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Thread: Roadside Bombs & IEDs (catch all)

  1. #181
    Council Member Infanteer's Avatar
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    Flying to work, like driving to work, is part of the "commuting" problem.

    If you try to avoid getting IED'd in your vehicles and switch to moving on foot, the bad guy will simply target dismounts.

    No form of technology is going to eliminate the IED threat - good TTPs and alert soldiers will mitigate it as best as possible....

  2. #182
    Council Member Tracker275's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Infanteer View Post
    If you try to avoid getting IED'd in your vehicles and switch to moving on foot, the bad guy will simply target dismounts.

    No form of technology is going to eliminate the IED threat - good TTPs and alert soldiers will mitigate it as best as possible....
    Very accurate statement. What most folks seem to forget is that what may be the most technologically advanced military in the world is being bogged down by folks that operate more fluid and in an asymetrical descentralized operations strategy. The more we rely on technology, the more they will identify the weaknesses with far less money than it took for us to develop and defeat what they have thrown at us.

    Every week, I arrive on a scene where a simple device was built to defeat either the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, or United States Forces (USF). I am never ceased to be amazed at how simple, yet complex the devices are, and most of the components could have been purchased at Walmart, Ace Hardware, and Radio Shack to produce what we are seeing.

    The common theme I see in most of the posts found in this thread is that the concept, collectively, is that of a reactive measure vs. a proactive measure. Instead of focusing a majority of our efforts on how we defeat devices through defense, let us focus on finding out where they are being made and stopping that prior to them being placed somewhere. Obviously, defensive measures are essential, however in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the appearance is that of not going after the "bad guy", but getting hit and trying to find out how to survive a strike...Then limp away.

    Rarely do I see efforts here in Iraq where the focus is on identifying where the devices are made, but more where they have been emplaced. I look at briefing after briefing that reflects hot spots of detonations, however I have yet to look at one that identifies where exactly the optimum location for them to be made is.

    What it comes down to in a nutshell is that no matter how you cut it, the faster lighter, and more adaptable force has proven to never win the battle, but win the war. This has been proven against the United States since the 1960's. The concept of "Light Infantry" has been destroyed by the modern day rucksack and the technological gadgets that we are forced to take with us onto the battlefield. Why is it that the RTO has to carry a 40lbs radio with spare battery and kit only to maintain commo sometimes spotty at best, and the insurgent uses a satphone that fits in his pocket and gets common 100% of the time?

    You can't fight an unconventional war with conventional tactics. That is a proven fact. As I have previously stated, you will win the battle, but you will never win the war. If our ultimate focus is on staying on the roads most of the time, then you have set yourself up for failure in that you now channeling your forces into a choke point that is miles long. The balance between armor and mobility are a very tricky balance, and if the focus is entirely on defensive postures, then we have lost the best defense, which is a good offense. TTP's change constantly, however the US military does not move as fast as the battlefield. What always remains a constant about an IED, is that someone has to place it somewhere and it has to wait for someone to go by it. Personally, I have yet to hear of a foot patrol in who knows how long get attacked by an IED (I'm not talking about a foot patrol being dismounts either) here in Iraq, but I regularly go to scenes where vehicles have been hit. The one thing that we all laugh about here is that the Iraqi insurgents can't shoot.

    So, if that is the case, why do we place ourselves in situations that they really do know how to do, and that is setup an IED?

    Granted, this is my first post here, but this is my $0.02 on this subject for what it is worth.
    Last edited by Tracker275; 01-19-2010 at 04:26 AM.

  3. #183
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    Thanks for that last post. It seems that light and mobile and good soldiering is the way to go. Any military that garrisons itself either thru heavy equipment or literal garrison without going outside the wire is outmanuevered by enemy. When contact occurs, the pursuit should ensue. I realize with IED's this isnt going to happen all the time but an idea of lightinfantry tactics to seek out and meet the enemy is better in the long run than riding around waiting.

  4. #184
    Council Member Xenophon's Avatar
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    There are other ways to mitigate the IED threat. Probably the best one is the one Schmedlap posted. Another is to decrease the size of A.O.s so that mounted patrols are not so necessary, but this is not always feasible and requires a larger amount of troops. The other is to stay off the roads by conducting dismounted patrols or, conducting old school mounted patrols via horse/donkey/camel (the original All Terrain Vehicle). But the other problem is re-supply. Small-scale re-supply in the future should be conducted with some kind of supply drop-ship UAV (one of the few times you'll hear me advocate a technological solution) but for large scale logistics I think the loggies are still going to be provisional route clearance for a long time.

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    Default Something similar has been done before:

    Quote Originally Posted by Xenophon View Post
    But the other problem is re-supply. Small-scale re-supply in the future should be conducted with some kind of supply drop-ship UAV
    In Vietnam, I believe the Mobile Guerilla Forces (Blackjack Projects) sometimes resupplied with fast movers dropping canisters. Basically like a bombing run. So I think your UAV idea for resupply has merit.
    "Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper

  6. #186
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    Yeah, I'm thinking just a flying pallet. Troops at a rear base strap on some boxes of ammo, some MRE's, some medical supplies, a "pilot" flies it out to the COP, then the troops there unload it, maybe throw on some empty ammo cans, an EPW or two, then the "pilot" flies it back.

  7. #187
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Xenophon View Post
    Yeah, I'm thinking just a flying pallet. Troops at a rear base strap on some boxes of ammo, some MRE's, some medical supplies, a "pilot" flies it out to the COP, then the troops there unload it, maybe throw on some empty ammo cans, an EPW or two, then the "pilot" flies it back.
    You're 100% right! - not surprisingly. Plus Medevac!
    ... and this is why Helicopters are extremely useful in both regular and irregular warfare. - so you need lots of them!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  8. #188
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    You're 100% right! - not surprisingly. Plus Medevac!
    ... and this is why Helicopters are extremely useful in both regular and irregular warfare. - so you need lots of them!

    It was developed years ago for Vietnam. Actually for the original Air Cavalry.

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOVh-vlUius

  9. #189
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Default The Original Flying Platform

    Original Hiller Flying Platform......made good Helicopters and VTOL Aircraft too.



    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MwhBW...eature=related


    That's Ken White driving it.
    Last edited by slapout9; 01-22-2010 at 04:58 PM. Reason: stuff

  10. #190
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    I'm rather surprised, Slap, that you missed the opportunity to mention this particular marvel of modern flight
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


  11. #191
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    rex, I am not allowed to expose any secerts of the Redneck Air Force

  12. #192
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    I wasn't in Vietnam, but I've heard that helicopter landing zones there could be extremely dangerous places. I'm sure our current adversaries would quickly figure that out and adjust their tactics accordingly. A guy I served with, now a retired lieutenant colonel who was in Vietnam, said he was amazed to see how slow soldiers were to exit helicopters during a training exercise he witnessed in the 1980s. He mentioned it as an example of how skills degrade when they are not frequently practiced.

  13. #193
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    It was developed years ago for Vietnam. Actually for the original Air Cavalry.

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOVh-vlUius
    Actually, I'm pretty against AIR CAV.
    AIR SUPPLY, AIR MARCH and AIR SUSTAIN, all make sense to me, but using Helicopters as an APC or IFV doesn't really make sense to me.

    OK SOF may have some applications, but I just don't see putting Support Helicopters in harms ways as something sensible folks should do.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    .....using Helicopters as an APC or IFV doesn't really make sense to me.
    But what if we come in low out of the rising sun and about a mile out put on the music?

    Sorry, I just couldn't resist!
    "Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper

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    Default Chief Bratton

    Having been attacked with IEDs, I am not an advocate of just driving down roads in hopes you are not blown up. However, IMO completely avoiding roads, via helicopters, erodes credibility with the people, prevents Soldiers from developing intelligence, and seeing the ground from the people's perspective. Helicopters have viable missions, but not just as troop carriers.

    Chief Bratton (Chief of Police) NY, Boston and most recently LA - used to have his officers ride public transportation to work periodically so they saw the streets as did the people. I submit Soldiers have to do the same thing.

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    Default Charlie...

    Quote Originally Posted by Rifleman View Post
    But what if we come in low out of the rising sun and about a mile out put on the music?
    Don't surf!

  17. #197
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by John View Post
    However, IMO completely avoiding roads, via helicopters, erodes credibility with the people, prevents Soldiers from developing intelligence, and seeing the ground from the people's perspective. Helicopters have viable missions, but not just as troop carriers.
    All true, if done badly by stupid people. None of that is true, if done well, by a well-trained Army. All the negatives you cite had no impact on UK operations in South Armagh, or even the use of helicopters in other theatres, such as South Arabia, and Cyprus.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  18. #198
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    Default Howze Board

    The air assault division concept came about two years before the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The following is from American Military History, Volume II, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005:

    Seeking to improve mobility, an Army board in 1962 [the Howze Board, named for its president, Lt. Gen. Hamilton Howze] had compared the cost and efficiency of air and ground vehicles. Concluding that air transportation had much to commend it, the group recommended that the service consider forming new air combat and transport units. The idea that an air assault division employing air-transportable weapons and aircraft-mounted rockets might replace artillery raised delicate questions about the Air Force and Army missions, but Secretary McNamara decided to give it a thorough test.

    Organized in February 1963, the 11th Air Assault Division went through two years of testing. By the spring of 1965, the Army deemed it ready for a test in combat and decided to send it to Vietnam, where the war was heating up. To that end, the service inactivated the 11th and transferred its personnel and equipment to the 1st Cavalry Division, which relinquished its mission in Korea to the 2d Infantry Division and moved to Fort Benning, Georgia. Renamed the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the reorganized unit had an authorized strength of 15,787 men, 428 helicopters, and 1,600 road vehicles (half the number of an infantry division). Though the total of rifles and automatic weapons in the unit remained the same as in an infantry division, the force’s direct-support artillery moved by helicopter rather than truck or armored vehicle. In the same way, it employed an aerial rocket artillery battalion rather than the normal tube artillery. In all, the division’s total weight came to just 10,000 tons, less than a third of what a normal infantry division deployed.
    Last edited by Pete; 01-23-2010 at 08:09 AM.

  19. #199
    Council Member TYR's Avatar
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    From my experience in Afghanistan I defiantly felt we needed more helicopters. The problem I see is that when helicopters are used they are not used properly. Most times a unit infiltrated right on top of their objective. All surprise and security was lost and usually the unit damaged the local’s private property in the process which isnt good if you want to make friends. I guess if you are going to plan for failure and land on top of your objective then yes you are taking a chance of getting RPG’d or shot down with a SAM. Sometimes I thought that some of those units who planned those operations wanted to replay “Blackhawk Down”. I was always a proponent for conducting an operation over a week or more, inserting far enough away from the objective area and walking in moving along the high ground to get to our objective area. After all, the enemy was using the high ground as well to move from village to village. In most cases the enemy wasn’t in the village anyway, but rather using Sheppard cabins further up the mountain or valley then coming down to do their business with in the village. Most village elders wouldn’t let the insurgents live within the village anyway. The village never wanted to risk getting extra attention from the coalition. Every time we walked in using the high ground the locals as well as the enemy were surprised and wondered where we came from. The further we were inserted from the Objective area the more success we had. The closer we inserted to the target area we always ran into a dry hole. If we inserted using vehicles we moved at night using non standard vehicles. The insurgents would never risk IEDing a Jinga truck for fear of turning the locals against them. After disembarking we moved on foot to high ground. When we got to the target area again we had success. It only takes one time driving down the restrictive roads in Afghanistan and getting IED’d to understand that whatever you are doing is probably not the preferred method. The problem I see is that we have thrown out the “decentralize” Light Infantry concept that was developed to fight “Brush Fire Wars” for a more motorized way of getting to the battle, becoming heavier in restricted terrain and becoming less mobile and more dependent on that vehicle as a support platform in the process. Not to say we shouldn’t move on the roads at all, but maybe employ a more balanced approach of getting to the objective. Airmobility defiantly can give you an advantage in Afghanistan. But it takes planning and resources. However, using the Rhodesian “Fire Force” technique as someone suggested wouldn’t have worked where I was operating just because the terrain was to extreme.
    "Soldiers who are lacking in basic training, discipline, poor leadership and inadequate command and control will not be able to win wars with technology and firepower alone. When their technology fails, they will find themselves in a vacuum they cannot easily extricate themselves from."- Eeben Barlow

  20. #200
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default The Air Assault concept was pioneered by the Marines

    Who made the first helicopter borne assault on 21 Sep 1951 (LINK). They were far ahead of the Army in chopper use by 1960, much less by 1964. Still are, in many respects.

    The Howze Board and the Air Assault test showed every flaw later to become apparent in actual Army helicopter operations. However, the Army wanted Birds so reality was not allowed to intrude. In the test, the rule was that if you could get the aircraft's full visibility tail number, you could consider it killed and the umpires would credit it. One little Airborne Infantry Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon, on that two week test exercise in North and South Carolina, accounted for 20 plus Chinooks and over 100 Hueys--plus three Mohawks.

    All that said, the birds do have their place, TYR is right on setting down elsewhere and walking to the objective -- which, as Wilf notes, is the right way to do it and does not cause the isolation phenomenon. The down side is that it takes longer. That is bad for overly impatient and demanding US Commanders who try to operate on a peacetime schedule (the MTCs teach bad habits as well as good...). It also means the troops are exposed (which of course, they should be...) but that is apparently not done today.

    Never enough time to do it right...Combat is dangerous...

    Who knew...

    Quote Originally Posted by Pete View Post
    The air assault division concept came about two years before the Tonkin Gulf Resolution...

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