Operationalizing The Jones Model through COG

[William F. Owen]

This thread is about applying a logical methodology to get at the most important things that one must get at in order to prevail in an insurgency.

Ends, Ways, Means?

The fact that that is also "COG analysis" and that it differs from what the books say I am supposed to think and do, is just something that the COG Nazis will have to live with.
I can call a horse a pig, but it is still a horse.

So you'll say "Shock" when what you are actually describing is "Surprise."
Sorry, but this is why modern Concepts and Doctrine can be so poor.
Use the words as they are used in English. There is 1 definition of a COG. It is well described. It is useful to those of us who understand it.

Based on the commonly used definition, the Population is not a COG. You are just arbitrarily assigning the word, based on your wish to use it. Do you mean that "securing the population is the objective?"

[Bob's World]

Ends, Ways, Means?


So you'll say "Shock" when what you are actually describing is "Surprise."
Sorry, but this is why modern Concepts and Doctrine can be so poor.
Use the words as they are used in English. There is 1 definition of a COG. It is well described. It is useful to those of us who understand it.

Based on the commonly used definition, the Population is not a COG. You are just arbitrarily assigning the word, based on your wish to use it. Do you mean that "securing the population is the objective?"

"COG" is in truth a broad concept given very brief coverage by its founder, Mr. CvC. Since then various military organizations have attempted often to codify it, with those codifications covering a broad range of meanings and degrees and types of process prescribed that continually evolve over time.

The concept is a sound one, but I believe it must be applied with an open mind. Conflict within a state, among a single populace is a VERY VERY different thing in terms of its nature (though on the surface it may look quite similar) to conflicts between distinct states or populaces. For those who believe rigidly that all political violence is war, and that all war is the same, and that every application of the military is solely to defeat the opponents capability and capacity to produce violence, will remain forever trapped in a box, and surrounded by high walls.

I merely offer you a window to peak through. I do not demand that you come out of your box, or that you tear down your walls. As I learned as a trial attorney, I can disagree without being disagreeable; object without being objectionable; and be outraged without being outrageous. (though sometimes I confess, I fail in all of those nicities...)

The fact is that most insurgencies are handed to the military to deal with. The fact also is that most Empires that possess the military power to ward off all external state threats are also so confident and reliant on their military abilities that they apply them to internal struggles as well. Those Empires now all reside in a tremendous graveyard filled with those who have fallen to successful insurgency.

My position is that the one so often presented on these electronic pages by Mr. William F Owen is a very, very dangerous one indeed. It is a map to a well traveled path that many a failed empire has taken in good faith of their righteousness and full confidence in their military prowess.

[Infanteer]

Sorry to deviate from the COG discussion again, but I still can't get this packaged up right:

Conflict within a state, among a single populace is a VERY VERY different thing in terms of its nature (though on the surface it may look quite similar) to conflicts between distinct states or populaces.

Do we consider Afghanistan a single populace? Do the Kandaharis consider Uzbeks from the north to be of the same people? Many discussions I had with the average southern Pashtun indicated that they had as much in common as me, Joe Canuck, and a Mexican. Americans and Canadians have more in common than certain ethnic divisions in Afghanistan.

What does this do to the model of warfare/insurgency that you have presented? Maybe bringing this back to the thread (so I am not a complete off-topic guy) what does this means that "perception of good governance" =/= "Afghanistan".

[Bob's World]

Sorry to deviate from the COG discussion again, but I still can't get this packaged up right:



Do we consider Afghanistan a single populace? Do the Kandaharis consider Uzbeks from the north to be of the same people? Many discussions I had with the average southern Pashtun indicated that they had as much in common as me, Joe Canuck, and a Mexican. Americans and Canadians have more in common than certain ethnic divisions in Afghanistan.

What does this do to the model of warfare/insurgency that you have presented? Maybe bringing this back to the thread (so I am not a complete off-topic guy) what does this means that "perception of good governance" =/= "Afghanistan".

The intial test is this a conflict between peoples under two separate systems of govenrance, or is that conficts between a segment of a popualce the governance over them. The first is war, the second is insurgency.

As to how do the popopulaces perceive themselves, and this govenance over them? Ah, now you are getting to the Jones Model. There are many reasons why a popualce may not perceive the governance over them as legitimate.

The American Colonists felt that Government in England had become too removed, and too self-serving at their expense and exclusion from input.

The People of France in WWII felt that a government emplaced and supported by the German invaders lacked legitimacy.

The people of Afghanistan, and they are indeed goegraphically separated in diverse groupings, surely take a wide range of perspectives on ANY centralized governance in Afghanistan. Though there is probably greater agreement that when that centralized form is created and supported by an invading outsider that it drops to an even lower level of acceptance in terms of its legitimacy.

Things like borders and treaty-driven divisions of populaces and establishments of governments can confuse the issues as well as create conditions for insurgent violence. The creation of a a state of North Viet Nam, for example, did not suddenly turn the issues there into state vs state issues; the issues were still largely rooted in the popular challenge to such treaties and governments being imposed upon them by outsiders. These things are rarely black and white, and as Ken White loves to beat me about the head and shoulders with (hey, a guy his age needs the exercise) there are no pat answers. There are, however, some underlying fundamental "truths" that help shape an effective understanding of the suface conditions we observe.

[Fuchs]

I think it's appropriate that we've got two definitions today; the CvC definition of a Schwerpunkt (a bit fuzzy becasue it varies between books) that's about the location of greatest might and the U.S. definition of a "Center of Gravity" (center with -er!) or "CoG" that's more a kind of weak spot lever analysis.

It's too late to force the world to accept the original one as the only one because the weak spot analysis needs a title as well - but it's not too late to deny people the right to assert that their differing concept goes back to CvC and his Schwerpunkt.

[Dayuhan]

The intial test is this a conflict between peoples under two separate systems of govenrance, or is that conficts between a segment of a popualce the governance over them. The first is war, the second is insurgency.

I suspect that the key question in Afghanistan is how the populace perceives the conflict: is the core conflict between the GIROA and the Taliban, with the foreigners intervening in support of the GIROA, or is the core conflict between the foreigners and the Taliban, with the foreigners setting up the GIROA as a local agent of their own devising? If the former, then yes, this is insurgency and we're doing FID. If the latter, then it is war, regardless of how badly we'd like to call it something else.

[jcustis]

That tendency is evident in our preference for central government, and in our assumption that effective governance is a desirable thing. In many cases it may not be. If a group of people is accustomed to governing themselves, with nominal allegiance to a distant and abstract national entity, the prospect of an effective government - of a government that actually proposes to govern them - might be regarded as a direct assault on a treasured autonomy. We might see a police force and a courthouse as "delivering justice", the populace might see it as an attempt to impose a foreign system of justice.

Not all that unlike the brand of ultra-survivalists and anti-taxation folk in our own country, if you stop and think about it. Deep inside, a large cross-section of the population empathize with them. Maybe not so strongly as to provide aid and comfort in the wake of an attack against one of our institutions, but there is fertile ground that can be worked with a hoe if governance and its institutions are already weak or corrupt.

I suspect that the key question in Afghanistan is how the populace perceives the conflict: is the core conflict between the GIROA and the Taliban, with the foreigners intervening in support of the GIROA, or is the core conflict between the foreigners and the Taliban, with the foreigners setting up the GIROA as a local agent of their own devising? If the former, then yes, this is insurgency and we're doing FID. If the latter, then it is war, regardless of how badly we'd like to call it something else.

I don't see, after 9 years at this effort, where we are any closer to understanding the dynamic.

The common insurgent weakness revolves around the relationship between insurgent leaders and their followers, both the rank-and-file fighters and the supporting populace. It's not universal, but where it exists it provides a key strategic target. If we look at "the insurgency" as a monolithic entity driven solely by resistance to bad governance, we can overlook this vulnerability.

Insurgent leaders are typically ideologically driven, and fighting for a particular desired end state, generally one in which they take political power. Insurgent followers are more typically driven by local issues that threaten them: they fight against an unacceptable status quo. The ideology of the leader is frequently less that significant (and often less than comprehensible) to the follower. The key to success for the insurgent leadership is in understanding those local grievances (which will vary widely from one locale to the next) and in presenting themselves as a solution or as an ally.

That dynamic presents an interesting challenge. The leadership may be diffuse and difficult to target; even when some of them are killed or captured new leaders emerge from the ideological core. If we target the followers, we end up punishing people who see themselves fighting for their own rights or their own survival, often exacerbating the issues that the core insurgent propagandists exploit. For me, the key to resolving a situation like this is to understand the core narrative of the followers in any given locale, identify the divergences between the narratives of leader and follower, and act to address the issues that motivate the followers. The idea is to drive a wedge between leader and follower, less a question of decapitation than disembodiment. We will never persuade the core ideologues, but if we can isolate them from their followers we can render them irrelevant.

Great observations that play into my own struggle to define area denial. Reading your points brings home the fact that despite all the collections assets we have at our disposal, that harness military manpower, very few of them (at least that I can tell) are focused on identifying the root causes of why knuckleheads do what they do, and spend inordinant amounts of time and resources simply showing us the sypmtoms. I can't tell you how many times I have read reporting that does a great job making connections within the realm of Slap's four F's, and details what has or is about to happen, but simply canno fathom the reason why. It seems that assessment is often reserved for the human terrain folks, and that presents an inverse proportion of effort.

Perhaps that's because it will always be easier to be the counterinsurgent than to actually resolve the insurgency across the spectrum.

[William F. Owen]

Perhaps that's because it will always be easier to be the counterinsurgent than to actually resolve the insurgency across the spectrum.

Correct, but so what? It is not "your' job to solve the problem. "Your" is to break their armed force, using armed force.

"You" apply military force, which kills and destroys and so deters as a result of doing so, or intending so.
The military contribution to crushing a revolt is to kill and capture the "revolting." - that's it! Military force can only destroy or deter.

ALL ELSE is done by politics and diplomacy - with only the alternative to kill and capture, if the rebels act out again.

Killing and capturing rebels requires skill. It does not create more rebels. This is fallacy, though it can and might, it is not a given, and this is not a reason not to do it.

[slapout9]

I can't tell you how many times I have read reporting that does a great job making connections within the realm of Slap's four F's, and details what has or is about to happen, but simply canno fathom the reason why. It seems that assessment is often reserved for the human terrain folks, and that presents an inverse proportion of effort.

JC, that is why I say Motive, Method, and Opportunity should replace Ends, Ways and Means. CvC even talks about always going back to the Original Motive for the war! But here is what I think is the flaw in Wilf's argument, nobody ever ask soldiers/police officers how to prevent crime/war and if by some slim chance they do Politicos don't like the answers they get. Here is where I think Wilf is right......It's all politics.....politics causes war and crime. And that is the value in the Jones model....if it wakes some people up and gets them to pay attention to what the root cause/problem is....then that is a good governance thing. The fact that a soldier produces it or recommends it shouldn't really concern people IMO.

Plus, Wilf is really a nice guy he just can't stand it because that dead German guy had no since of humor whatsoever. Keep your head down.

[Entropy]

I suspect that the key question in Afghanistan is how the populace perceives the conflict: is the core conflict between the GIROA and the Taliban, with the foreigners intervening in support of the GIROA, or is the core conflict between the foreigners and the Taliban, with the foreigners setting up the GIROA as a local agent of their own devising? If the former, then yes, this is insurgency and we're doing FID. If the latter, then it is war, regardless of how badly we'd like to call it something else.

I'll note again that Afghanistan was in civil war when we invaded. The Quetta Shura Taliban not only want to defeat a foreign invader, but regaining what control of the country they previously had (tenuous though it was). On the other hand, for HiG expelling the foreign invader is arguably their primary goal. Point being is that motivations and goals vary from group to group. I think looking at Afghanistan solely from the perspective of "insurgency" misses the underlying and long-standing civil conflict that predates the US intervention.

[Entropy]

I am well aware that the military is having to pick up the slack for other agencies failings and strategic dissonance.
I am merely stating the truism that if you apply military forces to problems that are not military in nature, then you will rarely get the outcome by the route you desire.
There are real limits to military power as a solution to non-military problems.

I think this is an important point which ties into my previous comment about the problem of competing organizations. The issue of the "militarization" of our effort has been brought up time-and-again over the last nine years yet nothing changes. That's one reason why, I fear, Col. Jone's model is irrelevant to Afghanistan no matter it's merits. We have proven incapable of synchronizing our efforts and have proven ourselves unable to bring the necessary non-military support to bear.

[William F. Owen]

"COG" is in truth a broad concept given very brief coverage by its founder, Mr. CvC.

Huh? How is it given "brief coverage?" He clearly and usefully explains what it is. What screws everything up is folks trying to change the inconvenient truth of what he states. A COG is something you strike. If you cannot strike it is not a COG! The whole concept is about harming the enemy.

Those Empires now all reside in a tremendous graveyard filled with those who have fallen to successful insurgency.

That is simply is not true. Empires have been sustained and created by crushing rebellions. If you say Rebellion or Revolt instead of insurgency, then I think this clarifies the issues in a historical context. It certainly gets puts all the new words and concepts in context.

It is a map to a well traveled path that many a failed empire has taken in good faith of their righteousness and full confidence in their military prowess.

It's a map well supported by 3,000 years of history of how to use armed force to set forth policy. It works if done by the skilled and fails when done by the un-skilled.

[Bob's World]

Huh? How is it given "brief coverage?" He clearly and usefully explains what it is. What screws everything up is folks trying to change the inconvenient truth of what he states. A COG is something you strike. If you cannot strike it is not a COG! The whole concept is about harming the enemy.

That is simply is not true. Empires have been sustained and created by crushing rebellions. If you say Rebellion or Revolt instead of insurgency, then I think this clarifies the issues in a historical context. It certainly gets puts all the new words and concepts in context.

It's a map well supported by 3,000 years of history of how to use armed force to set forth policy. It works if done by the skilled and fails when done by the un-skilled.

I will not argue that empire after empire pitted their armies to suppress the insurgent will of the populaces they exercise dominion over. I will not argue that such efforts have sustained such emipires long after the populaces contained within them desired them to be gone. But I also will not argue with the facts that such efforts always ultimately fail.

This is why The USSR is but a blink in history, England is but an island; Rome is but a city, and Greece is in foreclosure. The list is as long as history to support my point; where is the history to support yours?