Operationalizing The Jones Model through COG

[Bob's World]

And I am advocating that Great Britain (and all of Colonial Europe for that matter) are examples of Empires that crumbled under the very tactics you profess, and that we study so closely today.

That these European Empires were born of an information age powered by the Printing Press; and succumbed to a following information age born of Steam and Electricity. Revolutions in Information technology drive revolutions in Governance. What had worked (as you often profess) forever, is now as obsolete as so many tools that lay about our grandfather's garages and sheds.

Now comes the United States on the heels of these failed Empires, in the midst of this revolution of information technology. All of the tools handed to us by our predecessors were obsolete when we received them, but there was no way to know that, as they had always worked before. Silicon Chips, satellites, etc empowered the populaces of Eastern Europe to stand up to their Soviet masters, knowing the rest of the world backed their play. Now the Middle East seeks its opportunity as well. It is as natural as the rotation of the earth, or the movements of the tides. It is human nature, and it controls us, not the other way around.

We can resist this force of nature, or we can embrace it. I argue that success comes from embracing the emerging age; and that all powers seeking to emerge will do so. History tells us that empires seeking to hold onto their gains cling to the past, and to applying force to sustain the status quo.

Your model is obsolete Mr. Owen. Like Fred Flintstone, you are riding a dinosaur to work.

[William F. Owen]

And I am advocating that Great Britain (and all of Colonial Europe for that matter) are examples of Empires that crumbled under the very tactics you profess, and that we study so closely today.

The British Empire did not "crumble." It either altered into dominions, or was was granted independence - in the vast majority of cases, peacefully - as was the policy. The Empire ceased to exist because of politics and economics. It was not vanquished by force. In fact the exact opposite is true.

I argue that success comes from embracing the emerging age; and that all powers seeking to emerge will do so. History tells us that empires seeking to hold onto their gains cling to the past, and to applying force to sustain the status quo.

Well that's very romantic, but it's not good history. Empires come and go as a result of politics, -which sometimes includes the use of armed force, but almost never as a result of rebellions alone - in fact I cannot think of one.

Your model is obsolete Mr. Owen. Like Fred Flintstone, you are riding a dinosaur to work.

...and immensely happy to be so! Not sure that forms an argument, but certainly an amusing image. My wife recently managed to persuade someone she rode a donkey to work every morning!

[Bob's World]

I think my assessment of history is fine, but I am open minded.

When I was with the Egyptian Army, they all believed quite seriously that they had never lost a war with Israel.

When I talk to "Good Cold Warriors" they see America as bringing nothing but goodness, democracy, and rule of law to the people of the world.

It does not surprise me then, that one with a background in Great Britain would have a similarly biased view of their own history.

If 5 SWJ members, not of the empire, come up on the net and say "yeah, Bob, the Brits really rolled up the carpet as part of a master economic plan, and not due to the populaces of places like the US, India, or Iran throwing them out; then fine, I will hit the books and drill deeper. To say you have a strategy of reducing the empire because your strategy to hold the empire failed in the face of popular revolt, does not count.

[Dayuhan]

Silicon Chips, satellites, etc empowered the populaces of Eastern Europe to stand up to their Soviet masters, knowing the rest of the world backed their play. Now the Middle East seeks its opportunity as well. It is as natural as the rotation of the earth, or the movements of the tides. It is human nature, and it controls us, not the other way around.

The Middle East seeks the opportunity… to do what? To stand up to its masters? The Middle East hasn’t any master to stand up to. Of course they will seek to develop, emerge, and take their place in the world, why should they not? Certainly the US has no reason to try to stop them… Osama and his ilk will certainly try to abort the process, but it’s not likely that they’ll succeed: their support is just not broad enough.

The challenge the Middle East faces isn’t foreign mastery, it’s reconciling the conflicting impulses of their own populaces: some want full-on modernity, some want to retreat to the Middle Ages, some want material progress while retaining cultural traditions. Some want to maintain strong central states, some want regional autonomy… and on, and on, and on. It’s a diverse place with a lot of populaces and a lot of disagreement on direction and desired end state.

A lot of Americans misread the situation by assuming that change, progress, and emergence must necessarily mean abandonment of traditional political structures. Many Americans simply can’t imagine a government run by a King, Sheik, Emir, or Sultan that isn’t faced by a popular insurgency. It’s not something we’d accept, so we assume others shouldn’t accept it either.

Of course reality is much more complicated. Some of the more progressive and most emergent states in the Middle East are under traditional royal structures: Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE... and these governments enjoy very high levels of popular support. Some of those closest to collapse have Western-style structures, (Yemen, for one). In many cases populaces seem quite content with traditional structures, and the objections seem to come primarily from Americans who find the idea of royalty aesthetically displeasing... I can't say I find it aesthetically pleasing myself, but it's not my problem or my affair.

In any event, meddling in the internal affairs of these countries, no matter what the motive, is going to win no points with government or populace. We need to be minding our own business wherever possible, not trying to decide what constitutes good or bad governance for anyone else.

[Bob's World]

Dayuan,

My message is to stop meddling, not to meddle. To back out of roles where we are perceived as the source of legitimacy of governments that lack popular support. As you say, many of the small oil states have a wealth to populace ratio that makes the "no taxation, no representation" model function; others, like Saudi Arabia fall farther behind every day. Then there are the countries that lack the temporary wealth of oil.

It’s complicated. You always twist my message into one of "pro manipulation", and seem to think all is calm in the Middle East. You need to study the news coming out of there more closely. Suppressed insurgencies in states with controlled media don't necessarily scream in the headlines. You have to read the signs. The Saudis have been suppressing all of their Shiite populace and large portions of their Sunni populace since inception; and in the past 60 years they have manipulated our fear of oil disruption to suit their royal needs.

Follow the trails of foreign fighters back to where they come from and then research there first. Follow the trail of AQ "terrorists" back to where they come from and research there as well. Study how those populaces perceive the legitimacy of their governments. Study how they perceive the role of the US and the West in their countries. Study how they perceive their justice systems; or if they believe there is equal opportunity for all. Study how much control or influence they believe they have over their governance or even their personal fate. We've gotten into the middle of some messy situations. I'm saying we need to back out, not dig in. Not cut and run, but cut off the blank check of blind support and urge reforms be adopted if continued support is desired.

I've always said the only perception of good or bad governance is that of the governed populace. You always try to twist that, and I don't know why.

Governance is not Poor in the Middle East in many of our allied countries because I say so, but because the young men flocking to join AQ and local insurgent movements affiliated with AQ say so. And even larger cross sections of these same societies cutting checks and providing moral support say so as well. The people have no voice, but they are voting with their actions.

[Dayuhan]

My message is to stop meddling, not to meddle.

I refer to this:

First is to assess every nation with which the U.S. engages for how the major groupings within their populace perceive their own governance in terms of Legitimacy, Justice, Respect and Hope. Second is to ensure that the form of U.S. engagement is designed so as to be least likely to create perceptions of preemption of Legitimacy by the U.S. (remembering that this is as viewed through the eyes of those populaces; need only be perception and not fact; and that the perception of U.S. policy makers as to the intent and nature of said engagement is completely immaterial). Lastly is to encourage Hope; to tell the people of the world not to despair, while at the same time applying carrots and sticks as required to the governments of the same to engage their populaces and to make reasonable accommodations on terms acceptable within their unique cultures, to give the people a legal means to voice their concerns.

That, to me, is an open prescription for meddling. When we bring out the carrots and the sticks to get others to do what we think they ought to do, that's interference in the internal affairs of others. That's meddling.

I do believe that the Jones Model is an accurate description of many (not all) insurgencies, and that it can be a useful tool. It can also be a very dangerous tool, because it is so easy to interpret it as a justification to interfere: they need better governance, they don't seem able to deliver it themselves, we'd better go and help them, or do it for them. There's a very strong suggestion here that interference is acceptable - and even desirable - as long as it's "good" interference.

I've always said the only perception of good or bad governance is that of the governed populace. You always try to twist that, and I don't know why.

Why is very simple: the moment we speak of good or bad governance, we impose our own standards and our own values. When we assess we do it through our lens, with our prejudices and our assumptions. We can't do it any other way. We don't know what any other populace thinks or wants. We can't know, we're not them. Sure, there are people who claim to speak for the populace. Often there are lots of them, all saying something different. The guy with the loudest voice doesn't necessarily speak for the populace. The guy with a bomb doesn't necessarily speak for the populace.

Certainly in some circumstances we can deduce that a populace is upset, but the moment we set about trying to ascertain why they are upset or what needs to be done about it, we invariably bring our own perceptions and our own prejudices to the table.

What I see you recommending above is that we should assess another nation's internal politics, we should decide what we think is bothering the populace, and we should pressure that government to do what we think is needed to improve its relations with its own populace. There's a whole lot of "we" in that picture.

Follow the trails of foreign fighters back to where they come from and then research there first. Follow the trail of AQ "terrorists" back to where they come from and research there as well. Study how those populaces perceive the legitimacy of their governments. Study how they perceive the role of the US and the West in their countries. Study how they perceive their justice systems; or if they believe there is equal opportunity for all. Study how much control or influence they believe they have over their governance or even their personal fate. We've gotten into the middle of some messy situations.

I don't see the foreign fighter picture as being terribly relevant. You can't deduce an insurgent population from a few hundred angry young men, and if we assume that the foreign fighters speak for the populace, we push assumption beyond rational bounds.

The assumption that foreign fighters are fighting because of what they perceive to be malicious US influence in their own countries is not entirely compatible with evidence. For one thing, substantial numbers of foreign fighters come from countries (Libya and Syria) where the US has no significant presence and with which the US has had a generally antagonistic relationship. On top of that, we have already seen that AQ was able to successfully recruit foreign fighters for their jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which had nothing whatsoever to do with the US. In short, I think you're seeing a backlash against the US because that conclusion is compatible with your assumptions. All I can deduce from the foreign fighter issue is that the "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" narrative still has sufficient legs to recruit a few hundred people across the Muslim world to fight, regardless of what specific infidel is involved. I see no reason at all to assume a US-specific cause. If we want to resolve the foreign fighter problem we don't have to make everyone in the Muslim world like us, we have to wind up our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. They can't travel to join the fight if there's no fight for them to join.

I'm saying we need to back out, not dig in. Not cut and run, but cut off the blank check of blind support and urge reforms be adopted if continued support is desired.

Where does this "blank check of blind support" exist?

I think you drastically overrate the ability of the US to promote reform by threatening to withdraw support. As I said above, it won't work in Libya or Syria, because they don't get any US support. It won't work in Saudi Arabia either; they don't receive or require assistance from the US... if anything, we need assistance from them. Even where US assistance is substantial (Egypt, Yemen) the degree of reform that could be generated by a threat to withdraw aid is highly debatable. The use of aid conditionality as a tool to press for reform is nothing new, it's been tried many times, generally with mixed results, and it's been debated in the aid community for a long time. It's not necessarily a bad idea, but it's not a panacea either... and of course it can achieve nothing in states that don't get US aid.

I think overall you're assuming that the US has far more influence in these environments than it actually does. Overestimating one's own influence is often risky.

[Dayuhan]

You always twist my message into one of "pro manipulation", and seem to think all is calm in the Middle East. You need to study the news coming out of there more closely. Suppressed insurgencies in states with controlled media don't necessarily scream in the headlines. You have to read the signs. The Saudis have been suppressing all of their Shiite populace and large portions of their Sunni populace since inception; and in the past 60 years they have manipulated our fear of oil disruption to suit their royal needs.

As I said before, I see a strong suggestion in your model, sometimes openly stated, that manipulation is desirable as long as we think that manipulation is in support of the populace... given our inability to know what the populace thinks or wants, that seems a very shaky idea to me.

I didn't say that all is calm in the Middle East. I do not see a broad pattern of resistance against (generally nonexistent) US influence, and I do not see a broad pattern of resistance to autocratic governance structures. I see a large number of countries, each trying to balance competing imperatives from various segments of its populace. Some do it well, some do it less well. It is rarely so simple as "unified populace rebels against despotic bad governance".

The whole issue of suppressed insurgency is I think debatable: an insurgency with real popular support is not so easy to suppress. I get the feeling that you're looking at governments that by your standards deserve an insurgency, and assuming that if there isn't one it must be suppressed.

Governance is not Poor in the Middle East in many of our allied countries because I say so, but because the young men flocking to join AQ and local insurgent movements affiliated with AQ say so. And even larger cross sections of these same societies cutting checks and providing moral support say so as well. The people have no voice, but they are voting with their actions.

Please note that AQ has only succeeded in generating substantial support in cases where resistance to foreign intervention is involved: against the Soviets in Afghanistan, against the US in Iraq and Afghanistan. AQ's efforts to generate insurgency against governments in Muslim states have generally fallen pretty flat: AQ does not speak for the populace of Saudi Arabia, or any other populace. This suggests that the narrative driving AQ's recruitment and fund-raising is not "overthrow the despotic governance of your country and replace it with our even more despotic governance" but rather "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful". Many in the ME are perfectly happy to support AQ when they are battling foreign invaders in distant lands. When there's a prospect of AQ imposing their own brand of despotism at home, the reaction is very different. You're right, they are voting with their actions. They're voting against foreign engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they are voting for themselves, not on behalf of a populace. Jumping from there to the idea that they are voting against bad governance in their own countries is an assumption with very shaky support.

I see the following weaknesses in the Jones Model:

1. There seems to be an assumption that all violence against a state is a backlash against despotic bad governance. That may be the case in some places, but it is not necessarily the case in all. In some cases violence against government can be a consequence of good governance: reforms or modernization that are desired by a majority can invoke a violent backlash from a disaffected minority.

We have to be very careful about assuming that terrorist violence is the outcome of popular resistance to despotic governance. Because terrorism lends itself to application by small groups of radicals with little popular support, it is often used by such groups. If Timothy McVeigh had the capacity to raise an insurgency or to draw a million supporters to march on Washington, he'd have done it. He didn't have that kind of support, so he blew up a building. That didn't make him a spokesperson for an insurgent populace, it made him a fringe nutter with a bomb.

We have to be very careful about assuming that violence is a popular backlash against bad governance. When we deal with a government that we are predisposed to dislike, we need to be triply careful about assuming that our prejudices are shared by the populace. We can't eliminate our prejudices, but if we're aware of them we can prevent them from controlling us.

2. You seem to use "bad governance" and "despotism" almost interchangeably. I don't see that bad governance is necessarily despotic: it may simply be inept or impotent. Insurgency can result from a popular backlash against a despotic government; it can just as easily result from conflict between different populaces with radically different ideas of what governance should be, and from government's inability to effectively manage divergent goals.

3. I see a tendency to assume that all governments can govern well if only they choose to, and thus that external pressure can force governments to choose to govern well. I think this fails to consider the process by which governance grows. When we see a government that governs well and suits the populaces it governs, it doesn't mean that this governance was well installed by some deus ex machina process, or that those who govern simply chose to govern well. It means that this government evolved to suit the conditions in which it governs. The process of this evolution often - in fact almost always - involves conflict and disagreement. It typically involves violence at some stage. It is not a process that can be jump-started or short-circuited by a foreign power telling the locals how to govern themselves or how to please their populace. They have to work it out themselves. The process is likely to be messy, just as it was for the US. What we see as an insurgency against a despotic government is likely one step along that evolutionary path. Messing with it, whether out of self-interest or imagined altruism, is generally going to make it worse.

[William F. Owen]

When I was with the Egyptian Army, they all believed quite seriously that they had never lost a war with Israel.

Welcome the Middle East. We have three versions of history. Yours, ours and theirs!

It does not surprise me then, that one with a background in Great Britain would have a similarly biased view of their own history.

Welcome to Middle East...... etc etc.

If 5 SWJ members, not of the empire, come up on the net and say "yeah, Bob, the Brits really rolled up the carpet as part of a master economic plan, and not due to the populaces of places like the US, India, or Iran throwing them out; then fine, I will hit the books and drill deeper. To say you have a strategy of reducing the empire because your strategy to hold the empire failed in the face of popular revolt, does not count.

WW1 Bankrupted the Empire. There was simply no chance of holding onto it, especially as the UK had been left with policing what was left of the Ottoman Empire _ Palestine, the Trans-Jordan and Iraq. While economically of some benefit between the Wars, the Empire became "A-Strategic" after WW2. It was simply unsustainable - politically and economically.

Now you do not have to read a lot of books to see that the vast majority of Colonial possessions were transferred peacefully, and voluntarily.
Now it may be a fine line between the UK dissolving the Empire because both Political and economic circumstances made it impossible, and the issue that the UK probably could not maintain the Empire in the face of any serious opposition, even if it wanted too.

Fact is the UK policy underlying all the major post 1945 insurgencies (except Ulster) was to set the conditions for a peaceful transfer of power - and even the IRA has given up the "Armed Struggle" - in line with the UK's stated policy.
There were failures. In Aden, the UK announced a departure date, which actually made the existing insurgency worse, and the Palestine mandate was vacated with no agreement in place. Rhodesia declared UDI! - and War followed.

[Bob's World]

Today's Development-Focused Population Centric COIN is very focused on producing effects that I would categorize as "Critical Capabilities." These are capabilities that one would expect to see as outputs of a healthy Populace-Governance relationship. I believe the rationale is that because these things are missing, there is insurgency; so if these things are provided artificially, there will be no insurgency.

I see this as applying the same logic of if one imports thousands of Toyotas, and parks them in rows, that somehow a Toyota factory will appear. Maybe it will, but to me it appears that we focus on the wrong things, that these things cost way too much, and show little promise of producing enduring effects in terms of Good Governance and stability.

The counterinsurgent approach focuses on defeating the insurgent himself. Again, as this approach does not address the root causes, and increases governmental oppression of the populace in the process, it typically merely suppresses an insurgency for some number of days, months, or years.

The Jones Model directs attention to what are admittedly broad concepts, rooted in the top end of Maslow's hierarchy. The theory being that it is abuses of these fundamental, higher order human requirements that drive a populace to insurgency (at least the leadership, the heart and soul of the movement. The rank and file will recognize these causal perceptions, but may be driven by baser issues life, survival, and raising a family).

So under the Jones Model:
1. Security operations remain a critical supporting function. Always remembering that the insurgent is part of the populace, and tailoring violence accordingly. (As ADM Olson recently announced, there must be some counterinsurgent operations in counterinsurgency).

2. "Population-Centric COIN" is fine, but it must be operationalized with a clearer understanding of the nature of Insurgency. Afghanistan is filled with well intentioned professionals and experts in a wide range of disciplines; sadly while some are newly minted "experts" on COIN, few know much about INSURGENCY. One cannot counter what one does not understand.

3. This tool provides a methodology for going after those things the Jones Model identifies as most critical to removing the causal factors of insurgency.

a. The first step is to, by focused district or area, assess and attempt to understand what the populace of that specific area's perceptions are on the 4 causal factors.

b. Step two is to then determine your CVs or those CRs that are most important to that populace and that you are most likely to be able to positively affect.

c. Step three is to then break this down in more detail by determining, across the disciplines of you COIN force, what type of engagement/projects you could specifically do designed to get directly at the CVs. In the example provided, where "justice" is lacking it is assessed that a regular, professional, fair, and assessable court system is lacking. Elements of providing this are ID'd as HVTs.

d. Step four are your HVIs (Individual people or projects) that go toward building that missing capability or capacity that is deemed most likely to address the CV of concern in that community.

e. Step five is to execute all of this in a manner that empowers the HN governance and keeps them to the forefront.

f. Step six is to continue to assess and refine and minimize external influence (by both the FID forces AND the UW forces) at every opportunity.

Updated operationalizing tool:

[William F. Owen]

In the example provided, where "justice" is lacking it is assessed that a regular, professional, fair, and assessable court system is lacking.

OK, question: Surely if you can provide "justice" you've won, regardless of everything else. Populations support those that have power over them - "the man with a gun at their door, at midnight"-
If you are the arbiter or what is right and what is wrong and you can demonstrate that, that is power. If no one can challenge that, you are in control. People will support who ever dispenses the justice they want. Is that not the case?

Question 2: What is justice is this Power Point Slide? My guess is you mean promoting a US style form of justice, which folks will probably fight against, because if patently is not "just" in their eyes.

[Bob's World]

All critical causal factors are as viewed from the perspective of the populace in question.

What foreigners think matters not at all; and typically the HN counterinsurgent is blind to what the populace perceives as well, so there take will lead you astray as well.

Current efforts In Population Centric COIN are on promoting "Rule of Law" - my point is that greater enforcement of a legal system percieved by the populace as unjust is tyranny.

While Taliban justice is harsh, it is, by populace assessment, perceived as more "just" than that provided by the GIROA.

So, yes, it must be the pursuit of "justice" ie, how the populace FEELS about the legal system that is the goal.