Roadside Bombs & IEDs (catch all)

[Firn]

150 pounds, easily, on that kid's back. Feeling the pain.

Tankersteve

Very much so. And the heat. And the sweat. Light infantry indeed.

Most of the points have been already adressed. A well armored vehicle is a (very) important element but only the last line of defense against IEDs. The COIN operations in Rhodesia and current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that well designed armored vehicles play a very important part in troop survivability, but have also important drawbacks (greatly increased fuel consumption, reduced mobility, lesser situational awareness). Finding the right mix and balance as well as adjusting it in time and space is the great difficulty, as war is no science but art.


Firn

[Eden]

Other reasons why we travel on the ground:

We are, in fact, short of helicopters in Afghanistan. More are being sent, or so I glean from open sources, but we lack the resources to move many troops around by air. Moreover, any heliborne insertion results in a continuing committment of aircraft to logistically support the inserted force. Our allies are especially short of helicopters - I know it is something of a national scandal in the UK.

Also, the environment in Afghanistan makes employment of helicopters problematical in many areas due to climate and elevation.

[zealot66]

Thanks for the input. I know that COIN requires sustained presence on the battlefield. I was really curious on the supply of helo's in the area. Its just so frustrating to see a good many men die without confronting the enemy and just get whacked by a roadside bomb.

It does make sense that in being on the ground and clearing, holding and building will yield intelligence on who and where the ambushes take place. Gary Schroen in his book, first in in 2005 decried our resource allocation to Iraq and pretty much predicted what would happen in afghanistan. Little resources people and machines and believing the terrs have departed the region only to come back in droves. Again, thanks for clarifying some issues. I aint been there so its hard to understand some methods and why.

[Steve Blair]

If you review some possible lessons from Vietnam, you find that potential LZs are also quite susceptible to IED-type activities (the NV/NVA used to booby-trap LZs with unexploded bombs or shells, Chinese claymore copies in trees, and so on). So it doesn't necessarily get you around the issue, and in fact it can make it more complicated (downed birds and all that).

[Schmedlap]

Anecdotal experience...

In 2005, we avoided and countered the IED threat by emplacing fire teams in covert positions throughout the AO. They were inserted usually at night, by way of dismounted patrols from our patrol base. Once curfew was lifted, the IED emplacers would come out. Anyone seen emplacing an IED was killed on sight. Suddenly, people were less enthusiastic about emplacing IEDs. The psychological impact was significant upon potential adversaries (most said, "screw that") and upon the populace (when lots of IED emplacers are shot in the chest from a single gunshot that comes out of nowhere - at least once per day - there is a sense that the Americans are now in control of security and the insurgents are dead men walking). Fewer IEDs improved our mobility, which made it easier to emplace fire teams in a wider variety of positions and continue to spread paranoia among our adversaries and reassurance among the populace.

[Doofous]

And there's a parallel with the value of vertical envelopment. In Vietnam, the shock value of airmobile tactics was compromised by two factors: telegraphing the arrival sites and times, and essentially utilizing the Hueys as aerial taxis to bring troops in and then have them simply walk around on random search-and-destroy missions that were based on a feeling that the enemy would be where we land -- classic military projection of your wishful thinking onto an enemy's likely decisions -- and a plausible explanation for why we were less effective than we could have been. We took a lot of casualties on LZs to booby traps (that's how I got mine) and snipers.

[Infanteer]

Flying to work, like driving to work, is part of the "commuting" problem.

If you try to avoid getting IED'd in your vehicles and switch to moving on foot, the bad guy will simply target dismounts.

No form of technology is going to eliminate the IED threat - good TTPs and alert soldiers will mitigate it as best as possible....

[qp4]

Anecdotal experience...

In 2005, we avoided and countered the IED threat by emplacing fire teams in covert positions throughout the AO. They were inserted usually at night, by way of dismounted patrols from our patrol base....

Also in 2005 we did the exact same thing. We had a COP about 12km from our main FOB that had only three roads in, so naturally these chokepoints became one of the most contested areas in our OE. After three months of dedicated SKTs and observation by tanks, we were down to one road that stayed red and two roads that were black. The AO continued to deteriorate for the next three years (that COP was the home of both DUSTWUN events in Iraq).

It got so bad that helicopters were being used as a transport rather than ride the roads. And as John points out:

Having been attacked with IEDs, I am not an advocate of just driving down roads in hopes you are not blown up. However, IMO completely avoiding roads, via helicopters, erodes credibility with the people, prevents Soldiers from developing intelligence, and seeing the ground from the people's perspective. Helicopters have viable missions, but not just as troop carriers.

And that AO that got so bad? It started to get better when we started walking everywhere.

v/r,
qp4

[zealot66]

Im still here. You all have alot more experience in debating this issue that I do. My question came as a result of studying wars in southern africa and the measures they took to overcome the landmine issue. I think that terrain, strategy and even a landmine vs an IED demand differences in employment of troops. It is just a sick feeling to watch our casualties from IED's knowing that they werent even the result of a contact just some kid with a remote control. Keep going. I look at this board everyday and consider it an education.

I find the above posts about landing patrols away from the target and walking to a target very interesting and in though the terrain in afghanistan might prohibit some of this, The issue still remains are we using the choppers to their fullest and are there enough ?