Who are you, you optimist? And what have you done with Steve?
Who are you, you optimist? And what have you done with Steve?
The strategic aspect of the invasion of Iraq
had very little to do with WMD or even with remapping the ME. It was all about disruption and that disruption was on a world, to include Europe and Asia, scale. The number of things that were synergistically folded into the effort is huge; there were dozens of reasons, few of themselves very important but together, they created a significant change in a number of then proposed or possible actions by many players around the world. It is too early to tell how successful it was; probably about 2033 that will be fairly -- but not completely -- clear. The strategy was one of those rare long term US efforts that was not predicated on the election cycle -- indeed, it was launched at the time it occurred specifically to preclude an interruption by the vagaries of that cycle; Bush was afraid if he didn't launch, his successor would not and his second term was not a lock at the time. It was also launched to effectively commit the US to a long term course of action and it succeeded in achieving both those goals
I personally believe that, even as early as today it can be counted as a qualified success and I say that acknowledging the quite valid negative points raised by Fuchs and others and admitting that the US Government and the US Army, regrettably, screwed it up badly. Not least because of some 20-40 year old bad domestic political and military decisions that earlier locked the Bush Administration into less than optimum responses to provocations. It took entirely too long to get the course corrections in place (some needed and acknowledged important corrections are still being discussed, for Gawds sake...). That course correction comment applies to both the previous and current US Administrations, to DoD as an entity and to the Army.
I'm trying to think of a war where we didn't screw up....at the start.Originally Posted by Ken White
had very little to do with WMD or even with remapping the ME. It was all about disruption and that disruption was on a world, to include Europe and Asia, scale. The number of things that were synergistically folded into the effort is huge; there were dozens of reasons, few of themselves very important but together, they created a significant change in a number of then proposed or possible actions by many players around the world. It is too early to tell how successful it was; probably about 2033 that will be fairly -- but not completely -- clear. The strategy was one of those rare long term US efforts that was not predicated on the election cycle -- indeed, it was launched at the time it occurred specifically to preclude an interruption by the vagaries of that cycle; Bush was afraid if he didn't launch, his successor would not and his second term was not a lock at the time. It was also launched to effectively commit the US to a long term course of action and it succeeded in achieving both those goals
I personally believe that, even as early as today it can be counted as a qualified success and I say that acknowledging the quite valid negative points raised by Fuchs and others and admitting that the US Government and the US Army, regrettably, screwed it up badly. Not least because of some 20-40 year old bad domestic political and military decisions that earlier locked the Bush Administration into less than optimum responses to provocations. It took entirely too long to get the course corrections in place (some needed and acknowledged important corrections are still being discussed, for Gawds sake...
Then consider your nation blessed that you can, generally speaking, finish wars well.
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
Heh. There aren't any -- it's the American way...
ChrisjM has it right. Thus far we've mostly had time to sort it out or we've been lucky and had opponents who were even less competent than we were.
I'm not sure we should rely on that always being the case in the future...
Ken,
I find myself largely in agreement with what you wrote. It is reassuring to see that I am not crazy. Or, at a minimum, that the voices in my head and in yours are eavesdropping on one another.
Schmedlap:
I went to Iraq to help us structure and implement our departure, which (fingers crossed) I hope we succeeded at. Gen. Petreaus proved in that instance, that COIN was a useful tool (however partially or haphazardly applied) for that withdrawal. Much of my time was, in fact, spent re-linking the effectiveness of national government to the provinces.
For all the national fretting, Gen Abdullah, Salah ad Din's Deputy Governor, is plowing ahead with his dream of an international airport in Tikrit to handle the tourists already returning. No US or national funds. I will be proud to land at that airport, which we first discussed, and organized the strategy for, in February 2008.
Several folks were killed trying to restore electricity, roads, etc... especially in and around Bayji in early 2008.
My last visit to Tikrit was for a Safe Water Working Group to, in part, restore and construct regional water systems. My last day on DoS duty, I spent on a hillside at Arlington watching services for a young soldier shot by a sniper while providing security to inspect one of those projects. Now, open.
Private First Class Christopher Lotter, a young soldier from Chester Heights, Pennsylvania, who died at age 20 on December 31, 2008 after being shot by a sniper while on patrol to inspect a water treatment plant outside Tikrit, Iraq.
If I was face-to-face with his parents today, I can honestly state that, while his death may never be explicable, the work he was doing was important, and made a real difference.
It took two months to organize the temporary replacement bridges across the Tigris at Bayji and elsewhere in the North, but the permanent ones have already opened or will soon, and have not been attacked yet. Nor, do I believe the forces that could threaten those bridges have the likely resources to do so. They would profoundly alienate a struggling post-conflict economy, and face a pretty decently organized Iraqi Army.
Last week, one of my senior advisor cohorts in Tikrit helped to organize a very successful trade and investment conference there. Very proud of him.
They have a civilian GIS mapping framework and are pushing ahead with the census. That was one of my principal responsibilities.
KRG issues have not turned into a disaster. I believe my service on the UN's disputed boundary team made a small difference in that regard.
Not every meaningful dream happens right away, and I am absolutely sure that the assurance of a functioning Iraq will come from emerging vibrance in the provinces---the national politics in Iraq, like in the US, is just one dimension of a Country's resilience.
I am very proud of our work, and very aware of all those who died or were seriously injured trying to do it.
From our little band of civilian advisors, perhaps Terry Barniche, blown up in June 2009, was the most widely covered, but there was never a time that we were not aware of the sacrifices of all the young route clearance, and patrolling soldiers that, for the most part, allowed our work to be safely accomplished.
Unlike some, I understand what we did in the surge period as very productive and successful within the limited goal of engineering our successful departure and a reasonable handoff to basically functioning civilian control.
That optimism does not extend to Afghanistan, where I have friends on the ground and am very aware of the civilian reconstruction limitations. Are they going to be able to make the kind of contributions were made in Iraq, despite multiples more hardships? I don't believe so absent substantial changes from our current set and strategy.
Afghanistan, in my opinion, will, regrettably, prove that COIN (ala Iraq) can not serve as a substitute for either quelling the materially different situation in that Country, or standing in lieu of a functional national government.
My Dad was a Royal Marines Commando (before coming to the US during the brain drain in 1960), and, among other things, travelled in the Great White Fleet (on Hood 2) after WWII. He always wanted to go through the Khyber Pass, but was prevented then, and throughout the next fifty years from taking that trip due to conflicts.
My optimism vanishes when you take the Iraq expereince and attempt to improperly apply it to Afghanistan.
I am expecting either a major course correction very soon, or both Petreaus's and McCrystal's place in US military history will not be pretty.
If somebody asks me to go to Afghanistan to get us out, or to actually tackle Afghanistan's real problems (political), I will be happy to undertake that mission as to my little skill set, but the rest is a fool's dream, playing out in an already immutable script. Small pieces of tactical successes cannot substitute for a flawed, and unimplementable strategy.
Can't really agree with that, but without more detail it's hard to disagree. Would you care to elaborate?
Disagreements cheerfully accepted.
Even if most are wrong...
My opinions and conjectures are based on long experience with the way the government of the US really works as opposed to what most think. I also accept, believe and support the Conrad Black dictum "The US has the most consistent foreign policy in the world. They do not tolerate threats and have not for over 200 years." That does not mean Iraq, per se was a threat -- it does mean that the invasion disrupted other potential threats, some quite long term. It also means we have long done that and will almost certainly continue to do so in the future. We are not as dumb as we often deliberately and accidentally appear...
As for more detail, here's the gist of it:LINK. The Thread that is from contains more from me and others on the topic of this thread. There are more synergies and issues but I'm not going to put many of them on an open forum. I think you can discern some...
This LINK expands on the previous link.
This LINK discusses alternative methods which were not available so Bush IMO had to pursue an undesirable option.
Bush responded to provocations from the ME which four predecessors had caused through improper responses to escalate. He did the best he could with the tools available. He also set about disrupting other long term but then developing, slowly, threats.
@Ken:
You may see a grand strategy with some 'disruption' effect doing magical things in the world.
I see a wasted decade instead.
See; I'm a German (surprise!), and Germany has learned long ago (and then re-learned and again re-learned, hopefully with lasting effect) that it's the economy, stupid!
We had the greatest expansion of our wealth in times of peace with little participation in foreign political conflict (we weren't supplying the refrigerator of the Cold War).
The U.S., UK, France and most of all Russia have not applied this insight very well. Germany didn't either for two generations, with the most spectacular effects of all.
The U.S: economy poisoned itself during the last decade. An energetic national policy could have turned this around, but the nation's attention was in great part captured by foreign affairs and partisan clashes instead.
Just as a reminder; using U.S. statistics (CIA World Factbook, bea.gov trade data) I calculated that the population of the U.S. produced 18.25% less goods in 2008 than it consumed & invested. This already assumes the services balance surplus as goods production (because it's worth the same in trade).
Roughly a fifth of the perceived material wealth was illusion, based on debt. It wasn't always like this. The situation deteriorated in the late 90's and became terrible in the 2000's, merely waiting for the bubble to burst. The "recovery" today is a return to this deficit culture, provoking the next crash.
An energetic U.S. national economic policy could have harnessed the nation's potential for urgent and necessary repairs during the GWB administrations.
Instead, the attention (and fortune) was wasted on great power games.
The Chinese were smarter, much more subtle - and much more successful.
The two are not incompatible. Strategies fail, as this one did. I see a poorly considered attempt to achieve results through disruption that were never likely to be achieved, and a strategy based on unacceptably fluffy assumptions about the US capacity to manage the aftermath of its military successes.
The US economy poisoned itself in the 1990s. The impact of the poison wasn't felt until 2000/2001, and in economic as well as foreign policy the Bush administration was forced into a reactive mode, which in both cases it managed very badly.
What "energetic national policy" do you think could have "turned this around"? I suspect that you overestimate the impact of policy on economic affairs, which is less than many assume it to be.
The US trade deficit has been a growing problem for decades. It's been fueled primarily by the reality that the value of the dollar has been artificially inflated since WW2, largely by factors over which US policy has little control. Of course dependence on imported energy is also a factor, especially given the volatility of prices, but you can't escape the impact of currency value distortions on trade.
China has policy options unavailable in a democracy. Short-term strengths, long-term possible weaknesses. Those who expect China to enjoy an unfettered path to economic dominance may be surprised; likely there will be some bumps and ruts along that road.
I've no shortage oc complaints about both economic and foreign policy under Bush (and under Clinton) but the assumption that focus on foreign policy was a significant cause of ineffective economic policy seems to me speculative and unsupported by data or reasonable argument. I don't think Bush's economic team had their heads in Iraq, I think they had their heads up their sphincters, just as their predecessors did.
Last edited by Dayuhan; 06-04-2010 at 10:14 PM.
Too early to tell...
Your prerogative. We can disagree on that. I think the relative state of the ME in general to include Saudi Arabia and Iran, and of south asia to include Pakistan and India -- and of the US -- in ten or twenty years or so will be the true measure. Add China into that mix; yes they're smart and have done well -- but at a cost. We'll see what that cost is over the next decade, I think. All those ancillary efforts are low key, below a lot of radars but they are ongoing and were all part of that strategery.True -- but your economy sure did benefit from that refrigeration...See; I'm a German (surprise!), and Germany has learned long ago (and then re-learned and again re-learned, hopefully with lasting effect) that it's the economy, stupid!We had the greatest expansion of our wealth in times of peace with little participation in foreign political conflict (we weren't supplying the refrigerator of the Cold War).Agreed. I also agree with the rest of your comment on the economic issues.The U.S., UK, France and most of all Russia have not applied this insight very well...The U.S: economy poisoned itself during the last decade. An energetic national policy could have turned this around, but the nation's attention was in great part captured by foreign affairs and partisan clashes instead.True to an extent. You along with many non-US commentators (and entirely too many US commentators who should know better) do not understand the dysfunction deliberately built into the US political system that precludes National efforts (other than in time of existential peril). Many also miss the political reality of two not particularly different political parties -- you did not -- who continually jockey for political power to the exclusion of concern for the nation. They really need to be reined in, both of them.An energetic U.S. national economic policy could have harnessed the nation's potential for urgent and necessary repairs during the GWB administrations. Instead, the attention (and fortune) was wasted on great power games.
The Chinese were smarter, much more subtle - and much more successful.
Had Bush's four predecessor's done better handling the probes from the ME from 1979 until 2000, 9/11 might likely not have occurred and things would have been different (but likely not radically different on the economic front due to the aforementioned political problems and intended dysfunction). Instead he believed he had to respond to a provocation and a potential low order threat (Islamist fundamentalism anger direct at the west) to which he believed his fellow western leaders (and his likely replacement) probably would not adequately reply. I believe that was a valid assessment.
I wouldn't have done it the way he did but he did what he believed necessary with the tools he had available in a way that worked. I do believe it or something like it was very necessary and long overdue. Had James Earl Carter not so badly mishandled the Tehran Embassy seizure in 1979, US history would almost certainly have been quite different. Had Carter's successors handled subsequent probes and actions against US interests differently...
None of them did it right and Bush had to pick up the tab.
Due to flawed execution -- not his fault, mostly but not entirely the Army's -- the success was not as great as it potentially might have been. I believe it still to be a qualified success at this point with potential to be a fully accorded success when a number of ongoing efforts come to fruition over the next ten years or so. Many make the mistake of looking at Iraq in isolation. It was only the most visible face of the entire effort -- very deliberately and purposefully distractingly so...
So while I generally agree with your comments on policies and economic aspects, that has little to do with Iraq as -- or not -- a strategic blunder. It was a strategic choice whose total impact is still to be fully determined. That it had an adverse impact on the US economy cannot be denied. As far as social and political impacts -- too early to tell. We'll see.
Last edited by Ken White; 06-04-2010 at 10:31 PM.
Possibly, but it's not a measure we'll be able to use effectively, as we will never know what the outcome of other policy options would have been. Things may go badly or well because of or in spite of our actions: there are too many variables in the picture to clearly say what actions caused what consequences.
Possibly so, but I can't see how that particular response was calculated to address that threat, unless our policy was to address the threat by exacerbating it. Since when do we fight our enemies by giving them what they want and need?
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