4 Jan. Washington Post Letters to the Editor in response to the Three Lessons from Vietnam Op-Ed piece.
Vietnam Lessons That Really Apply in Iraq
4 Jan. Washington Post Letters to the Editor in response to the Three Lessons from Vietnam Op-Ed piece.
Reasons for war in Vietnam and Iraq broader than critics arguments
One of the letter writers uses the Bush and Johnson lied us in to war argument. This is really weak. The progress toward war in Vietnam was much broader than events in the Tonkin Gulf that may or may not have happened. If the Johnson administration was looking for a causus belli, it did not have to wait for action on the high seas. The North Vietnamese were already in clear violation of the Geneva Accords which prohibited all parties from military activities in Laos. The reason Johnson did not use this as his reason for going to war was his reluctance to engage in Laos where the violation was taking place. Shutting down the Ho Chi Minh Trail would have defeated the communist, according to their own historians, but Johnson and McNamara were not willing to use overt force in Laos. By restricting the US to transitory force, i.e. raids by special forces and raids by air craft, and refusing to use a blocking force, they committed the US to a much more difficult war in South Vietnam.
They further complicated the war within South Vietnam by restricting the number of troops below that needed to control the space. Unlike Iraq where the commanders have gotten all the troops they requested, in Vietnam troops provided were always significantly below the amount requested. ( I know about Shinseki's observation of troops needed in post war Iraq, but he was never a commander of operations in Iraq and his statement was made in the context of a wag (wild ass guess) in a congressional hearing and not as a result of analysis by staffers working the problem. The facts are that Gen. Franks and Gen Abizaid got the troops they requested.
The WMD "lied us into war meme" is also weak. First those making it also believed Saddam had WMD, they just were not willing to go to war to remove the threat. Second there were several reasons beyond that for going to war and one of the most important was Saddam's failure to account for his WMD as required by his cease fire agreement in 1991 and by numerous UN resolutions. His failure to account was reason enough to believe he posed a threat. Even after all the work by the Iraqi survey group, much of his WMD is still unaccounted for. Saddam's failure to account put the US in the position of taking the word of a madman or going to war. Apparently the crits would have preferred to take the word of a despotic psychopath.
I wonder if this is because they really don’t see a need for more troops or because they feel pressured not to use more troops. If so they wouldn’t be the first senior officers to tailor their assessment to please political bosses. The fact of the matter is that the number of troops in Iraq has always been unusually small for that type of mission (historical speaking). Also while Shinseki was never a commander there I don’t think his assessment can be dismissed as a guess, the man has vast experience in these types of affairs. For the senior political leadership to dismiss out of hand the recommendations of the Army Chief of Staff shows that their minds were made up about the war and how they would deal with Iraq, decisions which seem to have come back to haunt us all.Originally Posted by Merv Benson
Troop numbers in Iraq
Both the Secretary of Defense and the President have said repeatedly that if the commanders want more troops all they have to do is ask for them, That does not sound like they are being pressured not to ask for them. The commanders have also repeatedly testified before the congress that they did not need more troops. I get the impression that they felt like the smaller foot print to maintain the situation until the Iraqis could take over was their plan all along. They all have been recommending Laurences Seven Pillars which says you need to get the Arabs involved. At this point I do not see any reason not to take the commanders at their word.
I disagree, after what happened with Shinseki it would have been obvious to anyone what answer the administration wanted to hear with regards to troops levels. That is very obvious pressure to not ask for more troops. Also Laurence is good reading but he was trying start a guerrilla war not end one, just something to think about.
Troop requests
Stu-6,
The position you are suggesting is that the President, the Secretary of Defense, Gen. Abizid, Gen. Franks and Gen. Casey are not telling the truth. Do you really believe that?
It's more complicated
Our President is definitely a leader, and while he may or may not harbor private doubts, he can’t afford to air them in public. Can you imagine the impact on our revolution if George Washington aired his serious doubts about our Army’s chances of winning to the common soldier at Valley Forge? Our current national leaders understand the concepts of leadership and loyalty, and obviously have the best interests of our nation foremost in mind when they make decisions, but there is a dangerous flip side to this also that can lead to poor decision making despite everyone’s best intentions.
I’m not pretending to be a sociologist or a psychologist, and definitely welcome the opinions of those who are better versed in these fields than I am, but as a long time observer of human behavior (like the rest of us) I think there are factors that weigh on our decision making and perceptions that prevent us from being as objective as we would like, and these are very prevalent in the military service. Two relevant factors I think are relevant are Group Think and loyalty.
Group think is when a group shares a certain view of the world, and if you don’t share it you may very well find yourself outside the group, such as GEN Shinseki did. GEN Shinseki’s analysis about several things ranging from the Stryker Bde concept to the amount of forces needed in Iraq to conduct stability operations were correct based on his well reasoned assumptions (his estimate was not a WAG as stated earlier). However, if you assumed like many in the administration that the Iraqis would embrace us and that mankind naturally embraces democracy then GEN Shinseki’s estimates would seem absurd. Can there be two truths? Within the Army there are different positions (or opposing Group Think positions) on this, so we are far from a consensus. Several senior officers state off the record that they think we need more troops, but out of “loyalty” to their chain of command feel morally constrained from going public with their opinions, then there is another Group of officers that sincerely think we need to downsize our forces in OIF, because they believe our presence is the catalyst that drives the insurgency. Both sides can make logical supporting arguments for their cases, but Group Think generally prevents us from honestly considering a view of the world that is counter to our Group. Groups tend to cherry pick intelligence, history, and daily incidents to support their Group’s view. Objective thinking is hard work, because it requires subordinating the ego to logic, and it can be especially hard if you reach conclusions that are counter to your Group’s commonly held perceptions (paradigm shifts).
So we have a combination of loyalty and Group Think that tends to make the truth far from perfect, but that isn’t necessarily the act of lying. In short, I don’t agree with Stu’s statement that our senior officers are under no pressure not to ask for more troops. Group Think and loyalty provide that pressure, and would have a big impact on me if I was in their shoes, because I would think that if I asked for more troops that I would be hurting our President, so I would be very hesitant to do so, even if I really thought that the right answer based on my assessments. The President is not pressuring them, but the influence of Group Think and loyalty is because that is what we perceive as the President’s intent. This is a global phenomenon, not something uniquely American. The old saying about the emperor not wearing any clothes obviously has it roots in long established truths about the way people interact with their leaders. The emperor longs for the truth, but the emperor’s subjects tell the emperor what “they” think he wants to hear.
Another old saying that should be considered is that truth is the first casualty of war. Probably all of our nation’s leaders throughout history had to painfully decide when to lie to the American people for national security purposes. It is a challenging ethical question for a democracy and a nation that is built on its values more than anything else. There is a big difference about lying about having sex with that woman and lying about what the NSA is doing. One is self serving and the other serves to protect the nation, or so we think, but in so doing are we threatening the constitution we swore to defend? No easy answers that I can see, so Charlie Mike (or continue mission)
Last edited by Bill Moore; 01-06-2006 at 06:41 AM.
That is not even close to what I am suggestion. What I am saying is that there is obvious pressure on those involved not to ask for more troops and that may be influencing their actions. In fact I think that is a very high probability, but I have not accused anyone of not telling the truth as they see it . . . yet.
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