Iraq - A Strategic Blunder?

[Steve the Planner]

Agreed that it was a startegic blunder.

Why? Somewhere between neo-con revenge, regrets about the limitations in the prior war, and the delusion of oil control or a base for democracy/bulwark against Iraq, etc... Tak any from the menu, it doesn't matter.

Interesting about advance planning, though. Lots of people actually knew lots about it, but what they knew never passed the portal into decision-making, before, during, or after. Amazing how much is known but how little knowledge an organization has.

I was particularly intrigued by the State Department's Crocker study (pre-invasion). They rounded up a bunch of folks to brainstorm Iraq. Trouble is these folks' knowledge and opinions were "political" in nature, and had no real substance as to basics like demographics, organizational structure, infrastructure, etc... It was like an amateur side show.

Again, amazing...

Now, we leave for a while having gained little in the way of structured analysis and understanding, and, after years of occupancy, and all will be shortly forgotten.

Amazing...

Steve

[jkm_101_fso]

This is more personal than the rest. I hope that's OK:

It's hard for me to say that Iraq wasn't worth it. I spent a few years there and lost some good friends. Personally, I wouldn't want to say that it was for nothing.

However, I understand reality. Was Saddam a threat to the United States in March of 2003? Probably not. Was he a threat to neighboring countries? Maybe, but I don't think so. Probably just a toothless tiger at that point in history. Was he a threat to his own people? Certainly; but so are many other unsavory tyrants around the world. It doesn't mean that we overthrow them all. We can’t do that.

So, I get it. We didn't need to invade Iraq. It was a costly war in terms of blood and treasure. It was also costly because of the irreparable damage done to the Army, in terms of individuals killed, wounded and those left the service because of it. They are not easily replaced. Additionally, all of the equipment destroyed and damaged, which can be replaced, but at high cost.

But, Iraq caused the Army to change, for the better, in many ways. We now have COIN doctrine and recent practical application of successful TTPs. We have experienced and knowledgeable counterinsurgents in our ranks. We have more adaptable and flexible leaders. We have fielded some amazing tools to our kit that amplifies our ability to succeed in these types of wars.

I look back and think about if I did more harm than good there. Was I able to help some people improve their quality of life? Yes. That is true across the board for most during this conflict. We all helped some of the people of Iraq. Not all of them, unfortunately. Did many die prematurely because of us? Yes, unfortunately.

I believe that the Civil War that occurred in Iraq during our tenure would have eventually happened (or a similar variant), even if we didn't invade. Saddam would have died at some point and I'm not sure anyone (to include his sons) would have been able to fill the vacuum. Maybe I'm wrong.

I am numb when I think about Iraq. I am glad for the people whose lives have improved. I am sad for the people who died. But I am alive and healthy. It’s a convenient view, I suppose.

Surprisingly, during my darkest days, I was not angry about the invasion of Iraq. I am most upset with HOW we fought that war for the first 3+ years. Many could see what we were doing was absolutely not working, but all I heard commanders, Generals and politicians saying was "it's getting better" and "the situation is improving" when it clearly was not. My rage then (and now) was toward green-suitors and politicians. They could not accept that we were losing and what we were doing was not working.

I am angry we didn't have enough troops. I am angry we didn't anticipate the looting, chaos and subsequent insurgency. I am angry we stupidly dissolved the Iraqi Army without much thought. I am angry we initially denied the violence was an insurgency. I am angry we put entire maneuver brigades on FOBs and asked them to drive around and get blown up. I am angry we asked Soldiers in soft-skin humvees to conduct "route clearance". I am angry that many units did not secure the AOs they were responsible for. I am angry that we prematurely turned battle space over the unready and untrained Iraqi units. I am angry we let so many police forces become death squads. I am angry that we refused to acknowledge it was a civil war. I am angry we let the bloodshed go on FOR SO LONG before we chose to change the way we were doing things. I am angry about so much of it.

It took the removal of the SECDEF and a Mid-Term election to make a change happen. I am glad that it FINALLY happened. Because it appears for now, that it worked.

I will return to Iraq very soon. I am excited to see the security improvement and (mostly) violent-free streets. I am excited to be part of the effort that "turns the light off" for US involvement. I was there at the beginning. I was there in the middle. I will be there at the end. Rather fitting, I guess. But it still doesn’t bring me much closure.

Years from now, I don't know what I will think of it. Probably depends on what ends up happening there. History might remember it as a mistake, or a great victory. I don't know. But I think decades from now, the truth is that I will still be pretty unsure about it all, just like I am today.

Lest we forget.

[Steve the Planner]

jkm:

Interesting, isn't it that, like Viet Nam, some of us have experienced a country that we will all be linked to.

Ditto on the decision-higher ups, and ditto on helping Iraqis.

I did an infrastructure, econ and pop assessment in Jan 2008, and rapidly figured out that, after decades of sanctions and mismanagement, the whole affair could have been pushed over with a few well-placed feathers, but, the pregnant question was always "What happens next?"

That was the question that all of us, and the Iraqis, participated in answering---the hard way. Like Ricks said, the final chapters will be written by the Iraqis, not us, and, despite the appearance of turmoil, I have a sneaking suspicion that, one day, some of us will go as tourists to see the now-restored monuments we saw only as dust-heaps.

My prayers are that the answers for our dead and injured come from that future, which, like a bricklayer for the Empire State Building, will always be "our" building... and even with friends who died building it.

I was very pleased to see that, after all the sturm-unt-drang about the election, it opens with Allawi, the initial winner having the first opportunity to form a new government. Far from over, but small steps for a whole troubled country are, in fact, big steps.

[Schmedlap]

Who are you, you optimist? And what have you done with Steve?

[Ken White]

had very little to do with WMD or even with remapping the ME. It was all about disruption and that disruption was on a world, to include Europe and Asia, scale. The number of things that were synergistically folded into the effort is huge; there were dozens of reasons, few of themselves very important but together, they created a significant change in a number of then proposed or possible actions by many players around the world. It is too early to tell how successful it was; probably about 2033 that will be fairly -- but not completely -- clear. The strategy was one of those rare long term US efforts that was not predicated on the election cycle -- indeed, it was launched at the time it occurred specifically to preclude an interruption by the vagaries of that cycle; Bush was afraid if he didn't launch, his successor would not and his second term was not a lock at the time. It was also launched to effectively commit the US to a long term course of action and it succeeded in achieving both those goals

I personally believe that, even as early as today it can be counted as a qualified success and I say that acknowledging the quite valid negative points raised by Fuchs and others and admitting that the US Government and the US Army, regrettably, screwed it up badly. Not least because of some 20-40 year old bad domestic political and military decisions that earlier locked the Bush Administration into less than optimum responses to provocations. It took entirely too long to get the course corrections in place (some needed and acknowledged important corrections are still being discussed, for Gawds sake...). That course correction comment applies to both the previous and current US Administrations, to DoD as an entity and to the Army.

[Valin]

had very little to do with WMD or even with remapping the ME. It was all about disruption and that disruption was on a world, to include Europe and Asia, scale. The number of things that were synergistically folded into the effort is huge; there were dozens of reasons, few of themselves very important but together, they created a significant change in a number of then proposed or possible actions by many players around the world. It is too early to tell how successful it was; probably about 2033 that will be fairly -- but not completely -- clear. The strategy was one of those rare long term US efforts that was not predicated on the election cycle -- indeed, it was launched at the time it occurred specifically to preclude an interruption by the vagaries of that cycle; Bush was afraid if he didn't launch, his successor would not and his second term was not a lock at the time. It was also launched to effectively commit the US to a long term course of action and it succeeded in achieving both those goals

I personally believe that, even as early as today it can be counted as a qualified success and I say that acknowledging the quite valid negative points raised by Fuchs and others and admitting that the US Government and the US Army, regrettably, screwed it up badly. Not least because of some 20-40 year old bad domestic political and military decisions that earlier locked the Bush Administration into less than optimum responses to provocations. It took entirely too long to get the course corrections in place (some needed and acknowledged important corrections are still being discussed, for Gawds sake...). That course correction comment applies to both the previous and current US Administrations, to DoD as an entity and to the Army.

I'm trying to think of a war where we didn't screw up....at the start.

[Chris jM]

I'm trying to think of a war where we didn't screw up....at the start.

Then consider your nation blessed that you can, generally speaking, finish wars well.

[Ken White]

I'm trying to think of a war where we didn't screw up....at the start.

ChrisjM has it right. Thus far we've mostly had time to sort it out or we've been lucky and had opponents who were even less competent than we were.

I'm not sure we should rely on that always being the case in the future...

[Dayuhan]

had very little to do with WMD or even with remapping the ME. It was all about disruption and that disruption was on a world, to include Europe and Asia, scale. The number of things that were synergistically folded into the effort is huge; there were dozens of reasons, few of themselves very important but together, they created a significant change in a number of then proposed or possible actions by many players around the world.

Can't really agree with that, but without more detail it's hard to disagree. Would you care to elaborate?

[Ken White]

Even if most are wrong...

My opinions and conjectures are based on long experience with the way the government of the US really works as opposed to what most think. I also accept, believe and support the Conrad Black dictum "The US has the most consistent foreign policy in the world. They do not tolerate threats and have not for over 200 years." That does not mean Iraq, per se was a threat -- it does mean that the invasion disrupted other potential threats, some quite long term. It also means we have long done that and will almost certainly continue to do so in the future. We are not as dumb as we often deliberately and accidentally appear...

As for more detail, here's the gist of it:LINK. The Thread that is from contains more from me and others on the topic of this thread. There are more synergies and issues but I'm not going to put many of them on an open forum. I think you can discern some...

This LINK expands on the previous link.

This LINK discusses alternative methods which were not available so Bush IMO had to pursue an undesirable option.

Bush responded to provocations from the ME which four predecessors had caused through improper responses to escalate. He did the best he could with the tools available. He also set about disrupting other long term but then developing, slowly, threats.