Operationalizing The Jones Model through COG

**William F. Owen** · 05-23-2010

Originally Posted by Fuchs

"source of strength" is way too prone for misinterpretation.

So the Howard Paret translation is wrong?

The industry or the population or culture and such are never a Schwerpunkt in the CvC sense.

Concur. I subscribe to the CvC view, because it is clear and I understand it.

**Fuchs** · 05-23-2010

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

So the Howard Paret translation is wrong?

Tell me book, chapter and a longer quote and I'll try to find it in the original to check.

**Dayuhan** · 05-24-2010

I think the Jones model is an excellent tool for understanding what might be called "classic insurgency", where a populace or portion thereof rises up against its government. One limitation is that the term "insurgency" (and again I feel the discussion suffers for want of a definition) is widely used to describe other circumstances. For example, many here use the term "insurgency" to describe irregular resistance to foreign occupation, a circumstance in which the quality of governance is not the core issue driving the conflict.

A similar situation might arise in a diverse populace in which government is dominated by one subset (ethnic, religious, whatever), and another subset is resisting domination by that government. An observer working from the Jones model might be tempted to interpret the core narrative of the conflict as "they are governing us badly", when in fact it is "we refuse to be governed by them".

Another limitation is that no matter how often we repeat that it is the populace's perception of governance, not ours, that matters, we will always evaluate governance according to our own standards, and we will always project our own preferences onto our assumptions of what the populace is thinking. We are, after all, human.

That tendency is evident in our preference for central government, and in our assumption that effective governance is a desirable thing. In many cases it may not be. If a group of people is accustomed to governing themselves, with nominal allegiance to a distant and abstract national entity, the prospect of an effective government - of a government that actually proposes to govern them - might be regarded as a direct assault on a treasured autonomy. We might see a police force and a courthouse as "delivering justice", the populace might see it as an attempt to impose a foreign system of justice.

Models are useful, but they can also create assumptions that color and distort our ability to interpret core narratives. On the local level, a commander trained with the Jones model might be inclined to look to quality of governance as the core narrative of the local insurgent, and overlook issues with the source of governance.

On the macro strategy level there's a greater risk. The 1970s and 80s taught us that we can no longer go around installing dictators to run other countries for us. The current engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan should be teaching us a similar lesson, and I'm concerned that the model in question might lead us to look past it. In short, we might be inclined to assume that it's ok for us to go around removing governments and installing new ones, as long as the governments we install are "good". If we make that assumption we end up asking ourselves how we can provide others with good governance, instead of asking the rather more important question of whether or not we should be trying to establish governments in other countries at all. Under certain interpretations the Jones model could be used to justify intervention in places where intervention can have serious unintended and undesirable consequences.

I also feel like the Jones model overlooks two key factors, one an important vulnerability in many insurgencies, the other an important weakness common among governments facing insurgents.

The common insurgent weakness revolves around the relationship between insurgent leaders and their followers, both the rank-and-file fighters and the supporting populace. It's not universal, but where it exists it provides a key strategic target. If we look at "the insurgency" as a monolithic entity driven solely by resistance to bad governance, we can overlook this vulnerability.

Insurgent leaders are typically ideologically driven, and fighting for a particular desired end state, generally one in which they take political power. Insurgent followers are more typically driven by local issues that threaten them: they fight against an unacceptable status quo. The ideology of the leader is frequently less that significant (and often less than comprehensible) to the follower. The key to success for the insurgent leadership is in understanding those local grievances (which will vary widely from one locale to the next) and in presenting themselves as a solution or as an ally.

That dynamic presents an interesting challenge. The leadership may be diffuse and difficult to target; even when some of them are killed or captured new leaders emerge from the ideological core. If we target the followers, we end up punishing people who see themselves fighting for their own rights or their own survival, often exacerbating the issues that the core insurgent propagandists exploit. For me, the key to resolving a situation like this is to understand the core narrative of the followers in any given locale, identify the divergences between the narratives of leader and follower, and act to address the issues that motivate the followers. The idea is to drive a wedge between leader and follower, less a question of decapitation than disembodiment. We will never persuade the core ideologues, but if we can isolate them from their followers we can render them irrelevant.

The key weakness I see in our COIN/FID efforts lies in our relationship with host governments, and in the reasons why bad governance exists in the first place. We don't fight insurgents in our own country, we haven't any. We fight them in other countries, often countries with traditions of governance that don't exactly appeal to us or to the populace being governed. In these cases we can talk all we want about good governance, but we have to recognize that the governing elites we're dealing with cannot implement our recommendations without compromising their own power and prerogatives, which they will not do. Bad governance exists because somebody finds it very profitable, generally somebody in power... and that somebody is going to do all in their power to resist changes to the status quo. Recommending change in such circumstances is like talking at a wall. Of course we have the option to withdraw support, but that can mean sacrificing the strategic objectives that brought us into the picture in the first place. A bit of a quandary, and there's no good solution, but to manage those situations we have to first acknowledge that they exist, and that in many of the cases we seek to influence our capacity to influence may be very limited.

All meant as constructive comment; this post is already way too long to be discussing areas of agreement.

**Bob's World** · 05-24-2010

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

I think the Jones model is an excellent tool for understanding what might be called "classic insurgency", where a populace or portion thereof rises up against its government. One limitation is that the term "insurgency" (and again I feel the discussion suffers for want of a definition) is widely used to describe other circumstances. For example, many here use the term "insurgency" to describe irregular resistance to foreign occupation, a circumstance in which the quality of governance is not the core issue driving the conflict.

A similar situation might arise in a diverse populace in which government is dominated by one subset (ethnic, religious, whatever), and another subset is resisting domination by that government. An observer working from the Jones model might be tempted to interpret the core narrative of the conflict as "they are governing us badly", when in fact it is "we refuse to be governed by them".

Another limitation is that no matter how often we repeat that it is the populace's perception of governance, not ours, that matters, we will always evaluate governance according to our own standards, and we will always project our own preferences onto our assumptions of what the populace is thinking. We are, after all, human.

That tendency is evident in our preference for central government, and in our assumption that effective governance is a desirable thing. In many cases it may not be. If a group of people is accustomed to governing themselves, with nominal allegiance to a distant and abstract national entity, the prospect of an effective government - of a government that actually proposes to govern them - might be regarded as a direct assault on a treasured autonomy. We might see a police force and a courthouse as "delivering justice", the populace might see it as an attempt to impose a foreign system of justice.

Models are useful, but they can also create assumptions that color and distort our ability to interpret core narratives. On the local level, a commander trained with the Jones model might be inclined to look to quality of governance as the core narrative of the local insurgent, and overlook issues with the source of governance.

On the macro strategy level there's a greater risk. The 1970s and 80s taught us that we can no longer go around installing dictators to run other countries for us. The current engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan should be teaching us a similar lesson, and I'm concerned that the model in question might lead us to look past it. In short, we might be inclined to assume that it's ok for us to go around removing governments and installing new ones, as long as the governments we install are "good". If we make that assumption we end up asking ourselves how we can provide others with good governance, instead of asking the rather more important question of whether or not we should be trying to establish governments in other countries at all. Under certain interpretations the Jones model could be used to justify intervention in places where intervention can have serious unintended and undesirable consequences.

I also feel like the Jones model overlooks two key factors, one an important vulnerability in many insurgencies, the other an important weakness common among governments facing insurgents.

The common insurgent weakness revolves around the relationship between insurgent leaders and their followers, both the rank-and-file fighters and the supporting populace. It's not universal, but where it exists it provides a key strategic target. If we look at "the insurgency" as a monolithic entity driven solely by resistance to bad governance, we can overlook this vulnerability.

Insurgent leaders are typically ideologically driven, and fighting for a particular desired end state, generally one in which they take political power. Insurgent followers are more typically driven by local issues that threaten them: they fight against an unacceptable status quo. The ideology of the leader is frequently less that significant (and often less than comprehensible) to the follower. The key to success for the insurgent leadership is in understanding those local grievances (which will vary widely from one locale to the next) and in presenting themselves as a solution or as an ally.

That dynamic presents an interesting challenge. The leadership may be diffuse and difficult to target; even when some of them are killed or captured new leaders emerge from the ideological core. If we target the followers, we end up punishing people who see themselves fighting for their own rights or their own survival, often exacerbating the issues that the core insurgent propagandists exploit. For me, the key to resolving a situation like this is to understand the core narrative of the followers in any given locale, identify the divergences between the narratives of leader and follower, and act to address the issues that motivate the followers. The idea is to drive a wedge between leader and follower, less a question of decapitation than disembodiment. We will never persuade the core ideologues, but if we can isolate them from their followers we can render them irrelevant.

The key weakness I see in our COIN/FID efforts lies in our relationship with host governments, and in the reasons why bad governance exists in the first place. We don't fight insurgents in our own country, we haven't any. We fight them in other countries, often countries with traditions of governance that don't exactly appeal to us or to the populace being governed. In these cases we can talk all we want about good governance, but we have to recognize that the governing elites we're dealing with cannot implement our recommendations without compromising their own power and prerogatives, which they will not do. Bad governance exists because somebody finds it very profitable, generally somebody in power... and that somebody is going to do all in their power to resist changes to the status quo. Recommending change in such circumstances is like talking at a wall. Of course we have the option to withdraw support, but that can mean sacrificing the strategic objectives that brought us into the picture in the first place. A bit of a quandary, and there's no good solution, but to manage those situations we have to first acknowledge that they exist, and that in many of the cases we seek to influence our capacity to influence may be very limited.

All meant as constructive comment; this post is already way too long to be discussing areas of agreement.

Point one is that "the source of governance" as well as how governance is sustained in power are the keys to the critical causal factor of "Legitimacy." If the populace does not recognize either one you are on the fast track to insurgency. When Regime change by a foreign power occurs their is a presumption of illegitimacy that is virtually possible to overcome.

Point two. Insurgent leaders are not "ideologically driven"; they are politically driven and use ideology to motivate and drive the masses to support their political goals. Not saying their ideology is not often very important to them, it just isn't what drives them.

**slapout9** · 05-27-2010

Originally Posted by Bob's World

Point one is that "the source of governance" as well as how governance is sustained in power are the keys to the critical causal factor of "Legitimacy." If the populace does not recognize either one you are on the fast track to insurgency. When Regime change by a foreign power occurs their is a presumption of illegitimacy that is virtually possible to overcome.

Point two. Insurgent leaders are not "ideologically driven"; they are politically driven and use ideology to motivate and drive the masses to support their political goals. Not saying their ideology is not often very important to them, it just isn't what drives them.

BW, I think you meant to say virtually IM-possible did you not? Which is more in line with what I learned years ago. The cause(will of the populace) has to come from the indigenous population it cannot be manufactured or inserted by a foreign government, but it can be discovered by a foreign government and then supported to enable the establishment of good government based of the consent of the governed. But consent can not be based on force or fraud or the insurgency will flair up again.

**Bob's World** · 05-27-2010

Originally Posted by slapout9

BW, I think you meant to say virtually IM-possible did you not? Which is more in line with what I learned years ago. The cause(will of the populace) has to come from the indigenous population it cannot be manufactured or inserted by a foreign government, but it can be discovered by a foreign government and then supported to enable the establishment of good government based of the consent of the governed. But consent can not be based on force or fraud or the insurgency will flair up again.

Yes, Impossible.

As an aside, during QDR one of the service reps (Brigadier) in the session I was in, tried to put "regime change" on the table as a future mission that we needed to resource and train to. Thankfully he was roundly shot down and told to purge the term from his vocabulary.

**Entropy** · 05-27-2010

Col. Jones,

No, the objective is for the Governance of a particular populace to gain a better understanding and empathy for the concerns of their own populace; and to rededicate themselves to meeting those needs.

You can't have justice or governance without control. Justice, for instances, is about picking winners and losers and if you don't have power to enforce decisions (and prevent other justice systems from enforcing theirs) then it isn't justice or governance. As I said before, I think control/power is a necessary element of legitimacy. And while we do want government to be responsive to the needs of the populace, there are limits to this. Governments, for instance, rarely give up control of a population even if that would be in that population's best interest. This is not necessarily despotism since the government may genuinely believe that keeping that population under their control is for the best.

Similarly, what if the concern of the populace is for the governance to GTFO? What if the populace doesn't want your governance - what if they want someone elses or their own? Since your model places complete responsibility on the governance and not on the populace, how can better governance fill this kind of "need?"

This brings me back to a subject I keep raising: irreconcilable differences between two or more populations under a one system of governance. I don't think you've answered yet, but I am still wondering how you account for that.

Consider separatist insurgencies, which you've talked a bit about elsewhere. If minority ethnicity X does not want to live under a government controlled by majority ethnicity Y, then how can "better governance" solve that disconnect?

The insurgency and the insurgent are merely symptoms that come in many flavors. As you say popualaces are diverse. One can see this in Afghanistan as there are actually multiple insurgencies going on. But they are all in response to the failures of ONE government.

After some additional thought, I see a major flaw in your model in that it doesn't account for where governance takes place. In reality, there is rarely ONE government. Where governance occurs within a system of governance matters, so perhaps governance is best seen as a system.

Consider the US experience and the constant tension between local, state and federal power and authority. Additionally, what counts for "governance" for one population is, for a different population, handled through non-governmental means (such as religious institutions).

Your model appears to treat highly centralized and highly decentralized governance equally.

Also, I think your views expressed here on the relationship between governance and the populace has the effect of infantilizing the populace. You've explicitly stated that the governance is wholly responsible for the governance provided. However, in the absence of governance, a population will create its own system so how can the population hold no responsibility? Here's where I see a major internal disconnect in your arguments. On one hand, you've compellingly argued about self-determination and the centrality of the populace. On the other hand, you seem to argue that that the populace isn't responsible for their governance and that effective governance is best delivered through a technocratic top-down approach by determining what the populace wants and then providing that want.

**Chris jM** · 05-24-2010

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

So the Howard Paret translation is wrong?

Apologies to the last few posters, as this is a small (and hopefully quick and painless) divergence back to the CoG issue.

The following article contains some discussion of the H-Paget translation of CvC: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0735.pdf

The article makes some good points for the first few pages and then promptly descends into effects-based discussion, making my brain spin.

Noted that this thread isn't about CoG, so I'll be quiet now.