The two are not incompatible. Strategies fail, as this one did. I see a poorly considered attempt to achieve results through disruption that were never likely to be achieved, and a strategy based on unacceptably fluffy assumptions about the US capacity to manage the aftermath of its military successes.
The US economy poisoned itself in the 1990s. The impact of the poison wasn't felt until 2000/2001, and in economic as well as foreign policy the Bush administration was forced into a reactive mode, which in both cases it managed very badly.
What "energetic national policy" do you think could have "turned this around"? I suspect that you overestimate the impact of policy on economic affairs, which is less than many assume it to be.
The US trade deficit has been a growing problem for decades. It's been fueled primarily by the reality that the value of the dollar has been artificially inflated since WW2, largely by factors over which US policy has little control. Of course dependence on imported energy is also a factor, especially given the volatility of prices, but you can't escape the impact of currency value distortions on trade.
China has policy options unavailable in a democracy. Short-term strengths, long-term possible weaknesses. Those who expect China to enjoy an unfettered path to economic dominance may be surprised; likely there will be some bumps and ruts along that road.
I've no shortage oc complaints about both economic and foreign policy under Bush (and under Clinton) but the assumption that focus on foreign policy was a significant cause of ineffective economic policy seems to me speculative and unsupported by data or reasonable argument. I don't think Bush's economic team had their heads in Iraq, I think they had their heads up their sphincters, just as their predecessors did.
Bookmarks