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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Default Operationalizing The Jones Model through COG

    “Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” Sun Tzu


    Is much of our current engagement merely the noise before defeat?

    With so many talented providers swarming into places like Afghanistan, and with so much funding currently available to resource such engagement one would expect that if "effectiveness" (security, development, government) is indeed the road to victory, that victory will soon be ours.

    But what if "effectiveness" is far more the output of a stable, insurgency-free state, rather than being the input that will ultimately produce such a state??

    In other words, is the conventional wisdom attempting to back its way into stability by importing the products of good governance rather than going in the front door by targeting the perceptions of good governance among the disaffected populace?

    I have produced COG-based engagement tools in the past, and shared them with the SWJ community on other threads. My recent work the Jones Insurgency Model caused me to go back and readdress that work. In the past I came to the position that there are two COGs; "The Populace" for COIN; and "The Network" for CT. Once I completed my work on my Insurgency Model I realized that I needed to reassesses my COG for COIN. Many had challenged the rather broad category of "The Populace" previously, but I had nothing better to offer to describe what I was getting at, and frankly, neither did any of these challengers. I wasn't fully satisfied, but I couldn't "get no satisfaction" either.

    http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...urgency-model/

    So this morning I dusted off my old COG targeting model and reframed it in the context of the Jones Insurgency Model. I offer that product here for your collective consideration and comment. In the example below let us assume that a variety of HN, interagency, military, and NGO teams are all working independently to conduct COIN in a specific community. For currency sake, let us say that community is the Arghandab valley on the northern outskirts of Kandahar City. Each of the teams has its own mission, chain of command, authorities, funding, priorities, etc. In other words, they are systemically prevented from being able to agree on virtually anything. In this (hypothetical) case, they all have read about the Jones Insurgency Model, and decide to conduct an assessment of the perceptions of Poor Governance among the populace of the Arghandab. Upon completion of that assessment they determine that the number one concern of the populace that was also a causal factor of insurgency under the Jones Model was the lack of Justice. (Thus elevating "Justice" from being a CR to also being a CV in this community). Continuing to drill down on this CV they derive a series of HVTs and HVIs and a scheme to work within their respective lanes to mutually produce this critical line of operation aimed directly at the heart of the center of gravity, and to make it each of their number one priority project.

    Armed with this new focus each is able to tailor their overall schemes of engagement by minimizing or cancelling ineffective engagement that they had been working on (with the greatest of intentions) previously; and also many discovered that they had more in common with each other than they had thought prior to this new effort.

    Equally important, the shared assessment and collective plan for achieving it was sitting the desk's of all of their respective bosses, creating enhanced synergy at the highest levels, as well as down at the operator level.


    (Note, I do not employ the COG process as described in the Joint Pub, as I find it illogical and as likely to produce arguments and confusion on a staff as it is to produce focus and synergy. CvC didn't prescribe any particular rules, so I feel free to think about this concept in a manner that makes sense to me.)
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    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Here's some quick editing recommendations for your argument.

    With so many talented providers swarming into places like Afghanistan, and with so much funding currently available to resource such engagement one would expect that if "effectiveness" (security, development, government) is indeed the road to victory, that victory will soon be ours.
    Another analogy is Ayn Rand's character Dagny Taggart in Atlas Shrugged. She saw her world and society collapsing around her, and she felt that she could change it through her own sheer will and determination. She was over-confident in her own abilities and over-optimistic in the potential of others and the state of human nature.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    But what if "effectiveness" is far more the output of a stable, insurgency-free state, rather than being the input that will ultimately produce such a state??
    Change output to outcome. You're speaking in technical systems terms. Outputs in a governance system would be in terms of the stable, insurgency-free metrics (low levels of violence, free/fair elections, mutual respect towards differing cultures/religions, women's rights, etc...). The outcome is good governance.

    For the slide, the picture is confusing. It looks like a systems slide, but the items on the left are critical requirements not inputs.

    Mike
    Last edited by MikeF; 05-23-2010 at 10:53 AM.

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Mike,

    You're missing my point, so I'll try to be clearer.

    Perhaps from the bottom up:

    The COG is "Good Governance." What I propose here is that if you have good governance you have peace, at least internally to your state.

    Critical Requirements ARE the inputs. They are what are required to produce Good Governance. If one sees the COG as the factory; CCs are what the Factory produces; and CRs are the materials the factory requires to produce it.

    I see our current development-focused COIN as essentially importing parking lots full of final products in the hope that somehow the "factory" that produces such products will miraculously appear.

    So what I propose is that if in fact Good Governance is the COG; and that if in fact these four causal perceptions are what determines if Good Governance exists; then one must logically determine in any given community what the perceptions are on these four factors (giving you your CVs) and focusing on the ones that are negative but also shapeable. HVTs and HVIs are then merely refining ones targeting down to specific families of action and specific projects within those families.

    So, yes, it is a "systems" slide in that it takes a fuzzy concept like COG and frames it in a predictive, logical format that allows COG to more than just a slide in the Command Brief that drives nothing; or a topic for strategy geeks to debate at the club.

    If you are confused by the slide start at one end and work your way to the other. It is a simple reduction/refining process.

    I contend that currently we focus on those things that exist in a state that has no insurgency, and believe that if we produce those things in a state that has insurgency, the insurgency will go away. I offer that that logic is flawed and is not likely to work. It is based on observation of the symptoms of insurgency rather than being based on the root causes of insurgency.
    Last edited by Bob's World; 05-23-2010 at 11:35 AM.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Hi Sir,

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    The COG is "Good Governance." What I propose here is that if you have good governance you have peace, at least internally to your state.

    Critical Requirements ARE the inputs. They are what are required to produce Good Governance. If one sees the COG as the factory; CCs are what the Factory produces; and CRs are the materials the factory requires to produce it.

    What I propose is that if in fact Good Governance is the COG; and that if in fact these four causal perceptions are what determines if Good Governance exists; then one must logically determine in any given community what the perceptions are on these four factors (giving you your CVs) and focusing on the ones that are negative but also shapeable. HVTs and HVIs are then merely refining ones targeting down to specific families of action and specific projects within those families.
    Thanks for the clarification. Can the above be considered your BLUF?

    I see our current development-focused COIN as essentially importing parking lots full of final products in the hope that somehow the "factory" that produces such products will miraculously appear.
    Here's one example, as I see it, of our attempt to bring in the final products without first building the factory.

    Marjah- Marines clear Taliban gov't and assume control; however, there is no ready-made alternative government structure to fill the political, security, and economic vacuum. Without an existing security force to police, a judicial system to resolve disputes, and an economic system to encourage growth, the local populace perceives bad governance.

    OTOH,

    So what I propose is that if in fact Good Governance is the COG; and that if in fact these four causal perceptions are what determines if Good Governance exists; then one must logically determine in any given community what the perceptions are on these four factors (giving you your CVs) and focusing on the ones that are negative but also shapeable. HVTs and HVIs are then merely refining ones targeting down to specific families of action and specific projects within those families.
    This reminds me more of the Phillipines or Colombian model. The task organization would be 80/20 state to mil. Instead of clearing and holding areas, advisors would work to assist and encourage the existing gov't towards better governance.

    Am I tracking?

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default The COG

    Sorry but CvC is the only valid provider of what a COG is.

    He is quite clear. The/A COG is that from which the enemy draws his "strength and cohesion", - and which can be harmed (against which the blow should be focussed)! If a COG is "destroyed", then the enemy cannot exist or even re-generate as an effective force.

    We can make up new words and new definitions to alter the fact and truths to fit the opinion, but as concerns the only precise meaning of "COG" in military thought, that is it!
    Last edited by William F. Owen; 05-23-2010 at 11:59 AM.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Default Ahh, but Carl wrote of war, I write of Insurgency

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Sorry but CvC is the only valid provider of what a COG is.

    He is quite clear. The/A COG is that from which the enemy draws his "strength and cohesion", - and which can be harmed (against which the blow should be focussed)! If a COG is "destroyed", then the enemy cannot exist or even re-generate as an effective force.

    We can make up new words and new definitions to alter the fact and truths to fit the opinion, but as concerns the only precise meaning of "COG" in military thought, that is it!
    In war each opponent has a COG; he must defend his own and seek to destroy the other's.

    In COIN the COG is shared. Both insurgent and Counterinsurgent compete for the support of the populace, both compete to be perceived as the provider of Good Governance. A COG is something to be earned, not protected or destroyed.

    Carl is the master of warfare, and his theories can be applied to Insurgency, but they must be adapted in full recognition that Warfare and Insurgency are two different things.

    Those who believe COIN to be extremely difficult and likely to be a long drawnout affair believe so because they fight it like a war; or because they think they can develop their way out of it. One can fight a long war and ultimately suppress the symptoms of insurgency; one can perhaps give a populace so much "stuff" that they stop resisting your poor governance. Or, one can produce Good Governance and make the insurgency go away. I'd love to have this conversation with CvC. While most of his deciples will fight me to the mat, like Peter slicing the Roman soldiers ear from his head with his sword to protect his master; I think CvC would immediatlely grasp the nuance I put before him.
    Last edited by Bob's World; 05-23-2010 at 12:45 PM.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    In COIN the COG is shared. Both insurgent and Counterinsurgent compete for the support of the populace, both compete to be perceived as the provider of Good Governance. A COG is something to be earned, not protected or destroyed.
    Then it's not a COG! It's something completely different. You need to call it something else, and not muddy the existing proven and good theory by using the same term in an imprecise and confusing way.
    Carl is the master of warfare, and his theories can be applied to Insurgency, but they must be adapted in full recognition that Warfare and Insurgency are two different things.
    I strongly disagree. Insurgencies use violence for a a political purpose, therefore War, thus is conducted using warfare - as were many countless rebellions and revolts throughout history.
    One can fight a long war and ultimately suppress the symptoms of insurgency; one can perhaps give a populace so much "stuff" that they stop resisting your poor governance.
    Yes anyone can do stupid stuff, by ignoring the fundamentals of warfare. Your job, as a soldier is to break the military means used to oppose the policy. The policy is none of your business unless you are an Army not accountable to it's civilian leaders.

    This is nothing to do with suppressing symptoms. Ends Ways and Means!! Your sole job is to prevent the "enemy" attaining his policy via violence. If he does it using song, art or ballet, good for him. Your job is to ensure he does not use violence and opts for peaceful means.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Sorry but CvC is the only valid provider of what a COG is.

    He is quite clear. The/A COG is that from which the enemy draws his "strength and cohesion", - and which can be harmed (against which the blow should be focussed)! If a COG is "destroyed", then the enemy cannot exist or even re-generate as an effective force.

    We can make up new words and new definitions to alter the fact and truths to fit the opinion, but as concerns the only precise meaning of "COG" in military thought, that is it!
    I think you should read CvC again, or maybe choose a better translation. You're dangerously close to the American idea of a "Center of gravity" that's quite unlike the original "Schwerpunkt".

    I do especially object to
    The/A COG is that from which the enemy draws his "strength and cohesion", (...)

    Let me quote myself:

    Ever since I've been irritated by the use of the term "center of gravity" (Schwerpunkt) in (American) English military theory writings. It's being used with the meaning of "critical vulnerability" instead of as "great accumulation of power for the best chance to win an important battle".

    It's OK to invent a new concept, but please name it accordingly - and don't misuse an old, famous and established term for it. Most importantly, don't link your concept to a respected theorist because that's an illegitimate move that exploits that author's crediility.

    Again and again I discussed these points with little effect. The new meaning of the term was long since established in English-language literature and people stubbornly kept linking it to von Clausewitz.


    Well, it turned out to be a double surprise because my position was long since official doctrine - in the U.S.! The USMC acknowledged this in its FMFM-1 "Warfighting" field manual (1989):

    "(...) Sometimes known as the center of gravity. However, there is a danger in using this term. Introducing the term into the theory of war Clausewitz wrote (p.485): "A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated the most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity." Clearly, Clausewitz was advocating a climatic test of strength against strength "by daring all to will all" (p. 596). This approach is consistent with Clausewitz' historical perspective. But we have since come to prefer pitting strength against weakness. Applying the term to modern warfare, we must make it clear that by the enemy's center of gravity we do not mean a source of strength, but rather a critical vulnerability."

    in a footnote that was in reference to

    "Therefore, we should focus our efforts against a critical enemy vulnerability. Obviously, the more critical and vulnerable, the better."
    The American CoG concept seeks an easy lever for victory, while CvC's "Schwerpunkt" was primarily about how to arrange the own forces without wasting potential.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    I think you should read CvC again, or maybe choose a better translation. You're dangerously close to the American idea of a "Center of gravity" that's quite unlike the original "Schwerpunkt".
    OK, using the Howard and Paret translation - page 485-6 ; "The fighting forces of each belligerent- whether a single state or an alliance of states- have a certain unity and therefore certain cohesion. Where there is cohesion, the analogy of the centre of gravity can be applied."

    Point being:
    a.) It is a source of strength - on which the enemy's power relies
    b.) It can have force applied against it.

    Am I missing something?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Col. Jones,

    I will need to mull this over for a while (I'm a slow thinker), but here are some initial impressions:

    As a generic model, it makes sense. However, the example used to demonstrate the model is problematic and rests on a few questionable assumptions, so "operationalizing" the model is where I see problems:

    The biggest flaw begins with this: "In other words, they are systemically prevented from being able to agree on virtually anything." That condition is the completely normal result of independent bureaucracies with independent resources and independent agendas. Your example first assumes they are all working on "COIN" and further assumes they can be brought together in the context of that COIN work towards a common objective. Then there is the assumption that this can be accomplished simply by "showing them the light" on what the principle concern in the area is.

    That is wishful thinking IMO. First of all, it's not obvious that they are actually working toward "COIN" despite what they main believe/claim. Secondly, independent organizations cannot be made to reliably work together without some kind of unified command with the authority to force competing bureaucracies and interests to play nice. Third, independent organizations are not going to work together based on a survey, no matter how comprehensive and rigorous. In short, you can't assume that those organizations will see things your way and rearrange their priorities toward the goal you've identified as central in priority.


    Equally important, the shared assessment and collective plan for achieving it was sitting the desk's of all of their respective bosses, creating enhanced synergy at the highest levels, as well as down at the operator level.
    To summarize my argument, how are you going to keep those bosses from putting the plan in the circular file?

    I like the model, but, like any model, one must consider if can be reasonably implemented in a given set of circumstances.
    Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post

    Is much of our current engagement merely the noise before defeat?
    BW, I just watched a movie on HBO awhile back called "The Objective" It is about a CIA operative backed by an SF A-team who has to gain critical information about a secret WMD inside A'stan. The CIA guy goes to a local "holy man" for advice and this is what he said.
    "America cannot free Afghanistan only Allah can free Afghanistan".:eek: The WMD turns out to a Spiritual WMD aka Bad Ass Ghost with extreme powers. I hope that is not the future!


    Your recent posts has a lot to think about so I will answer in sections, since I have to cut the Grass here

    CR's are inputs-Good Governance is a PROCESS not an output or an out come IMO. The system in focus is a "Territorial Stabilization System". Good Governance is the process used to achieve that. A'tan is a territory not a country or state IMO.... like Steve Blair's Arizona Territory.

    Drop the COG stuff, just call it a critical process.
    How to operationalize it example.
    I-P-O- model


    Input-------------Good Governance PROCESS ----------Output

    __________________________________________________ __________


    People...............voter registration/election .................Elected Official

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Gotta agree with Slap

    Your COG usage muddies your water. Wilf and Fuchs challenge to it will be repeated by many others...

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Agree, alway dangerous to swim in muddy water, and between the debates between the deciples of CvC over the few words he wrote about a simple concept of "COG"; and the (my personal opinion) jumbled mess of operationalizing it that the US Joint doctrine takes lately; it is muddy water indeed.

    Personally I think I take a lean, clean, logical aproach to COG analysis; but for those who are used to mud in their water it does spark them to defend their pet points.

    But this thread isn't about COG. This thread is about applying a logical methodology to get at the most important things that one must get at in order to prevail in an insurgency.

    The fact that that is also "COG analysis" and that it differs from what the books say I am supposed to think and do, is just something that the COG Nazis will have to live with.
    I can call a horse a pig, but it is still a horse.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Talking "Don't complify; simplicate!" Said a wise old bird...

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Personally I think I take a lean, clean, logical aproach to COG analysis
    I'd suggest perhaps excessively lean, possibly overly logical in contrast to the human conflicts it discusses which are rarely logical and thus perhaps not as firmly cast as some might think.

    I do sort of wonder how it can be clean if the water is muddied by pointless battles over terminology...
    ...This thread is about applying a logical methodology to get at the most important things that one must get at in order to prevail in an insurgency.
    Some insurgencies? I agree. All? Arguable.
    I can call a horse a pig, but it is still a horse.
    True. However, you might offend some pigs (or horses...); might attract undue attention of a sort that can adversely impact adoption of your hypothesis and possibly lose some supporters by imposing your will on a height difference or definition that adds to the confusion and proliferation of terms and which could even exacerbate "that jumbled mess of operationalizing it that the US Joint doctrine takes lately." You may be unnecessarily complifying.

    All of course, your prerogative -- my thoughts are simply offered for your consideration only and I for one make no claims to having any solutions to the problems of mankind...

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    This thread is about applying a logical methodology to get at the most important things that one must get at in order to prevail in an insurgency.
    Ends, Ways, Means?
    The fact that that is also "COG analysis" and that it differs from what the books say I am supposed to think and do, is just something that the COG Nazis will have to live with.
    I can call a horse a pig, but it is still a horse.
    So you'll say "Shock" when what you are actually describing is "Surprise."
    Sorry, but this is why modern Concepts and Doctrine can be so poor.
    Use the words as they are used in English. There is 1 definition of a COG. It is well described. It is useful to those of us who understand it.

    Based on the commonly used definition, the Population is not a COG. You are just arbitrarily assigning the word, based on your wish to use it. Do you mean that "securing the population is the objective?"
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Default You live in an intellectual box surrounded by very high walls, I fear.

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Ends, Ways, Means?


    So you'll say "Shock" when what you are actually describing is "Surprise."
    Sorry, but this is why modern Concepts and Doctrine can be so poor.
    Use the words as they are used in English. There is 1 definition of a COG. It is well described. It is useful to those of us who understand it.

    Based on the commonly used definition, the Population is not a COG. You are just arbitrarily assigning the word, based on your wish to use it. Do you mean that "securing the population is the objective?"
    "COG" is in truth a broad concept given very brief coverage by its founder, Mr. CvC. Since then various military organizations have attempted often to codify it, with those codifications covering a broad range of meanings and degrees and types of process prescribed that continually evolve over time.

    The concept is a sound one, but I believe it must be applied with an open mind. Conflict within a state, among a single populace is a VERY VERY different thing in terms of its nature (though on the surface it may look quite similar) to conflicts between distinct states or populaces. For those who believe rigidly that all political violence is war, and that all war is the same, and that every application of the military is solely to defeat the opponents capability and capacity to produce violence, will remain forever trapped in a box, and surrounded by high walls.

    I merely offer you a window to peak through. I do not demand that you come out of your box, or that you tear down your walls. As I learned as a trial attorney, I can disagree without being disagreeable; object without being objectionable; and be outraged without being outrageous. (though sometimes I confess, I fail in all of those nicities...)

    The fact is that most insurgencies are handed to the military to deal with. The fact also is that most Empires that possess the military power to ward off all external state threats are also so confident and reliant on their military abilities that they apply them to internal struggles as well. Those Empires now all reside in a tremendous graveyard filled with those who have fallen to successful insurgency.

    My position is that the one so often presented on these electronic pages by Mr. William F Owen is a very, very dangerous one indeed. It is a map to a well traveled path that many a failed empire has taken in good faith of their righteousness and full confidence in their military prowess.
    Last edited by Bob's World; 05-24-2010 at 07:08 AM.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    A little bit of a change of pace, but this discussion of "good governance" and "perception" brought me back to the TCAF Survey and its applicability in "tacticalizing" the "Jones model".

    I kind of balked at the surveys at first but after a while I started making these the primary form of intelligence gathering of patrols. Building up a good collection of these on a community (combined with some basic census info) will help define what the local perception is.

    Problem was I filed these and never saw nor heard anything about them. Much information got plugged into an Excel ASCOPE spreadsheet and was lost forever to the network drive.

    I know this isn't in the weeds of COG, but it came to mind as I went through this.

  18. #18
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    Default Not to worry folks,

    The Powers That Be seem to have problems settling on the name of what is going to happen in the Argandab valley and the other scenic Kandahar venues.

    This from today's WP, Results of Kandahar offensive may affect future U.S. moves:

    Senior U.S. military officials briefing American reporters in Kabul early last month described extensive "clearing operations" planned in the outlying Kandahar districts of Zhari, Argandab and Panjwai, where the Taliban is entrenched.
    ....
    The name of the offensive -- Hamkari Baraye Kandahar, or Cooperation for Kandahar -- was carefully chosen to avoid the word "operation," which suggests violence. The administration official described it benignly as a "military presence" and Karzai has defined it as a "process." Last week, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, called the offensive "a unique challenge."
    So, Slap and Karzai are on the same page here (a "process") - probably the only time that will happen.

    The vocabulary for the "good governance process" should be primarily political and less military - what it involves is the process of mobilizing the masses per Mao and John McCuen on various levels (security, opportunity and ideology, working from the base needs upwards), which has to be attempted by whatever side is interested in arriving at an acceptable outcome. That political effort will involve violence - sometimes narrators will have to kill and wolfhounds will have to narrate (not theoretically perfect, Wilf, but we live in a world of finite resources).

    A "key point" (note I didn't say CoG, which to me was firstly a matter of physics, calculus, statics and dynamics - ill-spent youth at an engineering school), in this political effort, is the interface between the political types and the military types. That interface (strong or weak) applies to both insurgent and incumbant.

    If that interface (boundary) is strong - unity of effort and unity of principles - we are likely to end up with a Malaya situation from the Brit-Malaysian viewpoint. If there are contradictions (which the opponent will exploit), we have a Malaya situation from the ComTerrs viewpoint. The CTs had a comparatively weak political-military interface. As Entropy correctly notes, developing a strong political-military interface is no easy given.

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 05-23-2010 at 08:07 PM.

  19. #19
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Smile Arggghhh. You are killing me Mike.

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    The Powers That Be seem to have problems settling on the name of what is going to happen in the Argandab valley and the other scenic Kandahar venues.

    This from today's WP, Results of Kandahar offensive may affect future U.S. moves:



    So, Slap and Karzai are on the same page here (a "process") - probably the only time that will happen.

    The vocabulary for the "good governance process" should be primarily political and less military - what it involves is the process of mobilizing the masses per Mao and John McCuen on various levels (security, opportunity and ideology, working from the base needs upwards), which has to be attempted by whatever side is interested in arriving at an acceptable outcome. That political effort will involve violence - sometimes narrators will have to kill and wolfhounds will have to narrate (not theoretically perfect, Wilf, but we live in a world of finite resources).

    A "key point" (note I didn't say CoG, which to me was firstly a matter of physics, calculus, statics and dynamics - ill-spent youth at an engineering school), in this political effort, is the interface between the political types and the military types. That interface (strong or weak) applies to both insurgent and incumbant.

    If that interface (boundary) is strong - unity of effort and unity of principles - we are likely to end up with a Malaya situation from the Brit-Malaysian viewpoint. If there are contradictions (which the opponent will exploit), we have a Malaya situation from the ComTerrs viewpoint. The CTs had a comparatively weak political-military interface. As Entropy correctly notes, developing a strong political-military interface is no easy given.

    Regards

    Mike
    Two points:

    A. Who ever wrote this piece is about 50% right 50% clueless, and 100% dangerous in the flawed perceptions he is creating.

    B. I picked Arghandab for my eample to run one of the critical causal perceptions through the mill from CR down to HVI. Fact is it is immaterial to this thread, (and in the Arghandab, which is in fact the gateway to Kandahar; and Khakrez is the staging area to that gateway) as it is about the process, not an example. All CRs must be addressed in the Afghandab, not just "Justice"
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  20. #20
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    So, Slap and Karzai are on the same page here (a "process") - probably the only time that will happen.
    Sorta, like all politcians Karzai is working a process to stay in power. Mine isn't.

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