Iraq - A Strategic Blunder?

[Dayuhan]

had very little to do with WMD or even with remapping the ME. It was all about disruption and that disruption was on a world, to include Europe and Asia, scale. The number of things that were synergistically folded into the effort is huge; there were dozens of reasons, few of themselves very important but together, they created a significant change in a number of then proposed or possible actions by many players around the world.

Can't really agree with that, but without more detail it's hard to disagree. Would you care to elaborate?

[Ken White]

Even if most are wrong...

My opinions and conjectures are based on long experience with the way the government of the US really works as opposed to what most think. I also accept, believe and support the Conrad Black dictum "The US has the most consistent foreign policy in the world. They do not tolerate threats and have not for over 200 years." That does not mean Iraq, per se was a threat -- it does mean that the invasion disrupted other potential threats, some quite long term. It also means we have long done that and will almost certainly continue to do so in the future. We are not as dumb as we often deliberately and accidentally appear...

As for more detail, here's the gist of it:LINK. The Thread that is from contains more from me and others on the topic of this thread. There are more synergies and issues but I'm not going to put many of them on an open forum. I think you can discern some...

This LINK expands on the previous link.

This LINK discusses alternative methods which were not available so Bush IMO had to pursue an undesirable option.

Bush responded to provocations from the ME which four predecessors had caused through improper responses to escalate. He did the best he could with the tools available. He also set about disrupting other long term but then developing, slowly, threats.

[Fuchs]

@Ken:
You may see a grand strategy with some 'disruption' effect doing magical things in the world.
I see a wasted decade instead.


See; I'm a German (surprise!), and Germany has learned long ago (and then re-learned and again re-learned, hopefully with lasting effect) that it's the economy, stupid!
We had the greatest expansion of our wealth in times of peace with little participation in foreign political conflict (we weren't supplying the refrigerator of the Cold War).

The U.S., UK, France and most of all Russia have not applied this insight very well. Germany didn't either for two generations, with the most spectacular effects of all.

The U.S: economy poisoned itself during the last decade. An energetic national policy could have turned this around, but the nation's attention was in great part captured by foreign affairs and partisan clashes instead.

Just as a reminder; using U.S. statistics (CIA World Factbook, bea.gov trade data) I calculated that the population of the U.S. produced 18.25% less goods in 2008 than it consumed & invested. This already assumes the services balance surplus as goods production (because it's worth the same in trade).
Roughly a fifth of the perceived material wealth was illusion, based on debt. It wasn't always like this. The situation deteriorated in the late 90's and became terrible in the 2000's, merely waiting for the bubble to burst. The "recovery" today is a return to this deficit culture, provoking the next crash.

An energetic U.S. national economic policy could have harnessed the nation's potential for urgent and necessary repairs during the GWB administrations.
Instead, the attention (and fortune) was wasted on great power games.
The Chinese were smarter, much more subtle - and much more successful.

[Dayuhan]

You may see a grand strategy with some 'disruption' effect doing magical things in the world. I see a wasted decade instead.

The two are not incompatible. Strategies fail, as this one did. I see a poorly considered attempt to achieve results through disruption that were never likely to be achieved, and a strategy based on unacceptably fluffy assumptions about the US capacity to manage the aftermath of its military successes.

The U.S: economy poisoned itself during the last decade. An energetic national policy could have turned this around, but the nation's attention was in great part captured by foreign affairs and partisan clashes instead.

The US economy poisoned itself in the 1990s. The impact of the poison wasn't felt until 2000/2001, and in economic as well as foreign policy the Bush administration was forced into a reactive mode, which in both cases it managed very badly.

What "energetic national policy" do you think could have "turned this around"? I suspect that you overestimate the impact of policy on economic affairs, which is less than many assume it to be.

The US trade deficit has been a growing problem for decades. It's been fueled primarily by the reality that the value of the dollar has been artificially inflated since WW2, largely by factors over which US policy has little control. Of course dependence on imported energy is also a factor, especially given the volatility of prices, but you can't escape the impact of currency value distortions on trade.

The Chinese were smarter, much more subtle - and much more successful.

China has policy options unavailable in a democracy. Short-term strengths, long-term possible weaknesses. Those who expect China to enjoy an unfettered path to economic dominance may be surprised; likely there will be some bumps and ruts along that road.

I've no shortage oc complaints about both economic and foreign policy under Bush (and under Clinton) but the assumption that focus on foreign policy was a significant cause of ineffective economic policy seems to me speculative and unsupported by data or reasonable argument. I don't think Bush's economic team had their heads in Iraq, I think they had their heads up their sphincters, just as their predecessors did.

[Ken White]

You may see a grand strategy with some 'disruption' effect doing magical things in the world. I see a wasted decade instead.

Your prerogative. We can disagree on that. I think the relative state of the ME in general to include Saudi Arabia and Iran, and of south asia to include Pakistan and India -- and of the US -- in ten or twenty years or so will be the true measure. Add China into that mix; yes they're smart and have done well -- but at a cost. We'll see what that cost is over the next decade, I think. All those ancillary efforts are low key, below a lot of radars but they are ongoing and were all part of that strategery.

See; I'm a German (surprise!), and Germany has learned long ago (and then re-learned and again re-learned, hopefully with lasting effect) that it's the economy, stupid!We had the greatest expansion of our wealth in times of peace with little participation in foreign political conflict (we weren't supplying the refrigerator of the Cold War).

True -- but your economy sure did benefit from that refrigeration...

The U.S., UK, France and most of all Russia have not applied this insight very well...The U.S: economy poisoned itself during the last decade. An energetic national policy could have turned this around, but the nation's attention was in great part captured by foreign affairs and partisan clashes instead.

Agreed. I also agree with the rest of your comment on the economic issues.

An energetic U.S. national economic policy could have harnessed the nation's potential for urgent and necessary repairs during the GWB administrations. Instead, the attention (and fortune) was wasted on great power games.
The Chinese were smarter, much more subtle - and much more successful.

True to an extent. You along with many non-US commentators (and entirely too many US commentators who should know better) do not understand the dysfunction deliberately built into the US political system that precludes National efforts (other than in time of existential peril). Many also miss the political reality of two not particularly different political parties -- you did not -- who continually jockey for political power to the exclusion of concern for the nation. They really need to be reined in, both of them.

Had Bush's four predecessor's done better handling the probes from the ME from 1979 until 2000, 9/11 might likely not have occurred and things would have been different (but likely not radically different on the economic front due to the aforementioned political problems and intended dysfunction). Instead he believed he had to respond to a provocation and a potential low order threat (Islamist fundamentalism anger direct at the west) to which he believed his fellow western leaders (and his likely replacement) probably would not adequately reply. I believe that was a valid assessment.

I wouldn't have done it the way he did but he did what he believed necessary with the tools he had available in a way that worked. I do believe it or something like it was very necessary and long overdue. Had James Earl Carter not so badly mishandled the Tehran Embassy seizure in 1979, US history would almost certainly have been quite different. Had Carter's successors handled subsequent probes and actions against US interests differently...

None of them did it right and Bush had to pick up the tab.

Due to flawed execution -- not his fault, mostly but not entirely the Army's -- the success was not as great as it potentially might have been. I believe it still to be a qualified success at this point with potential to be a fully accorded success when a number of ongoing efforts come to fruition over the next ten years or so. Many make the mistake of looking at Iraq in isolation. It was only the most visible face of the entire effort -- very deliberately and purposefully distractingly so...

So while I generally agree with your comments on policies and economic aspects, that has little to do with Iraq as -- or not -- a strategic blunder. It was a strategic choice whose total impact is still to be fully determined. That it had an adverse impact on the US economy cannot be denied. As far as social and political impacts -- too early to tell. We'll see.

[Dayuhan]

I think the relative state of the ME in general to include Saudi Arabia and Iran, and of south asia to include Pakistan and India -- and of the US -- in ten or twenty years or so will be the true measure.

Possibly, but it's not a measure we'll be able to use effectively, as we will never know what the outcome of other policy options would have been. Things may go badly or well because of or in spite of our actions: there are too many variables in the picture to clearly say what actions caused what consequences.

he believed he had to respond to a provocation and a potential low order threat (Islamist fundamentalism anger direct at the west) to which he believed his fellow western leaders (and his likely replacement) probably would not adequately reply. I believe that was a valid assessment.

Possibly so, but I can't see how that particular response was calculated to address that threat, unless our policy was to address the threat by exacerbating it. Since when do we fight our enemies by giving them what they want and need?

[Ken White]

Possibly, but it's not a measure we'll be able to use effectively, as we will never know what the outcome of other policy options would have been. Things may go badly or well because of or in spite of our actions: there are too many variables in the picture to clearly say what actions caused what consequences.

Regrettably (or fortunately, viewpoint dependent), there are few metrics that one can apply to strategic outcomes due to those variables so there is rarely a measurable effect. Was US participation in World War II a strategic blunder? Was the war a strategic success? How about Korea? Viet Nam? Desert Shield/Desert Storm?

Possibly so, but I can't see how that particular response was calculated to address that threat, unless our policy was to address the threat by exacerbating it. Since when do we fight our enemies by giving them what they want and need?

It was. Exacerbate that is. Give it some thought. It was also calculated to show the collection of nations from which the threat originates that attacks on US interests world wide emanating from the ME would, contrary to previous experience, bring a disproportionate response. As Afghanistan had earlier shown that attacks on US soil would be met with even swifter and possibly more disproportionate response. Afghanistan didn't work for the ME message as it isn't in the ME.

The response notably attacked a nation only peripherally if at all involved. It also was aimed at giving the nominal enemies what they though they wanted but in a quite different place and not with results they anticipated -- so I'm not at all sure they got what they needed...

Recall this also; "It was only the most visible face of the entire effort -- very deliberately and purposefully distractingly so..."

[tequila]

It was. Exacerbate that is. Give it some thought. It was also calculated to show the collection of nations from which the threat originates that attacks on US interests world wide emanating from the ME would, contrary to previous experience, bring a disproportionate response. As Afghanistan had earlier shown that attacks on US soil would be met with even swifter and possibly more disproportionate response. Afghanistan didn't work for the ME message as it isn't in the ME.

This might have worked if the insurgency had not broken out. Instead it gave us five years of jihadist propaganda and videos of American hummvees exploding. It made for very poor intimidation if your target was the wider Middle Eastern populace. With regards to state actors, I doubt it made much of a difference. Iran certainly did not intimidate well - it was not long before they were killing Americans with far greater success and frequency than even the worst years in Lebanon. Syria's ties with Iran are tighter than ever, and Turkey as well. Certainly anti-Americanism in the region is as strong or stronger than ever before.

As for the invisible effects, I suppose it's a bit difficult to ever argue that point. Perhaps great benefits are accruing out of sight. I suppose you could say that about any policy.

[Dayuhan]

Give it some thought. It was also calculated to show the collection of nations from which the threat originates that attacks on US interests world wide emanating from the ME would, contrary to previous experience, bring a disproportionate response.

The response notably attacked a nation only peripherally if at all involved. It also was aimed at giving the nominal enemies what they though they wanted but in a quite different place and not with results they anticipated -- so I'm not at all sure they got what they needed...

I don't see that disproportionate response carries much deterrent force if it isn't applied to those who did whatever it is we are responding to. The message we communicate is that you can attack the US and get away with it, and benefit from it, because the response is going to be applied to somebody else, leaving you with a propaganda bonanza.

I think the people who attacked us did get what they needed, and far more of it than they expected. Fortunately for us, they were unable to exploit the opportunity we gave them to the fullest possible extent. It's useful to have incompetent enemies, but it's not something we want to rely on.

Our strategic weakness lies in long-term political will. Our vulnerability is the war of attrition. This is no secret: we know it, our allies know it, our enemies know it. They can't defeat us, but if they can maneuver us into the right position, they might be able to outlast us and achieve the same effect. We know they will try to maneuver us into long-term static occupation of Muslim nations: that's where they want us to be. It is in our interest not to permit them to place us in this position. Seems to me we haven't exactly achieved that.