Roadside Bombs & IEDs (catch all)

[Jedburgh]

Published on-line by the Congressional Research Service:

IEDs in Iraq: Effects & Countermeasures

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are responsible for many of the more than 2,000 deaths and numerous casualties suffered by U.S. and coalition forces since the invasion of Iraq.1 The bombs have been hidden behind signs and guardrails, under roadside debris, or inside animal carcasses, and encounters with IEDs are becoming more numerous and deadly. The threat has expanded to include vehicle-borne IEDs, where insurgents drive cars laden with explosives directly into a targeted group of service members. DOD efforts to counter IEDs have proven only marginally effective, and U.S. forces continue to be exposed to the threat at military checkpoints, or whenever riding in vehicles in Iraq. DOD reportedly expects that mines and IEDs will continue to be weapons of choice for insurgents for the near term in Iraq, and is also concerned that they might eventually become more widely used by other insurgents and terrorists worldwide. This report will be updated as events warrant.

[Bill Moore]

We all agree that IEDs are an old method of waging guerrilla warfare.

If we reflect back to recent history, we'll also all agree that the Iraqi intelligence/military service had excellent IED making skills and other paramilitary skills, as demonstrated in numerous successful attacks overseas against selected expats and other targets. We also know the Lebanonese Hizbullah have long been masters in developing sophisticated IEDs, probably in large part due to training and assistance received by the Iranians and Syrians, who probably received their initial training from the USSR back in the day. It is probably a fair assessment to assume at least some of the foreign fighters coming into Iraq from Syria hail from Lebanon. None the less I wouldn't write off the possiblity, or even probability, that some states are also providing IED and other support to select insurgent groups. If we end up proving this, then we have a situation that we need to fix with appropriate response.

In the mid to long run the greatest danger is that their IED techniques, tactics, and procedures will migrate between the various terrorist/insurgent groups, and will eventually be exported elsewhere to support Jihad in say Indonesia or Nigeria. Anyone notice the rapid rise of IED attacks in Afghanistan lately?

I think the bottom line is we need to need to find, fix, and finish the IED facilitators wherever they are, and sooner rather than later. Everyday they survive, they improve their craft.

[Jedburgh]

We also know the Lebanonese Hizbullah have long been masters in developing sophisticated IEDs, probably in large part due to training and assistance received by the Iranians and Syrians, who probably received their initial training from the USSR back in the day.

Hezbollah actually received quite a bit of their initial assistance regarding construction and use of roadside bombs from the ANC. A bit of a come-about, as Israel had very close mil-to-mil relations with Apartheid South Africa. Iran definitely provided most of the materials required, shipped through Syria. But Hezbollah provided plenty of local innovation in construction and targeting and was also the first to systematically video IED attacks for use in media propaganda.

In the mid to long run the greatest danger is that their IED techniques, tactics, and procedures will migrate between the various terrorist/insurgent groups, and will eventually be exported elsewhere to support Jihad in say Indonesia or Nigeria. Anyone notice the rapid rise of IED attacks in Afghanistan lately?

"Threat migration" of TTPs between Iraq and Afghanistan has been going on for a while - but its definitely increased in scale recently. The threat potential of such migration beyond the AOR to targets in the West - let alone places like Indonesia or Nigeria - is serious.

But keep in mind that threat migration doesn't necessarily mean physical transfer of bad guys to train and advise indig in other countries. The migration of the concept of IEDs as an effective, simple, and cheap method of attack is enough. The Maoists in Nepal, for example, have developed unique IED TTPs all their own, that owe nothing to what we've been seeing in Iraq.

I think the bottom line is we need to need to find, fix, and finish the IED facilitators wherever they are, and sooner rather than later. Everyday they survive, they improve their craft.

True enough. The intel problem in relation to that is another discussion altogether. But we've also got to accept that IEDs in some form are a threat that we may continue to face in the forseeable future. That is where the defense appropriations come in, as referenced in the CRS report. The counter-IED capability that we are developing in the force is something that will stand us in good stead over the long run.

[aktarian]

And we shouldn't ignore simple fact of evolution both in material and use/placement. If something works use it. If something doesn't work (or doesn't work anymore) change it or stop using it.

I see tendency to draw conclusion: "IED are getting more sophisticated therefore they are receiving foreign help. IED are getting more effective therefore they are receiving foreign instructors." But it could be simple evolution. Wire detonated bombs are easy to spot so they change to command-detonated. Certain frequencies are getting jammed so they change it or use different source of command signal. Armored vehicles are hard to destroy so use more explosive. etc

It's not only the US that learns.

[GorTex6]

The new sophistication is in the system and rapidly evolving tactics used to employ them. One guy gets paid to manufacture, another gets paid to dig the hole, another to lay the wire, and another to detonate the charge, ect... They videotaped almost every attack, post them on jihadist bulletin boards, and critique each video like a high school football coaching staff, discovering patterns in our battle drills. They are very patient and keen observers, learning everything about us.

[Jedburgh]

The new sophistication is in the system and rapidly evolving tactics used to employ them. One guy gets paid to manufacture, another gets paid to dig the hole, another to lay the wire, and another to detonate the charge, etc...

That's a basic description of a step-by-step cell. That method of organization for support and ops is very common in a wide range of insurgent organizations. Not new at all. That type of cell was used very effectively by HAMAS during the Intifada for the distribution of propaganda and calls for strikes - the Israelis were never able to completely stop the distro, although they rolled up quite a few cells.

We've talked about natural evolution in the use of IEDs - the same thing occurs in operational cell structure. Organizational methods, means of clandestine communications, security cut-outs, etc. are learned the hard way by the bad guys. But in Iraq they had a head start, given the nature of the multi-layered police state that was Saddam's regime. I'm not just talking about the Mukhabarat; many elements within Iraqi society developed such networks for a variety of survival reasons during Saddam's rule. The same thing is true of political opposition and smuggling networks that exist in every repressive regime in the region.

[GorTex6]

Not new at all.

Was the cell driven by money, exploiting unemployment? Was membership/employment solicited on internet message boards(like this one)? Did each group set their differences aside to collude with each other autonomously? This is not new?

[jcustis]

In the mid to long run the greatest danger is that their IED techniques, tactics, and procedures will migrate between the various terrorist/insurgent groups, and will eventually be exported elsewhere to support Jihad in say Indonesia or Nigeria. Anyone notice the rapid rise of IED attacks in Afghanistan lately?

"Threat migration" of TTPs between Iraq and Afghanistan has been going on for a while - but its definitely increased in scale recently. The threat potential of such migration beyond the AOR to targets in the West - let alone places like Indonesia or Nigeria - is serious.

The above quotes were pulled from other posts in this thread. From the perspective of military theory (despite the historical precedent), has the IED become a revolution in military affairs? Following the argument that RMAs can be the revolutionary technology itself (e.g. rifled musket, tank, etc.) I'm inclined to think we have a new RMA for a number of reasons:

- If employed properly, IEDs have an almost David-vs.-Goliath quality that facilitates a certain degree of freedom of maneuver, critical to insurgent ops.

- The powerful imagery of an IED's effects can move around the globe as soon as it is either broadcast on a major news network, or uploaded to a jihadist website. I think that even though the aftermath and ensuing casualties may tell a less dramatic story, the initial shock of the image at detonation is so powerful that it has reached virtually every insurgent/terrorist group around the world. As a result, the how-to of complex IEDs may not have reached other groups, but I believe the IED will become a "keeping up with the Joneses" concern for groups if they do not already possess it the capability.

- We should expect to see IEDs on any future battlefield (Conventional and UW). I firmly believe that if IEDs had been employed with the same tradecraft during the March Up as they are now, we might still be making that movement to Baghdad. The components of an effective IED are all around us in our daily lives, minus the explosive compound (and there are even recipes for that on the Internet).

Althought IEDs have been around for a long, long time, the technological and organizational recommendations for change that are coming out of the OIF/OEF experience, I believe we are witnessing such a revolution. I cannot recall which Marine General officer made the statement, but he spoke of Marines deploying in armored HMMWVs in the future, and that the soft-skin "highbacks" would be a thing of the past if we were to tread into other hostile environments. Any validity behind that statement?

Is the IED just one component of a larger RMA in the works?