Roadside Bombs & IEDs (catch all)

[Rifleman]

.....using Helicopters as an APC or IFV doesn't really make sense to me.

But what if we come in low out of the rising sun and about a mile out put on the music?

Sorry, I just couldn't resist!

[John]

Having been attacked with IEDs, I am not an advocate of just driving down roads in hopes you are not blown up. However, IMO completely avoiding roads, via helicopters, erodes credibility with the people, prevents Soldiers from developing intelligence, and seeing the ground from the people's perspective. Helicopters have viable missions, but not just as troop carriers.

Chief Bratton (Chief of Police) NY, Boston and most recently LA - used to have his officers ride public transportation to work periodically so they saw the streets as did the people. I submit Soldiers have to do the same thing.

[William F. Owen]

However, IMO completely avoiding roads, via helicopters, erodes credibility with the people, prevents Soldiers from developing intelligence, and seeing the ground from the people's perspective. Helicopters have viable missions, but not just as troop carriers.

All true, if done badly by stupid people. None of that is true, if done well, by a well-trained Army. All the negatives you cite had no impact on UK operations in South Armagh, or even the use of helicopters in other theatres, such as South Arabia, and Cyprus.

[Pete]

The air assault division concept came about two years before the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The following is from American Military History, Volume II, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005:

Seeking to improve mobility, an Army board in 1962 [the Howze Board, named for its president, Lt. Gen. Hamilton Howze] had compared the cost and efficiency of air and ground vehicles. Concluding that air transportation had much to commend it, the group recommended that the service consider forming new air combat and transport units. The idea that an air assault division employing air-transportable weapons and aircraft-mounted rockets might replace artillery raised delicate questions about the Air Force and Army missions, but Secretary McNamara decided to give it a thorough test.

Organized in February 1963, the 11th Air Assault Division went through two years of testing. By the spring of 1965, the Army deemed it ready for a test in combat and decided to send it to Vietnam, where the war was heating up. To that end, the service inactivated the 11th and transferred its personnel and equipment to the 1st Cavalry Division, which relinquished its mission in Korea to the 2d Infantry Division and moved to Fort Benning, Georgia. Renamed the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the reorganized unit had an authorized strength of 15,787 men, 428 helicopters, and 1,600 road vehicles (half the number of an infantry division). Though the total of rifles and automatic weapons in the unit remained the same as in an infantry division, the force’s direct-support artillery moved by helicopter rather than truck or armored vehicle. In the same way, it employed an aerial rocket artillery battalion rather than the normal tube artillery. In all, the division’s total weight came to just 10,000 tons, less than a third of what a normal infantry division deployed.

[TYR]

From my experience in Afghanistan I defiantly felt we needed more helicopters. The problem I see is that when helicopters are used they are not used properly. Most times a unit infiltrated right on top of their objective. All surprise and security was lost and usually the unit damaged the local’s private property in the process which isnt good if you want to make friends. I guess if you are going to plan for failure and land on top of your objective then yes you are taking a chance of getting RPG’d or shot down with a SAM. Sometimes I thought that some of those units who planned those operations wanted to replay “Blackhawk Down”. I was always a proponent for conducting an operation over a week or more, inserting far enough away from the objective area and walking in moving along the high ground to get to our objective area. After all, the enemy was using the high ground as well to move from village to village. In most cases the enemy wasn’t in the village anyway, but rather using Sheppard cabins further up the mountain or valley then coming down to do their business with in the village. Most village elders wouldn’t let the insurgents live within the village anyway. The village never wanted to risk getting extra attention from the coalition. Every time we walked in using the high ground the locals as well as the enemy were surprised and wondered where we came from. The further we were inserted from the Objective area the more success we had. The closer we inserted to the target area we always ran into a dry hole. If we inserted using vehicles we moved at night using non standard vehicles. The insurgents would never risk IEDing a Jinga truck for fear of turning the locals against them. After disembarking we moved on foot to high ground. When we got to the target area again we had success. It only takes one time driving down the restrictive roads in Afghanistan and getting IED’d to understand that whatever you are doing is probably not the preferred method. The problem I see is that we have thrown out the “decentralize” Light Infantry concept that was developed to fight “Brush Fire Wars” for a more motorized way of getting to the battle, becoming heavier in restricted terrain and becoming less mobile and more dependent on that vehicle as a support platform in the process. Not to say we shouldn’t move on the roads at all, but maybe employ a more balanced approach of getting to the objective. Airmobility defiantly can give you an advantage in Afghanistan. But it takes planning and resources. However, using the Rhodesian “Fire Force” technique as someone suggested wouldn’t have worked where I was operating just because the terrain was to extreme.

[William F. Owen]

Well, I was all into this thread and wanting to participate as far as the last post by TYR, however...immediately after he posted, this thread went to pieces.

Welcome to information age. The same happens in conversations.

Much of what he and I stated appears to be tied together real closely, and what I noticed is that although both Iraq and Afghanistan are pretty much two completely different war zones, there are many similarities.

Noted. Some more detail perhaps?

The problem I see is that we have thrown out the “decentralize” Light Infantry concept that was developed to fight “Brush Fire Wars” for a more motorized way of getting to the battle, becoming heavier in restricted terrain and becoming less mobile and more dependent on that vehicle as a support platform in the process.

What is a “decentralize” Light Infantry concept? In an age of good HF radios, digital comms and SAT phones I think we have to be pretty careful of our descriptions of C2, and support.
The real issue here lies with the force protection postures and an inability to assess the comparative risks in line with the force protection policy.

However, using the Rhodesian “Fire Force” technique as someone suggested wouldn’t have worked where I was operating just because the terrain was to extreme.

The RLI Fire Force concept was born of necessity in not having a not enough helicopters, and very small army in a huge country. The trick wasn't the jumping out of DC-3's but the cueing of the strike action based on surveillance and intelligence. - so the "jump" was the easy bit.
It did work well against a very low quality irregulars, but it would have had real problems had the Terrs got more MANPADs (- and they had them, but only used them on airliners) and been skilled enough to stand and fight in numbers - something they only seem to have done very rarely.

[Ken White]

Who made the first helicopter borne assault on 21 Sep 1951 (LINK). They were far ahead of the Army in chopper use by 1960, much less by 1964. Still are, in many respects.

The Howze Board and the Air Assault test showed every flaw later to become apparent in actual Army helicopter operations. However, the Army wanted Birds so reality was not allowed to intrude. In the test, the rule was that if you could get the aircraft's full visibility tail number, you could consider it killed and the umpires would credit it. One little Airborne Infantry Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon, on that two week test exercise in North and South Carolina, accounted for 20 plus Chinooks and over 100 Hueys--plus three Mohawks.

All that said, the birds do have their place, TYR is right on setting down elsewhere and walking to the objective -- which, as Wilf notes, is the right way to do it and does not cause the isolation phenomenon. The down side is that it takes longer. That is bad for overly impatient and demanding US Commanders who try to operate on a peacetime schedule (the MTCs teach bad habits as well as good...). It also means the troops are exposed (which of course, they should be...) but that is apparently not done today.

Never enough time to do it right...Combat is dangerous...

Who knew...

The air assault division concept came about two years before the Tonkin Gulf Resolution...

[Ken White]

shows that even though you were in the Army and now read a lot, you still don't really understand that Army...

I don't drop and give anyone 20, have not since jump school much less making SGT and that long before being a SGM. Nor did I ever 'drop' people, that's a stupid punishment or harassment that accomplishes nothing except antagonizing the troops needlessly. I have yet to see a few pushups make better Soldiers or clean a weapon or a latrine. All minor froth in any event as I'm not a SGM anymore, just an old retarded silly-villian who dang sure doesn't do pushups for anyone.

No. I'm not quibbling, now and only rarely otherwise. I'm merely expanding on your post. I'm also pointing out that your inference; the Army did this years ago, while correct apparently inadvertantly omits the fact that the Marines got there long before the Army did and refined the process perhaps more rapidly.

My post does refer back to the thread in the context of other recent posts and thus wasn't just another link or two posted with no real discussion. It also tried to add some context to your blind posted links and quote, thus I was trying to help, mot quibble.

You'll note I added mention of the Air Assault II Exercise and Test. It was conducted actually after that Resolution in October of '64 but it is, I think, relevant to this thread in the sense that said test showed all the flaws later operational experience with helicopters has revealed. As I've suggested before, if you want to flood the area with links, fine -- but we would hope you had some thoughts pertaining to them to add to the link.

In any event, I'm totally unsure what the relevance of the Howze Board being conducted before the Tonkin Resolution has to do with Vertical Envelopment and IED's as this thread has developed and I'd really appreciate knowing what that connection and point happen to be.

[Pete]

Ken, the "drop and give me two-zero" post was made in jest. I deleted it about 15 minutes after posting it when I thought it might be misconstrued--if you were offended I apologize. I enjoy the perspective and institutional memory you add to this forum and a few of the published anecdotes on the '50s and '60s I've posted here have been deliberate attempts to draw you out.

I brought up the subject of the Howze Board because Slapout had said that air cavalry was implemented for Vietnam; Willf added his thoughts on air mobility. I was reluctant to directly contradict anyone but thought some background on how the air mobile division came to be would add to the discussion. Usually when the Army makes a ruling on a concept the basic idea has been under consideration for quite some time, often on an ad hoc basis. It's a bit like the Army R & D stuff I used to do as a contractor--there's no funding or official backing to do any work until there's a TRADOC-approved requirements document.

In March 2003 the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment, V Corps, took quite a beating in the vicinity of Karbala. I don't know what impact it may have had on air mobile doctrine and tactics.

[John]

But what if we come in low out of the rising sun and about a mile out put on the music?

Don't surf!