The British In Iraq (merged thread)

[patmc]

Saw on today's Early Bird:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle4461023.ece

The Times August 5, 2008

Secret deal kept British Army out of battle for Basra

A secret deal between Britain and the notorious al-Mahdi militia prevented British Forces from coming to the aid of their US and Iraqi allies for nearly a week during the battle for Basra this year, The Times has learnt.

Four thousand British troops – including elements of the SAS and an entire mechanised brigade – watched from the sidelines for six days because of an “accommodation” with the Iranian-backed group, according to American and Iraqi officers who took part in the assault.

US Marines and soldiers had to be rushed in to fill the void, fighting bitter street battles and facing mortar fire, rockets and roadside bombs with their Iraqi counterparts.

The British apparently made a deal that no troops would enter Basra without the Defense Secretary's approval, thus keeping them out of combat with the militias and Mahdi elements. As the article says, "Cutting a deal with the bad guys is generally not a good idea." They had hoped to accomodate the militias ala the IRA, but it did not pan out as planned. The Iraqis and US elements in Basra have lost respect and trust in the British allies, since they are not willing to act when necessary.

[William F. Owen]

So let me get this right. The UK set up a secret deal with the enemy, to prevent British casualties and then did not tell the Iraqi's or the US? ... and when our allies were under fire, they did not respond in order to support our agreement... with the enemy.

If so, the British actively colluded with terrorists, then someone needs to go to jail, or invoke "Crown Agent immunity."

[Steve Blair]

Here's BBC's take on it: link.

[davidbfpo]

If true a scandal and weakened IMO by the off-record media exposure.

Politically the UK government would not return troops to street fighting in Basra, after all we wanted out from that hellhole; yes, one we helped make it that.

How the UK government managed to hide the alleged agreement and related decisions from our closest ally is unclear.

Murky. How this story resonates here is unclear, maybe I will comment another day.

Here is the comment in The Daily Telegraph, with HMG and Opposition comments: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...-in-Basra.html

davidbfpo

[Ken White]

six months ago in the media. I didn't think much about it at the time because that's been a British (and others, including us [rarely] and the French and Germans [frequently].) technique for many score years -- and allegedly MI6 / SIS or whoever they are today had just done the same thing not long before in Helmand, Afghanistan.

My recollection in the latter case is that Dan McNeill blew the whistle on the deal...

[Norfolk]

If true, a perfect example of field commanders findings themselves having to look over their shoulder because their Government has no real will to win the war, just to appear to fall into line with U.S. policy.

[SWJED]

I started a SWJ Blog roundup post and will keep it updated as more of this story unfolds.

Patmc - I stole your title - thanks and a hat tip.

[Ken White]

If true, a perfect example of field commanders findings themselves having to look over their shoulder because their Government has no real will to win the war, just to appear to fall into line with U.S. policy.

That seems to also frequently apply to US Commanders...

Why, one could almost suspect there was no US policy...

[carl]

The effect of British policy on Iraqi public opinion should be considered too. If the following quote from a TimesOnLine story is in any way typical of that opinion, the policy has been a disaster.

'He had less of a glowing impression of the British military, which had control of security in Basra from March 2003 until December 2007, a period that saw the al-Mehdi Army militia grow in strength and influence.

"British forces did not make an impression on the people of Basra. They let the militia control the city and stayed away from events."

Ms Ali was also unimpressed, describing the British troops as lodgers.

"As we know, people who rent stay away from trouble even if it is harming the house he has rented," she said.

"In my personal opinion, although I have no expertise, the US forces always want to appear strong and able to succeed in any battle. They will never allow militias to ruin the reputation of the US army."'

[Fuchs]

Saw on today's Early Bird:
The British apparently made a deal that no troops would enter Basra without the Defense Secretary's approval, thus keeping them out of combat with the militias and Mahdi elements.

I fail to see the scandal.
Iraq is supposed to be a quite sovereign nation, what's wrong not to execute any military operations on its soil if its defense secretary doesn't agree?

I mean - if THAT kept the British out of Basra, then it's the Iraqi cabinet's (SecDef) fault.

If in turn the Iraqi government equaled the enemy - what would be the point of clearing Basra instead of simply leaving?

[Cavguy]

I fail to see the scandal.
Iraq is supposed to be a quite sovereign nation, what's wrong not to execute any military operations on its soil if its defense secretary doesn't agree?

I mean - if THAT kept the British out of Basra, then it's the Iraqi cabinet's (SecDef) fault.

If in turn the Iraqi government equaled the enemy - what would be the point of clearing Basra instead of simply leaving?

I think it was the UK Defence Secretary, not the Iraqi. According to the article, Maliki wanted the British to execute the operation, and he's the PM.

[davidbfpo]

With limited press coverage and no mention on the TV news it appears that the British brigade based outside Basra is being forced to exit due to an Iraqi decision: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/

Linked to this is a report by a UK reporter on a visit to Basra: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...w-reality.html

There was a Channel 4 documentary last week, on Basra, which I only partly caught; which cited Colin Powell's ex-chief of staff that Iran was the dominant local power there now. I wonder how the conservative Shia factions react to the reported lax social scene?

[Mark O'Neill]

with the Brits actually in Basra (ie , not on the COB) during COTK I am not that sure that the simplistic comments we are hearing about Brit success or failure hold much water when it comes to insight. I cannot offer any substantial critical comment about the Brit performance I observed (well, ok ... Their view of comfort in the field is disconcertingly more similar to the Australian than the US one (which we had gotten used to) and their rations make MRE look good). The whole Basra story is highly complex one, at a number of levels and does not lend itself to simplistic reductionism. There is no 'black or white' but certainly a whole lot of grey. For what it is worth, the officers and men of the 1st Scots, RDG and Lancs that my oppo and I worked with were first rate and, as he and I discussed in our post op hotwash, the equal of any US or Aus troops that we have served with, in any theatre.

And, although he will hate me for saying this so I will not name him, the man (Brit 06) who was the senior mentor to the Iraqi Basra Operational Commander at the time has, in my opinion, one of the best military COIN brains running around in uniform today.

I will offer this observation: Portillo was a leading light of the Tories, so , naturally, he will not have anything positive to say about the Blair / Gordon Labour Party Iraqi adventure.

Cheers

Mark

[davidbfpo]

Taken from a lecture at RUSI, Whitehall "think tank" comments on the UK Army in Basra: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...d-officer.html

davidbfpo

[SPWilson]

with the Brits actually in Basra (ie , not on the COB) during COTK I am not that sure that the simplistic comments we are hearing about Brit success or failure hold much water when it comes to insight. I cannot offer any substantial critical comment about the Brit performance I observed (well, ok ... Their view of comfort in the field is disconcertingly more similar to the Australian than the US one (which we had gotten used to) and their rations make MRE look good). The whole Basra story is highly complex one, at a number of levels and does not lend itself to simplistic reductionism. There is no 'black or white' but certainly a whole lot of grey. For what it is worth, the officers and men of the 1st Scots, RDG and Lancs that my oppo and I worked with were first rate and, as he and I discussed in our post op hotwash, the equal of any US or Aus troops that we have served with, in any theatre.

And, although he will hate me for saying this so I will not name him, the man (Brit 06) who was the senior mentor to the Iraqi Basra Operational Commander at the time has, in my opinion, one of the best military COIN brains running around in uniform today.

I will offer this observation: Portillo was a leading light of the Tories, so , naturally, he will not have anything positive to say about the Blair / Gordon Labour Party Iraqi adventure.

Cheers

Mark

Mark,
I can agree with some of your points. I spent the majority of my last tour (Nov 2007-2008) in Basra (at the palace) with my 500 man INP battalion.

1. As the initial "attack" into Basra commenced, the British pretty much confined operations to the COB and the BaOC. I recall as I rolled into Basra passing a UK mech co sitting by the COB waiting for something. It was only later (mid April) that I saw any substantial UK forces in Basra- ground forces at the BaOC, UK MiTTs, etc.

2. UK support during my time was excellent logistically (except coordinating air resupply). Operational and intel cooperation was almost non-existant. First, was that our systems did not talk. I did not have SIPR, NIPR, just FM, BFT, and good old cell phones. Even when I could talk (through UK LNO at the palace, I usually did not get any response). Even at the COB, soem sections were definitely better than others. To me there seemed to be a lack in Unity of Effort/ Command.

3. To a one, every Iraqi officer I spoke with in Basra, to include the 14IA CDR did not have a very favorable opinion of the British they worked with. Most were very excited to when the U.S. was announced to take the lead in MND-SE.

4. I think the UK had some good guys in Basra, but they were suppressed or prevented from execution due to political necessities (keep casualties low, survive, go home). It really explains a lot of practices they have there that run contrary to common-sense.


P.S.
The Brits definitely had better reading material than the U.S. bases offer