Roadside Bombs & IEDs (catch all)

[tankersteve]

They were conducting a deep attack against a brigade (I believe) of Iraqi armored forces. This was an AH-64 force. The attack was not coordinated well with any SEAD and the force got fired up quite a bit by small-arms fire, to the point that they couldn't continue the mission.

So what is the relevance? Well, the Army seems to be forgetting about deep attacks and is focusing on Apaches conducting direct support to ground forces - and are doing an excellent job of it. If reacting to a TIC, they show up overhead, and talk to the ground force commander, telling him what he has, and for how long, and asks for an update on the situation and what the ground force needs him to do. Simple, no JTAC/Anglico to work through, on regular FM nets. If it is a preplanned mission, a bit of coord can make sure that they have the same mission graphics that the ground force is using.

I am not an expert on Air Assault missions, I am just a big fan of the direction that attack aviation elements have gone. I would not be surprised if the deep attack has fallen completely out of favor, freeing up a lot more Apaches to work with the guys on the ground.

By far, the easiest and most responsive aviation asset available to the ground force maneuver commander.

Tankersteve

[Ken White]

Not offended, just have a long term antipathy to dropping or 'smoking' people -- idle harassment IMO. I've never seen any benefit in it. None. The concept raises my hackles and being a curmudgeon, I tend to curmudge about it...

Thanks for the expansion on the original post, that places it in context and makes sense. Might I suggest that wasn't apparent to an old slow Dude like me. The younger folks may have instantly gotten the connection but many of my synapses have synapped...

No need to try to draw me out, best bet is just to ask a question and I'll answer as best I can or admit I'm clueless (a frequent occurrence). Some folks post with a lot of links, I use very few. Everyone has their own techniques, which is fine but this is a discussion board where one can say what one thinks and ask questions, it isn't a forum where brevity is desired (good thing or I'd be in deep yogurt...).

As Tankersteve says, aviation doctrine is evolving and mostly for the better. Helicopters are great items of equipment but like anything else, they have to be used as designed and the limitations have to be respected. We misused them in Viet Nam (badly in some cases) and the Karbala attack was an exercise in bone stupidity. However, we are getting better.

Interestingly, Howze -- a former cavalryman and one of the better Generals of his era (he was the best XVIII Abn Corps Commander I've seen thus far, probably as good as was Ridgeway) was way back then adamant that attempting to directly attack ground elements with Armor and ADA using gun ships was excessively dangerous and that airmobile raids with carefully chosen LZs and the guns in support were the best use of airmobile assets...

He also said they'd be used for log support and overflying significantly dangerous terrain or routes subject to heavy attack -- and he pushed for more heavy birds (Chinooks) versus the lighter ones (UH1 / UH60). Unfortunately, he lost that one but the Marines listened and thus are replacing their Phrogs with Ospreys and the 53E with the K model...

[Pete]

Thanks Steve. Perhaps "Aviation doctrine and tactics" were the words I should have used.

Edit:
Ken, I'm glad you weren't offended. For a moment there I thought you might have something against people who live in West Virginia!

[82redleg]

In preparation for "WW3 (TM)" in Europe, Aviation (specifically, attack aviation) convinced the Army that they were a maneuver branch, vice a fire support element (witness the use of the Aerial Rocket Artillery Battalion in the Vietnam-era Air Cavalry Division, vice the normal GS 155/8in composite BN). I think that Karbala finally showed the fallacy of this, and since then, attack aviation has generally been employed as a fire support asset (witness TankerSteve, and the increased emphasis on CCA).

As a fire supporter, this is a good thing, IMHO. It emphasizes the necesity of integrating the aviation plan into the ground plan, which sometimes falls by the wayside when you treat your aviation as a separate maneuver element.

[Ken White]

That move, IMO, was as bad as making SF a branch. Both fields originally were effectively branch immaterial and Officers from all branches got to fly and do SF things -- they then rotated back to the 'Big Army" and spread their wealth and knowledge and the two specialties reaped the benefit of a far larger pool of incoming folks which forestalled a lot of bureaucracy and inbreeding. It was beneficial for everyone. The Warrants in both branches (SF later) and the NCOs provided continuity and the system worked quite well. This from a guy who actually wore Branch Unassigned brass and had no beret even if he did have an 'S' suffix on his MOS in the days prior to the 18 series...

However, it was a pain to the Per community who cheerfully supported separate branches to lighten their workload -- great Guys, they're always giving...

The few to many (it varied from time to time dependent upon the attitude of the Army leadership to the specialty in question) malcontents who argued for pure Branch status with the expectation that 'everything will be better, we'll be richer, we can write our own doctrine and we can control our own destiny...' have found out that it may be better in some respects but it's worse in others -- and it isn't much more wealth-showering, their doctrine is still shackled and they do not control their own destiny.

The Army, Aviation and SF all lost a bit...

Pete: How can anyone who reveres T.J. Jackson as one of his major Gods have anything against West by God... *

( * aka Byrdland )