Operationalizing The Jones Model through COG

[slapout9]

Is much of our current engagement merely the noise before defeat?

BW, I just watched a movie on HBO awhile back called "The Objective" It is about a CIA operative backed by an SF A-team who has to gain critical information about a secret WMD inside A'stan. The CIA guy goes to a local "holy man" for advice and this is what he said.
"America cannot free Afghanistan only Allah can free Afghanistan".:eek: The WMD turns out to a Spiritual WMD aka Bad Ass Ghost with extreme powers. I hope that is not the future!


Your recent posts has a lot to think about so I will answer in sections, since I have to cut the Grass here

CR's are inputs-Good Governance is a PROCESS not an output or an out come IMO. The system in focus is a "Territorial Stabilization System". Good Governance is the process used to achieve that. A'tan is a territory not a country or state IMO.... like Steve Blair's Arizona Territory.

Drop the COG stuff, just call it a critical process.
How to operationalize it example.
I-P-O- model


Input-------------Good Governance PROCESS ----------Output

__________________________________________________ __________


People...............voter registration/election .................Elected Official

[Ken White]

Your COG usage muddies your water. Wilf and Fuchs challenge to it will be repeated by many others...

[Bob's World]

Agree, alway dangerous to swim in muddy water, and between the debates between the deciples of CvC over the few words he wrote about a simple concept of "COG"; and the (my personal opinion) jumbled mess of operationalizing it that the US Joint doctrine takes lately; it is muddy water indeed.

Personally I think I take a lean, clean, logical aproach to COG analysis; but for those who are used to mud in their water it does spark them to defend their pet points.

But this thread isn't about COG. This thread is about applying a logical methodology to get at the most important things that one must get at in order to prevail in an insurgency.

The fact that that is also "COG analysis" and that it differs from what the books say I am supposed to think and do, is just something that the COG Nazis will have to live with.
I can call a horse a pig, but it is still a horse.

[Ken White]

Personally I think I take a lean, clean, logical aproach to COG analysis

I'd suggest perhaps excessively lean, possibly overly logical in contrast to the human conflicts it discusses which are rarely logical and thus perhaps not as firmly cast as some might think.

I do sort of wonder how it can be clean if the water is muddied by pointless battles over terminology...

...This thread is about applying a logical methodology to get at the most important things that one must get at in order to prevail in an insurgency.

Some insurgencies? I agree. All? Arguable.

I can call a horse a pig, but it is still a horse.

True. However, you might offend some pigs (or horses...); might attract undue attention of a sort that can adversely impact adoption of your hypothesis and possibly lose some supporters by imposing your will on a height difference or definition that adds to the confusion and proliferation of terms and which could even exacerbate "that jumbled mess of operationalizing it that the US Joint doctrine takes lately." You may be unnecessarily complifying.

All of course, your prerogative -- my thoughts are simply offered for your consideration only and I for one make no claims to having any solutions to the problems of mankind...

[William F. Owen]

This thread is about applying a logical methodology to get at the most important things that one must get at in order to prevail in an insurgency.

Ends, Ways, Means?

The fact that that is also "COG analysis" and that it differs from what the books say I am supposed to think and do, is just something that the COG Nazis will have to live with.
I can call a horse a pig, but it is still a horse.

So you'll say "Shock" when what you are actually describing is "Surprise."
Sorry, but this is why modern Concepts and Doctrine can be so poor.
Use the words as they are used in English. There is 1 definition of a COG. It is well described. It is useful to those of us who understand it.

Based on the commonly used definition, the Population is not a COG. You are just arbitrarily assigning the word, based on your wish to use it. Do you mean that "securing the population is the objective?"

[Bob's World]

Ends, Ways, Means?


So you'll say "Shock" when what you are actually describing is "Surprise."
Sorry, but this is why modern Concepts and Doctrine can be so poor.
Use the words as they are used in English. There is 1 definition of a COG. It is well described. It is useful to those of us who understand it.

Based on the commonly used definition, the Population is not a COG. You are just arbitrarily assigning the word, based on your wish to use it. Do you mean that "securing the population is the objective?"

"COG" is in truth a broad concept given very brief coverage by its founder, Mr. CvC. Since then various military organizations have attempted often to codify it, with those codifications covering a broad range of meanings and degrees and types of process prescribed that continually evolve over time.

The concept is a sound one, but I believe it must be applied with an open mind. Conflict within a state, among a single populace is a VERY VERY different thing in terms of its nature (though on the surface it may look quite similar) to conflicts between distinct states or populaces. For those who believe rigidly that all political violence is war, and that all war is the same, and that every application of the military is solely to defeat the opponents capability and capacity to produce violence, will remain forever trapped in a box, and surrounded by high walls.

I merely offer you a window to peak through. I do not demand that you come out of your box, or that you tear down your walls. As I learned as a trial attorney, I can disagree without being disagreeable; object without being objectionable; and be outraged without being outrageous. (though sometimes I confess, I fail in all of those nicities...)

The fact is that most insurgencies are handed to the military to deal with. The fact also is that most Empires that possess the military power to ward off all external state threats are also so confident and reliant on their military abilities that they apply them to internal struggles as well. Those Empires now all reside in a tremendous graveyard filled with those who have fallen to successful insurgency.

My position is that the one so often presented on these electronic pages by Mr. William F Owen is a very, very dangerous one indeed. It is a map to a well traveled path that many a failed empire has taken in good faith of their righteousness and full confidence in their military prowess.

[Infanteer]

Sorry to deviate from the COG discussion again, but I still can't get this packaged up right:

Conflict within a state, among a single populace is a VERY VERY different thing in terms of its nature (though on the surface it may look quite similar) to conflicts between distinct states or populaces.

Do we consider Afghanistan a single populace? Do the Kandaharis consider Uzbeks from the north to be of the same people? Many discussions I had with the average southern Pashtun indicated that they had as much in common as me, Joe Canuck, and a Mexican. Americans and Canadians have more in common than certain ethnic divisions in Afghanistan.

What does this do to the model of warfare/insurgency that you have presented? Maybe bringing this back to the thread (so I am not a complete off-topic guy) what does this means that "perception of good governance" =/= "Afghanistan".

[Bob's World]

Sorry to deviate from the COG discussion again, but I still can't get this packaged up right:



Do we consider Afghanistan a single populace? Do the Kandaharis consider Uzbeks from the north to be of the same people? Many discussions I had with the average southern Pashtun indicated that they had as much in common as me, Joe Canuck, and a Mexican. Americans and Canadians have more in common than certain ethnic divisions in Afghanistan.

What does this do to the model of warfare/insurgency that you have presented? Maybe bringing this back to the thread (so I am not a complete off-topic guy) what does this means that "perception of good governance" =/= "Afghanistan".

The intial test is this a conflict between peoples under two separate systems of govenrance, or is that conficts between a segment of a popualce the governance over them. The first is war, the second is insurgency.

As to how do the popopulaces perceive themselves, and this govenance over them? Ah, now you are getting to the Jones Model. There are many reasons why a popualce may not perceive the governance over them as legitimate.

The American Colonists felt that Government in England had become too removed, and too self-serving at their expense and exclusion from input.

The People of France in WWII felt that a government emplaced and supported by the German invaders lacked legitimacy.

The people of Afghanistan, and they are indeed goegraphically separated in diverse groupings, surely take a wide range of perspectives on ANY centralized governance in Afghanistan. Though there is probably greater agreement that when that centralized form is created and supported by an invading outsider that it drops to an even lower level of acceptance in terms of its legitimacy.

Things like borders and treaty-driven divisions of populaces and establishments of governments can confuse the issues as well as create conditions for insurgent violence. The creation of a a state of North Viet Nam, for example, did not suddenly turn the issues there into state vs state issues; the issues were still largely rooted in the popular challenge to such treaties and governments being imposed upon them by outsiders. These things are rarely black and white, and as Ken White loves to beat me about the head and shoulders with (hey, a guy his age needs the exercise) there are no pat answers. There are, however, some underlying fundamental "truths" that help shape an effective understanding of the suface conditions we observe.

[William F. Owen]

"COG" is in truth a broad concept given very brief coverage by its founder, Mr. CvC.

Huh? How is it given "brief coverage?" He clearly and usefully explains what it is. What screws everything up is folks trying to change the inconvenient truth of what he states. A COG is something you strike. If you cannot strike it is not a COG! The whole concept is about harming the enemy.

Those Empires now all reside in a tremendous graveyard filled with those who have fallen to successful insurgency.

That is simply is not true. Empires have been sustained and created by crushing rebellions. If you say Rebellion or Revolt instead of insurgency, then I think this clarifies the issues in a historical context. It certainly gets puts all the new words and concepts in context.

It is a map to a well traveled path that many a failed empire has taken in good faith of their righteousness and full confidence in their military prowess.

It's a map well supported by 3,000 years of history of how to use armed force to set forth policy. It works if done by the skilled and fails when done by the un-skilled.

[Bob's World]

Huh? How is it given "brief coverage?" He clearly and usefully explains what it is. What screws everything up is folks trying to change the inconvenient truth of what he states. A COG is something you strike. If you cannot strike it is not a COG! The whole concept is about harming the enemy.

That is simply is not true. Empires have been sustained and created by crushing rebellions. If you say Rebellion or Revolt instead of insurgency, then I think this clarifies the issues in a historical context. It certainly gets puts all the new words and concepts in context.

It's a map well supported by 3,000 years of history of how to use armed force to set forth policy. It works if done by the skilled and fails when done by the un-skilled.

I will not argue that empire after empire pitted their armies to suppress the insurgent will of the populaces they exercise dominion over. I will not argue that such efforts have sustained such emipires long after the populaces contained within them desired them to be gone. But I also will not argue with the facts that such efforts always ultimately fail.

This is why The USSR is but a blink in history, England is but an island; Rome is but a city, and Greece is in foreclosure. The list is as long as history to support my point; where is the history to support yours?

[Infanteer]

A little bit of a change of pace, but this discussion of "good governance" and "perception" brought me back to the TCAF Survey and its applicability in "tacticalizing" the "Jones model".

I kind of balked at the surveys at first but after a while I started making these the primary form of intelligence gathering of patrols. Building up a good collection of these on a community (combined with some basic census info) will help define what the local perception is.

Problem was I filed these and never saw nor heard anything about them. Much information got plugged into an Excel ASCOPE spreadsheet and was lost forever to the network drive.

I know this isn't in the weeds of COG, but it came to mind as I went through this.

[jmm99]

The Powers That Be seem to have problems settling on the name of what is going to happen in the Argandab valley and the other scenic Kandahar venues.

This from today's WP, Results of Kandahar offensive may affect future U.S. moves:

Senior U.S. military officials briefing American reporters in Kabul early last month described extensive "clearing operations" planned in the outlying Kandahar districts of Zhari, Argandab and Panjwai, where the Taliban is entrenched.
....
The name of the offensive -- Hamkari Baraye Kandahar, or Cooperation for Kandahar -- was carefully chosen to avoid the word "operation," which suggests violence. The administration official described it benignly as a "military presence" and Karzai has defined it as a "process." Last week, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, called the offensive "a unique challenge."

So, Slap and Karzai are on the same page here (a "process") - probably the only time that will happen.

The vocabulary for the "good governance process" should be primarily political and less military - what it involves is the process of mobilizing the masses per Mao and John McCuen on various levels (security, opportunity and ideology, working from the base needs upwards), which has to be attempted by whatever side is interested in arriving at an acceptable outcome. That political effort will involve violence - sometimes narrators will have to kill and wolfhounds will have to narrate (not theoretically perfect, Wilf, but we live in a world of finite resources).

A "key point" (note I didn't say CoG, which to me was firstly a matter of physics, calculus, statics and dynamics - ill-spent youth at an engineering school), in this political effort, is the interface between the political types and the military types. That interface (strong or weak) applies to both insurgent and incumbant.

If that interface (boundary) is strong - unity of effort and unity of principles - we are likely to end up with a Malaya situation from the Brit-Malaysian viewpoint. If there are contradictions (which the opponent will exploit), we have a Malaya situation from the ComTerrs viewpoint. The CTs had a comparatively weak political-military interface. As Entropy correctly notes, developing a strong political-military interface is no easy given.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

The Powers That Be seem to have problems settling on the name of what is going to happen in the Argandab valley and the other scenic Kandahar venues.

This from today's WP, Results of Kandahar offensive may affect future U.S. moves:



So, Slap and Karzai are on the same page here (a "process") - probably the only time that will happen.

The vocabulary for the "good governance process" should be primarily political and less military - what it involves is the process of mobilizing the masses per Mao and John McCuen on various levels (security, opportunity and ideology, working from the base needs upwards), which has to be attempted by whatever side is interested in arriving at an acceptable outcome. That political effort will involve violence - sometimes narrators will have to kill and wolfhounds will have to narrate (not theoretically perfect, Wilf, but we live in a world of finite resources).

A "key point" (note I didn't say CoG, which to me was firstly a matter of physics, calculus, statics and dynamics - ill-spent youth at an engineering school), in this political effort, is the interface between the political types and the military types. That interface (strong or weak) applies to both insurgent and incumbant.

If that interface (boundary) is strong - unity of effort and unity of principles - we are likely to end up with a Malaya situation from the Brit-Malaysian viewpoint. If there are contradictions (which the opponent will exploit), we have a Malaya situation from the ComTerrs viewpoint. The CTs had a comparatively weak political-military interface. As Entropy correctly notes, developing a strong political-military interface is no easy given.

Regards

Mike

Two points:

A. Who ever wrote this piece is about 50% right 50% clueless, and 100% dangerous in the flawed perceptions he is creating.

B. I picked Arghandab for my eample to run one of the critical causal perceptions through the mill from CR down to HVI. Fact is it is immaterial to this thread, (and in the Arghandab, which is in fact the gateway to Kandahar; and Khakrez is the staging area to that gateway) as it is about the process, not an example. All CRs must be addressed in the Afghandab, not just "Justice"

[slapout9]

So, Slap and Karzai are on the same page here (a "process") - probably the only time that will happen.

Sorta, like all politcians Karzai is working a process to stay in power. Mine isn't.