Iraq - A Strategic Blunder?

[Valin]

had very little to do with WMD or even with remapping the ME. It was all about disruption and that disruption was on a world, to include Europe and Asia, scale. The number of things that were synergistically folded into the effort is huge; there were dozens of reasons, few of themselves very important but together, they created a significant change in a number of then proposed or possible actions by many players around the world. It is too early to tell how successful it was; probably about 2033 that will be fairly -- but not completely -- clear. The strategy was one of those rare long term US efforts that was not predicated on the election cycle -- indeed, it was launched at the time it occurred specifically to preclude an interruption by the vagaries of that cycle; Bush was afraid if he didn't launch, his successor would not and his second term was not a lock at the time. It was also launched to effectively commit the US to a long term course of action and it succeeded in achieving both those goals

I personally believe that, even as early as today it can be counted as a qualified success and I say that acknowledging the quite valid negative points raised by Fuchs and others and admitting that the US Government and the US Army, regrettably, screwed it up badly. Not least because of some 20-40 year old bad domestic political and military decisions that earlier locked the Bush Administration into less than optimum responses to provocations. It took entirely too long to get the course corrections in place (some needed and acknowledged important corrections are still being discussed, for Gawds sake...). That course correction comment applies to both the previous and current US Administrations, to DoD as an entity and to the Army.

I'm trying to think of a war where we didn't screw up....at the start.

[Chris jM]

I'm trying to think of a war where we didn't screw up....at the start.

Then consider your nation blessed that you can, generally speaking, finish wars well.

[Ken White]

I'm trying to think of a war where we didn't screw up....at the start.

ChrisjM has it right. Thus far we've mostly had time to sort it out or we've been lucky and had opponents who were even less competent than we were.

I'm not sure we should rely on that always being the case in the future...

[Schmedlap]

Ken,
I find myself largely in agreement with what you wrote. It is reassuring to see that I am not crazy. Or, at a minimum, that the voices in my head and in yours are eavesdropping on one another.

[Steve the Planner]

Schmedlap:

I went to Iraq to help us structure and implement our departure, which (fingers crossed) I hope we succeeded at. Gen. Petreaus proved in that instance, that COIN was a useful tool (however partially or haphazardly applied) for that withdrawal. Much of my time was, in fact, spent re-linking the effectiveness of national government to the provinces.

For all the national fretting, Gen Abdullah, Salah ad Din's Deputy Governor, is plowing ahead with his dream of an international airport in Tikrit to handle the tourists already returning. No US or national funds. I will be proud to land at that airport, which we first discussed, and organized the strategy for, in February 2008.

Several folks were killed trying to restore electricity, roads, etc... especially in and around Bayji in early 2008.

My last visit to Tikrit was for a Safe Water Working Group to, in part, restore and construct regional water systems. My last day on DoS duty, I spent on a hillside at Arlington watching services for a young soldier shot by a sniper while providing security to inspect one of those projects. Now, open.

Private First Class Christopher Lotter, a young soldier from Chester Heights, Pennsylvania, who died at age 20 on December 31, 2008 after being shot by a sniper while on patrol to inspect a water treatment plant outside Tikrit, Iraq.

If I was face-to-face with his parents today, I can honestly state that, while his death may never be explicable, the work he was doing was important, and made a real difference.

It took two months to organize the temporary replacement bridges across the Tigris at Bayji and elsewhere in the North, but the permanent ones have already opened or will soon, and have not been attacked yet. Nor, do I believe the forces that could threaten those bridges have the likely resources to do so. They would profoundly alienate a struggling post-conflict economy, and face a pretty decently organized Iraqi Army.

Last week, one of my senior advisor cohorts in Tikrit helped to organize a very successful trade and investment conference there. Very proud of him.

They have a civilian GIS mapping framework and are pushing ahead with the census. That was one of my principal responsibilities.

KRG issues have not turned into a disaster. I believe my service on the UN's disputed boundary team made a small difference in that regard.

Not every meaningful dream happens right away, and I am absolutely sure that the assurance of a functioning Iraq will come from emerging vibrance in the provinces---the national politics in Iraq, like in the US, is just one dimension of a Country's resilience.

I am very proud of our work, and very aware of all those who died or were seriously injured trying to do it.

From our little band of civilian advisors, perhaps Terry Barniche, blown up in June 2009, was the most widely covered, but there was never a time that we were not aware of the sacrifices of all the young route clearance, and patrolling soldiers that, for the most part, allowed our work to be safely accomplished.

Unlike some, I understand what we did in the surge period as very productive and successful within the limited goal of engineering our successful departure and a reasonable handoff to basically functioning civilian control.

That optimism does not extend to Afghanistan, where I have friends on the ground and am very aware of the civilian reconstruction limitations. Are they going to be able to make the kind of contributions were made in Iraq, despite multiples more hardships? I don't believe so absent substantial changes from our current set and strategy.

Afghanistan, in my opinion, will, regrettably, prove that COIN (ala Iraq) can not serve as a substitute for either quelling the materially different situation in that Country, or standing in lieu of a functional national government.

My Dad was a Royal Marines Commando (before coming to the US during the brain drain in 1960), and, among other things, travelled in the Great White Fleet (on Hood 2) after WWII. He always wanted to go through the Khyber Pass, but was prevented then, and throughout the next fifty years from taking that trip due to conflicts.

My optimism vanishes when you take the Iraq expereince and attempt to improperly apply it to Afghanistan.

I am expecting either a major course correction very soon, or both Petreaus's and McCrystal's place in US military history will not be pretty.

If somebody asks me to go to Afghanistan to get us out, or to actually tackle Afghanistan's real problems (political), I will be happy to undertake that mission as to my little skill set, but the rest is a fool's dream, playing out in an already immutable script. Small pieces of tactical successes cannot substitute for a flawed, and unimplementable strategy.