I participated in the online Q&A with Tom Ricks today. Here are the questions I submitted - only number 2 got picked-up for an online answer.

1. In the article adaptation of FIASCO you mentioned the Army’s Command and General Staff College and School of Advanced Warfare curriculum changes. Are you aware that the Marine Corps’ Command and Staff College also completely revamped their curriculum to address the very problems you outlined?

2. Where does the crux of the blame for the FIASCO lie? There were a lot of efforts to incorporate lessons learned and new “ways” of thinking into military concepts, doctrine, education and training prior to OIF. Why did these efforts fail to take?

3. Considering counterinsurgencies have historically taken many years to complete and most, if not all, have had their share of failures and lessons learned, is it possible that we are fully capable of seeing this through to a successful completion given time? How much time and will the American public support a long-term effort?

4. You mentioned Galula's book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. I would also recommend a down and dirty piece that lays out COIN in a tactical and practical format - Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency by David Kilcullen. Kilcullen is a retired Australian lieutenant colonel now working for the US State Department. Earlier you mentioned 10-15 years in Iraq. That is if we get it right. Do you see a trend that the “one- third that are trying but not really getting it and the one-third just want to kick a little butt” are being pushed aside or are we permanently handicapped by not being fully combat effective?

Also, counterinsurgencies require all elements of national power and in most cases the military element is secondary to success. How do you view the other (non-DoD) agencies efforts? Is the military doomed to taking on the whole spectrum of Small Wars by default?

Here is one Q&A I found interesting:

Quantico, Va.: First, I'd like to complement you on the large body of balanced material you've produced over the years.

I vividly remember a conversation I had with my Battalion Commander in Camp Lejeune about three years before the war started. I was a Marine Platoon Commander and we were conducting a formal professional discussion with all of the battalion officers on Dien Bien Phu. The subject turned to training for low intensity conflict (which includes counter-insurgency) and our ability to prepare for it adequately. The consensus was that we didn't have the time to prepare for the range of missions we might encounter and that we should focus on traditional high intensity combat. The theory was that we could always scale back but not up.

I think that, collectively, the entire U.S. military probably made the same decision. Thus, when the war evolved into an insurgency we started at a huge deficit. The result was that you ended up with a situation where every commander may have a completeley different idea of how to fight the war in Iraq. Your story of Major General Odierno is just one example of a failure to understand the nature of the conflict. Stories of very senior commanders being upbraided by LtGen Petaues (then the commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command), for instance, have made the rounds among junior officers. My question is this - do you really think that the services are making their best effort to adapt to the nature of the war considering the significant mental challenges that need to be overcome? For instance, we don't reward officers for serving as embedded trainers with Iraqi units. Many senior officers haven't even internalized the tenets of Manuever Warfare, the central warfighting theory of the Marine Corps, do you really think we can get all services to internalize the principles of counter-insurgency?

Tom Ricks: Thanks. Would you take our friend in Corpus Christi aside for a quiet chat?

Seriously, I think you raise good points. Counterinsurgency is tough--especially because it runs so contrary to much the US military has taught over the last two decades. For example, classic counterinsurgency doctrine says to use the minimal amount of force necessary to doing the job, rather than use overwhelming force. And it also says to treat the people well, even prisoners.

One senior officer in Iraq told me earlier this year that about one-third of his subordinate officers "get it," one- third are trying but not reallly getting it, and one-third just want to kick a little butt. That means your force is probably less than half effective, and part of it is counterproductive.