Roadside Bombs & IEDs (catch all)

[SWJED]

Moderator's Note

Thread closed as there is new, main thread 'IEDs: the home-made bombs that changed modern war': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=16303

Associated Press: Bombs in Iraq Getting More Sophisticated. Excerpt follows:

"U.S. and British troops are being killed in Iraq by increasingly sophisticated insurgent bombs, including a new type triggered when a vehicle crosses an infrared beam and is blasted by armor-piercing projectiles."

"The technology, which emerged during guerrilla wars in Lebanon and Northern Ireland, has been used in recent roadside bombings that have killed dozens of Americans and at least eight British soldiers."

[Jedburgh]

We've seen a spate of articles this year about the "newness" and "sophistication" of certain classes of IEDs in Iraq, along with the continual frustrated opining about external sources of expertise in their construction.

Too many people who should really know better seem to have forgotten that Saddam's Mukhabarat and others in the former regime had plenty of training and experience with explosives and IEDs. This ain't something new, and they don't need external assistance or imported trainers to execute.

Back in the early '90s working up in Northern Iraq, I regularly saw examples of simple to sophisticated IEDs built into radios, hairdryers, cigarette cartons, etc. ad nauseum, and infiltrated into the Kurdish region by the Mukhabarat in a targeted destabilization effort. My first personal experience with a VBIED was a non-suicide device that initiated in the money-changers market in Zakho, Iraq in Feb 95. Over 100 killed and a similar number wounded. Of course, those incidents weren't happening on the scale of what is occurring now, but it gives a clear historical perspective on their use by the bad guys. The IED didn't suddenly appear as a weapon in Iraq after our invasion - Saddam's intel and security services had used and studied the potential of improvised explosive devices for a long time.

As regards the articles that have been appearing in the press for the past several months regarding the "newness" of IEDs capable of taking out armor - it just ain't true. Neither are IR triggers a "new" innovation. There was an increased use of improvised launchers for HEAT rounds, as well as crude platter and shaped charges specifically targeting armored vehicles well over a year ago. The threat continues to evolve naturally, as evidenced by new methods - and swapping back to older methods - of targeting and initiation in response to our countermeasures. It's a deadly learning curve for both sides. They may be getting better at their targeting, but they've had the basic elements of building IEDs capable of penetrating armor for quite a while.

[Tom Odom]

Agree that IEDs are not new. I lost one friend and had another severley wounded in southern Lebanon in early 1988. Car bombs, roadside bombs, remote fired RPGs etc were all in the tool kit for the factional fighting there.

What I particularly like about your comments above was the point that old TTPs remain in the tool kit. New TTPs do not mean emptying the toolkit. But that is a hard lesson that many have to learn the hard way.

Reference your screen name, a close friend of mine Dr. SJ Lewis, and I were roomies for a couple of years in the mid-80s. Sam was working on a special study on the Jedburgs and a number of them (I should say a handful given their life expectancy as Jedburgs and their ages by the mid-80s) came by for interviews and chat. Let's just say they had large cojones.

Sam's study is at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resour...ewis/Lewis.asp if you have not seen it.

Best,
Tom

[Jedburgh]

What I particularly like about your comments above was the point that old TTPs remain in the tool kit. New TTPs do not mean emptying the toolkit. But that is a hard lesson that many have to learn the hard way.

Yup. Yet again, it is something that too many who should know better fail to comprehend until it hits them in the face. Effective trend analysis requires that you maintain the full picture of the historical pattern - it is dangerous to discard anything in the mistaken belief that a "trend" is a linear development. As I stated earlier, threat TTPs evolve in the pressures of the the combat environment to meet our countermeasures. But it ain't a linear process - there are a variety of feedback loops involved.

Keeping to open sources, there was an article last month (in USA Today, of all places) that spoke to this topic. Titled Pressure-triggered bombs worry U.S. forces, it discussed the bad guys' return to pressure initiated systems when our countermeasures began to significantly impact their use of wireless initiation systems.

The quote by the MI officer at the end of the article says it all: There's a tendency to think of the insurgency as a bunch of guys running around the desert with Kalashnikovs. These are a group of dedicated professionals trying to improve their craft.

[Jedburgh]

Published on-line by the Congressional Research Service:

IEDs in Iraq: Effects & Countermeasures

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are responsible for many of the more than 2,000 deaths and numerous casualties suffered by U.S. and coalition forces since the invasion of Iraq.1 The bombs have been hidden behind signs and guardrails, under roadside debris, or inside animal carcasses, and encounters with IEDs are becoming more numerous and deadly. The threat has expanded to include vehicle-borne IEDs, where insurgents drive cars laden with explosives directly into a targeted group of service members. DOD efforts to counter IEDs have proven only marginally effective, and U.S. forces continue to be exposed to the threat at military checkpoints, or whenever riding in vehicles in Iraq. DOD reportedly expects that mines and IEDs will continue to be weapons of choice for insurgents for the near term in Iraq, and is also concerned that they might eventually become more widely used by other insurgents and terrorists worldwide. This report will be updated as events warrant.

[Bill Moore]

We all agree that IEDs are an old method of waging guerrilla warfare.

If we reflect back to recent history, we'll also all agree that the Iraqi intelligence/military service had excellent IED making skills and other paramilitary skills, as demonstrated in numerous successful attacks overseas against selected expats and other targets. We also know the Lebanonese Hizbullah have long been masters in developing sophisticated IEDs, probably in large part due to training and assistance received by the Iranians and Syrians, who probably received their initial training from the USSR back in the day. It is probably a fair assessment to assume at least some of the foreign fighters coming into Iraq from Syria hail from Lebanon. None the less I wouldn't write off the possiblity, or even probability, that some states are also providing IED and other support to select insurgent groups. If we end up proving this, then we have a situation that we need to fix with appropriate response.

In the mid to long run the greatest danger is that their IED techniques, tactics, and procedures will migrate between the various terrorist/insurgent groups, and will eventually be exported elsewhere to support Jihad in say Indonesia or Nigeria. Anyone notice the rapid rise of IED attacks in Afghanistan lately?

I think the bottom line is we need to need to find, fix, and finish the IED facilitators wherever they are, and sooner rather than later. Everyday they survive, they improve their craft.

[Jedburgh]

We also know the Lebanonese Hizbullah have long been masters in developing sophisticated IEDs, probably in large part due to training and assistance received by the Iranians and Syrians, who probably received their initial training from the USSR back in the day.

Hezbollah actually received quite a bit of their initial assistance regarding construction and use of roadside bombs from the ANC. A bit of a come-about, as Israel had very close mil-to-mil relations with Apartheid South Africa. Iran definitely provided most of the materials required, shipped through Syria. But Hezbollah provided plenty of local innovation in construction and targeting and was also the first to systematically video IED attacks for use in media propaganda.

In the mid to long run the greatest danger is that their IED techniques, tactics, and procedures will migrate between the various terrorist/insurgent groups, and will eventually be exported elsewhere to support Jihad in say Indonesia or Nigeria. Anyone notice the rapid rise of IED attacks in Afghanistan lately?

"Threat migration" of TTPs between Iraq and Afghanistan has been going on for a while - but its definitely increased in scale recently. The threat potential of such migration beyond the AOR to targets in the West - let alone places like Indonesia or Nigeria - is serious.

But keep in mind that threat migration doesn't necessarily mean physical transfer of bad guys to train and advise indig in other countries. The migration of the concept of IEDs as an effective, simple, and cheap method of attack is enough. The Maoists in Nepal, for example, have developed unique IED TTPs all their own, that owe nothing to what we've been seeing in Iraq.

I think the bottom line is we need to need to find, fix, and finish the IED facilitators wherever they are, and sooner rather than later. Everyday they survive, they improve their craft.

True enough. The intel problem in relation to that is another discussion altogether. But we've also got to accept that IEDs in some form are a threat that we may continue to face in the forseeable future. That is where the defense appropriations come in, as referenced in the CRS report. The counter-IED capability that we are developing in the force is something that will stand us in good stead over the long run.

[SWJED]

By Herschel Smith at his The Captain's Journal blog - The Ebb and Flow of IED Warfare: U.S. Lives are at Stake.

Due in part to a failure to listen adequately to Eric Shinseki and Anthony Zinni regarding Iraq war planning, along with premature cessation of conventional operations (bypassing large urban areas leading to costly MOUT later in the war) and halting invocation or implementation of counterinsurgency TTPs, the Iraq campaign has been problematic. In Concerning the Failure of Counterinsurgency in Iraq, I said “we were utterly unprepared for the toll that IEDs would take on U.S. troops, and even after it became obvious that this was a leading tactic of the enemy, we reacted with lethargy.” IEDs became one of the two most effective weapons of the insurgents, specifically because of two reasons: their cheap and ready availability, and the fact that they are a stand-off weapon, something unthinkable for the insurgents 40 or 50 years ago...

For a period of time the U.S. has enjoyed some degree of success in countering the effect of IEDs by jamming the signals from the insurgents to detonate them (sometimes from cell phones). Electronics has been put to good use in Iraq, but in case the reader hasn’t noticed, this enjoyment has diminished recently, and there is an increasing trend again in successful IED attacks apparently because the insurgents are employing electronics against us...

[Stan]

An interesting opinion or view, but little back-up at this final link

Anyone with a $200 oscilloscope can measure 'visible wave forms' or fluctuating electrical 'quantity'. Any good EOD or LE can figure out what's going on with limited equipment. CI elements should be 'searching' for this 'signal'.

The first and easiest method:

Once the signal strength and 'wave form' are obtained, it's just a question of more power along the same freqs. Most EOD jamming devices run well over 100 grand, and need a lot of power and cooling. This system will unlikely work with camels So, we're looking for vehicles within 500 meters, an antenna or two on the roof, etc. The trouble with this (for both us and them) is, using such high tech jamming equipment requires a huge power source soaking up a lot of juice in order to perform. Worse (for them), they need to be real close, even with 10,000 watts of power.

What does all this Bravo Sierra mean ?
The signal cannot make contact, and when it can’t make contact, it doesn’t detonate...much like a cellular phone call that does not connect. No connection, but the enemy thinks the call went through.

The second method, although a more expensive approach is our current Warlock system, available almost anywhere except K-mart.

It doesn't do anything dramatic, it basically works by intercepting the signal sent from a remote location to the IED instructing it to detonate. Again, override the source and ....boom.

Find it and delete it.

[SWCAdmin]

Viral Targeting of the IED Social Network System
by Scott Swanson

Open thread....

[Sarajevo071]

CBS report on (what they call) "Deadly New Weapon In Iraq", on LiveLeak... I heaved that sucker in my hand. Always made me laugh that can be used in modern war theater. Seams, I was wrong.

"Armor-piercing hand grenades have become a favorite al Qeueda weapon in Iraq. There's virtually no defense against them. Lara Logan reports."

link:
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=ada_1189106198

[davidbfpo]

Some of this footage has appeared before and was subject of a thread months ago.

Incidentally similar grenades, drogue grenades I think we called them, appeared in Northern Ireland, used by the Provisional IRA in an urban setting. Used against police and army vehicles.

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

Danger Room, 17 Sep 07: CSI vs IEDs: Inside Baghdad's Forensic Bomb Squad

They can dig up all the roadside bombs they want, and jam every radio-controlled killer out there. To get ahead of insurgents, coalition forces have to figure out who's really building and planting the bombs.

That's why tens of thousands of improvised explosive devices and their components wind up every month at this nondescript collection of trailers, in the middle of a U.S. military base near Baghdad. Here, troops and geeks from England, Australia and America pore over the weapons 24 hours a day, piecing together forensic evidence about the bombs -- and the bombers. It's CSI meets IEDs. And it's called "Sexy."

Captain Scottie Morris, a lanky, black-haired Aussie, takes me for a tour around the Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell -- CEXC, or "Sexy," for short. To the best of my knowledge, I'm the first journalist they've allowed inside....

[Jedburgh]

Fires Bulletin, Jul-Aug 07: A Different Approach to the Counter-IED Fight in Iraq

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are the preferred weapons employed by insurgent forces in Iraq today. This form of warfare is not easy to counter. Often techniques for countering IEDs are passive in nature, thus allowing the insurgents to have the upper hand. However, as the old saying goes, “There is more than one way ‘to skin a cat.’”

Tasked with the maneuver enhancement mission for the 101st Airborne Division’s area of operations (AO), the 555th Combat Support Brigade (CSB) aggressively attacked the counter-IED fight in Iraq by applying combined arms techniques to the mission. By combining engineer patrols to clear routes with brigade combat team (BCT) intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and division-level lethal assets, the 555th CSB took a proactive approach to countering IEDs and forced the insurgents to react to Coalition efforts, denying the insurgents freedom of action.....

[SWJED]

30 Sep Washington Post - 'The single most effective weapon against our deployed forces' by Rick Atkinson.

It began with a bang and "a huge white blast," in the description of one witness who outlived that Saturday morning, March 29, 2003. At a U.S. Army checkpoint straddling Highway 9, just north of Najaf, four soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division, part of the initial invasion of Iraq, had started to search an orange-and-white taxicab at 11:30 a.m. when more than 100 pounds of C-4 plastic explosive detonated in the trunk.

The explosion tossed the sedan 15 feet down the road, killing the soldiers, the cabdriver -- an apparent suicide bomber -- and a passerby on a bicycle. Lt. Col. Scott E. Rutter, a battalion commander who rushed to the scene from his command post half a mile away, saw in the smoking crater and broken bodies on Highway 9 "a recognition that now we were entering into an area of warfare that's going to be completely different."

Since that first fatal detonation of what is now known as an improvised explosive device, more than 81,000 IED attacks have occurred in Iraq, including 25,000 so far this year, according to U.S. military sources. The war has indeed metastasized into something "completely different," a conflict in which the roadside bomb in its many variants -- including "suicide, vehicle-borne" -- has become the signature weapon in Iraq and Afghanistan, as iconic as the machine gun in World War I or the laser-guided "smart bomb" in the Persian Gulf War of 1991...

[SWJED]

I indexed the Washington Post series on IEDs at the SWJ Blog here ---> Weapon of Choice. The series includes articles, video interviews and graphics.

[Van]

Moderator's Note

Thread closed as there is new, main thread 'IEDs: the home-made bombs that changed modern war': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=16303

Can anyone cite the use of a VBIED prior to 7 August 1588?

The oldest VBIED I've been able to track down is the "hell burners", the massive charges of gunpowder loaded on ships and pointed at the Spanish fleet by English Lord Admiral Charles Howard (and an effective weapon they were).

If someone's got an older example, I'd like to push this date further back. Candidly, I'm frustrated and annoyed by the folks who talk as if IEDs are innovative and new.

Thanks!

[AmericanPride]

Van,

A possible candidate:

- 1363: Battle of Lake Poyang; Chinese used a similar technique to the one you described.

The main action of that day (31 August) would involve the creation and launching of fire ships by the Ming. Small rafts and fishing boats were loaded up with bales of straw and gunpowder, set aflame, and launched toward the enemy fleet. Dummies with armor and weapons were placed on the fireships as well, to aid in confusing and tricking the enemy. Due to a favorable wind, and the tight formation of the Han fleet, the fire ships were very successful, and many Han ships were either destroyed or suffered extensive damage.

There might be an earlier Chinese example because the Chinese introduced gunpowder to the battlefield in the 10th century. And though not 'explosive', there are of course many historical examples of setting fire to some kind of vehicle (wheels, wagons, ships, animals, etc) and employing them against the enemy.

[Granite_State]

Can anyone cite the use of a VBIED prior to 7 August 1588?

The oldest VBIED I've been able to track down is the "hell burners", the massive charges of gunpowder loaded on ships and pointed at the Spanish fleet by English Lord Admiral Charles Howard (and an effective weapon they were).

If someone's got an older example, I'd like to push this date further back. Candidly, I'm frustrated and annoyed by the folks who talk as if IEDs are innovative and new.

Thanks!

I'm almost sure you've seen it, but on the off chance you haven't, I've got a book called Buda's Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb that came out about a year ago. Think he starts in the 19th century though, haven't gotten around to it yet.

[Van]

AP - 1363? Sweet! That's another two centuries older!

Granite - Thanks for the book recommendation, I've heard of Buda's Wagon, and was in the process of checking it out.

I've looked at some of the old Roman and Chinese flame throwers and Greek fire, but despite the DoD definition I'm passing on incendiaries. Gunpowder, however, makes the cut.

[The DoD definition: Improvised Explosive Device. A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components.
(Department of Defense DIRECTIVE; NUMBER 2000.19E February 14, 2006, SUBJECT: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO))
I usually interpret this as any weapon not professionally purpose built as a weapon or any weapon used by someone other than a professional soldier, an insanely broad definition.]