Mech Platoon: CAB or ACR

[Fuchs]

What is your objection to fairly specialised sea capable vehicles like the EFV/AAV? Especially for marine/naval infantry units

* large volume, surface + thin armour

* high cost

* carries "amphibiousness" component weight and volume along even in protracted land campaigns

* commonality with army vehicles limited to components

[Infanteer]

Caught up on this one.

I recall reading an article in the Gazette which spoke to the problems of meshing Rifle Companies with separate AAV organizations and advocated moving to a different model (what, I can't remember).

As I stated elsewhere, I used to think we should split until I was a Rifle Platoon Comd. The LAV is a tool - albeit a big tool - but a tool none the less. A good commander should view it along the same lines as vector binos or a ATGM system - use the tool to give you the best advantage. Crew tasks were interchangeable within the section. Just because a guy was the "Driver" did not mean he was always driving. I frequently rotated my drivers (and gunners and, at times, crew commanders) throughout the tour. For most operations, drivers/gunners were out on dismounted OP/ambushes and conducting patrols. Driving and gunning isn't rocket science and the troops build up pretty good collective expertise in living and fighting with the vehicle. No point in separating that. To those who'd argue that it is a millstone that interferes with more traditional "bayonet" training I say BS - both in garrison and on operations, properly instituted maintenance routines take relatively little time from the section to ensure the vehicle is good to go.

I'm liking the Heavy IFV on logic alone (been stuck too many times in a LAV trying to keep up with tanks), but I'd argue that it should be integral to the guys driving it (as per the Israeli example provided by Wilf).

[William F. Owen]

I'm liking the Heavy IFV on logic alone (been stuck too many times in a LAV trying to keep up with tanks), but I'd argue that it should be integral to the guys driving it (as per the Israeli example provided by Wilf).

While spiritually and emotionally I am in total agreement, there is a very good counter argument that suggests that manoeuvring/fighting/sustaining vehicles and doing the same on foot are two very different forms.

Now, I don't buy this totally because training is training - but, something like a Namer of an LAV is a complicated bit of kit. More so than a mortar. Manoeuvring 4 x LAV/APC in any type of broken terrain is not really a something that can be taken for granted. You need to keep current to be good at it, so having the training time and funds available, is an issue.

I don't think you could really prove that one way is better than the other. The test would be how well each way could be done given the same training time and money - and yes, sadly time and money count in the real world.

[Ken White]

The Infantry Carrier thing, that is (he leered...).

Was in an Infantry Div when the Carriers (M-75s later replaced by M59s) were assigned to a Carrier Bn and tabbed to a unit that needed them on an as required basis. It worked fairly well in peacetime with only occasional arguments between the Carrier Platoon Leader or Co Cdr and the Infantry unit. Some minor problems with tactical employment, .50 cal support and such. Can't say how it would work in combat -- that tends to magnify those minor peacetime problems...

Also later worked with assigned carriers (M113 series). Almost no problems with employment. Maintenance wasn't overwhelming.

Thus I'm agnostic on where the carriers are but I'm inclined to lean toward owning one's own solely on the basis that everyone doesn't take care of their equipment at the same level AND there is a distinct advantage to knowing the peculiarities of the machinery you use -- and ALL machinery has individual quirks. Bad as a buncha females...

Then there are Helicopters -- in most cases always owned by someone else. I have seen a few combat assaults that were coordination glitch free and I've seen slightly fewer that were nightmares. Mostly they went fairly well with everyone trying to make it work. The level of difficulty was most often dependent on the personalities involved. The key difference in the Choppers is that there's no tactical employment in the action as there is with carriers so they are purely transportation whereas the carriers will have to be integrated in the tactical plan. I know most people realize that and I mention it only to highlight the necessity of that integration which makes a vehicular mounted force a different thing, tactically and psychologically for those involved, to a helicopter transported or walking force.

That said, there is IMO a distinct difference in mindset between mounted and dismounted Infantry units. Neither is wrong but they are different and that difference affects methods of employment and capabilities (mentally as well as the obvious support and sustainment issues). Experience is great but the law of averages says that an Infantryman will acquire the bulk of his experience in one form or the other and my observation has been that most develop a preference for one form and do not want to deal with the other. This can affect their performance.

As an aside, I also rode in what were then LVTs (today's AAVs) in the Marine Corps, always owned by someone else and rarely did the same units work together in those days (deliberately to foster interoperability and deter pattern establsihment). That was strictly transportation then and there were no tactical employment issues. The advantage of hauling 25 plus people meant fewer Tracks could move large quantities of people fairly quickly.

All that leads me to suggest that the idea of multi skilled Infantry is nice but I've seen enough problems in implementation that I believe that specialties and specialization exist and should be accepted. The issue is not training, that's not difficult to manage. It is experience related bias and preferences on the part of the Troops -- and many of their leaders...

[Infanteer]

While spiritually and emotionally I am in total agreement, there is a very good counter argument that suggests that manoeuvring/fighting/sustaining vehicles and doing the same on foot are two very different forms.

Out of interest - source?

I don't think you could really prove that one way is better than the other. The test would be how well each way could be done given the same training time and money - and yes, sadly time and money count in the real world.

Probably true.

Thus I'm agnostic on where the carriers are but I'm inclined to lean toward owning one's own solely on the basis that everyone doesn't take care of their equipment at the same level AND there is a distinct advantage to knowing the peculiarities of the machinery you use -- and ALL machinery has individual quirks. Bad as a buncha females...

YES! Our Army practices whole fleet management due to reduced availability of certain vehicles combined with increased number of users combined with stupid procurement policies (I'll take one of these, one of those....). Anyways, getting crap from the previous "renter" seems to be an accepted truth. My LAV Sgt had fun trying to sort out maintenance documentation for our LAVs in theater that hadn't been updated since 2007....

Then there are Helicopters -- in most cases always owned by someone else. I have seen a few combat assaults that were coordination glitch free and I've seen slightly fewer that were nightmares. Mostly they went fairly well with everyone trying to make it work. The level of difficulty was most often dependent on the personalities involved. The key difference in the Choppers is that there's no tactical employment in the action as there is with carriers so they are purely transportation whereas the carriers will have to be integrated in the tactical plan. I know most people realize that and I mention it only to highlight the necessity of that integration which makes a vehicular mounted force a different thing, tactically and psychologically for those involved, to a helicopter transported or walking force.

Agreed.

That said, there is IMO a distinct difference in mindset between mounted and dismounted Infantry units. Neither is wrong but they are different and that difference affects methods of employment and capabilities (mentally as well as the obvious support and sustainment issues). Experience is great but the law of averages says that an Infantryman will acquire the bulk of his experience in one form or the other and my observation has been that most develop a preference for one form and do not want to deal with the other. This can affect their performance.

All that leads me to suggest that the idea of multi skilled Infantry is nice but I've seen enough problems in implementation that I believe that specialties and specialization exist and should be accepted. The issue is not training, that's not difficult to manage. It is experience related bias and preferences on the part of the Troops -- and many of their leaders...

My experience, and I may be a prisoner of my own experience, is that with a good, professional Army this "Light/Mech" dichotomy is negligable. I've often asked for someone to explain the "Light Infantry Missions", "Light Infantry Skillsets" and "Light Infantry Doctrine" to me, because after 9 years in the Army, I still can't really identify them. While deployed (as a mech platoon commander), my platoon conducted over 130 patrols, with the lions share being without any vehicle support. My battalion conducted, at various levels, numerous airmobile operations both training and live. We operated in built up agricultural areas, complex urbanized terrain, and extremely "hilly" areas (although I wouldn't say it was quite mountain ops - but a few of our NCOs were qualified in this aspect), which included laying up for extended periods in traditional patrol bases. We also conducted armoured breaches when we had to. We're running out of "Light Infantry Missions" here. If parachute operations is the only aspect left, I believe all serious studies point out that most advantages of airborne operations have been supplanted by the helicopter in the last 40 years. The object is - as someone pointed out here - to make yourself asymmetric to the enemy, not enshrine certain equipment or tactics - and only good leadership at all levels is going to do that. Remember, all these COIN guys in the US Army are largely Armoured/Cavalry officers and the British Army's one success in Basrah was by a tank commander with a creative flair.

[Ken White]

My experience, and I may be a prisoner of my own experience, is that with a good, professional Army this "Light/Mech" dichotomy is negligable.

I can believe that. The US army is not as good at the basics as are the Australian and Canadian Armies and we have the 'advantage' of size and funding (mixed blessing, that) to enable more -- perhaps excessive -- specialization. That can imprint over time. It has advantages and disadvantages; the world has yet to develop the perfect Army.

I've often asked for someone to explain the "Light Infantry Missions", "Light Infantry Skillsets" and "Light Infantry Doctrine" to me, because after 9 years in the Army, I still can't really identify them.

Easy, 25-30 miles a day on foot with everything you need on your back, capable of 24-72 hour patrols with no resupply, all climate, all terrain, one hot meal every third day if lucky...

Those are all serious, even more serious is ability -- even desire (give that some thought...) -- to operate without and away from vehicles routinely and, most importantly, not being tied (in all senses of the word...) to a vehicle. Can be tedious in the field but when the Platoon gets back to base, it's a lot easier to clean and maintain two VS-17 Panels than it is four vehicles.

The flip side of that is that there is little that is less cost effective than a light infantry company in peacetime.

If parachute operations is the only aspect left, I believe all serious studies point out that most advantages of airborne operations have been supplanted by the helicopter in the last 40 years.

Virtually all such 'studies' have indeed said that -- though the authors of said studies still haven't figured out how to get a heliborne force on the ground and capable of doing damage at an objective several hundred or more miles away in those rare cases where that can be worth the costs.

The object is - as someone pointed out here - to make yourself asymmetric to the enemy, not enshrine certain equipment or tactics - and only good leadership at all levels is going to do that. Remember, all these COIN guys in the US Army are largely Armoured/Cavalry officers and the British Army's one success in Basrah was by a tank commander with a creative flair.

All true. I'm not a fan of Branches myself but we have them. Armor and Cavalry are important and they're okay, they're certainly generally less hidebound in the US Army than is the Infantry. There are jobs for everyone and the ability to swap roles and missions certainly exists and is to be encouraged. My question is simply whether or not that provides the most effective use (that METT-TC thing intrudes, I suspect). Everything you say is correct but, as you pointed out, we're all captives of our own experience. My point was and is that so too are units...

[William F. Owen]

Out of interest - source?

Any Armour Corps Officer in any Army, anyone has ever spoken to!
I've even met Royal Thai Army tankers who believed that commanding tank units was black art!!

[davidbfpo]

Infanteer,

You cited:

Remember, all these COIN guys in the US Army are largely Armoured/Cavalry officers and the British Army's one success in Basrah was by a tank commander with a creative flair.

Can you provide a source for the UK success?

[Fuchs]

I suspect he means the UK officer who created a kind of LRDG with long land rover-mounted patrols along the (Iranian?) border.
The officer got relatively good press.

I don't recall where I read about him, though.

[Infanteer]

Any Armour Corps Officer in any Army, anyone has ever spoken to!
I've even met Royal Thai Army tankers who believed that commanding tank units was black art!!

Oh - those guys. They look at a vehicle as the raison d'etre (man the arms) whereas the infantry merely see it as a tool (arm the man). An IFV is a gun/big rucksack/rest from walking, nothing more. So I'm not to concerned about what they think!

Infanteer,

You cited:

Can you provide a source for the UK success?

I can't for the life of me find it now - it was some Armoured LCol who abandoned his FOBs and was hailed as "Lawrence of Arabia". Bit of a misnomer, as all he was doing is living in the desert in laagers, but it was a creative interdiction effort.

[MK]

This should be the article/LCol in question:

http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/mh/d...p?startpage=26

[davidbfpo]

MK,

Thanks for the link. I do wonder whether the "maverick" Lt. Col. David Labouchere, of the Queen's Royal Hussars, is still serving? A quick website check failed to find an answer.

I like the snippet that if a fisherman is caught smuggling a weapon, he'll destroy the weapons, sink the boat, take the fisherman home and ransack his home. No detention.

[Tukhachevskii]

A flat, stackable and unsinkable (foamed cells) landing craft with remote piloting option.

For the life of me I couldn't remember what this statement reminded me of until...now. Essentially what you have are Mexeflote rafts/ military "uber" surfboards. I suppose that you could collect them all after the initial assault elements have taken the beach and then build a mulburry harbour out of them for follow on exploitation forces!

[Fuchs]

I'd rather think of stacked surf boards or rigid engineer boats for river crossings.

[William F. Owen]

For the life of me I couldn't remember what this statement reminded me of until...now. Essentially what you have are Mexeflote rafts/ military "uber" surfboards.

Seriously excellent piece of equipment. Much underrated, except by anyone who has used it.

[Tukhachevskii]

The Regimental Rogue makes some interesting statements regarding the 21st Century Infantry Company which cover the doctrinal and practical aspects of LAV command, seating arrangements for dismounts as well as the composition of said beasties. His ideas seem to be a via media between the separate carrier Bn advocates and the US style embedded/infantry crewed APC concept.

(#1) Our officiers can speak volumes on the theory of tactical employment of IFVs at the combat team and higher, but we've never seriously figured out how we're going to tactically integrate these vehicles within the infantry compan y.

#2 The crewed vehicle concept ... requires the establishment, training and maintaining of dedicated crews for each vehicle. [...]

#3 One of the most awkward moments in the operations of an M113 or GRIZZLY company was the dismount. The delay and loss of continuity (of fire, observation and control) as the commander switched with the gunner was always simply "accepted" as part of the cost of doing business. [T]he [LAV] turret basket requires that the gun be traversed centre before the crew commander can dismount through the hull. this means every vehicle dismounting its creww commander will surrender the tactical advantage of a 25mm stabilised chain gun firing on the objective.

#4 At all levels, the infantry commander is the leader of the dismounted force and its supporting LAV component. The LAV APC is a firepower, mobility and protection asset supporting the ground battle waged by the dismounted infantry - but it must be crewed and directed with as much consideration as any other component of the battalion's combat power.

[William F. Owen]

#3 One of the most awkward moments in the operations of an M113 or GRIZZLY company was the dismount. The delay and loss of continuity (of fire, observation and control) as the commander switched with the gunner was always simply "accepted" as part of the cost of doing business. [T]he [LAV] turret basket requires that the gun be traversed centre before the crew commander can dismount through the hull. this means every vehicle dismounting its creww commander will surrender the tactical advantage of a 25mm stabilised chain gun firing on the objective.

So why dismount the man manning the gun? That's just moronic and bad training. Doing stupid stuff is always stupid.

[Infanteer]

So why dismount the man manning the gun? That's just moronic and bad training. Doing stupid stuff is always stupid.

It was an old drill when we had the M113/Grizzleys - the article was written before we brought the LAV in and codified our IFV doctrine. We've since moved away from that silliness with dedicated crew commanders. The big debate in the Infantry for us is where the Platoon Commander rides - in the turret for max command and control, in the back to dismount as soon as the troops do or switching up during the fight through (which leads to the debate of popping out of a turret in the middle of an assault and break-in).

[William F. Owen]

The big debate in the Infantry for us is where the Platoon Commander rides - in the turret for max command and control, in the back to dismount as soon as the troops do or switching up during the fight through (which leads to the debate of popping out of a turret in the middle of an assault and break-in).

For me there is no debate. He dismounts. The Plt Sgt looks after the vehicles. They are "fire support."
The Platoon Commander has got to lead by personal example. The vehicles follow the troops, and the troops follow the officer.

[Fuchs]

The Plt Sgt would become systematically ill-trained in the dismount action, lieutenants die like fleas on battlefields - and where's your effective no.2 dismount leader?