Mech Platoon: CAB or ACR

[gute]

Thanks gentlemen.

Mr. Owen and Mr. White: Why is the M2/M3 poor conceptually and doctrinally?

82redleg: You answered my unclear question. Problems with C2 with a six vehicle platoon seem to make sense. Also, 4x25mm and TOW more then make up for the lack of a weapons squad - good point. General consenus on this forum recommends adding a third manuever battalion to the BCT - would adding a Stryker battalion to the HBCT (replace the MGS with the M1) fill the gap? A heavier SBCT is interesting - maybe a CV90 type ICV and the M1. The infantry divisions (1,2,3 and 4) would have the heavier SBCT while 1AD and 1CAV have the HBCT?

Fuchs: I take it you are not a fan of the HBCT Combined Arms Battalion?

[Fuchs]

I'm rarely a fan of anything that didn't already prove its excellence and wasn't invented by myself.
I suggest to look at my arguments, not at what I (dis)like.

[gute]

Fuchs: What would a true Combined Arms formation look like? If you were organizing the U.S. Army HBCT, IBCT and SBCT what would they look like in both armor and infantry?

[Fuchs]

I) No size fits it all

II) Not every formation needs to be combined arms, some can be meant as attachments or to get attachments.

III) I'd spend ~20% of everything on reconnaissance, cavalry, skirmish troops that are not bound to any formation, but answer to a Corps.
These skirmishers are the key to my idea of a corps structure and operational art. The decision is in the skirmishing, all else is either about delaying or about mopping up quickly broken forces.

IV) No divisions.

V) Heavy brigades would be meant to go into very unfair, advantageous battles mostly. Routine tasks would include almost no LOS combat.

VI) Expert and reserve infantry formations would be separate; expert infantry would be similar to the best marines, ranger and Jäger units while reserve infantry would offer the cheap, quick training, quantity element.


The heavy brigades structure would be about 2-3 rather large combined arms (mortars instead of arty) battlegroups (~ Kampfgruppe) and one support group (providing support in a large radius to the battlegroups, skirmishers and other forces + additional infantry bn on APCs).

The area support function of the support group is rather unorthodox while the battlegroups (or Kampfgruppen) would look like something from the 40's or 50's (1st Heeresstruktur, ~58-62).

Reserve infantry battlegroups and heavy skirmisher companies could work together with a heavy brigade in order to add certain capabilities and tricks.



This does certainly sound like a patchwork of strange stuff. I didn't mention all the reasoning in it, just the superficialities.
It makes a lot of sense in a 40+ pages draft (that's meant to be published as a 200 pp. book, not online).


In short: I('d) develop a corps concept, not a brigade concept.

[William F. Owen]

III) I'd spend ~20% of everything on reconnaissance, cavalry, skirmish troops that are not bound to any formation, but answer to a Corps.
These skirmishers are the key to my idea of a corps structure and operational art. The decision is in the skirmishing, all else is either about delaying or about mopping up quickly broken forces.

There's a 3-day conference or 50,000 word SAMS paper right there for anyone with stones to tackle it!

I can agree with the "~20% of everything on reconnaissance." Cavalry to me means horses. It just never translates to AFVs, MBTs or Helicopters in any sensible way I can see.

How many Formatoins/Brigades in a Fuchs Corps?
Is the Fuchs Corp really a very flat Divison?

[Pete]

When I attended OCS at Fort Benning in 1977-78 the Vu-Graph slides of the future "Infantry Fighting Vehicle" the instructors showed us looked just like what the Bradley later turned out to be. Later in 1982 at Camp Roberts, California (where my dad had trained in WW II) a team from the Bradley manufacturer, FMC Corporation, would fire the automatic gun on a Bradley into the impact area all day long Monday through Friday. They must have been doing some sort of Mean Rounds Between Failure testing--that's the only plausible explanation I can think of for the amount of ammo they were expending. Some of my forward observers had to ask the FMC guys to stop driving their tracked vehicles so fast past our bivouac area because they were raising huge clouds of dust that settled all over the campsite. A year later I took a tour of the FMC factory in San Jose and asked why the M548 cargo carrier was so unreliable. The answer I got was that it must be Army maintenance because they were perfect when they left the factory!

[Fuchs]

there's a 3-day conference or 50,000 word sams paper right there for anyone with stones to tackle it!

I can agree with the "~20% of everything on reconnaissance." cavalry to me means horses. It just never translates to afvs, mbts or helicopters in any sensible way i can see.

How many formatoins/brigades in a fuchs corps?
Is the fuchs corp really a very flat divison?

pm

[82redleg]

Fuchs: What would a true Combined Arms formation look like? If you were organizing the U.S. Army HBCT, IBCT and SBCT what would they look like in both armor and infantry?

If I were organizing the US Army, I would retain the 3 tier system, but rebalance. Overall, I prefer big BCTs, when going modular, we should have used the assets of the old Force XXI division to produce 2 very large, very capable BCTs, instead of 4 minimally capable BCTs.

IBCTs: initial/immediate is 8 only (reduction from 20ish), all on ABN status and active duty; in addition to severely restricted terrain, the other are that truly "light" formations excel in is rapid deployment/forced entry; second step is get the third maneuver battalion back, if necessary trading the current recon SQDN down to a separate troop; sequentially, add a fourth maneuver battalion and convert the WPNS Cos to rifle companies, retaining a single TOW company in the BCT, preferably on something light and armored (Wiesal maybe, something in that class anyway) instead of HMMWV.

SBCTs: I like this organization, convert most BCTs to this model (29 of 45 active BCTs, 1/2 to 2/3s of the ARNG); retain identical organizations, while producing variety by modifying the vehicle systems used, M2s or even M113s, maybe a more modern ICV replacement; M1, M8 AGS or something like Centauro for an MGS replacement; not sure about the RV, but we could probably find some variant that shares parts in the modified organizations; organizationally, the AT CO should go into the infantry BNs (maybe as a platoon in HHC), and a fourth CO added to each BN; an STB to C2 all the current separate COs; some other minor organizational changes (HUMINT consolidation, probably need increased EN capability with sappers in the maneuver battalions and bridging in the STB, etc); the key is that all of these middle-weight BCTs are organized identically, just differing equipment

HBCTs: again, reduction from 17-20 (whatever we are at now) to 8 active, converting the rest to SBCTs (ARNG is 1/3 - 1/2 HBCT, remaining SBCT); logic on this reduction is that we executed OIF 1 with the equivalent of 4 HBCTs from 3ID, 8 allows us to maintain that capability- if we need more, we can activate the ARNG and accelerate the active forces in the ARFORGEN cycle; ultimately, build a third CAB, and return the sapper/gap crossing to the CABs with bridging/roadbuilding/construction engineers in the STB;

[William F. Owen]

Mr. Owen and Mr. White: Why is the M2/M3 poor conceptually and doctrinally?

In the briefest of terms, from a conceptual view confused about what it does. It's designed to fight along side MBTs' yet lacks MBTs protection, and firepower. It carries too few men and is far too big.
The problems with the concept provide the same problems with doctrine.

[gute]

Israel must be on the right track with the Namer ICV - believe it is based on their MBT.

[William F. Owen]

Israel must be on the right track with the Namer ICV - believe it is based on their MBT.

It's the way to go, if you've been trained like an Israeli. Yes, it has near identical mobility to their MBT, as it uses the same chassis and running gear, with similar power to weight. I've climbed all over one and visited a platoon of them that was bouncing around the Golan. They're impressive.

If you took almost any MICV, ditched the turret, added more armour in place of it, and increased the dismount seating to 8-10, then you'd be in business.

...but the application of the vehicle is as important as the vehicle itself. I think MICVs are just a dumb idea, but obviously has merit if skilfully employed, by good men, against an inferior opponent.

[Ken White]

overall size and the wasted space. For huge vehicle to carry only six dismounts -- five if you leave one to pass 25mm ammo up to the turret as is the norm is borderline criminal IMO. That goes to only three or four if you're short a man or two in the squad (which is typical). The height of the vehicle makes it a shot or missile magnet. It is over-armed for its role; the TOWs encourage tactical misuse. It's range limited...

It's supposed to be an infantry carrier -- it's not, it's a light tank. Too light...

The vehicle was a compromise in too many respects. Instead of the needed heavily armored, accompany the M1 vehicle (like a Namer) AND a battle taxi for volumes of Mech infantry (M-113 updates) AND a decent Cavalry Scout vehicle (M-113 would also work for that...) we got a compromise vehicle on a drug deal between the Chief of Infantry and the Chief of Armor. The former would support buy of the M1; the latter would support buying the M2 and its M3 variant. Both agreed to give up something, Armor the Future Scout Cavalry System and Infantry the XM-8 Protected Gun system. Bad deal all 'round...

It's perhaps noteworthy that the two Cavalry Regiments in Europe at the time of adoption called the M3 Cavalry BFV the 'burning fighting vehicle' contending there'd be a trail of hulks all over Europe if the USSR were to attack. They also sensibly lobbied to get rid of that humungous turret and replace it with a .50 cal overhead weapons station (thus allowing 7-8 dismounts...) to lower the profile.

[Fuchs]

Some U.S. commanders removed the Bradley from the first line (2003) and let them move behind the MBTs because the threat of 60's RPGs became too intense.

HAPC + cheap APCs is the way to go.

[82redleg]

Some U.S. commanders removed the Bradley from the first line (2003) and let them move behind the MBTs because the threat of 60's RPGs became too intense.

Got a reference for this? First I've heard of it. My friends that took Bradley's on the Thunder Runs, and multiple rotations since all talk about how survivable they are.

[Fuchs]

The most recent source I recall was a monograph on armoured recce (or cavalry). Maybe I'll find it.

[Ken White]

Got a reference for this? First I've heard of it. My friends that took Bradley's on the Thunder Runs, and multiple rotations since all talk about how survivable they are.

the various mods make a difference? IIRC, the base and A1 mods differed only in missile fit but the A2, A2(ODS) and A3 were all successive upgrades with increased survivability as a goal??? Dunno...

I do know that many guys from both the 2d and 11th ACRs at the time the Wall came down were not Bradley fans...

[82redleg]

I've read of 2ACR in 1991 leading with M1s vs M3s (IIRC, at 73 Easting).

Never seen anything about it in 2003. By then, most or all should have been at least M2A2, right?