22 Jan 08 testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on That Which is Not Obligatory is Forbidden: Censorship and Incitement in the Arab World:
Joel Campagna, Committee to Protect Journalists
Richard Eisendorf, Freedom House
Kenneth Jacobson, Anti-Defamation League
CEIP, 26 Feb 08: The New Middle East
Complete 48 page paper at the link......The Middle East of 2008 is indeed a vastly different region from that of 2001, and the war in Iraq has been the most important driver of this transformation, although by no means the only one. The outcome, however, is not what the Bush administration envisaged. On the contrary, the situation has become worse in many countries. Despite the presence of over 160,000 U.S. troops in Iraq at the end of 2007 and an improvement in the security situation, Iraq remains an unstable, violent, and deeply divided country, indeed a failed state. Progress is being undermined by the refusal of Iraqi political factions to engage in a serious process of reconciliation, as the Bush administration has repeatedly warned. Furthermore, with the demise of Saddam Hussein, the balance of power between Iran and Iraq has been broken, increasing the influence of Tehran in the Gulf and beyond. Meantime, Iran continues its uranium enrichment program undeterred by United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions or the threat of U.S. military action.
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict remains unsolved, but its parameters have changed considerably, with a deep split in the Palestinian ranks and the effects of decades of unilateral Israeli actions calling into question whether a two-state solution can possibly be implemented. Although Lebanon has been largely liberated from direct Syrian domination, the country is deeply divided and teeters on the brink of domestic conflict. The power of Syria has been diminished by the forced withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon, but the country maintains its potential as a spoiler. The threat of nuclear proliferation is not just limited to Iran; from Morocco to the Gulf, a growing number of countries are declaring their intention to develop a nuclear capacity—for civilian use, to be sure, but a nuclear capacity nevertheless. Confessional and ethnic divisions have acquired greater saliency in many countries.
There has been no successful democratic revolution in any Middle Eastern country. Instead, the democratic openings advocated and supported by the United States have either led to sectarian division or revealed the greater popular appeal and strength of Islamist rather than liberal organizations, one of several reasons the United States has retreated from democracy promotion. Far from having leapfrogged over old problems, the United States is now confronting most of the old problems, often in a more acute way, as well as new ones.....
I am sure this will be warmly reviewed at AEI...
CEIP, 4 Jun 08: Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: Restoring Credibility
The Bush administration’s effort to foster democratic transformation in the Middle East has not had a significant impact on Arab countries, which remain largely autocratic. After a brief period of ferment in 2004–2005, Middle Eastern politics has become stagnant again. Moreover, the Bush policy—never clearly defined, long on rhetoric, short on strategy, and fitfully implemented—has undermined U.S. credibility and will make it more difficult for the next administration to devise a successful approach to political reform in the region.
The new administration must devise a new policy. While it is imperative that the United States abandon the mixture of simplistic assumptions and missionary fervor of the last few years, ignoring the need for reform and simply supporting friendly regimes are not a viable alternative. Such policy will not maintain stability in a region that is transforming rapidly economically and socially, because stability will depend on the ability of regimes to adapt to change rather than cling to the status quo. Moreover, fewer countries now, and even fewer in the future, are willing to embrace the United States unconditionally: “Friendly to the United States” has become a relative concept at best. Thus, the United States needs a new approach toward regimes that are facing deep political challenges but do not see the United States as either a model to imitate or a reliable ally....
CEIP, 17 Jul 08: The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S.
Many Arab countries traditionally aligned with the United States are showing increasing reluctance to follow Washington’s lead in addressing regional problems. This tendency toward an independent foreign policy is particularly evident among the Gulf countries. Even states that host major U.S. military facilities on their soil, such as Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain, consider U.S. policy in the region counterproductive and are forging a new diplomacy.
Gulf countries have refused to enter into an anti-Iranian alliance with the United States, and have chosen instead to pursue close diplomatic contacts with Tehran, although they fear its growing influence. They are trying to bring about reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine, while the United States is seeking to isolate Hamas. They have helped negotiate a compromise solution in Lebanon, while the United States has encouraged the government to take a hard-line position. Yet, the new diplomacy of the Arab countries is not directed against the United States, although it contradicts U.S. policies.....
Last edited by Jedburgh; 07-17-2008 at 01:56 PM.
USIP, Jun 09: Justice Interrupted: Historical Perspectives on Promoting Democracy in the Middle East
Summary
• Foreign affairs experts routinely use historical analogy to develop and justify policy. However, as professional historians have long noted, attractive analogies often lead to bad policies. Officials regularly choose analogies that neglect or distort the historical case they aim to illuminate. Nonetheless, history can be used effectively in international relations.
• To do so, practitioners must first recognize the difference between historical analogy and precedent. Historical precedent, drawn from the past of the region in question, is a safer guide to policy than historical analogy, which is based on comparisons to events in other regions. Because historical precedent is a self-limiting form of analogy restricted to a certain place, people, and time, it provides a better indication of how a certain society understands and responds to a given situation.
• The recent U.S. intervention in Iraq highlights the misuses of history: American leaders employed analogies to World War II to justify the invasion and to predict success in establishing a democratic regime after. These analogies proved to be a poor guide to nation building in the short term. In the long term, they have deeply aggravated U.S. relations with Iraqis and the rest of the Arab world.
• A more effective use of history would have been to refer to the precedent of World War I, a crucial moment when American policy could have supported indigenous Arab constitutional democracy—but, fatefully, did not.
• For the new administration, the Arabs’ experience of “justice interrupted” after World War I can still be a useful touchstone for promoting democracy in the region.1 This precedent alerts us that foreign intervention can spark a deep-seated and negative political reaction in the postcolonial Arab world and that reform in Arab politics must begin with respect for national sovereignty. It also reminds us that constitutionalism and the desire to participate in the community of international law are enduring values in Arab politics.
Telhami Poll
The Telhami poll is must reading for anyone who is considering American policy in the Middle East. It is also very depressing. Even on an interpersonal level, I found it very difficult to get to any reasonable middle ground when talking to Arabs in the region about politics. Our starting points as to what a reasonable middle ground should be are so different that it is very difficult to get to any common understanding on key issues. For instance, one might think that some shared perception of an Iranian threat could spur cooperation in the Gulf, yet even in that case, the polls show that Gulf Arabs do not share American concerns.
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