Selective Use of History in the Development of American COIN Doctrine

[Schmedlap]

I stumbled upon this piece by COL Gentile in the Summer 2009 issue of Army History Magazine (9.65 MB PDF file): The Selective Use of History in the Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine (begins on page 21 of 60). In it, Gentile points out that current COIN theory was developed largely in response to one narrow type of conflict, ignoring others, and now is being misapplied wholesale to other inappropriate situations.

In a nutshell: Galula assumes future wars will be countering Maoist revolutionary wars, Galula proposes a sophisticated counter to it, US doctrine writers fall for it, hilarity ensues.

Here is a series of excerpts that summarize the basic idea...

The French officers of the Revolutionary War School constructed a simplified model to explain these insurgencies based on Mao Tse-tung’s overthrow of the Nationalist Chinese government in 1949... The French officers reduced Maoist revolutionary war into a simplified and rigid template for action that, they believed, other Communist-inspired insurgencies would follow... These officers spent their time constructing a doctrine and methods to counter the simplified type of insurgency they posited instead of gaining a deeper appreciation and more sophisticated explanation of what Maoist revolutionary wars really entailed. The French officers essentially reduced Maoist revolutionary war to a set of uncomplicated steps that would occur during the process of internal revolution or insurgency... The counterrevolutionary approach that these French Army officers produced, in contrast to their simplification of Maoist war, was actually quite sophisticated. They sought to counter Maoist tactics by turning the process leading to Communist revolution on its head... Since the ultimate goal for Maoist revolutionary war was to use the Communists’ domination of the people to overthrow the government, the officers’ goal in fighting it was to de-couple the people from the revolutionary insurgency.
- Excerpted from pages 25 and 26

So, my questions are...

1. For you historians, or those of you who play historians online, do you agree with the basic argument put forth that current COIN doctrine, based heavily upon Galula et al, is too narrowly built upon assumptions of insurgencies resembling Maoist revolutionary wars? Why?

2. If we assume that our COIN doctrine does, indeed, rest upon assumptions characteristic of a Maoist revolutionary war, does this render it inapplicable - or significantly flawed - for today's operations in Afghanistan? Why or why not?

3. What historical examples, if any, provide us with conflicts that share more parallels with Afghanistan and/or better lessons more applicable to Afghanistan? Why?

[GI Zhou]

You haven't got a master's paper to write and are looking for ideas are you? (VTIC)

[Christian]

3. Ferghana Valley Bolsheviks vs. "Basmachi" and Eastern Bukhara highlands Bolsheviks versus Lokai, Enver Pasha and Basmachi.

Why? Because, aside from being in the neighborhood and involving the use of Islam as a rallying call by the insurgents, the bolsheviks were able to create local allies and win elites to their side despite being militantly anti-religious. The alien divide between locals and bolsheviks was even worse than between Americans and random folks up in the hills in Kunar. However, the Afghan Amir agreed to end the safe haven on his side of the river, so hard to compare with Pakistan these days.

Also, Tajikistan from 1992-1997. The opposition eventually signed a joke of a "power-sharing" agreement from a position of weakness. But that involved Sri Lanka style movement of supporting civilians and mass killing etc.. Also, they lost the safe haven in Afghanistan after Massoud allied with the Russians. So no usable lessons. Jesse Driscoll has a forthcoming book on the subject, so there will finally be something useful on the topic in English.

Unfortunately, the literature on Russian/Soviet COIN in Central Asia is terrible.

[Schmedlap]

3. Ferghana Valley Bolsheviks vs. "Basmachi" and Eastern Bukhara highlands Bolsheviks versus Lokai, Enver Pasha and Basmachi.

I admit to knowing nothing about this. Can you recommend a source (preferably a paper, rather than a book) to shed any light on it?

Also, Tajikistan from 1992-1997... Jesse Driscoll has a forthcoming book on the subject, so there will finally be something useful on the topic in English.

I googled to see if it's on pre-order at amazon, bn, etc - nothing listed. Do you know the name of it? Also, I saw that he did a paper on militias and civil wars, but I don't see it available online - perhaps there's a future tweet.

You haven't got a master's paper to write and are looking for ideas are you? (VTIC)

No. But if I did. Hopefully someone with an interest and a need stumbles upon this thread.

VTIC?

[Pete]

I haven't read Galula so I can't say whether his writings are exclusively an answer to Maoist revolutionary doctrine. However, history has lots of examples of unconventional warfare that had nothing to do with Mao. Three instances of UW in which the unconventional forces operated in support of larger conventional efforts were the Confederate John S. Mosby's battalion in Virginia during the American Civil War, the SAS and OSS Jedburgh operations in 1944 in France in support of the Normandy landings, and U.S. Army Special Forces as they were originally conceived when founded in the 1950s, stay-behinds in Germany who would promote insurgencies behind Soviet lines in the event WW III broke out. In the 1980s SF adopted the crossed arrows insignia of the old Indian Scouts, poachers turned gamekeepers who if I'm not mistaken were founded by the Army officer George Crook in the 19th century.

[Steve Blair]

I haven't read Galula so I can't say whether his writings are exclusively an answer to Maoist revolutionary doctrine. However, history has lots of examples of unconventional warfare that had nothing to do with Mao. Three instances of UW in which the unconventional forces operated in support of larger conventional efforts were the Confederate John S. Mosby's battalion in Virginia during the American Civil War, the SAS and OSS Jedburgh operations in 1944 in France in support of the Normandy landings, and U.S. Army Special Forces as they were originally conceived when founded in the 1950s, stay-behinds in Germany who would promote insurgencies behind Soviet lines in the event WW III broke out. In the 1980s SF adopted the crossed arrows insignia of the old Indian Scouts, poachers turned gamekeepers who if I'm not mistaken were founded by the Army officer George Crook in the 19th century.

Crook was not the first officer to use Indian scouts, although his PR machine would have people believe that. Scouts (both native and Frontiersmen) formed the backbone of the Frontier Army's reconnaissance efforts, and had been so since the 1830s (if not sooner).

[slapout9]

I haven't read Galula so I can't say whether his writings are exclusively an answer to Maoist revolutionary doctrine. However, history has lots of examples of unconventional warfare that had nothing to do with Mao. Three instances of UW in which the unconventional forces operated in support of larger conventional efforts were the Confederate John S. Mosby's battalion in Virginia during the American Civil War, the SAS and OSS Jedburgh operations in 1944 in France in support of the Normandy landings, and U.S. Army Special Forces as they were originally conceived when founded in the 1950s, stay-behinds in Germany who would promote insurgencies behind Soviet lines in the event WW III broke out. In the 1980s SF adopted the crossed arrows insignia of the old Indian Scouts, poachers turned gamekeepers who if I'm not mistaken were founded by the Army officer George Crook in the 19th century.

The Revolutionary War is almost a carbon copy of the old 7 steps from hell Special Forces model.

George Washington was the guerrilla force leader and he hired General Von Steuben to advise and train, not fight the US guerrillas. (The First Green Beret!) Because of the heroism and legitimacy of many US guerrilla members, they emerged as leaders for the demobilization step. The demobilization step is where we (US) seem to fail alot. We are good at starting and fighting, not so good at ending.

America often gets into trouble following other peoples models, we should look at our own first.

[Schmedlap]

3. What historical examples, if any, provide us with conflicts that share more parallels with Afghanistan and/or better lessons more applicable to Afghanistan? Why?

Well, at risk of being provocative and putting forth a suggestion that hasn't a snowball's chance of being implemented... perhaps the rule of Abdur Rahman? Massive forced resettlements. Hey, didn't that work in Malaysia, too?

[Pete]

Massive forced resettlements.

That's an idea. We could call it the Strategic Hamlet Program.

[tequila]

Well, at risk of being provocative and putting forth a suggestion that hasn't a snowball's chance of being implemented... perhaps the rule of Abdur Rahman? Massive forced resettlements. Hey, didn't that work in Malaysia, too?

Abdur Rahman didn't really face a non-tribalized insurgency. Breaking up tribal power structures worked for him in specific regional contexts because what Pashtun opposition there was to his rule often was sparked within specific tribal grievances, i.e. resistance to new forms of conscription. I doubt this would work against the Taliban. Also, again, not a snowball's chance in hell of actually being implemented, for good reason.

Also, no Hazarajat to use as outside-enemy/conquest/looting opportunity to unify the Pashtuns. I don't think the Hazaras are willing to play this role again.

Unless you wanted to redefine Afghanistan as a country of Tajiks, Farsiwan, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, and put the Pashtuns on the bottom? Many Pashtun seem to think this is happening anyway, so why not confirm their conspiracy theory, substituting the south and east for Hazarajat, and indulge in mass killing, enslavement, and expulsion of the Pashtun population at the hands of a newly-unified coalition of Tajik/Hazara/Uzbek warlords? Very Victorian-era of us, I would think!

Oh, right, we're supposed to be the good guys. Also the Soviets tried a version of this already and it didn't work that great for them. The existence of Pakistan also makes this scenario utterly impractical as well.

[Schmedlap]

I guess I should clarify that I threw this out there as devil's advocate in hopes of drawing out some less traditional ideas (not so much courses of action - but just ideas, factoids, etc).

Abdur Rahman didn't really face a non-tribalized insurgency.

Some would argue that this is not a non-tribalized insurgency. And some, such as Tom Johnson and Chris Mason argue (below), argue that the Taliban is a Pashtun phenomenon.

The Taliban and the other Islamic extremist insurgent elements operating on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border are almost exclusively Pashtuns, with a sprinkling of radicals from nonborder ethnicities. The implications of this salient fact—that most of Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s violent religious extremism, and with it much of the United States’ counterterrorism challenge, are centered within a single ethnolinguistic group—have not been fully grasped by a governmental policy community that has long downplayed cultural dynamics.
- from Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier," International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008) p. 42

Rahman perceived his problems to be along tribal and ethnic lines. The following passages are from Thomas J. Barfield, " Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan," Iranian Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, June 2004.

… Abdur Rahman looked upon the tribal rebellions that had led to the British withdrawal as a greater danger to him than they were to the British. Had the rebellious Tajiks or Ghilzais that attacked Kabul had leaders with more vision, or more ambition, they could have seized power … Rahman made sure they would not have the chance to change their minds.
- p. 278

Rahman set out to ensure that large swaths of the country that were more or less autonomous were put under central control. Specifically, he was concerned that many areas had the ability to raise armed forces that could challenge the state that he was creating. That seems to be a similar problem today among the Pashtun areas where the Taliban has its sanctuaries. Rahman saw those areas as a risk to the government because of the political coalitions that could form along kinship lines (or, in today's case, perhaps allegiances to warlords that roughly coincide with ethnicity/tribe).

Abdur Rahman destroyed this autonomy by sub-dividing provinces into smaller units and by appointing new governors who were personally loyal to him rather than immediate relatives... Large numbers of defeated Ghilzais were uprooted and exiled to northern Afghanistan.
- p. 278-9.

You point out...

Breaking up tribal power structures worked for him in specific regional contexts because what Pashtun opposition there was to his rule often was sparked within specific tribal grievances, i.e. resistance to new forms of conscription.

I don't think that is the only plausible explanation. Again, quoting Barfield...

From 1881 until 1888 Abdur Rahman directed most of his campaigns against the Pashtuns, particularly the Ghilzai. Yet for the next 90 years, the Pashtuns as a whole would see themselves, and be seen by others, as the privileged ethnic group in the country. For if the Pashtuns were the prime victims of Abdur Rahman’s early wars they were the beneficiaries of his later ones. For example, his suppression of the Ghilzai revolt coincided with his recovery of Afghan Turkestan in 1888. This allowed the amir to punish large numbers of rebellious Pashtuns from the south by exiling them to Turkestan, a territory then inhabited primarily by Uzbeks and Tajiks. The deported Pashtuns were given rich agricultural lands and access to pastures for sheep-raising in a territory that had been depopulated by wars.
- p. 279

This seemed to pay off in the long run. After Amanullah was overthrown…

Nadir Khan… raised an army of eastern Pashtuns from both sides of the Durand Line to support him in part by portraying the Tajik ruler of Afghanistan as a usurper who had no right to rule over Pashtuns. That the Ghilzais would rally around the idea of preserving Pashtun privilege by restoring another Muhammadzai leader to power, rather than attempting to seize power themselves, shows how effective Abdur Rahman had been in his policies of co-optation.
- p. 280

Again, playing devil’s advocate, in hopes that someone will see something in here to bite onto at a micro or macro level and spur a discussion to hopefully flesh out something useful.

Lastly, if this clarification helps at all, while I am playing devil's advocate, there are some suggestions that I think are sufficiently absurd and can be assumed to not be part of any argument that I am making. In particular, this one...

.... so why not confirm their conspiracy theory, substituting the south and east for Hazarajat, and indulge in mass killing, enslavement, and expulsion of the Pashtun population at the hands of a newly-unified coalition of Tajik/Hazara/Uzbek warlords? Very Victorian-era of us, I would think!

I'm playing devil's advocate, not Hitler's advocate.

[Entropy]

Well, a couple of thoughts on this:

First, insurgent violence highly correlates with areas with a significant Pashtun population.

Secondly, one effect of the Soviet invasion, occupation, withdrawal and subsequent civil war was a break-down in tribally loyalty structures. A generation of boys grew up divorced from the traditional tribal governance structures which weakened those structures. Not too surprising considering that 1/3 of the population became external refugees, another several million internal refugees and over a million were killed outright.

I haven't heard much talk about it lately, but one strategy we've been using in some areas of Afghanistan for the past several years is to attempt to rebuild broken tribal structures in order to displace other structures that developed during the period of the Soviet occupation and civil war.

[tequila]

Schmedlap,

Actually I agree with Barfield in most aspects. I think that that Abdul Rahman fought tribalized insurgencies, mostly because he was focused on unifying/controlling the Pashtuns for the first part of his reign. This required breaking Pashtun tribal leadership and forcing large numbers of tribesmen into the army. He then focused on conquering non-Pashtun parts of Afghanistan, focusing on the north and especially Hazarajat, which had the side benefit of increasing his control of the Pashtuns by granting them lands, property, and slaves at the dispensation of the central government.

However, this isn't the situation facing the current GiRoA. The Taliban may be a mostly ethnic Pashtun phenomenon, but they are not a tribal phenomenon - quite the opposite I'd argue. Indeed as Entropy pointed out, the Soviet occupation and the civil war broke tribal power structures far more thoroughly than even Abdur Rahman could, except in parts of the east.

Abdur Rahman faced the problem of unifying the country, which he did first by breaking rivals in his own Pashtun ethnic group, focusing their loyalty instead on himself and his government. Then he used them to brutally conquer and impose his will on the Hazarajat and the north, consolidating his rule by handing out the benefits of conquest. It's a time-tested method of building a kingdom. He did not, however, face problems from Pakistan (controlled by his erstwhile backers and allies, the British) or outside his own borders as the GiRoA do now, nor the problems of legitimacy.

Basically, Abdur Rahman had a different problem set than GiROA does at the moment. GiRoA faces, I think, a major legitimacy issue throughout the Pashtun south and east. It is viewed as a foreign puppet regime made up of the Pashtuns' traditional adversaries (i.e. the targets of Abdur Rahman's conquests), without the compensation of either strength in the ability to protect or punish, nor the wealth to hand out patronage and benefits. We cannot alter the former perception, being part of the problem ourselves, but anything that increases the latter should be done.