Vietnam collection (lessons plus)

[Merv Benson]

Both the Secretary of Defense and the President have said repeatedly that if the commanders want more troops all they have to do is ask for them, That does not sound like they are being pressured not to ask for them. The commanders have also repeatedly testified before the congress that they did not need more troops. I get the impression that they felt like the smaller foot print to maintain the situation until the Iraqis could take over was their plan all along. They all have been recommending Laurences Seven Pillars which says you need to get the Arabs involved. At this point I do not see any reason not to take the commanders at their word.

[Stu-6]

I disagree, after what happened with Shinseki it would have been obvious to anyone what answer the administration wanted to hear with regards to troops levels. That is very obvious pressure to not ask for more troops. Also Laurence is good reading but he was trying start a guerrilla war not end one, just something to think about.

[Merv Benson]

Stu-6,

The position you are suggesting is that the President, the Secretary of Defense, Gen. Abizid, Gen. Franks and Gen. Casey are not telling the truth. Do you really believe that?

[Bill Moore]

Our President is definitely a leader, and while he may or may not harbor private doubts, he can’t afford to air them in public. Can you imagine the impact on our revolution if George Washington aired his serious doubts about our Army’s chances of winning to the common soldier at Valley Forge? Our current national leaders understand the concepts of leadership and loyalty, and obviously have the best interests of our nation foremost in mind when they make decisions, but there is a dangerous flip side to this also that can lead to poor decision making despite everyone’s best intentions.

I’m not pretending to be a sociologist or a psychologist, and definitely welcome the opinions of those who are better versed in these fields than I am, but as a long time observer of human behavior (like the rest of us) I think there are factors that weigh on our decision making and perceptions that prevent us from being as objective as we would like, and these are very prevalent in the military service. Two relevant factors I think are relevant are Group Think and loyalty.

Group think is when a group shares a certain view of the world, and if you don’t share it you may very well find yourself outside the group, such as GEN Shinseki did. GEN Shinseki’s analysis about several things ranging from the Stryker Bde concept to the amount of forces needed in Iraq to conduct stability operations were correct based on his well reasoned assumptions (his estimate was not a WAG as stated earlier). However, if you assumed like many in the administration that the Iraqis would embrace us and that mankind naturally embraces democracy then GEN Shinseki’s estimates would seem absurd. Can there be two truths? Within the Army there are different positions (or opposing Group Think positions) on this, so we are far from a consensus. Several senior officers state off the record that they think we need more troops, but out of “loyalty” to their chain of command feel morally constrained from going public with their opinions, then there is another Group of officers that sincerely think we need to downsize our forces in OIF, because they believe our presence is the catalyst that drives the insurgency. Both sides can make logical supporting arguments for their cases, but Group Think generally prevents us from honestly considering a view of the world that is counter to our Group. Groups tend to cherry pick intelligence, history, and daily incidents to support their Group’s view. Objective thinking is hard work, because it requires subordinating the ego to logic, and it can be especially hard if you reach conclusions that are counter to your Group’s commonly held perceptions (paradigm shifts).

So we have a combination of loyalty and Group Think that tends to make the truth far from perfect, but that isn’t necessarily the act of lying. In short, I don’t agree with Stu’s statement that our senior officers are under no pressure not to ask for more troops. Group Think and loyalty provide that pressure, and would have a big impact on me if I was in their shoes, because I would think that if I asked for more troops that I would be hurting our President, so I would be very hesitant to do so, even if I really thought that the right answer based on my assessments. The President is not pressuring them, but the influence of Group Think and loyalty is because that is what we perceive as the President’s intent. This is a global phenomenon, not something uniquely American. The old saying about the emperor not wearing any clothes obviously has it roots in long established truths about the way people interact with their leaders. The emperor longs for the truth, but the emperor’s subjects tell the emperor what “they” think he wants to hear.

Another old saying that should be considered is that truth is the first casualty of war. Probably all of our nation’s leaders throughout history had to painfully decide when to lie to the American people for national security purposes. It is a challenging ethical question for a democracy and a nation that is built on its values more than anything else. There is a big difference about lying about having sex with that woman and lying about what the NSA is doing. One is self serving and the other serves to protect the nation, or so we think, but in so doing are we threatening the constitution we swore to defend? No easy answers that I can see, so Charlie Mike (or continue mission)

[Merv Benson]

Bill raises some interesting points about group think. It is interesting that when Schartzkoph was asked if he had all he needed he had no difficulty in asking for more. It is not really a question of whether Shinseki or Franks and Abizaid were right on the number of troops needed, it is really a question of what is the best way to get to that number. For reasons that appear sound to me, Abizaid and Casey thought that the best way to get to the force to space ration needed was through training Iraqis and making them responsible. This was a decision that obviously lengthened the time it took to suppress the enemy in western Anbar where US forces were frustrated by having to buy the same ground more than once. I think they were concerned that if the US supplied that force it would result in two problems. The first is greater resistance to US occupation than Iraqi occupation. The second is the Laurence point, if you do not get the Iraqis involved in their own defense, they would have been content to let us do it for a longer time. I think there is a third element also working based on advice from Israel and that relates to the matter of intelligence. Initially when the more troops issue was raised the command's response was that they did not need more troops, they needed better intelligence. It appears that they wound up getting better intelligence when they got more Iraqi troops involved.

[Stu-6]

Stu-6,

The position you are suggesting is that the President, the Secretary of Defense, Gen. Abizid, Gen. Franks and Gen. Casey are not telling the truth. Do you really believe that?

That is not even close to what I am suggestion. What I am saying is that there is obvious pressure on those involved not to ask for more troops and that may be influencing their actions. In fact I think that is a very high probability, but I have not accused anyone of not telling the truth as they see it . . . yet.

[Strickland]

I dont think anyone here is suggesting that our leadership has been dishonest; however, it is difficult to understand how every after-action report you read written from someone other than a general officer or think-tank states that we lack the appropriate numbers of infantry. While the number of troops necessary in Iraq may in fact only be 150,000; it needs to be 150,000 ground combat forces, and not 35,000 infantry or provisional infantry and 115,000 support personnel to include all members of the National Guard. If New York City maintains a police force of nearly 30,000, then surely a congruent amount of infantry is needed in Iraq. It is all about expectations. If you cannot secure your own border at home, should anyone expect that we can do it in Iraq? If you cannot stop drugs and other contraband from freely flowing around the US, can we expect to stop the flow of bombs and weapons around Iraq?