Operationalizing The Jones Model through COG

[Entropy]

I suspect that the key question in Afghanistan is how the populace perceives the conflict: is the core conflict between the GIROA and the Taliban, with the foreigners intervening in support of the GIROA, or is the core conflict between the foreigners and the Taliban, with the foreigners setting up the GIROA as a local agent of their own devising? If the former, then yes, this is insurgency and we're doing FID. If the latter, then it is war, regardless of how badly we'd like to call it something else.

I'll note again that Afghanistan was in civil war when we invaded. The Quetta Shura Taliban not only want to defeat a foreign invader, but regaining what control of the country they previously had (tenuous though it was). On the other hand, for HiG expelling the foreign invader is arguably their primary goal. Point being is that motivations and goals vary from group to group. I think looking at Afghanistan solely from the perspective of "insurgency" misses the underlying and long-standing civil conflict that predates the US intervention.

[Entropy]

I am well aware that the military is having to pick up the slack for other agencies failings and strategic dissonance.
I am merely stating the truism that if you apply military forces to problems that are not military in nature, then you will rarely get the outcome by the route you desire.
There are real limits to military power as a solution to non-military problems.

I think this is an important point which ties into my previous comment about the problem of competing organizations. The issue of the "militarization" of our effort has been brought up time-and-again over the last nine years yet nothing changes. That's one reason why, I fear, Col. Jone's model is irrelevant to Afghanistan no matter it's merits. We have proven incapable of synchronizing our efforts and have proven ourselves unable to bring the necessary non-military support to bear.

[marct]

I have a feeling that there is a basic incompatibility between the Jones Model and the application of the CoG concept. Basically, i would suggest that they are based on different analogies: CoG (and Schwerpunkt) is based on a Newtonian understanding of physics, while the Jones Model is, implicitly, based on a more complex field model (sort of a la Kurt Lewin).

Getting back to Slap's point about Voodoo, then the factors / dimensions in the Jones model are not so much indicators as conduits / flow channels for the reification of perceptions / beliefs. "Governments" (and insurgent movements, religions and other groups of people) in and of themselves, do not exist outside the minds of those who believe in them and inasmuch as those people impose that belief, through their actions, on others. It is this belief when coupled with actions that helps to create the "mass" that CvC was referring to. In a military (conventional) context, think about "moral".

The creation / maintenance of this "mass" (and the means of continually re-producing it) is what a COIN fight is all about, and that means guarding and controlling the conduit channels of "belief" and consequent actions. It is not so much about applying your "will" to a group so much as it is about focusing your will to enforce a belief system about "reality".

Shessh, I think I need more coffee......

[slapout9]

Getting back to Slap's point about Voodoo, then the factors / dimensions in the Jones model are not so much indicators as conduits / flow channels for the reification of perceptions / beliefs. "Governments" (and insurgent movements, religions and other groups of people) in and of themselves, do not exist outside the minds of those who believe in them and inasmuch as those people impose that belief, through their actions, on others. It is this belief when coupled with actions that helps to create the "mass" that CvC was referring to. In a military (conventional) context, think about "moral".

The creation / maintenance of this "mass" (and the means of continually re-producing it) is what a COIN fight is all about, and that means guarding and controlling the conduit channels of "belief" and consequent actions. It is not so much about applying your "will" to a group so much as it is about focusing your will to enforce a belief system about "reality".

Shessh, I think I need more coffee......

That is some really good coffee you are drinking, because that sums it up rather nicely IMO. in Systems Thinking it's the feedback loop(or lack of one) that will end up controlling the whole damn thing.

[marct]

That is some really good coffee you are drinking, because that sums it up rather nicely IMO. in Systems Thinking it's the feedback loop(or lack of one) that will end up controlling the whole damn thing.

Mediocre at best (Folgers). I really need to get my self down to the store and get the good stuff .

Anyway, yes, some of it does come out of systems theory but via some very weird channels (i.e. ritual studies and New Religious Movements). One of the nice things about the Jones Model is that it doesn't require specific end points where the content is pre-defined.

[slapout9]

Mediocre at best (Folgers). I really need to get my self down to the store and get the good stuff .

Mrs. Folgers was a master Propagandist.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=slJebNp9fxw&NR=1

[marct]

Mrs. Folgers was a master Propagandist.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=slJebNp9fxw&NR=1

LOL - too true! Now if the message matched the reality.....

[Bob's World]

Mediocre at best (Folgers). I really need to get my self down to the store and get the good stuff .

Anyway, yes, some of it does come out of systems theory but via some very weird channels (i.e. ritual studies and New Religious Movements). One of the nice things about the Jones Model is that it doesn't require specific end points where the content is pre-defined.

Recently MG Carter looked his commanders and staff in the eye and told them during a planning meeting for Kandahar: "The key to Hamkari is the creation of representative governance and representative opportunity."

Now, this is very much in line with what is proposed in the Jones Model, and I knew immediately what he was getting at, and more importantly, why it was so critical. To create these two conditions would strike at the heart of the causal perceptions of poor governance in Kandahar Provence.

Afterwords several of the commanders were discusing the meeting. One of them said: "I understand what the General wants, I just don't know what he wants me to do." This drew several nods and grunts of agreement.

This is complex stuff. Many well intentioned and very smart and experienced operators in the military, governance and development business are all doing their best to do what they think will bring stability to Afghanistan. All are operating within the guidance provided to them by their leadership. Many, however, know very little about insurgency.

Many military people want to simply defeat insurgent formations and disrupt their ability to generate decisive effects.

Many in the development business believe that if one brings electricty, paves roads, builds schools, etc stability will occur.

Many in the governance business believe that if they conduct elections and attack corruption stability will occur.

The Jones Model says that while all of those beliefs are reasonable, none are targeted directily at the perceptions of poor governance that give rise to the insurgency. They suppress the insurgent or artifically provide the things that good governance allows to occur, or they give semblences of legitimacy based on outsider perspectives.

The COG-based methodology provided here is for those who need a way to turn a fuzzy concept into specific things they can task, manage and execute. If it helps, use it. If it does not help, don't worry about it.

I have, however, made a few tweaks to the chart I provided to begin this thread, that I may post tomorrow.

[William F. Owen]

The Jones Model says that while all of those beliefs are reasonable, none are targeted directily at the perceptions of poor governance that give rise to the insurgency. They suppress the insurgent or artifically provide the things that good governance allows to occur, or they give semblences of legitimacy based on outsider perspectives.

What if the Taliban does not care about good governance? What if wants political power, to gain power over the population. If the population doesn't like it, they will kill them... just like they did before.

There was a civil war going in A'Stan long before NATO got there. What's that got to do with "good governance?" No one is fighting to "bring justice and peace." They are fighting to gain power over the population, to enrich themselves, socially, politically and economically.