That might be true...like the US gives money and GUNS to the Sons of Iraq aka former Sunni insurgents. It may be part of the COIN model to get them to stop planting IEDs, etc. aka Reintegration.
That might be true...like the US gives money and GUNS to the Sons of Iraq aka former Sunni insurgents. It may be part of the COIN model to get them to stop planting IEDs, etc. aka Reintegration.
I don't know from this armchair whether the UK is paying the Taliban in Helmand, clearly one hopes that some money is paid to informants and waverers. More likely is the payment to faction leaders, as was rumoured over the local, defecting Taliban chief at Musa Qala, who ended up arriving with four relatives and needed protection himself (cannot recall immediately his name).
Historically in the Imperial age payments were made along the NWFP for good behaviour and failing to comply led to punitive action.
Perhaps the rumours need to be seen in the context of the following story, that the UK cannot afford to send more, pernament troops to Afghanistan: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...recession.html
davidbfpo
Read this:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008...nistan-talibal
It isn’t just about objectively appraising small wars and competing approaches. Its about the sensitivities of the Anglo-American relationship, Greece educating Rome, etc. Hence the mythologised story of British COIN, propagated by both the likes of Aylwin-Foster and American Anglophiles.
The other problem is that we get fixated on COIN technique and not wider strategy. ISAF and OEF as a whole could be deployed to the Afghan provinces and perform wonders, but that won’t address one underlying source of the Taliban’s continued resurgence: politics in Pakistan. Can’t really blame the UK or any army for that.
It's not mythology. It's historical fact and an operational reality. The problem occurred when - mostly Americans- began to extrapolate items which just weren't there, and didn't take the context into account. Most the "propagating" was done by serving US Officers, much to annoyance of us Brits!
...you then get the irony of mostly the same men leaving most of the good British COIN writing off the recommended reading lists, and opting for the French instead.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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