Multinational corps and formations

[Red Rat]

My personal experience is of having seen the ARRC, MNDSE in Iraq and having spent 10 months with the Kabul Multi-National Bde.

I am in two minds as to whether it is the size or the construct of the HQ which matters most.

My experience is that where there is a lead nation then individual augmentees can slot in and the system works well. At Div and Corps where I have seen this happen it has worked very well. In MNDSE in 2005-6 it was the multinational augmentees that kept the ostensibly British HQ MNDSE afloat!

Where there is no lead nation or where the number of multinational augmentees is larger then 1/3 then national sensitivities start to cause a lot of friction. I think that bde HQs, despite their burgeoning size are still too small to allow a great degree of multinationality; the friction outweighs the benefits.

Common doctrine and language is one thing, but equally important when looking how these things work is what we call 'MSCOM' (Military Secretary Command) ie: who writes your report and does it count...

[Fuchs]

I'm not sure how it works in the German/Dutch Corps.
Both Germans and Dutch commonly know English, officers are simply expected to know English and most Dutch understand German because
a) the languages are somewhat similar (Dutch is in between English and German)
b) Dutch people watch German TV stations because they don't have a good choice of Dutch stations
c) they can/do learn it at school

As a German, there's a golden rule, though:
Never initiate a conversation with Dutchmen in German. Begin in English, eventually they'll propose to talk in German unless they're really much better in English than German.
It's about a "small neighbour" syndrome and a bit also about the "the stole my Grandpa's bike" problem.

[William F. Owen]

I cannot see any advantage in a multi-national HQs. Why are they required to run multi-national formations, divisions or Corps?

If I am UK brigade, I am quite happy to have Dutch Tank company attached. At most I may want a Dutch LO, but that's it. I certainly do not want a BG from another nation. Multi-national should mean someone under Command of someone else. Joint-command cannot work except as a very poor compromise. I understand the real world is different, but we do have to recognise that such organisations will run less well, when under real-pressure. So-
Corps should issue order for the next 36-24 hours, which should flow down to leave BGs 4 hours to plan and issue orders. That is the gold standard required and I doubt you can do that in a multi-national HQ.

HQ Size: Well here's an issue in itself. HQ benefits nothing from size. There are endless command studies that show this.

As an aside an IDF Formation HQ is less than 100 men, all up. - It's a Signals Company. The actual key players number less than 10.

[Fuchs]

That's already quite slow for mobile warfare, especially on the part of the brigades (unless they're resting in a camp).

[William F. Owen]

That's already quite slow for mobile warfare, especially on the part of the brigades (unless they're resting in a camp).

Maybe but IIRC, Guderian's Corps orders were for operations were issued about every 24 hours. Orders issued at midnight should carry through for 24 hours. EG: He issues Corps Order No 14 at 20:00hrs on the 27th and does not issue 15 until 23:15 on the 28th.

[Red Rat]

We allow (hours):

++++++++++++Execute++++++++++++++Planning and Observation

Corps ++++++++ 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 24-96

Div ++++++++++ 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 12-48

Bde ++++++++++ 12 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 - 30

'Execute' is time from receipt of orders through battle procedure to executing the plan. That is quite slow but:

a) We never claimed to be good at manoeuvre warfare (unlike COIN )

b) Rather then rely on a finely honed HQ of men (and women) tried, trained and few, we have dumbed down our officer corps and added layers of process and bureacracy instead - all of which adds time and diminshes tempo. We call it progress

[Fuchs]

Those are crappy peacetime figures. They were thrown overboard in 2003 even by the U.S.Army and that was overdue.

Formation leaders who lead from their Schwerpunkt (up front) were able to make on the spot decisions and turn around their formation or a big chunk of it in much less than two hours.


The allowance of days for preparations should be a relic of the days when front lines were established and defended. Formations had to be much, much more agile even back in that long gone age once the front line was penetrated.

Feel free to allow 6-96 hours if you want to recreate France's disaster in 1940.
A German armour Corps was expected to move about 300 km in 96 hrs and to defeat several rifle divisions on the move in '41.
Vehicle cruise speeds were increased by about 50-75% since 1941, communications gear has been improved - modern peer vs peer mobile warfare could easily exceed the gold standards set in WW2 by 25-50%.

Maybe but IIRC, Guderian's Corps orders were for operations were issued about every 24 hours. Orders issued at midnight should carry through for 24 hours. EG: He issues Corps Order No 14 at 20:00hrs on the 27th and does not issue 15 until 23:15 on the 28th.

Month, Year?

Guderian led mostly from up front, so his Corps orders were quite often "follow me" messages. The important decisions were made at the advance party (Vorausabteilung) which was in his direct reach if not direct control.

[William F. Owen]

Those are crappy peacetime figures.

Concur

Month, Year?

1940

[William F. Owen]

'Execute' is time from receipt of orders through battle procedure to executing the plan. That is quite slow but:

a) We never claimed to be good at manoeuvre warfare (unlike COIN )

Wow... seriously? Where do those times come from? The SOHB? or LWC?
To quote Lt Col Jim Storr, in his work on UK Command.

Patton was absolutely clear. In his ‘Letter of Instruction to Third U.S. Army’ , he said that a division should have twelve, or preferably eighteen, hours from the physical receipt of the order from corps headquarters. We will assume that the ‘one thirds, two thirds’ rule applies. That means that at each echelon of command a headquarters should take no more than one third of the total time available to both plan and give its orders. If we have twelve hours for a division, then we have eight hours for a brigade, and about five to six hours for a battle group.

Now actually I think BG's should aim, in training, to complete in 4 hours, so this pretty generous.

Rather then rely on a finely honed HQ of men (and women) tried, trained and few, we have dumbed down our officer corps and added layers of process and bureacracy instead - all of which adds time and diminshes tempo. We call it progress

.... that is a huge problem and one that folks keep pointing out, so I wonder why we do nothing about it?

[Fuchs]

Hmm, shock therapy then.

http://wi.informatik.unibw-muenchen....Mellenthin.pdf

Commanders and subordinates start to understand each other during war. The better they know each other, the shorter and less detailed the orders can be.

from a corps level wargame:

Generals Balck and von Mellenthin accepted the challenge and conferred privately over the map. General von Mellenthin, at one point, turned to the American participants to announce that they would not take long. He observed that in Russia they normally had about 5 minutes to make such decisions. In a very short time they arrayed their forces and expressed their willingness to explain their concept.

There is an almost irresistible temptation to put words in their mouths in the course of explaining their proposal. But in fact it was short, crisp, and simple. Their concept was the following:

(...; 7 bullet points on 3/4 of a page - 186 words - follow. The 8th bullet point is an explanation and cautioning.)

There may be a bit boasting involved, but it fits to German military history writings.


About leading from up front and how it influences the agility of a Corps' leadership: I was quite stunned to learn in 2008 that a Russian division commander had been wounded while being in an advance party, leading from up front a flanking attack. To me, this was the worst news of the month. I did not expect them to behave like that (his bad luck is unsystematic and not of interest).



@Wilf:
You're apparently referring to the hours immediately after the more than three days rest forced on the armour corps by Hitler (the infamous stop order at Dunkirk). Guderian was obviously able to let his corps quite loose in the first hours of advance (15 km to Dunkirk only) after days of waiting & preparations. The anecdote tells therefore little. An average figure for the hot phases (the peak challenge situations) of 1940 and 1941 would be much more telling.

[Eden]

I cannot see any advantage in a multi-national HQs. Why are they required to run multi-national formations, divisions or Corps?


HQ Size: Well here's an issue in itself. HQ benefits nothing from size. There are endless command studies that show this.

There is no advantage in wartime - you do need liaison but otherwise multinationality only creates friction. They are advantageous in peacetime for training purposes, interoperability, and the chance for a, say, Dutch lieutenant colonel to gain experience at a level he is unlikely to reach in his own army.

HQ have gotten so big because generals like big staffs...I have yet to meet one who has failed to criticize big staffs or who has actually reduced the size of his own. Big staffs allow you to revel in the weeds and micro-manage...small staffs can't do that. Also, headquarters no longer have to move, so there is no penalty for a bloated staff, at least not any that show up during a campaign.

Seriously, though, a larger staff does allow the headquarters to perform more functions - not necessarily efficiently or quickly. The root problem is that our leaders have trouble suppressing their appetite for centralization, and functions that were in the past performed at lower levels have continued to migrate upward. Staffs are huge because we have essentially replicated subordinate artillery, engineer, logistical, aviation, and other functional headquarters within the higher echelon.

Ironically, the much slower pace of decision making in counter-insurgency actually encourages the growth of staffs.

[William F. Owen]

They are advantageous in peacetime for training purposes, interoperability, and the chance for a, say, Dutch lieutenant colonel to gain experience at a level he is unlikely to reach in his own army.

Concur

Seriously, though, a larger staff does allow the headquarters to perform more functions - not necessarily efficiently or quickly.

Yet the almost the sole purpose of staffs is to be quick and efficient.

Ironically, the much slower pace of decision making in counter-insurgency actually encourages the growth of staffs.

Concur. Combat operations against competent regular enemies are the most demanding in planning, execution and skill - so yes, "COIN" does not require high staff performance.

[Infanteer]

HQ Size: Well here's an issue in itself. HQ benefits nothing from size. There are endless command studies that show this.

As an aside an IDF Formation HQ is less than 100 men, all up. - It's a Signals Company. The actual key players number less than 10.

Do you have access/links to any of this - all I've been able to find is the (very good) Storr article on Brit Brigades in Gulf War 1 and 2. Staff size (and bloat) has always held my interest as a look into organizational theory/military culture.

[Kiwigrunt]

Do you have access/links to any of this - all I've been able to find is the (very good) Storr article on Brit Brigades in Gulf War 1 and 2. Staff size (and bloat) has always held my interest as a look into organizational theory/military culture.

Would you by any chance have a link to that article?

[William F. Owen]

Do you have access/links to any of this - all I've been able to find is the (very good) Storr article on Brit Brigades in Gulf War 1 and 2. Staff size (and bloat) has always held my interest as a look into organizational theory/military culture.

Sorry. My source is an IDF Brigade commander, who I spent the best part of day talking to, while watching a tank live firing exercise on the Golan.
Storr is about as good as you get with Command and also someone very familiar with IDF Command issues.