Vietnam collection (lessons plus)

[Merv Benson]

Cohen recycles the Shinseki myth. The General served his full term before retiring.

Cohen also tries to make a comparison between McNamara and Rumsfeld which fails when faced with the facts. McNamara turned down requests for troops and Rumsfeld did not. Rumsfeld has said tht he was prepared to provide 400,000 or more troops for the Iraqi operation, but that General Franks and General Abizaid told him they did not need that many.

I am not being critical of that judgement on their part, but if you are going to criticize the decision on the number of troops, it should be focused on the General's decisions and their rational and not on some mythical restrictions by the President and Secretary of Defense who have consistently said that the troops levels are a decision made by the commanders. If you have any doubt on this, just read the Prolog to Tommy Franks' book American Soldier.

I think guys like Cohen know they could not win a debate with the generals so they keep hacking away at a strawman argument.

Having former generals second guessing those who succeeded them is nothing new. Many have made a career of it on TV. Cohen just likes Zinni et.al. because they reinforce his prejudice. There are a lot of former generals out there who probably support the decisions of Franks and Abizaid, but because of that fact their opinions are not news.

In case you are not aware of the arguments for the smaller number of troops, there are several including an offensive based on a rapid advance that disorients and overwhelms the enemy. More troops would have made this much more difficult because of the logistical support train needed for the additional troops. Winning in three weeks pretty well confirms Franks' judgement on that point. In terms of troops needed after major combat operations, Abizaid wanted to have the Iraqis take over the combat space as soon as possible. When the Iraqi Army disintegrated during the war, rebuilding became a major task, with several blips along the way. However, the new Iraqi Army is taking shape and taking over much of the battle space and is giving the force to space ratio needed to make the insurgency less effective.

There is obviously more to it than I can summarize in this space, but if you read Franks book you will not regret it.

[Nat Glozer]

There are so many contradictory points out there. In his book, Cobra II, General Trainor expresses the view that CENTCOM was micro-managed by Rumsfeld and the civilians in OSD, and that the low troop levels were pushed on Franks. So what is the truth? Don't know what your sources are, Merv, perhaps you do know the answer. But with all due respect, unless you were there, I don't see how you can say what the truth is regarding this question given that several credible sources say completely different things. The more important question is whether more troops would have limited or prevented the insurgency. I think that the vitriol and bad faith on the part of the media and anti-war politicians has prevented this important debate from taking place. The conversation should focus on that so that we can better our game for the next round.

[Merv Benson]

Please read the Prolog to General Franks' American Soldier. It is not even arguable. I would also add that General Pace confirmed the issue on troops levels in a press briefing today. Trainor may be relying too much on his NY Times co author. His assertions are clearly refuted by the statements of Franks and his component commanders. If you get further into the book, Franks lays out his reasons for his requested force levels. At no time does he suggest that he got less than what he asked for.

I would add that even Sen. Kerry backed off the Shinseki myth when reporters confronted him with the facts during the 2004 campaign.

BTW, the Trainor book also seriously misstates the events surrounding the flap over Gen. Wallace's purported statements concerning whether there was adequate wargaming on dealing with the Fedayeen. They also overlook the rather clever way the Centcom staff found to deal with the Fedayeen. I base this last comment on the excerpt of the book I saw in the NY Times that dealt with that kerfufle.

[SWJED]

12 April Los Angeles Times - Top General Disputes Criticism Against Rumsfeld.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, facing calls for his resignation by three retired senior officers for his handling of the Iraq war, received a full-throated endorsement Tuesday from the U.S. military's top general, who insisted that "this country is exceptionally well served" by Rumsfeld's leadership.

Marine Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, disputed accusations from retired top officers that Rumsfeld had forced the uniformed military into an invasion plan they didn't fully support.

"We had then, and have now, every opportunity to speak our minds, and if we do not, shame on us because the opportunity is there," Pace said at a Pentagon news conference. "The plan that was executed was developed by military officers, presented by military officers, questioned by civilians as they should, revamped by military officers, and blessed by the senior military leadership."

Pace's remarks, the most pointed on the Pentagon's leadership since he assumed the chairman's post in September, were prompted by a series of highly critical articles and interviews in recent weeks by former generals who were directly involved in the war or who served in top positions...

[Merv Benson]

CNN's report on Pace's statments includes the following:

Rumsfeld said Newbold "never raised an issue publicly or privately when he was here that I know of." Pace also said he was unaware of any objections Newbold raised.

Pace said plans for the invasion were significantly overhauled between the time Newbold retired and the day American troops crossed the Iraqi frontier in March 2003.

He said members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff signed on to the war plan presented by Gen. Tommy Franks, then-commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East, before it was presented to Rumsfeld and President Bush, and top officers had "every opportunity to speak our minds."

"And if we do not, shame on us, because the opportunity is there. It is elicited from us, and we're expected to," Pace said. (Emphasis added.)

[Merv Benson]

Here is the full transcript of remarks that the above news articles discuss.

This is a brief excerpt:

...

Let me just give you Pete Pace's rendition of how the process worked building up to Iraq. First of all, once it became apparent that we may have to take military action, the Secretary of Defense asked Tom Franks, who was the commander of Central Command, to begin doing some planning, which he did. Over the next two years, 50 or 60 times, Tom Franks either came to Washington or by video teleconference, sat down with the Secretary of Defense, sat down with the Joint Chiefs and went over what he was thinking, how he was planning. And as a result of those iterative opportunities and all the questions that were asked, not once was Tom told, "No, don't do that. No, don't do this. No, you can't have this. No, you can't have that." What happened was, in a very open roundtable discussion, questions about what might go right, what might go wrong, what would you need, how would you handle it, and that happened with the Joint Chiefs and it happened with the Secretary.



And before the final orders were given, the Joint Chiefs met in private with General Franks and assured ourselves that the plan was a solid plan and that the resources that he needed were going to be allocated. We then went and told the Secretary of Defense our belief in Tom's plan and in the resources, and I know for a fact, because I was there, that when the Joint Chiefs were called over to the White House, several of the questions that the president asked specifically were about our understanding and belief in the plan, and whether or not the amount -- proper amount of resources had been allocated. He did that both with us, just the Joint Chiefs, and then again when all the combatant commanders were in from around the globe well before a final decision was made.

...

This description is consistent with Gen. Franks description of the process. As I have pointed out before in the Prolog to his book Gen. Franks has the transcript of each component commander telling the President and Secretary of Defense that they had everything they needed for the mission.

There are probably enough people invested in the myth of "Rumsfeld did not give them enough troops" that it will keep popping up. However, a more constructive debate would involve asking the commanders why they chose the makeup of the force that they did, instead of assuming something that clearly is not so.

[Strickland]

While I have and will continue to trust and obey the orders of those appointed over me, and thus have no reason not to believe or doubt the integrity and moral courage of the senior leadership of our military, General Krulak once told me that "perception + truth = reality." Based off this formula, the truth may not be a clear cut as we would like. However, as all of us know that have participated in an planning session, "you dance with the girl you brought," or the girl your boss tells you to dance with; thus if all the commanders knew that asking for more troops was akin to asking where Jimmy Hoffa was buried, you develop courses of action consistent with assigned forces.