Roadside Bombs & IEDs (catch all)

[Danny]

I appreciate Lt. Col. Gentile's article. I also appreciate Rob's elucidation of the thoughts behind it and of his own. Allow me to weigh in.

I think Iraq is more complex than to call it a civil war, and leave it at that. There are aspects of that, indeed, just as there are aspects of Islamic jihad, and aspects of inteference by Iranian and Syrian elements (regional conflict), sectarian strife, indigenous insurgency, terrorism, etc. It is a complex affair. I believe these things not simply because of what I read in the MSM or even blogs written from the front. I have also extensively talked with Marines who have recently returned.

Rob and Jedburgh are right. I count myself as a conservative, but this administration failed us in too many ways to count. Rumsfeld's idea of fighting a war in Afghanistan with a few special forces operators, satellite uplinks for airmen as they guided bombs in on target, and indigenous fighters has been a failure. We needed force projection, and we got gizmos. He and Wolfowitz bullied Shinseki out of a job, and we got Iraq on the cheap. We needed force projection, we got gizmos.

The intelligence was poor. I was never impressed with the whole WMD argument (chemical weapons aren't as effective as conventional ordnance), and was in fact opposed to the whole idea of OIF to begin with, excepting the possibility of the nuclear option (which again, was poor intelligence). But I am in that category who believes that once started, losing is the worst of options (unless we intend to lose it - discussed below). Michael Ledeen and Victor Davis Hanson, both of whom have been incorrectly criticized over this forum, are also in that same category. Neither one supported the idea to begin with, but once started, found no option except success to be acceptable.

If my view is correct, many tens of thousands of foreign fighters who would have otherwise fought us elsewhere (Afghanistan, or even U.S. soil) have died in Iraq. My son has killed some of them. The unintended consequences of OIF is that it has become a killing field for al Qaeda, Ansar al Sunna, and other anti-American fighters. This is positive, along with the possibility that if we take the region seriously, Iran might be couched between what can become two stable states with U.S. presence as a deterent for their aspirations.

As to IEDs, I see the problem as tactical and local, but not simply as local. Rumsfeld's bold new vision for the region and our naive belief in the healing powers of democracy caused us to ignore the advice from Israel who had already encounted the IED and created V-Hull technology. Hence, we were surprised on a tactical level when, upon stupidly running an AAV down a desert road in Iraq with 14 recon Marines, it exploded into a pile of rubble and twisted metal in August of 2005, losing every Marine aboard.

http://www.cnn.com/interactive/us/05...t.exclude.html

We could have done better, and our leadership is to blame. And it IS THAT SIMPLE. I have advocated dismounted patrols as better for COIN at my little blog, but in the end, Lt. Col. Gentile is right. IEDs are here to stay, and will become part of the landscape into the future.

My own view is that we have made advances, but there are more necessary before we can call this finished. The JAM must be taken on and finished, and Syria and Iran must be dealt with. If Syria and Iran are dealt with (and I am not talking about talky-talk and "negotiations" with them), my opinion is that this will get a WHOLE . HELL . OF . A . LOT . EASIER.

If we are not goint to take all of this seriously, if we are engaged in order to keep this from appearing as a loss, or if things start to deteriorate towards a high level civil war where we refuse to take on Sadr and the Badr forces directly, then it is time to withdraw.

I think that the frustration with a large portion of the public has more to do with the lack of will to win than it does anything else. I see the public every day, I work with them, I talk with them, unlike many in the professional military. Releasing Sadr, supporting a regime in Iraq (Maliki) which is secretive and completely inept (and beholden to Sadr, Sistani and Iran), the refusal to take on the JAM, and all of the things that lead to the continuing violence, contribute to the perception that we are simply there being blown up, in the middle of a fight we didn't start and cannot control.

Not that anyone in a position of authority listens to me, but I don't want my son to go for a second combat tour under these conditions. If we continue to argue for more troops in Europe and continue to deploy forces along the DMZ to allow South Korea to pursue its childish "sunshine diplomacy" while troops in Iraq are doing 15 month deployments, and ignore the EFP factories in Iran while Carriers with aircraft and ordnance sit in the Persian Gulf unused, then bring all of our boys home, and immediately.

Yes, IEDs are effective, and cause the public to see the campaign in a negative light. But who is to blame for this, when we ignore the counsel of Israel years back on V-Hull vehicles, we won't shut down the factories in Iran, we allow Sadr to remain unmolested, and troops train with German and South Korean forces rather than Iraqi forces?

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/...egic-thinking/

Point? The failure is at the HIGHEST LEVELS OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP, and always have been.

[Ken White]

I appreciate Lt. Col. Gentile's article. I also appreciate Rob's elucidation of the thoughts behind it and of his own. Allow me to weigh in.

At the risk of getting even further off thread, while I disagree with you on several points, most of them like Afghanistan and the admittedly inexcusable treatment of Shinseki are not at all germane to this thread. Let me address one factor you emphasize that is slightly less off thread.

"Point? The failure is at the HIGHEST LEVELS OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP, and always have been.

That is, IMO generally correct. I suggest there have also been failures at intermediate levels as well. However, those at lower levels have several reasons that led to many of their failures (they also recovered far more rapidly). You cited one, very poor intelligence at the national level and both Langley and Bolling are to blame. Another is that which Rob mentioned, a failure prior to commitment to address the potential battlefield and problems realistically. The latter is indeed directly attributable to poor performance by the senior leadership. So is the possible greater failing by earlier senior leaders -- poor training.

Let me provide some boring background. The US army was sent to Viet Nam. For seven long years under the command of Paul Harkins and William Westmoreland, the Army tried to fight a land war in Europe. Those two commanders had such a war as their formative war and they tried unsuccessfully to emulate it. Fortunately, another WW II in Europe graduate was smarter and Creighton Abrams turned Viet Nam around. Too late; the politicians, more concerned about their reelection than the nation pulled the plug. Many of today's politicians would cheerfully do the same thing for the same reason -- reelection over national aims -- they do not need to be encouraged

Contrary to much common wisdom, the politicians were not the cause of the loss in Viet Nam (other than in their hubris and failure to understand what they were doing prior to commitment) -- nor were the Media (who like to credit themselves with that...). The Army blew it. The politicians do what they will always do, take the easy way out. The Media do what they will always do, credit themselves with far more clout than they really have.

The point of all that -- the Army allowed the pols and the media to share the blame and set themselves to the task of rebuilding the army to fight a land war in Europe. They did that in spite of all evidence that such a war was unlikely. Thus, the Army got to skate because their failings were obscured.

That's important because some will try do the same thing again if they can. You correctly point out that the senior leadership failed. What you do not point out is that the mid level leadership compensated and pulled us back from the so-called brink. What you do not point out is that most -- not all (and that is important and germane to this point and the entire thread) of the senior leadership has done a course correction and is trying to repair the damaged legacy their predecessors bequeathed. That is unfair on your part.

No question the flaws in intelligence and leadership need to be cited so that those errors are corrected. We failed to learn the lessons of Viet Nam -- we better not fail to learn the lessons of this one because it's far more important. There should also be no question that stating the problems as knowledgeably, accurately, concisely and fairly as possible is important.

Back to the thread. You say:

"Not that anyone in a position of authority listens to me, but I don't want my son to go for a second combat tour under these conditions. If we continue to argue for more troops in Europe and continue to deploy forces along the DMZ to allow South Korea to pursue its childish "sunshine diplomacy" while troops in Iraq are doing 15 month deployments, and ignore the EFP factories in Iran while Carriers with aircraft and ordnance sit in the Persian Gulf unused, then bring all of our boys home, and immediately."

To use your term, I am not "professional military" though I once was; I've been a civilian, disregarding my first 17 years, since 1977, thirty years and I too interface with civilians from all walks of life on a daily basis. Like you, I have a serving son though mine has three tours and is more than ready (not eager, but ready) to go back again and again if necessary.

Unlike Gian and unlike you, that son and I are quite convinced that the all sentiments you express in that last quote I provided and in particular the "...bring our boys home, and immediately" sound bite is badly misguided. It's in the interest of the serving and it's in the interest of the institution(s) which will try to protect itself (or themselves) at any cost -- it is not in the national interest. That trumps.

As an aside, I'm over 75, so a lot of people are boys to me -- the men and women in Iraq and all over the world in the Armed forces are not.

[Schmedlap]

There is another way to stop IEDs - used successfully in OIF III: make the cost of emplacing them prohibitively high. I'll err on the side of OPSEC and omit the city and nitty-gritty details, but the basic gist of it is that we flooded the city with small teams whose sole purpose in life was to observe, report, and kill anyone emplacing an IED. The going rate for digging in an IED went from $25 to over $500 because the imminent threat of death resulting from IED emplacement become so apparent to the populace. Now, this is not a strategy to defeat our enemies, but it was an approach that stopped IEDs and enabled us to get the IA and IP into the city with their unarmored vehicles with a greatly diminished threat of them incurring mass casualties.

Also, I take issue with one assertion in the article:

"But it seems clear that the necessary condition that has lowered IED attacks was a political agreement between the tribal sheikhs in Anbar and the Americans to stop fighting each other."

I think this is an incorrect assessment of what occurred - or at least a significantly incomplete assessment. The violence in Anbar was much more than simply US forces fighting against Anbar tribes. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other terrorist groups were killing US troops and intimidating the Anbar tribes. The necessary condition was not for the US forces and Anbar tribes to stop fighting one another. The necessary condition was to convince the Anbar tribes to drive al-Qaeda in Iraq out of the province.

[Danny]

Ken, the sound bite you cited is just that in the way you cited it. It needs context to understand it. It's context is the question whether we are committed to supplying the resources to do the job right. Without context, it is a mischaracterization and mere (to use your words) "sound bite."

I am certain that your position isn't that "regardless of whether we are nationally committed to the mission let's leave our forces deployed." This would be an irrational position to take.

I am supposing that you are arguing simply for garnering the national commitment for doing it right. That said, it isn't clear how you would intend to do this since you don't say.

Finally, my somewhat rambling prose is related to the subject in that IEDs must be seen in the larger context of the commitments we have across the globe. With a different strategy from the beginning, listening to the Israelis who had already dealt with IEDs, and force projection, the IED problem would not have been what it is today and has been for four years.

Point? I am blaming the magnitude of the problem on senior leadership.

[Rob Thornton]

it allows us to consider how IEDs (and other like conditions) effect all 3 levels of war. It also allows us to consider that the enemy must also overcome chaos and friction, often suffering directly and indirectly from actions occurring elsewhere as well as creating conditions which afford us opportunities provided we can recognize their significance and capitalize on them. This is not to say that this was a coordinated effort where task and purpose nested nicely with operational objectives and strategic ends - few planned things ever work out so well because the future is unpredictable and the attraction of linearizing things after they happen is strong; however the effort to make the linkages and take full advantage of them should not be understated - it is the art of recognizing potential, arranging resources and exploiting possibilities. It provides a model that military CDRs and planners along with policy makers and their advisers should consider when contemplating complex problems.

There is another way to stop IEDs - used successfully in OIF III: make the cost of emplacing them prohibitively high. I'll err on the side of OPSEC and omit the city and nitty-gritty details, but the basic gist of it is that we flooded the city with small teams whose sole purpose in life was to observe, report, and kill anyone emplacing an IED.

Overwatches/Ambushes along with patrolling and a QRF built on an understanding of the enemy through good reporting, debriefs and small unit AARs are good tactics - the enemy is more vulnerable here and for him to have an effect he must come to where he will find his enemy. This hits the enemy at the tactical level, but can also disrupt his operational goals - an example would be his attempting to increase OPTEMPO in an outlying city in order to get us to shift forces out of the capital or to try and operationally fix forces required in the capital.

The going rate for digging in an IED went from $25 to over $500 because the imminent threat of death resulting from IED emplacement become so apparent to the populace.

Depending on the flexibility of funding ascribed to a group or cell - raising the price of IED emplacement or the activity which supports it (dropping of supplies, recon, digging a hole, etc.) drains operational funds which might go to other activities such as material procurement, paying of government officials and informants, recruiting new members, training, movement, housing and food, etc. If this is a small group it may force them into criminal activity or some other activity which de-legitmizes them, slows their OPTEMPO, causes cell friction, or causes them to get sloppy and killed for example. If it is a part of a larger group it may drain funds from elsewhere disrupting those operations, force communications which allow us to understand and target them, and sew discord which exacerbates existing problems. Combined with other Lines of Effort which offer choices to those who supported IED networks - could be becoming an informant, could be a new line of work - the cost/value equation takes on a new perspective. For the politically committed this may be something to be waited out, but their network requires a certain amount of environmental facilitation - as that dries up, its harder for them to operate.

Now, this is not a strategy to defeat our enemies, but it was an approach that stopped IEDs and enabled us to get the IA and IP into the city with their unarmored vehicles with a greatly diminished threat of them incurring mass casualties.

Enabling the Host Nation security forces to operate in an environment where the enemy has been deprived of a tactic and weapon which afforded him an advantage has multiple benefits - it increases the amount of forces available to secure the populace and deny the enemy physical and moral freedom of movement, maximizes the natural advantages obtained by being a security force that is representative of the culture it operates in, and its often the first physical representation of the government which can lead to establishing legitimacy. Once the HN SecFor has established itself, US/CF assets/resources/units can be redistributed or redeployed -This is an exponential increase - and is a solid linkage to the operational and strategic levels of war through tactical operations.

The necessary condition was not for the US forces and Anbar tribes to stop fighting one another. The necessary condition was to convince the Anbar tribes to drive al-Qaeda in Iraq out of the province.

This is changing the nature of the political objectives/conversation by some of the belligerents through recognition of shift in conditions. In the captured letter between AQ leadership and AQIZ leadership great concern was expressed about the wanton carnage and tactics employed by AQIZ against Iraqis - it was recognized by AQ as jeopardizing the political objectives they were after - in fact the letter recommended that AQ expend more effort in its political operations then its military ones. There have been documented horrors as well as violations of familial and tribal honors which may have occurred partly as a result of impatience, frustration and stresses as AQIZ's vision of the battlefield failed to be realized - partly through tactical and operation successes by US, CF and ISF - which were partly enabled through freedom of movement - which means mitigating the effects of IEDs along MSRs and ASRs. This probably had some effect on how the Anbar Sheiks viewed the evolution of their political objectives from one where they were more aligned with the interests of AQIZ, to one where they were more aligned with us (and the HN).

All of these things combined create and compound operational problems for insurgents that flow in both directions, gain momentum at various points and can create new opportunities for us and the HN to be exploited.

Danger - this is not to say that the lines are clearly drawn - I don't think we can do that given the infinite variables that may have been introduced - but I do believe them related enough to use for considering the complex social conditions that occur in war and which IEDs represent.

Even though events unfolded as they did, there was no guarantee that they would -its more like we assembled the various pieces with some common frame of reference (and we're not done yet) - so policies which might create the conditions cannot guarantee the desired outcome - just because we'd like to imagine it as a linear series of events between the start point and the end point - doesn't make it that way (its more akin to guessing how the cards will land and which cards are under the others in 52 pick up then lining up dominoes). What we can do I think to maximize our chances of coming relatively close to the desired strategic outcome is attune ourselves to changes and opportunities and have the resources available to make the most of them while remaining flexible and adaptive at the tactical and operational levels.

We are not done in Iraq, not done in Afghanistan and the odds are that in some places they are designing and/or cranking out and caching Insurgent capabilities such IEDs that are far better then the ones we've seen so far, and training cadre and training documents that allow them to mix types of warfare and transition from different types of operations and retain the initiative. These UW capabilities will probably not be used solely for Internal defense but as in the past, used to foment insurgency, terrify and destabilize, possibly combined and coordinated with conventional GPF to achieve broader regional political objectives.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

Ken, the sound bite you cited is just that in the way you cited it. It needs context to understand it. It's context is the question whether we are committed to supplying the resources to do the job right. Without context, it is a mischaracterization and mere (to use your words) "sound bite."

That may be the question but I don't think you posed it in your first comment on this thread. Thus, lacking that context, you reaped. I'd also submit that whether we are committed to supplying the resources to do the job right is possibly not a good question. Within reason, all the services have for several years gotten pretty much what they asked for. Thus if the resources are not right, the requests from the field weren't right. Perhaps a better question is 'are we as a nation adequately committed to doing this job.' I suspect the answer to that question is very much perspective dependent and I suggest there is no correct answer.

I am certain that your position isn't that "regardless of whether we are nationally committed to the mission let's leave our forces deployed." This would be an irrational position to take.

I believe the current Administration and the bulk of those who might form the next administration are in fact committed to the mission; thus the nation is both de facto and de jure committed to the mission. I realize there are those in the adminsitration, in Congress, in the Armed Forces and across the nation who wish to not be committed to the mission but my guess is they will not have their wish granted because that would be inimical to the national interest and most people realize that. The politics of the issue are more appropriate elsewhere. This is a practices and methods, not a political board.

I am supposing that you are arguing simply for garnering the national commitment for doing it right. That said, it isn't clear how you would intend to do this since you don't say.

That would be the second incorrect supposition on your part. No 'national commitment' is required, merely the government's intention to continue the mission. I'll note that having been around since the very early '30s, I have yet to see a war in which we have been engaged that had a true 'national commitment.' WW II came very close but even it required a degree of State single-mindedness and coercion that has not existed since and is unlikely to lacking a war of national survival. Each subsequent war has had decidedly less -- and increasingly less -- 'national commitment.' That has generally been political and not necessarily practical.

Finally, my somewhat rambling prose is related to the subject in that IEDs must be seen in the larger context of the commitments we have across the globe. With a different strategy from the beginning, listening to the Israelis who had already dealt with IEDs, and force projection, the IED problem would not have been what it is today and has been for four years.

Being vaguely aware of those global commitments I believe I can see the broader context, certainly glimmers of it...

You say with a different strategy the IED problem would not be what it is. That means we would not be in Iraq as that is the only relevant strategic decision. Obviously true.

If you perhaps meant a different thrust operationally, that's possible. if you meant with different tactics, it is also possible. Note the latter two levels only provide a possibility of a lesser problem.

I believe that listening to the Israelis early on (late '03 and '04) at the behest of the then DepSecDef was done at some length. Doesn't seem to have helped much. You do know, I suppose, that the 'V' hull technology is South African, that we had been aware of it for years before the Israelis found out Hezbollah was just as smart as they were?

I'll also note that the US Army has dealt with IEDs for many years; from the Schu mines and off-route Panzerfausts of WW II and Korea through 105 and 155 shells and 500 and even 1,000 pound bombs buried in Viet Nam all cunningly emplaced and detonated by various means. They even did a few EFPs, a technique that also dates from WW II. We know how to deal with many things -- we just let egos get in the way and refuse to use our experience and apply lessons we learned with difficulty and unnecessary casualties. It's the American way.

Point? I am blaming the magnitude of the problem on senior leadership.

Magnitude of what problem? IEDs? If so, by magnitude do you mean the size, capability or quantity?

[nichols]

Part 1

This is a classic look at my right hand while I hit you with my left. This war isn't about a civil war in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon or any other country. It is a clash between two different cultures. IEDs have been the method of employment for centuries. Historically we have tried isolationism multiple times, every time we have paid dearly for our Fortress America, Monroe Doctrine attitude. Let's do a quick look at what we have been dealing with from 1970 until 9/11:

S/A, this info is from the Jewish Virtual Library, politically driven but facts are facts.

February 23, 1970, Halhoul, West Bank. PLO fires on a busload of pilgrims killing one and wounding two Americans.

March 28-29, 1970, Beirut, Lebanon. The PFLP fired seven rockets at the U.S. Embassy.

September 14, 1970, The PFLP hijacked a TWA flight from Zurich, four Americans were injured.

May 30, 1972, Ben Gurion Airport, Israel. Three members of the Japanese Red Army, acting on the PFLP's bbehalf, carried out a machine-gun and grenade attack at Israel's main airport, killing 26 and wounding 78 people. Many of the casualties were American citizens, mostly from Puerto Rico.

September 5, 1972, Munich, Germany. During the Olympic Games in Munich, Black September, a front for Fatah, took hostage 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team. Nine athletes were killed including weightlifter David Berger, an American-Israeli from Cleveland, Ohio.

March 2, 1973, Khartoum, Sudan. Cleo A. Noel, Jr., U.S. ambassador to Sudan, and George C. Moore, also a U.S. diplomat, were held hostage and then killed by terrorists at the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum. It seems likely that Fatah was responsible for the attack.

September 8, 1974, Athens, Greece. TWA Flight 841, flying from Tel Aviv to New York, made a scheduled stop in Athens. Shortly after takeoff, it crashed into the Ionian Sea and all 88 passengers were killed.

June 29, 1975, Beirut, Lebanon. The PFLP kidnapped the U.S. military attaché to Lebanon, Ernest Morgan, and demanded food, clothing and building materials for indigent residents living near Beirut harbor. The American diplomat was released after an anonymous benefactor provided food to the neighborhood.

November 14, 1975, Jerusalem, Israel. Lola Nunberg, 53, of New York, was injured during a bombing attack in downtown Jerusalem. Fatah claimed responsibility for the bombing, which killed six people and wounded 38.

November 21, 1975, Ramat Hamagshimim, Israel. Michael Nadler, an American-Israeli from Miami Beach, Florida, was killed when axe-wielding terrorists from the Democrat Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a PLO faction, attacked students in the Golan Heights.

August 11, 1976, Istanbul, Turkey. The PFLP launched an attack on the terminal of Israel's major airline, El Al, at the Istanbul airport. Four civilians, including Harold Rosenthal of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were killed and 20 injured.

January 1, 1977, Beirut, Lebanon. Frances E. Meloy, U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, and Robert O.Waring, the U.S. economic counselor, were kidnapped by PFLP members as they crossed a militia checkpoint separating the Christian from the Muslim parts of Beirut. They were later shot to death.

March 11, 1978, Tel Aviv, Israel. Gail Rubin, niece of U.S. Senator Abraham Ribicoff, was among 38 people shot to death by PLO terrorists on an Israeli beach.

June 2, 1978, Jerusalem, Israel. Richard Fishman, a medical student from Maryland, was among six killed in a PLO bus bombing in Jerusalem. Chava Sprecher, another American citizen from Seattle, Washington, was injured.

May 4, 1979, Tiberias, Israel. Haim Mark and his wife, Haya, of New Haven, Connecticut were injured in a PLO bombing attack in northern Israel.

November 4, 1979, Teheran, Iran. After President Carter agreed to admit the Shah of Iran into the U.S., Iranian radicals seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 66 American diplomats hostage. Thirteen hostages were soon freed, but the remaining 53 were held until their release on January 20, 1981.

May 2, 1980, Hebron, West Bank. Eli Haze'ev, an American-Israeli from Alexandria, Virginia, was killed in a PLO attack on Jewish worshippers walking home from a synagogue in Hebron.

July 19, 1982, Beirut, Lebanon. Hizballah members kidnapped David Dodge, acting president of the American University in Beirut. After a year in captivity, Dodge was released. Rifat Assad, head of Syrian Intelligence, helped in the negotiation with the terrorists.

August 19, 1982, Paris, France. Two American citizens, Anne Van Zanten and Grace Cutler, were killed when the PLO bombed a Jewish restaurant in Paris.

March 16, 1983, Beirut, Lebanon. Five American Marines were wounded in a hand grenade attack while on patrol north of Beirut International Airport. The Islamic Jihad and Al-Amal, a Shi'ite militia, claimed responsibility for the attack.

April 18, 1983, Beirut, Lebanon. A truck-bomb detonated by a remote control exploded in front of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 employees, including the CIA's Middle East director, and wounding 120. Hizballah, with financial backing from Iran, was responsible for the attack.

July 1, 1983, Hebron, Israel. Aharon Gross, 19, an American-Israeli from New York, was stabbed to death by PLO terrorists in the Hebron marketplace.

September 29, 1983, Beirut, Lebanon. Two American marines were kidnapped by Amal members. They were released after intervention by a Lebanese army officer.

October 23, 1983, Beirut, Lebanon. A truck loaded with a bomb crashed into the lobby of the U.S. Marines headquarters in Beirut, killing 241 soldiers and wounding 81. The attack was carried out by Hizballah with the help of Syrian intelligence and financed by Iran.

December 19, 1983, Jerusalem, Israel. Serena Sussman, a 60-year-old tourist from Anderson, South Carolina, died from injuries from the PLO bombing of a bus in Jerusalem 13 days earlier.

January 18, 1984, Beirut, Lebanon. Malcolm Kerr, a Lebanese born American who was president of the American University of Beirut, was killed by two gunmen outside his office. Hizballah said the assassination was part of the organization's plan to "drive all Americans out from Lebanon."

March 7, 1984, Beirut, Lebanon. Hizballah members kidnapped Jeremy Levin, Beirut bureau chief of Cable News Network (CNN). Levin managed to escape and reach Syrian army barracks. He was later transferred to American hands.

March 8, 1984, Beirut, Lebanon. Three Hizballah members kidnapped Reverend Benjamin T. Weir, while he was walking with his wife in Beirut's Manara neighborhood. Weir was released after 16 months of captivity with Syrian and Iranian assistance.

March 16, 1984, Beirut, Lebanon. Hizballah kidnapped William Buckley, a political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Buckley was supposed to be exchanged for prisoners. However when the transaction failed to take place, he was reportedly transported to Iran. Although his body was never found, the U.S. administration declared the American diplomat dead.

April 12, 1984, Torrejon, Spain. Hizballah bombed a restaurant near an U.S. Air Force base in Torrejon, Spain, wounding 83 people.

September 20, 1984, Beirut, Lebanon. A suicide bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in East Beirut killed 23 people and injured 21. The American and British ambassadors were slightly injured in the attack, attributed to the Iranian backed Hizballah group.

September 20, 1984, Aukar, Lebanon. Islamic Jihad detonate a van full of explosives 30 feet in front of the U.S. Embassy annex severely damaging the building, killing two U.S. servicemen and seven Lebanese employees, as well as 5 to 15 non-employees. Twenty Americans were injured, including U.S. Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew and visiting British Ambassador David Miers. An estimated 40 to 50 Lebanese were hurt. The attack came in response to the U.S. veto September 6 of a U.N. Security Council resolution.

December 4, 1984, Tehran, Iran. Hizballah terrorists hijacked a Kuwait Airlines plane en route from Dubai, United Emirates, to Karachi, Pakistan. They demanded the release from Kuwaiti jails of members of Da'Wa, a group of Shiite extremists serving sentences for attacks on French and American targets on Kuwaiti territory. The terrorists forced the pilot to fly to Tehran where the terrorists murdered two passengers--American Agency for International Development employees, Charles Hegna and William Stanford. Although an Iranian special unit ended the incident by storming the plane and arresting the terrorists, the Iranian government might also have been involved in the hijacking.

June 14, 1985, Between Athens and Rome. Two Hizballah members hijacked a TWA flight en route to Rome from Athens and forced the pilot to fly to Beirut. The terrorists, believed to belong to Hizballah, asked for the release of members of the group Kuwait 17 and 700 Shi'ite prisoners held in Israeli and South Lebanese prisons. The eight crewmembers and 145 passengers were held for 17 days during which one of the hostages, Robert Stethem, a U.S. Navy diver, was murdered. After being flown twice to Algiers, the aircraft returned to Beirut and the hostages were released. Later on, four Hizballah members were secretly indicted. One of them, the Hizballah senior officer Imad Mughniyah, was indicted in absentia.

[nichols]

Part 2


October 7, 1985, Between Alexandria, Egypt and Haifa, Israel. A four-member PFLP squad took over the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, as it was sailing from Alexandria, Egypt, to Israel. The squad murdered a disabled U.S. citizen, Leon Klinghoffer, by throwing him in the ocean. The rest of the passengers were held hostage for two days and later released after the terrorists turned themselves in to Egyptian authorities in return for safe passage. But U.S. Navy fighters intercepted the Egyptian aircraft flying the terrorists to Tunis and forced it to land at the NATO airbase in Italy, where the terrorists were arrested. Two of the terrorists were tried in Italy and sentenced to prison. The Italian authorities however let the two others escape on diplomatic passports. Abu Abbas, who masterminded the hijacking, was later convicted to life imprisonment in absentia.

December 27, 1985, Rome, Italy. Four terrorists from Abu Nidal's organization attacked El Al offices at the Leonardo di Vinci Airport in Rome. Thirteen people, including five Americans, were killed and 74 wounded, among them two Americans. The terrorists had come from Damascus and were supported by the Syrian regime.

March 30, 1986, Athens, Greece. A bomb exploded on a TWA flight from Rome as it approached Athens airport. The attack killed four U.S. citizens who were sucked through a hole made by the blast, although the plane safely landed. The bombing was attributed to the Fatah Special Operations Group's intelligence and security apparatus, headed by Abdullah Abd al-Hamid Labib, alias Colonel Hawari.

April 5, 1986, West Berlin, Germany. An explosion at the "La Belle" nightclub in Berlin, frequented by American soldiers, killed three--2 U.S. soldiers and a Turkish woman-and wounded 191 including 41 U.S. soldiers. Given evidence of Libyan involvement, the U.S. Air Force made a retaliatory attack against Libyan targets on April 17. Libya refused to hand over to Germany five suspects believed to be there. Others, however, were tried including Yassir Shraidi and Musbah Eter, arrested in Rome in August 1997 and extradited; and also Ali Chanaa, his wife, Verena Chanaa, and her sister, Andrea Haeusler. Shraidi, accused of masterminding the attack, was sentenced to 14 years in jail. The Libyan diplomat Musbah Eter and Ali Chanaa were both sentenced to 12 years in jail. Verena Chanaa was sentenced to 14 years in prison. Andrea Haeusler was acquitted.

September 5, 1986, Karachi, Pakistan. Abu Nidal members hijacked a Pan Am flight leaving Karachi, Pakistan bound for Frankfurt, Germany and New York with 379 passengers, including 89 Americans. The terrorists forced the plane to land in Larnaca, Cyprus, where they demanded the release of two Palestinians and a Briton jailed for the murder of three Israelis there in 1985. The terrorists killed 22 of the passengers, including two American citizens and wounded many others. They were caught and indicted by a Washington grand jury in 1991.

September 9, 1986, Beirut, Lebanon. Continuing its anti-American attacks, Hizballah kidnapped Frank Reed, director of the American University in Beirut, whom they accused of being "a CIA agent." He was released 44 months later. September 12, 1986, Beirut, Lebanon. Hizballah kidnapped Joseph Cicippio, the acting comptroller at the American University in Beirut. Cicippio was released five years later on December 1991.

October 15, 1986, Jerusalem, Israel. Gali Klein, an American citizen, was killed in a grenade attack by Fatah at the Western Wall in Jerusalem.

October 21, 1986, Beirut, Lebanon. Hizballah kidnapped Edward A. Tracy, an American citizen in Beirut. He was released five years later, on August 1991.

February 17, 1988, Ras-Al-Ein Tyre, Lebanon. Col. William Higgins, the American chief of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, was abducted by Hizballah while driving from Tyre to Nakura. The hostages demanded the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and the release of all Palestinian and Lebanese held prisoners in Israel. The U.S. government refused to answer the request. Hizballah later claimed they killed Higgins.

December 21, 1988, Lockerbie, Scotland. Pan Am Flight 103 departing from Frankfurt to New York was blown up in midair, killing all 259 passengers and another 11 people on the ground in Scotland. Two Libyan agents were found responsible for planting a sophisticated suitcase bomb onboard the plane. On 14 November 1991, arrest warrants were issued for Al-Amin Khalifa Fahima and Abdel Baset Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi. After Libya refused to extradite the suspects to stand trial, the United Nations leveled sanctions against the country in April 1992, including the freezing of Libyan assets abroad. In 1999, Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi agreed to hand over the two suspects, but only if their trial was held in a neutral country and presided over by a Scottish judge. With the help of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah, Al-Megrahi and Fahima were finally extradited and tried in Camp Zeist in the Netherlands. Megrahi was found guilty and jailed for life, while Fahima was acquitted due to a "lack of evidence" of his involvement. After the extradition, UN sanctions against Libya were automatically lifted.

[nichols]

Part 3

January 27, 1989, Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey. Three simultaneous bombings were carried out against U.S. business targets--the Turkish American Businessmen Association and the Economic Development Foundation in Istanbul, and the Metal Employees Union in Ankara. The Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left) was held responsible for the attacks.

March 6, 1989, Cairo, Egypt. Two explosive devices were safely removed from the grounds of the American and British Cultural centers in Cairo. Three organizations were believed to be responsible for the attack: The January 15 organization, which had sent a letter bomb to the Israeli ambassador to London in January; the Egyptian Revolutionary Organization that from out 1984-1986 carried out attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets; and the Nasserite Organization, which had attacked British and American targets in 1988.

June 12, 1989, Bosphorus Straits, Turkey. A bomb exploded aboard an unoccupied boat used by U.S. consular staff. The explosion caused extensive damage but no casualties. An organization previously unknown, the Warriors of the June 16th Movement, claimed responsibility for the attack.

October 11, 1989, Izmir, Turkey. An explosive charge went off outside a U.S. military PX. Dev Sol was held responsible for the attack.

February 7, 1991, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. Dev Sol members shot and killed a U.S. civilian contractor as he was getting into his car at the Incirlik Air Base in Adana, Turkey.

February 28, 1991, Izmir, Turkey. Two Dev Sol gunmen shot and wounded a U.S. Air Force officer as he entered his residence in Izmir.

March 28, 1991, Jubial, Saudi Arabia. Three U.S. marines were shot at and injured by an unknown terrorist while driving near Camp Three, Jubial. No organization claimed responsibility for the attack.

October 28, 1991, Ankara, Turkey. Victor Marwick, an American soldier serving at the Turkish-American base, Tuslog, was killed and his wife wounded in a car bomb attack. The Turkish Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack.

October 28, 1991, Istanbul, Turkey. Two car bombings killed a U.S. Air Force sergeant and severely wounded an Egyptian diplomat in Istanbul. Turkish Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

November 8, 1991, Beirut, Lebanon. A 100-kg car bomb destroyed the administration building of the American University in Beirut, killing one person and wounding at least a dozen.

October 12, 1992, Umm Qasr, Iraq. A U.S. soldier serving with the United Nations was stabbed and wounded near the port of Umm Qasr. No organization claimed responsibility for the attack.

January 25, 1993, Virginia, United States. A Pakistani gunman opened fire on Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees standing outside of the building. Two agents, Frank Darling and Bennett Lansing, were killed and three others wounded. The assailant was never caught and reportedly fled to Pakistan.

February 26, 1993, Cairo, Egypt. A bomb exploded inside a café in downtown Cairo killing three. Among the 18 wounded were two U.S. citizens. No one claimed responsibility for the attack.

February 26, 1993, New York, United States. A massive van bomb exploded in an underground parking garage below the World Trade Center in New York City, killing six and wounding 1,042. Four Islamist activists were responsible for the attack. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the operation's alleged mastermind, escaped but was later arrested in Pakistan and extradited to the United States. Abd al-Hakim Murad, another suspected conspirator, was arrested by local authorities in the Philippines and handed over to the United States. The two, along with two other terrorists, were tried in the U.S. and sentenced to 240 years.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

I believe the current Administration and the bulk of those who might form the next administration are in fact committed to the mission; thus the nation is both de facto and de jure committed to the mission. I realize there are those in the adminsitration, in Congress, in the Armed Forces and across the nation who wish to not be committed to the mission but my guess is they will not have their wish granted because that would be inimical to the national interest and most people realize that. The politics of the issue are more appropriate elsewhere. This is a practices and methods, not a political board.

Ken,

Could you expand on this a little? I am confused to what you're trying to say here? Are you saying the current administration is committed to finding an end to the war by creating a national-level strategy that ensures our troops are given focus and direction, thus doing those things that will bring the conflict in Iraq to an eventual end? If so, could you cite some examples of this strategy and how that is playing out in Iraq? Could you cite some examples of where GEN Patreaus and LTG Odierno have clearly articulated the "road to victory"?

Thanks, PT

[Ken White]

Ken,
Could you expand on this a little? I am confused to what you're trying to say here?...

Well, very little. (but I can state that little at great length ). It sort of says it all. I think perhaps you're trying to read things into the statement. Sorry for the confusion.

...Are you saying the current administration is committed to finding an end to the war by creating a national-level strategy that ensures our troops are given focus and direction, thus doing those things that will bring the conflict in Iraq to an eventual end?...

No. Tackling those thoughts in reverse order; there is little we can do to bring the conflict in Iraq to an eventual end. Such end will be mostly up to the Iraqis and to a lesser extent up to us and in varying still lesser amounts (and in no particular order) to the Turks, the Syrians, the Saudis, the Iranians and various Islamist factions. All have a vote of varying clout. Giving the troops focus and direction in Iraq is not a strategic issue, it is an operational issue and thus the province of DoD and the Armed Forces.

I believe this Administration has committed to a strategy wherein the "end" of war in Iraq is only one part of an extensive global strategy that envisions a lengthy worldwide effort to reduce the threat of international terrorism to an acceptable level; Iraq thus is only one of many ongoing efforts -- it is merely the most visible. I further believe this Administration has done that in such a way as to preclude successors from easily disabling or diverting that strategy and I also believe that this strategy in in the national interest. I could quibble about a lot of the techniques and the direction of some efforts but it doesn't have to be my way to work...

If so, could you cite some examples of this strategy and how that is playing out in Iraq?...

The strategy IMO (obviously I have no clue to the content of discussions or to the decisions, just my inferences from open sources) is what put us in Iraq and it broad based, flexible and, with respect to Iraq in particular, is aimed at accelerating to emergence of the ME into the world mainstream among other things. That strategy generally does not dictate operational or tactical methodology but relies on the government agencies (to include DoD, the Intel Community, Treasury and others) to develop and employ proper and effective methods to conduct rather broad based missions world wide (and that is important). That is, also IMO, as it should be.

What is "playing out" in Iraq are the operational decisions of those agencies with respect to that particular operation as a part of that strategy. Properly, the Administration is not dictating operational parameters but is relying on the Agencies to do it right.

I think thus far in Iraq we have seen three distinct phases that have changed the character of our efforts. The first phase lasted about 18 months and was characterized by excessive concern with force protection and a great lack of knowledge of what to do and how to do it. In essence, the operators did not do it right and thus, they did not aid the overall strategy but instead introduced an inadvertent wrinkle.

The next 18 months or so consisted of a learning phase and a realization of the need (if not well executed efforts) to install a viable government and develop Iraqi internal defense capability. The most recent 18 months or so have seen a pretty good refinement of that and implementation of more effective tactic and techniques. Things there are going fairly well as nearly as I can determine. We'll see.

... Could you cite some examples of where GEN Patreaus and LTG Odierno have clearly articulated the "road to victory"?

Thanks, PT

No, I pay little to no attention to what the Generals (all of them, now and then, here and there) or politicians say. IMO, one can put little stock in the words of either and what they say is pretty predictable. I have, however, closely watched what they do. I do not think there is any such thing as a "road to victory" in Iraq and after our initial missteps in the spring of 2003, there never was...

I have complained here that the use of words like "win," "lose," "defeat" and "victory" in relation to any counterinsurgency effort is a terrible idea. "Shock and awe" was one of the most stupid phrases ever applied anywhere in any war. Words are important and the wrong words can send a message of unachievable goals or results and can build false expectations in all the actors -- and observers -- involved.

One cannot "win" a counterinsurgency war unless one kills all the insurgents and that obviously is not an option. The best one can do is achieve an acceptable outcome. That's the best anyone has achieved in the post WW II era (to include the Brits in Malaya and East Africa). My belief is that is probable in Iraq and fairly soon.

Having said all that, recall my original comment you quoted, "I believe the current Administration and the bulk of those who might form the next administration are in fact committed to the mission; thus the nation is both de facto and de jure committed to the mission. I realize there are those in the administration, in Congress, in the Armed Forces and across the nation who wish to not be committed to the mission but my guess is they will not have their wish granted because that would be inimical to the national interest and most people realize that...."

That simply meant that I think most people -- not all -- realize that precipitous withdrawal from Iraq would confirm what the opposition has long said in many of their tapes and videos they've released; confirmation of the fact that the US is the proverbial toothless tiger, has no staying power and is totally untrustworthy. It would also lend credence to their claim that we are assaulting Islam and have no altruistic motive and would almost certainly adversely impact other equally important elements of the strategy. In the very pragmatic ME, inability to perform leads to rejection in all aspects.

Most Americans realize on a visceral level that such a message is not wise and not in our national interest. I think that is a correct sensing on the part of most Americans.

[goesh]

I'm reminded of the movie the "Horse Whisperer" starring Robert Redford in which he demonstrates the unique ability to salvage a damaged horse so it can become a beloved family member again and ridden once more. We can't embrace the nightware of what we are doing nor can we make it go away nor will learn from it nor can we separate the personal from the collective, the subjective from the objective. Mr. Gentile brings to bear the pain of a Commander and the anguish of presenting dead sons to their parents, a pawn caught up in the higher powers of economics and politics. We have no war whisperer and never have had one. Copper replaced flint, bronze over copper, iron over bronze, the long bow the pike, the rimfire over cap and ball, the machine gun over the bolt action. We have gone from the sling to the JDAM in a blink of the evolutionary eye and real-time, high technology makes us only more painfully aware of our inability to stop killing, nothing more. It offers no solution, it offers no alternative, only saltation which the collective psyche that is filled with so much love cannot keep abreast of. We are left with the only consolation we have ever had, what is best for the tribe, and that mandates we stand our ground in Iraq. The walking wounded have no choice but to return to the lines and bunkers and streets and attempt to save what lives they can on both sides and gain a spate of peace before the next one starts up. As an old coot who's had his war, it is extremely rare to encounter combat Vets who say they wouldn't be in Iraq if they were young enough to do so.

[Rob Thornton]

I saw some photos today of the MRAP series - its allot bigger then I thought it'd be - I think there is a photo of one being unwrapped to go to a unit responsible for running logistics on the MNF-I site. I originally hoped they'd just get RG-31s, or something of about the same size- the RG is not too much bigger then an 1151 - sits a little higher given its hull design, but its fairly narrow. The MRAPs I saw photos of today might work well on MSRs that are large, wide, stronger and free in power wires, accommodate a large turning radius, etc., but I'm not sure how much mobility they will have in some of the side streets, neighborhoods, and places where the infrastructure cannot accommodate something as big as a COUGAR or BUFFALO.

My concern now having seen at least a few photos of what we went with is that in the interest of maximum force protection, we've compromised mobility to a point where our hardware will at least in part limit our preferred tactics. I hope this is not the case, but its hard to say without climbing in one and driving it around in the environment - this may be one of those cases where we've over-engineered something to the point where its utility is very limited without testing it in the environment it will be used in - not EOD doing route clearance, but IN & AR (and MPs, and TTs, etc.) units doing urban mounted and dismounted patrols inside neighborhoods of cities and remote towns. There are always going to be trades in speed, mobility, protection and firepower when designing vehicles, but I hope this is not a case where we have over-emphasized one at the expense of the others - especially not when there was a good example of what right looked like in the RG.

If the initial buy of the big ones were to go to CSS and some CS units, that might not be too bad - but those units doing patrols might benefit from technology that suited the tactics they prefer to use in the places they need to go - otherwise we might be better off with 1151s/1114s.

It may well be that I just saw one of several variants to which at least one I did not see suits the requirements for the tactics we want to employ - I hope that is true.

Best, Rob

Here is a photo of an RG