at least marginally successful, all at a great cost for the benefit derived. If a capability exists it WILL be used, the system demands that it be...

We didn't have a medium-weight units in Kosovo, but we still went in anyway. Heavy units took way to long to get there. Light units weren't enough of a deterrence.

Oh? Better check your history. The Marines and 82 Abn elms that went in first were doing fine; SSGs were playing Village Mayor, LTs playing Disctrict Governors and they were getting things done -- until Do Do Bird Sanchez finally got there and delivered his first brilliant order "All Elements outside base camps will be accompanied by a field grade officer."

We need them because our nation has shown a consistent desire to intervene in LIC/COIN/paramilitary efforts. The Army can argue it should or shouldn't get involved efforts, but if the President says "go", the Army will go.

Not the Army's place to make that argument. It is the Army's job to provide capability to execute likely missions. ALL likely missions -- over emphasis on one sort of mission is as bad as denying the existence of mission sets.

I don't see this "limited utility"...

Okay.

...So it may end up being a net mobility gain, even though it's roughly 1 ton heavier.

We'll see. If I were a bettor...

I don't know if i agree with the "almost always" part...In fact, more agile HMMWV-mounted scouts were relegate to rear-area security duties because their commanders felt they were unsurvivable.

We all make judgements based on our experience. As for the HMMWVs, my son then in the 82d roamed all over Baghdad and Fallujah for a full tour with unarmored HMMWVs. Had a few IED hits but basically, went okay. Risk aversion is not a determinant of capability.

IMHO, if Stryker units had been available for OIF MCO, they would've performed well. They have just enough armor to defeat the Iraqi's primary anti-armor system (RPG-7), and have many more dismounts than heavy units.

Could be. Been interesting to watch.

[Pete]

As for the HMMWVs, my son then in the 82d roamed all over Baghdad and Fallujah for a full tour with unarmored HMMWVs. Had a few IED hits but basically, went okay. Risk aversion is not a determinant of capability.Could be. Been interesting to watch.

How did we ever make it through World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam with thin-skinned wheeled vehicles? All of a sudden in 2003 and 2004 unarmored vehicles became a big deal, a major case of negligence on the part of the U.S. Army. Rumsfeld was right on that one, you go to war with the Army you have.

[Fuchs]

It has to do with the absence of robust front-lines in modern warfare.
This absence is less related to a supposed rise of 'irregular' warfare than to decreased force densities (my opinion, obviously).

The fights of today are similar to encounters with hostile stragglers in WW2 or with red infiltrating infantry in Korea (IMO).

Years ago I reasoned that armoured trucks make only sense for mechanised brigades and convoys which attempt to supply them - the trend towards armouring everything will likely end in a few years when large quantities of vehicles need to be replaced.

[Rifleman]

There were always times when two manuever elements were enough. There were always times when four were needed. Three manuever elements seems to be the common sense starting point to task organize up or down from.

Lot's differences about details but the general consensus seems to be three manuever battalions, cavalry squadron, artillery battalion, and support battalion.

Arguments about wheeled vehicles and IFVs aside, is this the starting point for a brigade whether heavy, medium or light?

[JMA]

How did we ever make it through World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam with thin-skinned wheeled vehicles? All of a sudden in 2003 and 2004 unarmored vehicles became a big deal, a major case of negligence on the part of the U.S. Army. Rumsfeld was right on that one, you go to war with the Army you have.

Probably because today (or at least recently) we tend to drive up and down the same roads day in, day out. Took these clowns awhile to take advantage of the situation but now it is a headache. It is natural to want to protect your soldiers from such a treat (in the case of Afghanistan also on foot). Rhodesia and South Africa achieved much in Taming the Landmine but note that the project process time followed by the procurement process time make it all but impossible for the western armies to keep up with the innovations being used against them. There should be a fabrication works right there in Afghanistan turning out and modifying vehicles on the fly. As the threat changes so you recall the vehicles on rotation to carryout the necessary mod.

Its not about beating the enemy... its about beating the bureaucracy.

On yes and when the war is over... leave the vehicle there.

[Fuchs]

My quote was too short.

In Iraq, even with all of our whiz-bang ISR technology, most engagements resulted from movements to contact. So units have to absorb the initial volley before reacting.

Here's the flawed logic; a failure in one example does not allow the conclusion that this is how it needs to be ("have" instead of "had").

[82redleg]

A heavy mech inf company in the same situation has, at best, smaller 3x9 platoons, no mortars, no snipers, no fire support team.

I agree with your point, but you're wrong in one detail.

Mech IN CO FIST is 4 man HQ (LT, SSG, SPC, PFC) and 3 x 2-man PLT FO parties (SGT, PFC).

SBCT IN CO FIST is 4 man HQ (LT, SSG, SPC, PFC) and 3 x 1-man PLT FOs (SGT).

The addition of an RTO to the PLT FO (making it an FO party) is of limited value in mounted operations, but a great enabler in dismounted operations, as we're discussing here.