Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
A general problem exists, and I'll try to illustrate this with a scenario.

A heavy brigade moves through a country such as let's say Belarus. The route has alternately agricultural areas and forests on the roadside.
The brigade approaches a forest that it's supposed to cross ASAP, the vanguard troops are being ambushed in the forest after the recce troops easily slipped through.
The first attempt to move through the forest with tanks fails, and the brigade commander suspects a well-equipped and competent enemy infantry company along the forest road.
His infantry dismounts; four companies, in theory 400 men, but in reality only a few more than 300.
Artillery, mortars and infantry attempt to break through, but the effort is slow because at most two tanks can support the infantry on the narrow road and it's indeed fighting against a strong infantry company.

Finally, the dismounts barely overwhelm the enemy company thanks to the expenditure of a good share of the artillery and mortar ammunition, but they're reduced to only a few more than 200 capable infantrymen. Several IFVs were lost as well.

Next forest the same, except that this time there's not enough infantry left to meet the challenge. The brigade commander is forced to report that he's unable to execute his mission because two infantry companies were enough to stop his heavy (mech or whatever) brigade.

In the end, the operational commander accepts that the infantry element of his heavy brigades is too weak and restricts their movement to open terrain where their routes are longer, their observation easier and their routes more predictable. 0:1 for the enemy.


No matter how the brigades are being organized - there won't be enough infantry for anything but desert or open plains warfare if all infantry rides in IFVs.
Why would an armoured bde be moving through such terrian in the first place? What is their mission? Surely a proper IPB analysis would have flagged up mobility corridors, areas and routes that were potential mobility blocks to the maintenance of operational tempo. Higher up commnders shpould then have attached one-two infantry battalions to the bde to enable them to move through the abive terrain which would then be detached after their particualr contribution to the mission was accomplished.

Also, the problem with the BFV series was doctrinal. There were never meant to carry full infantry sctions but rather "close protection" squads (or "tank marines" in Fullers felicitous phrase). Their METL were restricted to local security for the mech unit, limited local area defensive tasks, assult on entrenched ATGM teams (which hadn't already been supressed by on board weapons - and the infantry firing through those terrible firing ports!!!) and other misions designed to augment and maintain mechanised tempos. They were simply not "true" infantry (in a METL sense) but resembled mounted escorts.

However, I have always admired the US Armoured Cavarly formations and think that six BFVs per platoon, each carrying a six man fireteam (organised into three sections of two vehicles each) would be an ideal set-up. It would also leave room for an attached FOO, or COLT, HUMINT operater, Medic, &c.