The British In Iraq (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

It is "common knowledge" (in a country of conspiracy theories, take from it what you will) that the British regularly give money to the Taliban in Helmand. What the truth is, who knows, but it has an affect on how people view NATO. One of our interpreters quit working for the British (even though they pay much more than we do) due to the fact that he claims to have seen these sorts of things "go down". In a fight like this, perception is everything.

Interesting allegation. For what purpose is such money given? UK casualties continue to rise, and more forces look like being placed in theatre, not less.

If the Brits are paying it is doing them no good, and at the tactical level, it's doing the Taliban even less good.

[AndrewMcJames]

I am not really sure exactly what they are talking about. If the Taliban "ease off" on the Brits, and thereby allow things like training security forces and infrastructure development to progress unhindered, then yes, in the long run its a bad deal for them. It is also a bit spotty for a NATO country with a legitimate army to want or have to resort to such things.

I think, however, that there is a decent chance that what people witness are misguided attempts at propping up local Afghans, i.e. the Musa Qala (Sp?) incident and what have you.

I did some work with a company of guardsmen and some other British soldiers, and I found them to be top notch. Aggressive, knowledgeable NCOs and well educated officers. Who knows what goes on at the higher levels.

[Spartan6]

That might be true...like the US gives money and GUNS to the Sons of Iraq aka former Sunni insurgents. It may be part of the COIN model to get them to stop planting IEDs, etc. aka Reintegration.

[davidbfpo]

I don't know from this armchair whether the UK is paying the Taliban in Helmand, clearly one hopes that some money is paid to informants and waverers. More likely is the payment to faction leaders, as was rumoured over the local, defecting Taliban chief at Musa Qala, who ended up arriving with four relatives and needed protection himself (cannot recall immediately his name).

Historically in the Imperial age payments were made along the NWFP for good behaviour and failing to comply led to punitive action.

Perhaps the rumours need to be seen in the context of the following story, that the UK cannot afford to send more, pernament troops to Afghanistan: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...recession.html

davidbfpo

[Ken Wilson]

Read this:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008...nistan-talibal

It isn’t just about objectively appraising small wars and competing approaches. Its about the sensitivities of the Anglo-American relationship, Greece educating Rome, etc. Hence the mythologised story of British COIN, propagated by both the likes of Aylwin-Foster and American Anglophiles.

The other problem is that we get fixated on COIN technique and not wider strategy. ISAF and OEF as a whole could be deployed to the Afghan provinces and perform wonders, but that won’t address one underlying source of the Taliban’s continued resurgence: politics in Pakistan. Can’t really blame the UK or any army for that.

[William F. Owen]

Hence the mythologised story of British COIN, propagated by both the likes of Aylwin-Foster and American Anglophiles.

It's not mythology. It's historical fact and an operational reality. The problem occurred when - mostly Americans- began to extrapolate items which just weren't there, and didn't take the context into account. Most the "propagating" was done by serving US Officers, much to annoyance of us Brits!

...you then get the irony of mostly the same men leaving most of the good British COIN writing off the recommended reading lists, and opting for the French instead.