Mech Platoon: CAB or ACR

[Ken White]

By then, most or all should have been at least M2A2, right?

I was at Knox when that deal was made and was never a Bradley fan so I'm not sure who had what variant. I think 3 ID should've had A2 if not A2(ODS). Someone here will know -- Mike Few will for sure...

[William F. Owen]

Israel must be on the right track with the Namer ICV - believe it is based on their MBT.

It's the way to go, if you've been trained like an Israeli. Yes, it has near identical mobility to their MBT, as it uses the same chassis and running gear, with similar power to weight. I've climbed all over one and visited a platoon of them that was bouncing around the Golan. They're impressive.

If you took almost any MICV, ditched the turret, added more armour in place of it, and increased the dismount seating to 8-10, then you'd be in business.

...but the application of the vehicle is as important as the vehicle itself. I think MICVs are just a dumb idea, but obviously has merit if skilfully employed, by good men, against an inferior opponent.

[William F. Owen]

III) I'd spend ~20% of everything on reconnaissance, cavalry, skirmish troops that are not bound to any formation, but answer to a Corps.
These skirmishers are the key to my idea of a corps structure and operational art. The decision is in the skirmishing, all else is either about delaying or about mopping up quickly broken forces.

There's a 3-day conference or 50,000 word SAMS paper right there for anyone with stones to tackle it!

I can agree with the "~20% of everything on reconnaissance." Cavalry to me means horses. It just never translates to AFVs, MBTs or Helicopters in any sensible way I can see.

How many Formatoins/Brigades in a Fuchs Corps?
Is the Fuchs Corp really a very flat Divison?

[Pete]

When I attended OCS at Fort Benning in 1977-78 the Vu-Graph slides of the future "Infantry Fighting Vehicle" the instructors showed us looked just like what the Bradley later turned out to be. Later in 1982 at Camp Roberts, California (where my dad had trained in WW II) a team from the Bradley manufacturer, FMC Corporation, would fire the automatic gun on a Bradley into the impact area all day long Monday through Friday. They must have been doing some sort of Mean Rounds Between Failure testing--that's the only plausible explanation I can think of for the amount of ammo they were expending. Some of my forward observers had to ask the FMC guys to stop driving their tracked vehicles so fast past our bivouac area because they were raising huge clouds of dust that settled all over the campsite. A year later I took a tour of the FMC factory in San Jose and asked why the M548 cargo carrier was so unreliable. The answer I got was that it must be Army maintenance because they were perfect when they left the factory!

[Fuchs]

there's a 3-day conference or 50,000 word sams paper right there for anyone with stones to tackle it!

I can agree with the "~20% of everything on reconnaissance." cavalry to me means horses. It just never translates to afvs, mbts or helicopters in any sensible way i can see.

How many formatoins/brigades in a fuchs corps?
Is the fuchs corp really a very flat divison?

pm

[Tukhachevskii]

@Tukhachevskii:

You have truly internalized the deficiencies as normal. Those deficiencies weren't normal pre-70's, though. There was a fabled time when armies had enough infantry (or at least no greater lack of infantry than of most other things).

There were even armour corps operations through forest areas (Ardennes anyone?) for the sake of surprise (you know, the opposite of limiting yourself to a handful of tactically acceptable corridors, which does essentially announce your route to the enemy!).
Look at a map; the utter inability to advance through slightly defended forests and settlements limits the manoeuvre options of a brigade to only 2-4 even on such open and relatively tank-friendly terrain as Belarus or the Ukraine. Armour brigades on rails.
Most if not all NATO brigades are fair weather brigades; good for only a few weeks on desert-like terrain or alternatively too light and therefore unable to defend themselves on open ground.

There was a time when it was perfectly self-evident that a first rate army is supposed to be able to fight offensively on all terrain, not only on open plains.



I agree that mechanized infantry was originally not meant to be true infantry, but tank-accompanying infantry. It was the same with German Panzergrenadiere and Soviet Desants; they were mostly meant to sweep trenches and suppress very short range AT weapons (Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck, Bazooka).
The armour divisions that had Panzergrenadiere on APCs or Desants on tanks had truck-mounted infantry as well, though.
Sadly, modern armour and even mechanized "infantry" brigades aren't combined arms formations any more; they lack a serious infantry component. "Combined arms" has long since become a mere slogan. There are even examples of armour and mech infantry brigades that lack organic indirect fire support, but that's another story.

WW2-experienced generals would likely attest that our force planners are incompetent (or worse) if they were able to look briefly on our TO&Es.

Ok. A bit of the ceteris paribus fallacy there. You can't compare the ACR or DIV 86 with a WWII era German division which had infantry battalions (truck borne) attached to them and, as you point out, had half-tracks which could caryy half decent numbers of infantry. Even Soviet tank bdes had at least a battalion of truck borne (more often than not foot mobile) infantry attached for break in ops) The question asked concerned the Armoured Cavalry Regiment company team organisation. Sure, if you want to frame the discussion in temporal terms (WWI vs post/Cold War) diametirically opposed to those in question then I concede your point but it would be nice to compare like for like. It is also true that a proper apc as opposed to an IFV would be preferable but in today's cash-strapped economies you have to work with what you've got.

[Fuchs]

I think I can compare them as long as they are supposed to fight on the same planet.
It's pointless to define the need for more infantry away. It persists, and no matter how you call a formation or what you assign as mission; you need a lot of infantry in closed and mixed terrain.

Modern mechanized/motorized ground forces are the equivalent of the 10% of the German WW2 army that were not foot- and horse carriage-mobile.
We removed the 90% infantry divisions and removed most of the infantry from the already infantry-weak mechanized forces as well.
That's not combined arms any more. It's a desert and prairie wars TO&E.

Look at the historical roots and you'll see that the conventional brigade structures of today were meant for a three-week mobile war in a country with much territorial security and infantry forces.
The dominant TOE philosophy was tested and found successful against 3rd rate forces in mostly open terrains. It was useless once settlements, hilly or mountainous terrain or forests became the focus.

[gute]

Why was the Bradley designed to only carry 6 troops - force the U.S. Army to have buy more of them?

What is the best APC/IFV out there? Which modern army seems to get it right when it comes to combined arms warfare?

[Tukhachevskii]

Why was the Bradley designed to only carry 6 troops - force the U.S. Army to have buy more of them?

What is the best APC/IFV out there? Which modern army seems to get it right when it comes to combined arms warfare?

As for the first question the following book is a useful place to start:

W. Blair Haworth, Jr., The Bradley and How It Got That Way:Technology, Institutions and the Problem of Mechanised Infantry in the United States Army(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999)

[William F. Owen]

Another good reference is "Why Johnny Can't Dismount:"

I do not buy all of the ideas and conclusions but it makes some good point. Why it has to keep quoting old Richard Simpkin, I just don't know. I keep reading him looking for insight and am almost never rewarded.

[Tukhachevskii]

I wonder if the better informed know how many M113A3's the US Army has left. Surely, if there's a proven APC out there that has to be it? 2+11pax can't be wrong and the IDF's Zelda variant has to be the best version armour protection wise (nice optional suppresive weapons mounts too). I know the FCS was cancelled but the IFV requirement is still active, albeit having been rolled into a different programme. The Ground Combat Vehicle IFV "looks" impressive (rather reminds me of the KIFV), got all the bells and whistles, and slightly better than the Bradley with 3+9 pax but as I see it its an awefully(sp?) expensive vehicle for an ill-thought out doctrinal/real world requirement. I understand too that the US defence industry needs to be retooled with newer contracts (and don't forget congressional/industrial pork) but ultimately is this really necessary? Would it not be better to re-fabricate and even re-open the M113 production line (amazingly the FAS sight claims that troops "unofficially" call it the "Gavin"; Sparky strikes again!!!) for vehicles with less complexity (thus easier maintenance and a vastly reduced log tail). I can just see in my minds eye a GCV infantry platoon/coy being rendered combat ineffective because some ideeeeiot (said in my best County Cork accent) gave the onboard Vetronics a virus or accidentially sat on a control screen....

[William F. Owen]

Please not the M-113. It really has reached it's sell by date, though you can still get a lot out of it.
Personally, I'd go for a "turretless" CV-90 2+8, with a STANAG 4569 level 5 in the horizontal and a level 3a and b in the vertical. Blast resistant seating and a belly plate might mean level 4 is possible.
1 x 12.7mm OWS should be sufficient for self-protection.
Hopefully the power to weight ration would stay within limits.

[Fuchs]

A reduced CV90 would still weigh twice as much as a M113-class vehicle. A M113-class vehicle (such as SEP/tracked) could get away with half the fuel consumption /100 km.

[Ken White]

until you cross the threshold of basic load cube x caliber/capability to enter the realm of diminishing returns and you'll accomplish little; they can still be easily killed and will not be able to kill everything they may meet. We got it wrong with the Brad. The CV 90, while the best of breed currently available still, IMO, is of the wrong breed. For success in combat and survivability of your troops, there are only four critical factors to consider :

Agility, speed, unrefueled range and employment.

[Tukhachevskii]

until you cross the threshold of basic load cube x caliber/capability to enter the realm of diminishing returns and you'll accomplish little; (1)they can still be easily killed and will not be able to kill everything they may meet. We got it wrong with the Brad. The CV 90, while the best of breed currently available still, IMO, is of the wrong breed. For success in combat and survivability of your troops, there are only four critical factors to consider :

(2)Agility, speed, unrefueled range and (3)employment.

... I'd thought I'd give it a go anyway. The comment I have labelled (1) above piqued my interest. So am I right in assuming that you find the concept (if not the practice) of mechanised infantry eesentially sound and ruined only by a sub-standard vehicle (BFV/CFV)? Which leads to my second query about employment (3). BFV and IFV TTPs in general haven't really been well thought out IMO (though FIBUA/MOUT may be the exception thanks to the recent troubles). Generally, the IFV/MICVs tend to follow MBTs and provide some sort of anti-infantry/ATGM protection. They aren't doctrinally or materially equipped for much else. How does one remedy (if that is the case) the situation? Obviously, if you intend your IFVs to cross the line of departure then you really need something the equivalent of a MBT in terms of protection. Firepower is a whole different issue altogether.

This impacts on (2). The power to weight ratio is also going to be a factor in terms of armour protection (active armour may help but you still need a baseline of physical armour) and add to the "diminishing returns" you speak of in your post (of course thats probably what you meant, and if so, I apologise for mis-understanding your statement). As does the issue of whether tracks or wheels are best which, again depends, I suppose, on whether or not you intend your vehicles to leave the assembly area and accompany/carry troops into combat; for the former case (troops debus in the assembly area) then I quite fancy the GPV Captain (2+14pax) whereas for the latter I'd convert however many old Challenger 1 hulls we have lying around, install a europack compact engine (at the front).

I only asked because I was always enamoured with mech units while denigrating line inf as "archaic" until I really tried to get my head around them; the pendulum has now swung firmly the other way

[William F. Owen]

until you cross the threshold of basic load cube x caliber/capability to enter the realm of diminishing returns and you'll accomplish little; they can still be easily killed and will not be able to kill everything they may meet.

Agree, but there has to be some level/standard of protection applied the problem. The idea of being "invulnerable" is patently stupid. It's what you can get for the Power-to-weight.

The CV 90, while the best of breed currently available still, IMO, is of the wrong breed.

Which is why I want a CV-90 chassis based APC only, not a CV-90 MICV.

For success in combat and survivability of your troops, there are only four critical factors to consider :

Agility, speed, unrefueled range and employment.

My wording would be "a high degree of reliable mobility," but I think if we talked around those points we'd be in basic agreement.
Employment is by for the most critical. Employed well, almost any vehicle will do - within reason.

[Ken White]

wording is better. "A high degree of reliable mobility." I like that...

[gute]

until you cross the threshold of basic load cube x caliber/capability to enter the realm of diminishing returns and you'll accomplish little; they can still be easily killed and will not be able to kill everything they may meet. We got it wrong with the Brad. The CV 90, while the best of breed currently available still, IMO, is of the wrong breed. For success in combat and survivability of your troops, there are only four critical factors to consider :

Agility, speed, unrefueled range and employment.

What is the right breed? Is there a vehicle/country out there that got it right? What would it llok like, what would it do, specifications?

[Ken White]

a new MTU 890 series pack @ 1,750hp would be the tank (not least because it can engage Helicopters, carry wounded and has a back door ), the Namer with 9 Infantrymen, a full squad, plus a crew of three and a .50 cal Overhead Weapons Station would be the best available Armored Infantry carrier IMO. In action, the Squad dismounts with ALL its people and the SL or PL fight the dismounts while the PSG (or, better, the senior track commander) controls the track(s) in supporting the dismounts. Obviously, they operate in conjunction with tanks and there should be couple of those nearby should more firepower be needed than the '50s provide.

For a Utility track and a Scout Vehicle, an upgraded M 113A3 with 6 composite roadwheels, hydropneumatic suspension and possibly Soucy tracks if they continue to improve -- Diehl instead of US tracks otherwise. A .50 OWS is all that's required. Overgunned tracked carriers are not tanks but invite misuse because of the weapon capability -- misuse because the vehicle is simply not adequate for the job.

Wilf's CV-90 minus the MICV turret and plus a .50 OWS would do for those who wrongly think the 113 is too old...

My big objection to the CV-90 variant is the weight. It may be slightly more survivable than the 113 but I don't think the added weight is adequately offset by that. The key to any light track is that you are buying mobility, not protection -- so you have to avoid placing them in bad situations. That's not difficult.

Though it is entirely too often forgotten...

In all cases, more range is desirable, best obtained by reducing powerpack size and replacing that cube and weight with fuel or in add-on side armor blister packs (which should be accompanied by a track width change to maintain agility). Powerpacks should be optimized for power and response curve, not fuel economy or mileage. It should be possible to engineer a variable horsepower / fuel demand engine which could be the best of both.

The 113 Scout track is for mobility in terrain or climates where tracks are necessary; for most purposes, a light unarmored but powerful and agile 4x4 wheeled vehicle is an excellent scout vehicle. The lack of armor has the advantage of keeping both the Scouts and more importantly their commanders honest -- they will be careful...

Armor has a flaw, a dangerous flaw -- it cocoons. People are then reluctant to leave their cocoon or to tell others to leave their cocoons and thus a lot of harsh, necessary combat stuff does not get done or isn't done right due to that syndrome. Today, it's easy to forget the guys below are Armored Infantrymen. Fighting dismounted but they weren't called 'dismounts.' I think there's a message in that...

[Uboat509]

When I was in 2 ACR at Ft. Polk, many years ago, the cav guys used to talk about how the M114 would be a better scout vehicle than the M113. The problem with either of these though, that I can see is that while both may be better suited for scouting than the Bradleys, I don't see how either would be particularly suited for screening or guarding or other missions where direct contact with the enemy is expected.

and a .50 cal Overhead Weapons Station would be the best available Armored Infantry carrier IMO.

Call me old fashioned but I dislike these things immensely. There were a number of these on HMMWVs in Iraq that I saw. I sincerely believe that these things encourage the loss of SA. The operator gets focused on just the screen and loses everything else. Even with regular turrets, I saw this in Iraq because gunners were allowed or even required to be so low in the turret that they couldn't see much anyway. I liked gunning and when I was on the gun my turret was always moving. I was always heads up and looking for threats. I saw guys, though, that would get the turret into a comfortable position, sit on the strap and zone out. I never could understand that. I always remembered reading the German tank commanders stressing the importance of being "heads up" in the turret and maintaining SA. Now we seem to be headed back the other way.