Multinational corps and formations

[Red Rat]

I concur with Eden.

The UK army rarely works at corps level (having only the one Corps HQ) and equally rarely within an understood corps context. When our div HQs exercise the scenario inevitably focuses on them (to run them out) and when they train for deployments (Afghanistan or Iraq) I suspect they see Corps HQs as their higher HQs without understanding the corps level of operations. My perspective from Iraq is that Div staff did not understand what Corps could do for them in terms of flexing resources, nor how Corps managed the campaign.

I would also say that Corps is the level where multinationality works well, at Div it is okay and (from personal experience) at brigade level it sucks.

[William F. Owen]

I suspect they see Corps HQs as their higher HQs without understanding the corps level of operations. My perspective from Iraq is that Div staff did not understand what Corps could do for them in terms of flexing resources, nor how Corps managed the campaign.

I agree with your basic point, but IIRC 1 BR Corps became the ARRC - did it not? Basically the ARRC is built on what the UK knew about the Corps level of Operations. I'd also submit, that Corps level operations are extremely theatre and context specific.
If you're telling me that UK's understanding of Corps level operations is not what it was, I'll take your word for it, and ponder as to why.

[Red Rat]

I think the ARRC (ex 1 BR Corps) knows its business, but that is a relatively small pool of staff in the army.

Intermediate Command and Staff Course (Land) (ICSC(L)) which is mandatory staff training for all newly promoted majors focuses on the brigade level. The advanced staff course is joint and does not have a Land phase per se (where we used to concetrate on Div and Corps level) so...

We have recognised we have an issue here although I am not sure what we will do about it

[Alfred_the_Great]

Does HCSC not cover the Joint Commander (and I presume Corps) level discussions. Or have I missed the point from my Maritime perspective; lets be honest, we'll never have a "Fleet" again....

[Red Rat]

I can but dream of achieving those lofty spires!

I've had 'maverick' bandied around far too much in my reports to get there!

[Eden]

I would submit that no western army has conducted a corps-level operation anywhere in the world since 1991, at least not in a tactical sense. We do have corps headquarters operating in war zones today, but their mighty warmaking faculties are typically focused on running brigade, battalion, and even company size operations.

If and when we are called upon to do so, I suspect there will be many lessons to be relearned.

[Red Rat]

I would submit that no western army has conducted a corps-level operation anywhere in the world since 1991, at least not in a tactical sense.

Maybe not in a manoeuvre sense, but MNC-I in 2007 with their Phantom Thunder and Phantom Strike operations seemed to be running Corps level operations?

I stand by to be educated!

[Infanteer]

I would submit that no western army has conducted a corps-level operation anywhere in the world since 1991, at least not in a tactical sense.

I would disagree. OIF I definately fits the bill for Corps-level tactical operations with at least 3+ Divisions (1UK, 3Inf, 1MarDiv, TF Tarawa) maneuvering under the command of V Corps.

[Chris jM]

I would also say that Corps is the level where multinationality works well, at Div it is okay and (from personal experience) at brigade level it sucks.

Could you (or everyone else who has agreed with these sentiments) help out an ignorant colonial, then, and explain what it is about the Div/ Brigade threshold that leads one to a workable coalition construct and one that doesn't?

It's going to have to have something to do with friction inside one's on chain, but I can't quite pick why one would be suitable over another. Is it to do with supporting fires best being co-ordinated within Div and lower, thus allowing for one to preserve your own culture in allocating and applying fires, or something else?

Fuchs, how does language work then inside the German/ Dutch Bde - obviously orders would be given to one's own soldiers in your native tongue at the lower units, but how about at Bn level? Are all radio comms are in english or certain radio nets only?

[Kiwigrunt]

Fuchs, how does language work then inside the German/ Dutch Bde - obviously orders would be given to one's own soldiers in your native tongue at the lower units, but how about at Bn level? Are all radio comms are in english or certain radio nets only?

I don't know about the Germans but the Dutch are using an ever increasing amount of English, especially in professional and technical arenas. Sometimes even to the point of annoying, like they are forgetting their own language. So for orders etc. they do indeed use Dutch, but with a lot of English key words and jargon thrown in.
Also, the more educated (typically officers, one would assume) speak English quite well, and many speak German reasonably to quite well. These languages (and French) are quite widely taught at school.
So if they need to communicate with the Germans they should have little trouble switching to English or indeed even German.

[Red Rat]

My personal experience is of having seen the ARRC, MNDSE in Iraq and having spent 10 months with the Kabul Multi-National Bde.

I am in two minds as to whether it is the size or the construct of the HQ which matters most.

My experience is that where there is a lead nation then individual augmentees can slot in and the system works well. At Div and Corps where I have seen this happen it has worked very well. In MNDSE in 2005-6 it was the multinational augmentees that kept the ostensibly British HQ MNDSE afloat!

Where there is no lead nation or where the number of multinational augmentees is larger then 1/3 then national sensitivities start to cause a lot of friction. I think that bde HQs, despite their burgeoning size are still too small to allow a great degree of multinationality; the friction outweighs the benefits.

Common doctrine and language is one thing, but equally important when looking how these things work is what we call 'MSCOM' (Military Secretary Command) ie: who writes your report and does it count...

[Fuchs]

I'm not sure how it works in the German/Dutch Corps.
Both Germans and Dutch commonly know English, officers are simply expected to know English and most Dutch understand German because
a) the languages are somewhat similar (Dutch is in between English and German)
b) Dutch people watch German TV stations because they don't have a good choice of Dutch stations
c) they can/do learn it at school

As a German, there's a golden rule, though:
Never initiate a conversation with Dutchmen in German. Begin in English, eventually they'll propose to talk in German unless they're really much better in English than German.
It's about a "small neighbour" syndrome and a bit also about the "the stole my Grandpa's bike" problem.

[William F. Owen]

I cannot see any advantage in a multi-national HQs. Why are they required to run multi-national formations, divisions or Corps?

If I am UK brigade, I am quite happy to have Dutch Tank company attached. At most I may want a Dutch LO, but that's it. I certainly do not want a BG from another nation. Multi-national should mean someone under Command of someone else. Joint-command cannot work except as a very poor compromise. I understand the real world is different, but we do have to recognise that such organisations will run less well, when under real-pressure. So-
Corps should issue order for the next 36-24 hours, which should flow down to leave BGs 4 hours to plan and issue orders. That is the gold standard required and I doubt you can do that in a multi-national HQ.

HQ Size: Well here's an issue in itself. HQ benefits nothing from size. There are endless command studies that show this.

As an aside an IDF Formation HQ is less than 100 men, all up. - It's a Signals Company. The actual key players number less than 10.

[Fuchs]

That's already quite slow for mobile warfare, especially on the part of the brigades (unless they're resting in a camp).

[Eden]

I cannot see any advantage in a multi-national HQs. Why are they required to run multi-national formations, divisions or Corps?


HQ Size: Well here's an issue in itself. HQ benefits nothing from size. There are endless command studies that show this.

There is no advantage in wartime - you do need liaison but otherwise multinationality only creates friction. They are advantageous in peacetime for training purposes, interoperability, and the chance for a, say, Dutch lieutenant colonel to gain experience at a level he is unlikely to reach in his own army.

HQ have gotten so big because generals like big staffs...I have yet to meet one who has failed to criticize big staffs or who has actually reduced the size of his own. Big staffs allow you to revel in the weeds and micro-manage...small staffs can't do that. Also, headquarters no longer have to move, so there is no penalty for a bloated staff, at least not any that show up during a campaign.

Seriously, though, a larger staff does allow the headquarters to perform more functions - not necessarily efficiently or quickly. The root problem is that our leaders have trouble suppressing their appetite for centralization, and functions that were in the past performed at lower levels have continued to migrate upward. Staffs are huge because we have essentially replicated subordinate artillery, engineer, logistical, aviation, and other functional headquarters within the higher echelon.

Ironically, the much slower pace of decision making in counter-insurgency actually encourages the growth of staffs.

[Infanteer]

HQ Size: Well here's an issue in itself. HQ benefits nothing from size. There are endless command studies that show this.

As an aside an IDF Formation HQ is less than 100 men, all up. - It's a Signals Company. The actual key players number less than 10.

Do you have access/links to any of this - all I've been able to find is the (very good) Storr article on Brit Brigades in Gulf War 1 and 2. Staff size (and bloat) has always held my interest as a look into organizational theory/military culture.