The new sophistication is in the system and rapidly evolving tactics used to employ them. One guy gets paid to manufacture, another gets paid to dig the hole, another to lay the wire, and another to detonate the charge, ect... They videotaped almost every attack, post them on jihadist bulletin boards, and critique each video like a high school football coaching staff, discovering patterns in our battle drills. They are very patient and keen observers, learning everything about us.
Last edited by GorTex6; 11-29-2005 at 07:12 PM.
That's a basic description of a step-by-step cell. That method of organization for support and ops is very common in a wide range of insurgent organizations. Not new at all. That type of cell was used very effectively by HAMAS during the Intifada for the distribution of propaganda and calls for strikes - the Israelis were never able to completely stop the distro, although they rolled up quite a few cells.Originally Posted by GorTex6
We've talked about natural evolution in the use of IEDs - the same thing occurs in operational cell structure. Organizational methods, means of clandestine communications, security cut-outs, etc. are learned the hard way by the bad guys. But in Iraq they had a head start, given the nature of the multi-layered police state that was Saddam's regime. I'm not just talking about the Mukhabarat; many elements within Iraqi society developed such networks for a variety of survival reasons during Saddam's rule. The same thing is true of political opposition and smuggling networks that exist in every repressive regime in the region.
Was the cell driven by money, exploiting unemployment? Was membership/employment solicited on internet message boards(like this one)? Did each group set their differences aside to collude with each other autonomously? This is not new?
Last edited by GorTex6; 12-13-2005 at 06:54 AM.
My statement was regarding the operational concept of a step-by-step cell, in either an operations or support context. The basic organizational method of breaking down tasks for execution by different elements separated from each other for security purposes is as old as the hills. Simple and straightforward.
The economic aspect is also as old as the hills. It doesn't take much of study to learn how unemployment - fused with socio-political pressures and other economic factors - tends to have a significant effect upon recruiting for radical organizations.
Aspects of recruiting, elements of clandestine communications, degree of collaboration between disparate organizations, etc. are initially worked out according to the degree of experience and training possessed by the leadership - not to mention significantly influenced by the perceived threat to the organization(s) in question. Tactics, techniques and procedures are never static, always evolving, and are shaped by both culture and techology - but "old" methods that have worked well for a wide variety of other organizations throughout the history of clandestine terror and insurgency are to be ignored at one's peril. We have seen clearly the readiness of the bad guys to return to older TTPs if they believe they will be effective in a new context.
What is relatively "new" is the manner in which modern communications technology provides innovative methods for establishing and running such cells. Standing them up in a more dispersed manner than possible using more traditional methods of clandestine communications, and - if done in a truly professional manner - with a greater degree of security. But a cut-out is still a cut-out, a dead-drop is still a dead-drop - whether it is physical or digital, or a combination of the two. It shouldn't confuse a good analyst.
However, that has nothing to do with the basic organizational structure of a step-by-step cell. If any intel analyst has trouble recognizing that structure, or believes it is "new", then shame on him. Recognize the structure, learn how it functions in its current context - which is what you are really referring to - then roll up the cell. Hopefully, their security and discipline is poor enough that we can exploit that cell to attack higher up in the organization. Unfortunately, a step-by-step cell is designed (or is supposed to be...) expressly to defeat that sort of exploitation.
IEDs the latest RMA?
In the mid to long run the greatest danger is that their IED techniques, tactics, and procedures will migrate between the various terrorist/insurgent groups, and will eventually be exported elsewhere to support Jihad in say Indonesia or Nigeria. Anyone notice the rapid rise of IED attacks in Afghanistan lately?The above quotes were pulled from other posts in this thread. From the perspective of military theory (despite the historical precedent), has the IED become a revolution in military affairs? Following the argument that RMAs can be the revolutionary technology itself (e.g. rifled musket, tank, etc.) I'm inclined to think we have a new RMA for a number of reasons:"Threat migration" of TTPs between Iraq and Afghanistan has been going on for a while - but its definitely increased in scale recently. The threat potential of such migration beyond the AOR to targets in the West - let alone places like Indonesia or Nigeria - is serious.
- If employed properly, IEDs have an almost David-vs.-Goliath quality that facilitates a certain degree of freedom of maneuver, critical to insurgent ops.
- The powerful imagery of an IED's effects can move around the globe as soon as it is either broadcast on a major news network, or uploaded to a jihadist website. I think that even though the aftermath and ensuing casualties may tell a less dramatic story, the initial shock of the image at detonation is so powerful that it has reached virtually every insurgent/terrorist group around the world. As a result, the how-to of complex IEDs may not have reached other groups, but I believe the IED will become a "keeping up with the Joneses" concern for groups if they do not already possess it the capability.
- We should expect to see IEDs on any future battlefield (Conventional and UW). I firmly believe that if IEDs had been employed with the same tradecraft during the March Up as they are now, we might still be making that movement to Baghdad. The components of an effective IED are all around us in our daily lives, minus the explosive compound (and there are even recipes for that on the Internet).
Althought IEDs have been around for a long, long time, the technological and organizational recommendations for change that are coming out of the OIF/OEF experience, I believe we are witnessing such a revolution. I cannot recall which Marine General officer made the statement, but he spoke of Marines deploying in armored HMMWVs in the future, and that the soft-skin "highbacks" would be a thing of the past if we were to tread into other hostile environments. Any validity behind that statement?
Is the IED just one component of a larger RMA in the works?
Ied=pgm
Yes, there is alot of merit to your thinking. As I have said before the enemy is very good at EBO. We use PGM's they use IED's the EFFECT is the same except their's are more cost effective. We have B-2's to hit buildings they highjack airliners again the EFFECT is the same!! Both systems penetrate radar undetected. IED's are precision guided munitions aimed at specific targets. They are stealth people with their own stealth weapons. I would like to see more of your thinking about this because understanding the problem is the first step to solving it. It is sharp thinking that will help us not just technology.
JC, I'm going to reply to your post in pieces.
IEDs represent simply another aspect of partisan, guerrilla, insurgent, asymetric - call it what you will - warfare. "David-vs-Goliath" has always been the quality of such combat. IEDs exemplify the age-old hit-and-run tactic of the ambush, in that if you are going to categorize them in military terms, you'd have to say they are being effectively employed as a mechanical ambush. In and of themselves, despite the efforts we are directing towards countermeasures, their use does not constitute an RMA. However, that brings us to your next points...
I think the key to the quote above is the statement you made at the end of your post: "Is the IED just one component of a larger RMA in the works?". Yes, and that larger RMA is the Information Revolution. There has already been a great deal posted on SWC regarding how the bad guys exploit the internet and other new communications technologies to facilitate their ops, spread their ideology, and distribute TTPs.
Years ago, Hizbollah began exploiting media with regards to IED attacks by having a cameraman with the individual initiating the device film the incident to show on local TV the same day. Now, that propaganda effect is multiplied exponentially by the bad guys' ability to post the vid on the 'net for viewing worldwide just as soon as they can upload it.
But that's just the propaganda piece - it goes well beyond that. I already discussed how modern communications tech facilitates dispersed, compartmented cellular ops in the post above yours. But, as you're already aware, it also facilitates sharing of TTPs with non-related groups to a degree not seen before. Insurgents, terrorists and revolutionaries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa - as long as they have 'net access - can exploit lessons learned in Iraq fighting against the world's superpower and put it into even greater effect in their own AO. This has the potential to provide a qualitative evolutionary leap in ops to a nascent or struggling group. As you stated, the material requirements are not great (and IEDs do not need to be "complex" to be effective). But the only thing in favor of regimes facing such a potential threat is that it requires a certain degree of intelligence and previous operational experience in order to effectively apply those TTPs in a new context. Thus far, we've only seen relatively limited threat migration. But I don't expect that situation to last.
Finally, as an aside:
I concur in that we must take IEDs into consideration in the planning stages for any future op. However, I disagree with you on the point about the March Up to Baghdad. IEDs are not very effective against a rapidly advancing combined arms maneuver force on a conventional battlefield (even if they have to deal with unconventional attacks en-route to the objective). Once that force occupies the objective, and has established patrol routes and static areas of responsibility in the effort to establish post-conflict stability and security, then it becomes vulnerable to IEDs.
I wouldn't go as far as that. IED itself isn't that new concept. During WW2 Japanese used burried arty shells to destroy US tanks. Soviets put explosives on dogs and trained them to run under enemy tanks. In Vietnam Vietnamese used unexploded munitions to make mines. And IED is just a more complex mine.
Jedburgs mentioned Hezbollah. I think that if you would study Hezbollah's evolution of IED use and compare it with Iraq you'd see same trends, from simple to complex, starting at similar position and taking similar stps. Only that Hezbollah's IEDs don't evolve as much (at least not under battlefield conditions) while in Iraq they do because there are constantantly developing counter-measures.
Are IED new RMA or part of it? IMO no. I see thm as next step in evolution of perticular weapons system. Same way as longbow (the one with arrows, not Hellfire missiles) wasn't RMA but simply next step in evolution of a bow.
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