The Middle East (general catch all)

[Bob's World]

A former CIA counterterrorism official that I can agree with. This article by Robert Grenier is IMO spot on and parallels my own beliefs and experiences within the SOF/military community.

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth...255184637.html

[Dayuhan]

A former CIA counterterrorism official that I can agree with. This article by Robert Grenier is IMO spot on and parallels my own beliefs and experiences within the SOF/military community.

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth...255184637.html

I quite agree that these revolts are good things, that there's no need to fear them, that they need to happen and where they are happening we should not oppose them, and indeed that we should help them along in appropriate way.

If we take that one step further and go out and try to provoke them in countries where they aren't yet happening, or support them too energetically (giving the impression that they are our pawns or doing our bidding) we will turn a good thing into an unholy mess.

[Bob's World]

Agree that this is not the time and place for provoking. We do, however, need to be in front of these and engaging the governments hard to open talks now with the people to ward off more turmoil. Not broadsides of advice from US podiums, but private talks. Not against blazing into town in Airforce one to have those private talks, but give these guys the ability to come out and announce their own changes without the words being fed to them acorss the airwaves.

My advice is contained in my model. First create "hope" through giving the people legal, trusted and certain means to engage and shape government. What these are will vary by culture, country, time. This is first because these are things that can be designed and approved at the stroke of a pen, and because this is the off ramp from insurgency.

Then I would advise them to look hard at how they can shore up and repair the populaces perceptions as to the legitimacy of the government. To look at and address how just the populace finds the rule of law to be and also to address deep-seated perceptions of disrespect where they exist. These are the drivers of insurgency.

Are the people hungry and poor? Certainly, but that alone does not make an insurgency. It typically takes the presence of some disconnected royal living in unearned opulence that can casually suggest when told that the people are staving and that they have no bread to "let them eat cake." A populace also without hope, with no justice under the law, treated with disrespect, and that has come to question a legitimacy to rule that they may once have supported.

[Dayuhan]

Agree that this is not the time and place for provoking. We do, however, need to be in front of these and engaging the governments hard to open talks now with the people to ward off more turmoil. Not broadsides of advice from US podiums, but private talks. Not against blazing into town in Airforce one to have those private talks, but give these guys the ability to come out and announce their own changes without the words being fed to them acorss the airwaves.

My advice is contained in my model. First create "hope" through giving the people legal, trusted and certain means to engage and shape government. What these are will vary by culture, country, time. This is first because these are things that can be designed and approved at the stroke of a pen, and because this is the off ramp from insurgency.

Then I would advise them to look hard at how they can shore up and repair the populaces perceptions as to the legitimacy of the government. To look at and address how just the populace finds the rule of law to be and also to address deep-seated perceptions of disrespect where they exist. These are the drivers of insurgency.

Are the people hungry and poor? Certainly, but that alone does not make an insurgency. It typically takes the presence of some disconnected royal living in unearned opulence that can casually suggest when told that the people are staving and that they have no bread to "let them eat cake." A populace also without hope, with no justice under the law, treated with disrespect, and that has come to question a legitimacy to rule that they may once have supported.

I don't think these governments have the slightest interest in our advice, or in our meddling, which is closer to what they would call it. Probably they wouldn't tell us that, but would listen very seriously, promise to think deeply on what we said, then go on doing what they want.

We've a very limited capacity, if any, to change how others govern.

[Bob's World]

Yes, but you also have told me countless times that there is no insurgency in these countries as well...

I think you might be surprised at how much clout the US has, we just haven't been too skilled at employing the more subtle aspects of it. This is why in the geo-politics of the Middle East it is so essential for the US to build and sustain working relationships with Turkey and Iran as these two states continue to rise. It is the art of balancing smaller states against and with each other that creates and sustains a stability that supports one's interests. If properly positioned, a simple private conversation between leaders is probably enough. In many ways this is like a giant game of poker

The new player in this old game is the power of the populaces themselves. The President has been playing that card. He didn't deal it, but when it landed on the table he looked at these guys and suggested that they might want to fold, or at least not raise their bet. Qaddafi over bet his hand and went all in and will end up dead, in prison or in miserable exile. Mubarak folded and will likely live the dignified life of a wealthy former head of state. Currently there are a whole lot of despots still sitting at the table looking at the cards showing and nervously checking and rechecking their hole cards as they attempt to calculate the odds of drawing a winning hand.

Being a despot is a good gig until the people call your bluff.

[Dayuhan]

However we have seen that the U.S. does have the capacity to change how our allies govern - especially when we have good military-to-military relations. The Philippines, El Salvador, South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, and Turkey have all made substantive political moves towards democracy in part due to U.S. pressure and influence. In several of those countries, military governments either surrendered power or acquiesced to a reduced political role and the election of former enemies. How does this not qualify as changes in governance?

Changes in governance, yes, but the degree to which US pressure was involved is debatable in all cases. In the Philippines US pressure was really not a factor at all. In other cases possibly more so, but in no case would I call it conclusive.

I doubt we will know the full picture for a long time, but I imagine there was not a little behind-the-scenes pressure on the Egyptian military by the Obama Administration as well.

Presumably so. Whether it played a decisive or a significant role will depend on who is doing the talking and on what circumstances emerge... as in whether people wish to claim credit or assign blame. If things go bad you can be sure it will all have been America's fault!

If you're going to try to apply pressure, you have to press with the tide, not against it, and to choose your time right. Try to pressure people who feel secure in their position and who see your prescriptions as contrary to their interests and they'll tell you to deposit it gently where the sun don't shine. When - and if - the masses are rattling the gates, they may sing a different tune. Timing is all.

Yes, but you also have told me countless times that there is no insurgency in these countries as well...

As traditionally defined, no, there isn't. Change the definition and it can be anything you want it to be. As stated above, applying pressure on these governments when they see no need for change is going to do nothing.

I think you might be surprised at how much clout the US has, we just haven't been too skilled at employing the more subtle aspects of it.

A bit hypothetical, that. Has our influence not moved anyone because we haven't used it right, or because we haven't as much of it as we thought we had? Hard to verify that. I see no reason to believe, though, that governments will change their domestic policies because we want them to. Do we change our policies on health care or capital punishment because they don't meet European standards?

This is why in the geo-politics of the Middle East it is so essential for the US to build and sustain working relationships with Turkey and Iran as these two states continue to rise. It is the art of balancing smaller states against and with each other that creates and sustains a stability that supports one's interests. If properly positioned, a simple private conversation between leaders is probably enough.

Remember that they are pursuing their own balances on the side, and that we're not necessarily a part of those balances. I can't imagine any position that would, for example, allow an American leader to tell a Saudi leader what domestic reforms he ought to undertake with any sort of positive results. People don't like that sort of thing. They never have. We wouldn't like it either. They might endure it if we had a real stick to wave, or a carrot they really really wanted, but that's not so much the case these days.

Currently there are a whole lot of despots still sitting at the table looking at the cards showing and nervously checking and rechecking their hole cards as they attempt to calculate the odds of drawing a winning hand.

Being a despot is a good gig until the people call your bluff.

Possibly so, but it's the people who call the bluff, not the USA. We may be able to push a bit with the tide, once it flows, but pushing while it ain't flowing won't do anything. There are very real and very significant limits to what we can do, and if we try to do what we can't, we don't improve things for ourselves.

[tequila]

If you're going to try to apply pressure, you have to press with the tide, not against it, and to choose your time right. Try to pressure people who feel secure in their position and who see your prescriptions as contrary to their interests and they'll tell you to deposit it gently where the sun don't shine. When - and if - the masses are rattling the gates, they may sing a different tune. Timing is all.

In South Korea, Taiwan, El Salvador, and Turkey, significant reforms and democratization occurred without any major crisis or mass demonstrations.

[tequila]

I don't think these governments have the slightest interest in our advice, or in our meddling, which is closer to what they would call it. Probably they wouldn't tell us that, but would listen very seriously, promise to think deeply on what we said, then go on doing what they want.

We've a very limited capacity, if any, to change how others govern.

However we have seen that the U.S. does have the capacity to change how our allies govern - especially when we have good military-to-military relations. The Philippines, El Salvador, South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, and Turkey have all made substantive political moves towards democracy in part due to U.S. pressure and influence. In several of those countries, military governments either surrendered power or acquiesced to a reduced political role and the election of former enemies. How does this not qualify as changes in governance?

I doubt we will know the full picture for a long time, but I imagine there was not a little behind-the-scenes pressure on the Egyptian military by the Obama Administration as well.

[Marc]

However we have seen that the U.S. does have the capacity to change how our allies govern - especially when we have good military-to-military relations. The Philippines, El Salvador, South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, and Turkey have all made substantive political moves towards democracy in part due to U.S. pressure and influence. In several of those countries, military governments either surrendered power or acquiesced to a reduced political role and the election of former enemies. How does this not qualify as changes in governance?

Indeed, The Philippines, Colombia, and El Salvador demonstrate that a combination of political pressure, low profile military engagement, and economic incentives can result in an effective U.S. capacity to change how our allies govern. However, alle these operations had/have one goal: to promote democracy. Until now, our track record on the promotion of democracy in the Middle East is less clear than it was/is in the three aforementioned examples.

[Steve the Planner]

Marc:

I continue to monitor the Rage events with a focus on something different.

We tend to focus not on promoting democracy but on establishing or maintaining nation-state power structures.

The debate in the Arab world, in my opinion, has, over the last 90 years or so, focused on who gets to control the apparatus of a strong central government descending from the ancient Persian/Greece/Roman empire models, which place sub-national governance/government in a very inferior position easily controlled from above.

What is fascinating to me about Libya is that, unlike the perennial battle over who gets to be in charge (ultimately creating one form of dictatorship over the previous), is that, with no pre-existing pattern, people are beginning to form, admittedly on an experimental and informal basis) sub-national governance structures.

The question they raise, which is markedly different from other countries, is not "who?," but "how?," which, I believe is the first crack in a wall that has, for the most part, held Arab peoples back, and diverted their attention from the issues needed to be addressed in more sophisticated and urbanized systems like they once had in Babylon, etc...

While the results are unpredicatable, in my view, the challenges raised and faced in Libya (free from distortion of anti-imperialism and poverty of resources) are fundamental ones: How do we, as a modern, young Arab society wish to govern ourselves to provide essential services and opportunities?

The Arab World's future may be re-shaped by these nascent Libyan experiments, which, hopefully will impact all the old, unworkable and externally-derived nation-state systems.

Notably, in a world of Nation-States, the shell and trappings are needed, but how can sub-national governance open opportunities (maybe not immediately) for Arab self-determination and civic advancement?

I heard a lady on CNN talking from Benghazi about what she wanted--- greater services, education, opportunities, freedom---voting rights, while perhaps significant vehicles to those ends, where not a front-runner.