As a recently returned CA bubba and someone who has been working in Dreamland at Leavenworth for a few years, I would like to offer a few thoughts that I am considering putting into "learned paper format"... or... something that will will ably hold some portion of the front and back cover of some locally produced rag or another.

What I found for the most part, was battalion, brigade and (yes) division level commanders and staff that could ably regurgitate CA and CMO doctrine but were completely clueless when it came to actually planning, resourcing and executing CMO. In addition, there remains the saddest of shortsightedness... the viewing of a CAT as four dudes with a gun truck and some neat-o equipment and somewhat cooler than average hair.

Now, I will be the first to admit that, as with any enabler, the confidence and repoire between the supported commander and the CA asset in question must be developed and maintained. However, considering that my supported manuever commander met me while I was on a rooftop calling for fire in the middle of a firefight while my team helped tow a vehicle that had been disabled by an EFP, I would like to think that I established my tactical proficiency early. With that out of the way, I gave him a fullup brief of the civil picture in sector and what I could do to help influence the fight. He nodded, asked relevant questions, assured me that I had his support and then promptly sidelined my team and I so that he could kill people and break stuff.

There is certainly a time and place for killing people and breaking stuff but why are our officers failing to connect the dots?

I believe part of the issue is the black and white of kinetic/nonkinetic and lethal/nonlethal. In a fight that is nuanced, ambiguous and rarely easy to codify I would like to think that we, as professionals, would be able to recognize that binary definitions of most situations are not only lacking, but considerably dangerous. How is the maneuver commander supporting the commander's intent when he identifies the current situation as "too hot" for CA? Why does he think that CA can't do anything to help with that situation? Why does he fail to support CA when things have calmed down and CMO can have a very real and lasting impact on his battlespace? I believe it is because there is a sad tenacity for fitting the tactical, and even operational, picture into neat little kinetic/nonkinetic boxes.

Further, on the odd days when we managed to sneak out in spite of the best efforts of the commander and his S3, we rarely failed to return without actionable intelligence for his 2. In fact, we returned intel that led to the apprehension of the #3 and #10 of the battalion HVT list. If nothing else, and fully acknowledging that CA is not supposed to actively collect intel, I do wonder how a commander could fail to utilize a consistent source of viable intelligence.

Perhaps this sounds like disillusioned bellyaching but it is, in fact, some of the thoughts I am entertaining as I frame a paper meant to help both the CA community prepare to play nice with Mother Army and, perhaps, a primer for the maneuver folks. Remember... we're here to help you. We're here to support your intent. We're here to make your life interesting.

And no... no I don't have soccer balls to hand out.