Mech Platoon: CAB or ACR

[William F. Owen]

I'm guessing your point will be that such a weapon system enables the vehicles to be used in roles they were not intended for. If that is the answer, surely good doctrine, very good training and knowledgeable leadership would allow for the vehicles to be used properly without forcing them to forego a huge capability?

It's a discussion. I am not sure you can say it is right or wrong, but if I have 56 vehicles in a Battle Group, I do need to store about 50-100 TOW re-loads somewhere and have them available, so 6-12 Pallets.
I also need a training budget, and another line item to maintain, etc etc.
Once the boys have a weapon, they will use it! - for whatever they want or need given the condition.
Will a commander with Coy of TOW equipped Warriors not commit them as an AT -Reserve, just because "doctrine" says, it's not its job,- they're just for self defence!

[Ken White]

Having 30mm/25mm is an easier argument - you then have the ability for the vehicle to provide both self-defence out to 2km+ and provide rather potent fire support to the dismounted element.

Possibly of use in a desert environment where ranges over 2km are possible but elsewhere? Advantage over .50 cal is minimal for cost and complexity needed?

I'm guessing your point will be that such a weapon system enables the vehicles to be used in roles they were not intended for. If that is the answer, surely good doctrine, very good training and knowledgeable leadership would allow for the vehicles to be used properly without forcing them to forego a huge capability?

I will refrain from comment on commanders and usage...

However, very good doctrine is very much METT-TC dependent -- lacking that, it is just doctrine, ignored as often as it is followed. Troops in contact will use whatever weapons are available, even well trained troops succumb to availability. They must be provided with the proper tools for the job, for sure -- but excessive tools will be misused. A case in point is the TOW missile and the Bradley. The temptation to use the Brad with its 25mm and TOWs as a light tank is quite strong.

...what is the benefit to a turreted vehicle as opposed to a RWS? I imagine a turreted wpn has a far greater ammunition capacity and can reload/ cycle through different ammunition types quicker - but other than that?

Actually, the turret limits ready ammunition due to volume and more is invariably stored in the hull (which often means leaving a dismount behind to pass more ammunition up to the turret...). Add the price of higher silhouette, lighter armor (mostly) and using a turret, you really have acquired a vulnerability for small if any benefit

[Chris jM]

William F. Owen: Once the boys have a weapon, they will use it! - for whatever they want or need given the condition.

Ken White: They must be provided with the proper tools for the job, for sure -- but excessive tools will be misused. A case in point is the TOW missile and the Bradley. The temptation to use the Brad with its 25mm and TOWs as a light tank is quite strong.

Acknowledge your points. Is the answer, though, to withdraw or deny the weapon platforms (say, 25mm/50cal and AArmd missiles on veh)?

I'm thinking that, if the Bradley couldn't be used as a light tank if METT-TC disallowed it, would it be such a big deal to throw the TOW onto it? Is it possible that we are using the Bradley as a light tank as, relative to enemy capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has all the characteristics required of protected armour?

It mightn't be perfect, but it may be better to have superfluous weapon platforms on a AFV, accept the potential for inevitable misuse and live with it than not have them altogether. When the situation is such that to use them as light armour is suicidal, could we rely on the gods of necessity correcting our ways?

William F. Owen: I also need a training budget, and another line item to maintain, etc etc.

True, very true. Then again, tell your crew commander and gunner that he doesn't have to worry about being anti-harassment qualified and you might be able to fit in some gunnery time. Sorry, my cynicism is getting the better of me...

Ken WhiteAdvantage over .50 cal is minimal for cost and complexity needed?

Excluding range, the sheer fact that a 25/30mm offers HE with correspondingly increased penetration would sell the cannons to me - admitting that I'm relatively ignorant in the maintenance/ logistic requirements.

I will refrain from comment on commanders and usage...

Much obliged!

[William F. Owen]

Acknowledge your points. Is the answer, though, to withdraw or deny the weapon platforms (say, 25mm/50cal and AArmd missiles on veh)?

The reason infantry have AFVs is to get them to the point where they dismount to fight, and then to support them S1/S4 wise. Tanks, do the fighting. - in a perfect world. It's certainly how the IDF currently thinks. See - my post yesterday.

Excluding range, the sheer fact that a 25/30mm offers HE with correspondingly increased penetration would sell the cannons to me - admitting that I'm relatively ignorant in the maintenance/ logistic requirements.

This is actually a good point. There is an extremely good senior military analyst at Rand, who is a friend of mine, and we go back and forth on this a lot. To me, 40mm HV and 12.7mm is all I want - but he makes your points and they are good points.

[Ken White]

Acknowledge your points. Is the answer, though, to withdraw or deny the weapon platforms (say, 25mm/50cal and AArmd missiles on veh)?

Depends on the state of training IMO. If our army were better trained, I'd agree. Given the current -- and likely future -- state of training, I'd say no. With mediocre training, arms that can be misused will be misused and all too often that provides concomitant unnecessary own casualties and can lead to tactical errors with potentially dangerous consequences.

I'm thinking that, if the Bradley couldn't be used as a light tank if METT-TC disallowed it...

If everyone did a good METT-TC analysis before committing. If even most commanders did one...

In my observation, the temptation to use a perceived power or capability over rides common sense all to often. I also believe Armor is seductive, the cocoon effect takes hold and people are reluctant to leave their vehicles for a harsh world where unfriendly types are about (there's also often a reluctance by Cdrs to order such dismounting for the same reason -- he doesn't want to get out either so he in fairness refuses to order his men to do so). That drives a desire to use the maximum vehicle power and protective capability available even if the tactical situation says no. Most carriers are not adequately armored for such employment. The IFV concept was and is seductive but it isn't very smart.

... When the situation is such that to use them as light armour is suicidal, could we rely on the gods of necessity correcting our ways?

Yes, for those who survive and gain experience. No for those killed by the error -- or their inexperienced replacements. All Armies gain combat experience and improve but poor equipment choices that lend themselves to misuse in the initial stages of a war and have to be corrected by harsh combat experience amount to killing off some of your best and best trained Soldiers hoping that their replacements will learn and do better -- and better equipment will appear. The US Army has long experience at doing just that.

I don't believe that's smart and I know it isn't necessary.

Sorry, my cynicism is getting the better of me...

Cynical perhaps but a very apt point. Democracies will not really train the bulk of their Armies well for a number of reasons, not least the intrusion of politically correct stuff. Add the fact that most politicians really do not want their Armies to be too effective and competent...

Excluding range, the sheer fact that a 25/30mm offers HE with correspondingly increased penetration would sell the cannons to me - admitting that I'm relatively ignorant in the maintenance/ logistic requirements.

The issue is what you want or require your vehicles to do, the type of terrain over which you may have to fight -- and to a lesser extent, the type enemy you will encounter.

On balance IMO, 120mm trumps 25 / 30mm or even 50mm. Assume a turret with such a weapon costs $1M (no Missiles a bit less, with Missiles a bit more) while a .50 cal RWS costs $150K. If one replaces the four turrets in a Platoon's vehicles with RWS, one could about buy another Tank thus a company's worth of turrets displaced would purchase another Tank platoon -- which option produces the most combat power?

That's one consideration, my concern is the tactical misuse potential that is offered and the thought of lightly armored vehicles being confronted by a well concealed tank platoon is troublesome. Friend of mine was a 1st Cav Div Bn Cdr in Desert Storm. He went into Kuwait with two Cos of M1s leading and two of Bradleys trailing behind. He lost no vehicles. His sister Bn reversed that and they lost three Bradleys against less opposition.

As Wilf said, infantry carriers SHOULD exist solely to get the Infantry to a point where they can dismount and fight (my emphasis) in support of and supported by Tanks. Sending medium caliber cannon armed infantry carriers into a fight where Tanks or anti-tank elements are enemy possibilities is an invitation to destruction and history proves that if a capability is present, it will be employed -- no matter how dumb the employment may be.

Scout vehicles are a different batch of issues and general METT-TC anticipations dependent, I agree they might advantageously have medium caliber cannon -- though in a great many situations, a lightly (.50 cal) armed light vehicle accompanied by Tanks could well be a better choice.

[Tukhachevskii]

..but what about bringing back the infantry support tank? Rather than spend large sums of money on APC's with IFV level firepower- and which according to SODs law- will be used as "fancy-dress" tanks (and more than likely get their arses kicked) wouldn't it be better to get a run-of-the-mill APC with appropriate armour (active and passive) and get as many troops as possible into it (i.e., 2+12?). Their infantry could debuss at the assembly area after which the APCs would be deployed as logistics resupply vehicles (ammo, food, etc. and mobile medical "taxis"). To escort dismounted troops over the departure line and onto the objective one could deploy a platoon (say per coy) of BMPT type vehicles (IMO, the badder-arse/ass version of the US MGS). They've got the armour protection needed, are armed to (and beyond) the teeth and would be easier to manage than an entire coy (13+) APCs/IFVs (+ attachments). One BMPT could be attached per platoon with one at HQ or together or whatever, METT-TC dependant. Their Attaka-T missles have HE and FAE variants. Never been too sure about the utility of sponson mounted 30mm GMGs, but why not? You've got a vehicle that can do FIBUA, desert warfare, light/infantry support and could even act as a strongpoint defensive position all by its lonesome! Sure, it's tactical height is a minor drawback (it also easily qualifies as a HVT) but then again so do most IFVS/AVs, deployment, well trained (and crafty) troops and doctrine should prevent any mishaps barring an enemy armed with standoff smart missiles (then again, I'm sure there's room on the BMPT for a local area anti-missile turret like that twin 7.62mm MMW guided TAMS thingy Marconi developed back in the late 90s). Must... stop....am .....drooling...

[Ken White]

However, the trend at the end of WW II was to avoid light tanks and go for what today are sometimes called main battle tanks. The Infantry Support Tank is effectively a light tank...

Like the Begleitpanzer with a 57mm gun and missiles of the mid-70s shown below. Last time I checked, 120mm trumped 57mm...

Your well trained and crafty troops are the problem -- those are rare commodities. Most Armies field a few such plus a large number of marginally capable elements. One should buy equipment predicated on misuse and worst case; military purchases or planning based on best case will put you in Afghanistan with little possibility of succeeding in many announced goals.

I never cease to be amazed at the amount of equipment and the number of weapons dreamed up by fertile if inexperienced minds in the Engineering and Marketing worlds that end up being a system looking for a role or conversely that are really unsuited to fulfill the role for which they were nominally designed (generally as a result of poor doctrine or specifications; often both). Most Armies are terribly naive about buying such stuff.

[William F. Owen]

However, the trend at the end of WW II was to avoid light tanks and go for what today are sometimes called main battle tanks. The Infantry Support Tank is effectively a light tank...

Like the Begleitpanzer with a 57mm gun and missiles of the mid-70s shown below. Last time I checked, 1200mm trumped 57mm...

Oooh! Any more info on the Begleitpanzer before I Google it? Nice piccy. Makes me quite embarrassed about the one I posted!

[Ken White]

Oooh! Any more info on the Begleitpanzer before I Google it?

This LINK goes to the picture. Not terribly informative write up.

Then there's this LINK(scroll down). IDR (pre-Jane's) did a full write-up with multiple graphics if you can access their archives.

[Fuchs]

Germany had many tank prototypes in the 70's/80's period.

The Begleitpanzer idea was revived in theoretical studies for Neue Gepanzerte Plattformen (NGP) in the early/mid 90's. The computer-based OR study in NGP had supposedly the result that a normal IFV is better.

We need to look at this assertion in the light of the peace dividend; the army wasn't even able to buy one new combat AFV type in the 90's, much less a whole family (although the industry had a mediocre family concept ("Puma") ready for production!)

[Ken White]

I don't think given the cost of equipping today anyone's going to be able to afford to go to war...

In Viet Nam, the cost to equip an infantryman was about $500.00 -- today, it's approaching almost 100 times that. Ten thousand dollar rifle sights, thousand dollar individual radios for everyone and six plus million dollar tanks are just a bit on the heavy side...

[Rex Brynen]

I don't think given the cost of equipping today anyone's going to be able to afford to go to war...

In Viet Nam, the cost to equip an infantryman was about $500.00 -- today, it's approaching almost 100 times that. Ten thousand dollar rifle sights, thousand dollar individual radios for everyone and six plus million dollar tanks are just a bit on the heavy side...

Perhaps then we could resolve these things gladiatorial-style in future, with one fully- and expensively-equipped combatant per side? It would sure cut down on all that dying...

[Cole]

Although I did attend junior college for 18 months before enlisting believing I would be an architect. Still live in the smallish house I designed and had built in '86. But I'm admittedly that guy with lots of ideas that are not always realistic or experience-based. Nevertheless:

COA 1: Design a 4-man armored pod that is hydraulically lifted onto the back of both GCV and Abrams. That exploits the multitude of current infantry system designs that don't carry 3+9 troops. More importantly, it reduces weight of the partially armored GCV to below 80,000 lbs to get 2 on each C-17. The pod and GCV would be V-shaped with troops facing the middle. With an elevated V-hull, part of the GCV floor could be a trap door allowing troop dismount under the vehicle during direct fire or artillery airbursts or when the pod is still attached...or pass through into the pod and exit its rear.

But also envision the squad leader directing GCV commanders to drop pods with one fire team in one location and the remaining fire team 50 meters further forward or laterally. Also use the pod as an OP, vehicle checkpoint, or guard station with cover. The split squad would ensure that either an RPG, sabot, or IED explosion did not kill/wound the entire squad. The ability for Abrams to carry the same pod would be ideal for urban and complex terrain environments. Engine heat would need to be ducted away from the pod and insulation added, obviously, but sure beats slat armor to protect the engine...and troops.

Perhaps the pod would also have an APU and extra water (could cool off Abrams exhaust heat transfer)/storage space under the V-hull to keep in stable on the ground. A small optionally-manned ATV or Class I UAS could be stored in back when no pod was attached. The same hydraulic platform or forklift arms that lifted the fire team pod, also could lift 120mm rounds and elevate the pod when crossing a gap where it otherwise might bottom out behind the tank/GCV. Abrams pods without troops inside could carry additional fuel. The same hydraulic platform could lift dirt to fill HESCO bastion or support a line-charge pod for minefield breaching.

COA 2: Design a diamond-shaped GCV to exploit angled-armor advantages and allow a CROW or manned cupola in the center with troops still having room to sit around it in a hexagon shaped interior. The driver, vehicle commander, and engine would face the front in the hexagon with fire teams along the hexagon side next to them, and dual side-opening doors (for cover) exiting out the rearish angled side with a second engine and more troops seated against the rear of the hexagon interior. Add large wide wheels on the front and rear with tracks in the middle to allow tires to be inflated to lift tracks off the ground on roads. Dual engines and tracks or wheels would be a back-up drive systems in the event an IED knocked out either.

COA 3: Keep and improve the Bradley's armor. Add the same armored pod to the rear of it, or use an M-ATV to carry the additional fire team. An M-ATV can be made optionally manned and lead Bradleys/Abrams when mines or IED are suspected. Plus theirs that COIN and stability ops thing.

[Pete]

If everyone did a good METT-TC analysis before committing. If even most commanders did one...

I don't mean to sidetrack the discussion, but the first time I heard the acronym METT was when I was at the advanced course in '81 or '82, about the time the Bradley was being fielded, too late for it to be applied to the vehicle's basic concept. If METT had been in use in '78 when I attended OCS and the basic course I probably would have heard it then. When I learned it the letters stood for mission, enemy, terrain and troops, with weather and time also being considerations; TC must have been added to it after my time in service. I'm only saying this because in many threads here I see the acronym being applied retroactively to situations that existed before it came into general use. Of course the principles it stands for have always been there.

[GI Zhou]

Ken, the old Ground Defence International did a wonderful write up about the Begleitpanzer.

Cole, You sound like the embodiment of the late Richard Simpkin, which is not a bad thing. I have always had the belief that the PLA followed some of his work when designing some of their formations and equipment, but I am have told those who shall not be named that he was heavily influenced by Soviet tank designers.

[Ken White]

I don't mean to sidetrack the discussion, but the first time I heard the acronym METT was when I was at the advanced course in '81 or '82.

Us dumb Grunts were using it before Viet Nam and heavily while in that lovely country. I was teaching it to Armor Officer Basiec Course Students in 1976.

...about the time the Bradley was being fielded, too late for it to be applied to the vehicle's basic concept.

My recall differs, as I said but even if the mnemonic had not been in common use, all those principles were studied and used by Soldiers for centuries before Omar Bradley was born, much less development of a vehicle bearing his name began -- as you said.

If METT had been in use in '78 when I attended OCS and the basic course I probably would have heard it then.

One would think...

When I learned it the letters stood for mission, enemy, terrain and troops, with weather and time also being considerations; TC must have been added to it after my time in service.

The original was METT, as you say. The third 'T' was added after you went to the Advanced Course, IIRC. The 'C' was added after 2001 as far as I know.

I'm only saying this because in many threads here I see the acronym being applied retroactively to situations that existed before it came into general use.

It's just shorthand for this---> " ...Of course the principles it stands for have always been there."

[William F. Owen]

Cole, You sound like the embodiment of the late Richard Simpkin, which is not a bad thing. I have always had the belief that the PLA followed some of his work when designing some of their formations and equipment, but I am have told those who shall not be named that he was heavily influenced by Soviet tank designers.

AHHHHH Simpkin!!! Seriously?? I have 4 of his books and comb them for insight, on anything above the blindingly obvious. How on earth a guy could make life so complicated and then get so many things wrong (Tank carrying submarines - the design of the T-90?) I just cannot understand.
If the PLA did follow his ideas, we're home and dry!

[Infanteer]

Interesting thread. To me, the idea of a heavy track and light wheeled vehicle makes the most sense. I love the LAV III and think it is the perfect all around mix but we must never forget that the first letter stands for LIGHT. I've done armoured combat breaches in 'em (with Armoured Engineers and Tanks out front, of course), but that's against a poor enemy. Light Armour and Wheels to me speaks to operational mobility (punching through the breach) rather than tactical mobility (slogging through defences).

[Pete]

Originally Posted by Ken White: You must've led a sheltered life, Pete...

Indeed I did. Blame it on my II-S student deferment ... If I recall correctly, the tactics instructor at my Field Artillery Advanced Course who I first heard the term from said something to the effect of, "The Infantry uses the term METT to describe ... "

[Ken White]

to remind us to eat. Now, if we had the superior intellects of all you Kings, we wouldn't need such artifices...

We're still wrestling with OCOKA / COKOA, corridors vs. compartments, topographic vs. military crests and dead space vs. terrain masking -- and with Pigs...