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Thread: Roadside Bombs & IEDs (catch all)

  1. #101
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Good, thoughtful post, Rob.

    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
    In the five or six years after 9/11 it seemed correct to lump together together the current and potential conflicts on the horizon together into a single GWOT or a Long War - maybe it was needed to get our arms around it - maybe it was a way to consider how our perception of the world had changed - although arguably the conditions were there, they'd just not come to our shores in so violent a way.
    ...
    The GWOT or Long War constructs while possessing some validity were always, IMO, a bad choice of words on many levels. Aside from the obvious negative PR aspect, your point that it was and is not a good way to look at the problem is I believe correct. Mostly because in addition to developing an "us against them" mindset or belief structure on both sides of the problem, it induces in us a mind set that is not conducive to flexibility.

    Your second and third paragraphs are very cogent and point at a big part of the problem -- appearances. Our overly bellicose statements do not help our case and, far more importantly, out national media portray us as a group of mindless idiots concerned more with the Tartlet of the day or the latest heinous crime in Missouri that is really not of national newsworthy caliber. Our international news coverage is so superficial as to be laughable and our domestic (and international) political coverage drips with bias in both directions and thus is not helpful. No sense beating that donkey here but those guys bear a lot of responsibility for that global perception.

    Your comment that we see things as we'd like them to be is certainly true and we always have. Every war or major operation since WW II proves that. Our massive egos get in the way of reality and the military decision is turned to because it -- often quite wrongly -- seems to offer a quick solution. Most Americans are wedded to quick solutions. "There's a problem, let's fix it and move on." We do it internally (sometimes not at well thought out or successfully) and we continue to try to apply that mantra to a world that does not work that way -- and then, most Americans wonder why we are in an unpopular situation...

    Because a pathetic education system has told them little about how their government works, about the rest of the world and our even more pathetic news media and its pop culture focus do nothing to aid in changing that.

    I digress...

    The whole GWOT / Long War syndrome is the result of a narrow worldview and a media focussed approach. It is not helpful. Our system of government is good and I wouldn't change it but a downside is that it reinvents itself every four or eight years, usually with inexperienced people with large egos at the helms of every executive agency and a Congress that is more concerned with its reelection and district rather than heeding their oath of office.

    That's why we get to reinvent wheels so often. The continuity in the system can in theory only come from the Executive branch and if the system is structured and the elected leaders are disposed to ignore that continuity, then the Government will wobble back and forth. That's sort of okay.

    However, the Armed Forces not only do not have to wobble back and forth they should not. Regrettably they do and that's why there is no consistency.

    People are like that...

  2. #102
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Target! BZ on the whole comment. Everyone should read it and digest it.
    Ken,

    I guess I will let you off the hook with your previous answer, but I would argue that having a strategy and focus tends to allow the commanders (PLT and above) in theater the ability to better focus their resources with some sort of endstate in mind. I think if you looked at some open source information you would see that our senior leadership (President on down to MNF-I/MNC-I Commanders) have failed to provide a clear strategy for our forces operating in Iraq. I am not so convinced that our strategy has a "bigger Middle East" theme and more of a "making it up as we go along" theme. I would be more convinced if the State Department could get its own foreign service corps to serve in Iraq and help implement this yet revealed Middle East strategy you refer to because I have scoured the internet looking for the POTUS and SECSTATE strategic vision for the Middle East, and how the forces currently in harms way are contributing to it.

    The current calm in Iraq (if you listen to the pundits) is all due to the successful surge of U.S. forces, but I would argue (from my sources) that it is more to do with the MAS initiated cease-fire from late August then U.S. forces taking it to the enemy across Baghdad. My sources tell me the Shia's are buying time and waiting for the U.S. forces to finally withdrawal so they can finish standing up the latest Shia Islamic Republic in the Middle East. They also tell me that MAS could turn the violence back on with the snap of his finger, which is why we're doing the slow dance with Maliki and the other Shia sympathizers within the "sovereign" government. Now I am not trying to be a smart ass but was this part of the greater Middle East plan our administration had envisioned when invading Iraq? I find it peculiar that our senior leaders had a plan to overthrow Saddam but after that they didn't have a clue and when their assessments (Pearle, Wolfowitz, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and crew claimed the Iraqi's would welcome as liberators and quickly assume their own security and governing) failed to materialize they fell back and called it an insurgency. I would argue what we see in Iraq is less of an insurgency and more of a failed invasion with no real vision on how to correct it. We will see an invetiable civil war fought inside Iraq within the next 36-48 months with the victors most likely being the Shia's, and how this will play out in the greater Middle East has yet to be seen. Anyway, I am not buying the overall greater Middle East plan that is supposedly the answer for this protracted war...

    In regards to IED's there is something like four major task forces within theater, and according to my sources neither of them is synched or coordinated but yet their overall annual budgets run into the billions!!

    PT

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    Quote Originally Posted by nichols View Post
    it is a clear cut clash of cultures.
    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    there is little we can do to bring the conflict in Iraq to an eventual end. Such end will be mostly up to the Iraqis and to a lesser extent up to us and in varying still lesser amounts (and in no particular order) to the Turks, the Syrians, the Saudis, the Iranians and various Islamist factions.

    If both these statements are true, then the only way we can win is by changing the culture of Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and various Islamic factions.

  4. #104
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Didn't know I was on a hook...

    Quote Originally Posted by Pragmatic Thinker View Post
    Ken,

    I guess I will let you off the hook with your previous answer, but I would argue that having a strategy and focus tends to allow the commanders (PLT and above) in theater the ability to better focus their resources with some sort of endstate in mind...
    Is what you argue for a strategic or an operational decision?

    Do you want a strategy or coherent commanders guidance and intent? Not a smart aleck question, really. I'm using the book definition of strategy (LINK). Not trying to be pedantic or a smart aleck. Just using the definition I'm familiar with.

    How finitely do you want this end state defined? IMO, it pretty well has been defined as minimal violence in all aspects and a reasonably functional Iraqi government, thus allowing a significant drawdown in the numbers of US forces committed.

    I'd also suggest that our failure to provide unity of command is a big disruptor of any effort toward coherence. The Prez says what he wants, that's strategy. DoD says do what the boss wants, the Army and the Corps generate forces and then CentCom sits in Tampa and decides who goes where with apparently little rhyme or reason and MNF-I gets to implement the resultant mess. For that kettle of worms, you can blame Goldwater-Nichols and the Congress. The Admin, DoD, CentCom and MNF-I can't really change that (well CentCom could -- but they won't)

    ... I think if you looked at some open source information you would see that our senior leadership (President on down to MNF-I/MNC-I Commanders) have failed to provide a clear strategy for our forces operating in Iraq.
    I've been a pretty voracious consumer of the open source material plus I still have a few friends and acquaintances who been there since Day 1 -- two there now -- and a serving son with three tours so I get a tad more than many do. IMO, it is not the President's job to tell DoD how to suck eggs (nor was it DoD's job to tell the Army how to do that - but that's another thread; as is the Army's failure to forcefully tell DoD of all the pitfalls...). That said, I would broadly agree with your assessment, pointing out that our one size fits all personnel 'system' placed LTG Ricardo Sanchez in initial command of MNF-I, a classic case of the wrong man for the job. In his defense, he grew up in an Army that never thought about or trained for an occupation or for an insurgency. Still, he and his successor were, IMO, more concerned about the Army than they were about the mission. That obviously led to major problems. Thus we agree on the practical effect but differ on who was at fault.

    ...I am not so convinced that our strategy has a "bigger Middle East" theme and more of a "making it up as we go along" theme. I would be more convinced if the State Department could get its own foreign service corps to serve in Iraq and help implement this yet revealed Middle East strategy you refer to because I have scoured the internet looking for the POTUS and SECSTATE strategic vision for the Middle East, and how the forces currently in harms way are contributing to it.
    You may be correct but indications are that you are not. My assessment -- informed guess, really -- is that the 'strategy' was loose and open ended and the implementation is having to be made up as we go because no one involved had ever done anything like this before. I do know for a fact that senior career people at State have bureaucratically resisted Iraq from the get go and are doing as little as they can get away with.

    The current calm in Iraq (if you listen to the pundits) is all due to the successful surge of U.S. forces, but I would argue (from my sources) that it is more to do with the MAS initiated cease-fire from late August then U.S. forces taking it to the enemy across Baghdad. My sources tell me the Shia's are buying time and waiting for the U.S. forces to finally withdrawal so they can finish standing up the latest Shia Islamic Republic in the Middle East. They also tell me that MAS could turn the violence back on with the snap of his finger, which is why we're doing the slow dance with Maliki and the other Shia sympathizers within the "sovereign" government...
    I agree with all that. The surge was of marginal military value. FWIW, I didn't think it would make much difference and did not think the cost in several paramenters justified it.

    ... Now I am not trying to be a smart ass but was this part of the greater Middle East plan our administration had envisioned when invading Iraq? I find it peculiar that our senior leaders had a plan to overthrow Saddam but after that they didn't have a clue and when their assessments (Pearle, Wolfowitz, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and crew claimed the Iraqi's would welcome as liberators and quickly assume their own security and governing) failed to materialize they fell back and called it an insurgency. I would argue what we see in Iraq is less of an insurgency and more of a failed invasion with no real vision on how to correct it...
    I agree with most of that. No question they had a short sighted and very unrealistic view of what would happen in Iraq. I think the initial plan involved a rapid withdrawal in the Aug-Sep 03 period and that something happened in early May to change that, thus the rapid (and bad) replacement of Garner by Bremer. Don't know what it was; it'll come out some day.

    The insurgency in Iraq did not need to happen. The Intel community totally missed the planned insurgency even though Saddam announced his intentions. The Troops had no clue what to do after they got to Baghdad and some precipitate action by the troops and the absolutely stupid disbandment of the Iraqi Army and Police set in motion an escalation that need not have occurred.

    We will see an invetiable civil war fought inside Iraq within the next 36-48 months with the victors most likely being the Shia's, and how this will play out in the greater Middle East has yet to be seen...
    Perhaps. I'm no ME expert but I know enough about the pragmatism and behind the scenes maneuvering to know that little is as it seems and things can shift in unexpected directions. We'll see

    ... Anyway, I am not buying the overall greater Middle East plan that is supposedly the answer for this protracted war...
    I'm not selling. You asked for my opinion and you got it, you don't have to take it or even like it.

    It by the way is not the answer for this particular war -- it is the reason this particular war was started; the answer for this protracted war is for the Army, Marines (who bear significant responsibility for it being as protracted as it is) and other agencies to get their act together and fix it. The good news is that they have -- belatedly -- started doing that. And they all deserve Attaboys for doing that. Took 'em seven years to do that in Viet Nam, it's only taken three plus here.

    In regards to IED's there is something like four major task forces within theater, and according to my sources neither of them is synched or coordinated but yet their overall annual budgets run into the billions!!
    True and another's on the way -- That's not a strategy effect; has nothing what so ever to do with strategy. That's a DoD typical reaction to a problem; throw money at it and try for a technological fix instead of training people and just getting on with the job. I spent 45 years in and around DoD, it was that way the whole time and in the 12 years I've been retired, nothing has changed.
    Last edited by Ken White; 11-12-2007 at 10:05 PM.

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    I'd also suggest that our failure to provide unity of command is a big disruptor of any effort toward coherence. The Prez says what he wants, that's strategy. DoD says do what the boss wants, the Army and the Corps generate forces and then CentCom sits in Tampa and decides who goes where with apparently little rhyme or reason and MNF-I gets to implement the resultant mess. For that kettle of worms, you can blame Goldwater-Nichols and the Congress. The Admin, DoD, CentCom and MNF-I can't really change that (well CentCom could -- but they won't)


    I am in violent agreement with you regarding CENTCOM, history will not speak well of it's post-invasion management of this conflict. I can't go into too many details due to my proximity to the problem but the lack of doctrinal structure (look at the joint doctrine and then compare it to how the C2 is structured in theater) and some of the bafoonery that goes into the decisions of force disposition are absolutely criminal. The Army will also not fair well in the Iraqi rearview mirror. Modularity and the piece-mealing of units together without consideration of cohesion and unity of command is also to blame for the confusing picture on the ground. When a BCT enters into its 12 month pre-deployment train-up with its organic battalions this should be the force it fights with for 15 months. Also, with the BCT's having numerous rotations into theater you would assume it makes sense to return them to the same AOR to maximize unit familiarity with the populace, enemy, and terrain but that doesn't happen either. All too often you see a BCT train-up to go to area X, only to be told while in Kuwait waiting to enter the box that they are going somewhere else, and that two of their organic battalions will go somewhere else and they will inherit two battalions from a different BCT... I am no Patton or McArthur but that doesn't make sense to me. I am miffed as to how we justify this and expect effectiveness not to suffer?!?

    True and another's on the way -- That's not a strategy effect; has nothing what so ever to do with strategy. That's a DoD typical reaction to a problem; throw money at it and try for a technological fix instead of training people and just getting on with the job. I spent 45 years in and around DoD, it was that way the whole time and in the 12 years I've been retired, nothing has changed. I agree with you sir...very sad indeed... Thanks for your response and candor.

    PT

  6. #106
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default You've hit one of the major protration contibutors

    Quote Originally Posted by Pragmatic Thinker View Post
    ...
    I am in violent agreement with you regarding CENTCOM, history will not speak well of it's post-invasion management of this conflict.... The Army will also not fair well in the Iraqi rearview mirror...
    Edit: Uh, that would be protraCtion contRibutors. Hey. lee me loan, I'm old

    Both true. Good news is the Army knows it and is working on fixing at least part of it. Bad news is that CentCom knows it and they and DoD don't care due to the 'joint' factor, the aforementioned B-N act and the rotation of round pegs into the square hole that is CinCCent every two or three years....

    Poor way to do business.

    Modularity and the piece-mealing of units together without consideration of cohesion and unity of command is also to blame for the confusing picture on the ground. When a BCT enters into its 12 month pre-deployment train-up with its organic battalions this should be the force it fights with for 15 months. Also, with the BCT's having numerous rotations into theater you would assume it makes sense to return them to the same AOR to maximize unit familiarity with the populace, enemy, and terrain but that doesn't happen either. All too often you see a BCT train-up to go to area X, only to be told while in Kuwait waiting to enter the box that they are going somewhere else, and that two of their organic battalions will go somewhere else and they will inherit two battalions from a different BCT... I am no Patton or McArthur but that doesn't make sense to me. I am miffed as to how we justify this and expect effectiveness not to suffer?!?
    Thee, me and a couple of commanders I know. I cannot understand why DA tolerates it, I cannot understand why CentCom and the MNF-I do it (both, as I understand it have a hand in it) nor do I understand why Commanders are not raising the roof about it.

    It also affects Afghanistan.

    Rotation of units for seven months or a year (or more) is far, far better than individual rotation -- but just 'cause it's better, is no reason to try to undo the good effect it can have. Sad.
    Last edited by Ken White; 11-12-2007 at 11:52 PM. Reason: Stupid typo

  7. #107
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    Default The War Whisperer

    I'm reminded of the movie the "Horse Whisperer" starring Robert Redford in which he demonstrates the unique ability to salvage a damaged horse so it can become a beloved family member again and ridden once more. We can't embrace the nightware of what we are doing nor can we make it go away nor will learn from it nor can we separate the personal from the collective, the subjective from the objective. Mr. Gentile brings to bear the pain of a Commander and the anguish of presenting dead sons to their parents, a pawn caught up in the higher powers of economics and politics. We have no war whisperer and never have had one. Copper replaced flint, bronze over copper, iron over bronze, the long bow the pike, the rimfire over cap and ball, the machine gun over the bolt action. We have gone from the sling to the JDAM in a blink of the evolutionary eye and real-time, high technology makes us only more painfully aware of our inability to stop killing, nothing more. It offers no solution, it offers no alternative, only saltation which the collective psyche that is filled with so much love cannot keep abreast of. We are left with the only consolation we have ever had, what is best for the tribe, and that mandates we stand our ground in Iraq. The walking wounded have no choice but to return to the lines and bunkers and streets and attempt to save what lives they can on both sides and gain a spate of peace before the next one starts up. As an old coot who's had his war, it is extremely rare to encounter combat Vets who say they wouldn't be in Iraq if they were young enough to do so.

  8. #108
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    I saw some photos today of the MRAP series - its allot bigger then I thought it'd be - I think there is a photo of one being unwrapped to go to a unit responsible for running logistics on the MNF-I site. I originally hoped they'd just get RG-31s, or something of about the same size- the RG is not too much bigger then an 1151 - sits a little higher given its hull design, but its fairly narrow. The MRAPs I saw photos of today might work well on MSRs that are large, wide, stronger and free in power wires, accommodate a large turning radius, etc., but I'm not sure how much mobility they will have in some of the side streets, neighborhoods, and places where the infrastructure cannot accommodate something as big as a COUGAR or BUFFALO.

    My concern now having seen at least a few photos of what we went with is that in the interest of maximum force protection, we've compromised mobility to a point where our hardware will at least in part limit our preferred tactics. I hope this is not the case, but its hard to say without climbing in one and driving it around in the environment - this may be one of those cases where we've over-engineered something to the point where its utility is very limited without testing it in the environment it will be used in - not EOD doing route clearance, but IN & AR (and MPs, and TTs, etc.) units doing urban mounted and dismounted patrols inside neighborhoods of cities and remote towns. There are always going to be trades in speed, mobility, protection and firepower when designing vehicles, but I hope this is not a case where we have over-emphasized one at the expense of the others - especially not when there was a good example of what right looked like in the RG.

    If the initial buy of the big ones were to go to CSS and some CS units, that might not be too bad - but those units doing patrols might benefit from technology that suited the tactics they prefer to use in the places they need to go - otherwise we might be better off with 1151s/1114s.

    It may well be that I just saw one of several variants to which at least one I did not see suits the requirements for the tactics we want to employ - I hope that is true.

    Best, Rob

    Here is a photo of an RG
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    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 11-13-2007 at 10:31 PM.

  9. #109
    Council Member redbullets's Avatar
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    Default Humanitarian Response to IEDs

    There's an RFI at the end of this post. Moderator, please let me know if I should shift this over to the RFI section.

    I have been exploring the humanitarian impact of IEDs upon civlian populations for the last year and a half. The humanitarian community has, by and large, been avoiding this issue. This is primarily a result of the principles of nuetrality that mainstream NGOs opeate under, and the lack of technical intervention capacity possessed by even the more advanced members of the Humanitarian Mine Action community.

    I'm dropping a proposal tomorrow with a USG donor to conduct a study of IED victimilzation in three countries and craft an approrirate version of Mine Risk Education (MRE, what used to be called Mine Awareness) aimed at translating behavior modification strategies from the Humanitarian Mine Action community (and others, such as HIV Awareness) to threat reduction for civlian populations with significant IED exposure. Call it IED Risk Education (IEDRE).

    My outfit has developed IED Awareness curricula in the past, and will include in this effort an exploration of strategies to protect aid workers in addition to the beneficiaries they serve. Seemed rather tragically timelly to have been writing this proposal when news of the Algiers bombing arrived.

    Given our landmine survey work over the years, I started fooling around with some comparisons between our survey data and open source IED attack reports. A small example:

    During the two-year period between 2004 and 2006 (our Landmine Impact Surveys examine the 24 month period prior to arrival of the data collectors), there were 12 landmine/UXO victims in Ta’meem (Kirkuk) Governorate. Of these victims, three were killed and nine wounded. On a single day during that same period, 15 June 2005, a suicide bomber struck in the city of Kirkuk. In this attack, 23 civilians were killed and nearly 100 wounded.

    I'm raising this disparity within my own community largely because of the substantial amount of resorces directly toward Humanitarian Mine Action during the past 15 years. Not to say that this response shouldn't be happening, but that a similarly vigorous effort should be directed toward reducing the exposure of at-risk populations to IED attack, and toward public health response for victims.

    I'm kicking out an OP/ED next week aimed at galvanizing a bit of interest and action within the relief and development arena, donors included, and will introduce four principles of humanitarian response to IEDs.

    I'm interested in hearing folks' thoughts on this, and very interested in data sources (unclassified, or able to be declassified) that we might use as we drive this effort forward.

    Cheers,
    Joe

    Just because you haven't been hit yet does NOT mean you're doing it right.

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    A little suggestion: Don't limit yourself to the direct health impacts of IEDs. Expand your research to include the indirect negative health consequences. Some examples off the top of my head: the halt of vaccination programs, flight of health professionals from the region, closure of medical clinics, halt of sanitation services (garage removal) etc.. etc.. When you include the indirect health consequences, the effect of IEDs on morbidity and mortality is going be to be orders of magnitude greater.

    I know for a fact that after those chlorine truck IEDs the US started holding chlorine trucks at the border. This in turn led to a cholera epidemic (chlorine is used in some way to prevent cholera).
    Last edited by Chris Albon; 12-14-2007 at 05:09 AM.
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    It seems to me that the challenge here is the limited options that civilian populations have, especially when those IEDs are deliberately targeted against locations where civilians must necessarily be as part of the fabric of their daily lives (markets, mosques, busy roads, etc). In contrast to mine casualties--where a significant proportion of casualties may come from ignoring warning signs, children failing to recognize mines and UXO, use of ad hoc, inadequate clearance methods, etc.--there is much less that civilians can do to reduce IED risks. Moreover, the IED risk is neither fixed in time or space, whereas the mine and UXO challenge may be much more so (leaving aside displacement due to weather or construction/clearance, or fresh mine laying due to continued hostilities).

    What kinds and components of IED awareness education were you thinking might be effective, that aren't included in current mine awareness programmes (which typically include trip-wire type IEds and any suspicious ordnance)?

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    I agree with Rex; the majority of our most recent IED awareness program was very similar to our current UXO campaigns. Only the target audience changed to include adults over 50. We had a 10-year long mad bomber indiscriminately placing IEDs in residential areas and without any apparent motive (even now after a year of hearings he has yet to fully disclose his reasons).

    The only commonalities were the general area where he liked to place his VOIEDs and the materials he used (thanks in part to our awareness campaign, one IED was rendered safe and recovered for forensics).

    There was little hope in changing 100,000 people’s daily routine in a 10 square-kilometer residential area, so we concentrated on making people more aware and set up CCTVs. We counted on the folks that live in the general vicinity to review the recordings for what they conclude ‘doesn’t fit in my neighborhood’.

    I’d be very interested in your four principles of humanitarian response to IEDs.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    It seems to me that the challenge here is the limited options that civilian populations have, especially when those IEDs are deliberately targeted against locations where civilians must necessarily be as part of the fabric of their daily lives (markets, mosques, busy roads, etc). In contrast to mine casualties--where a significant proportion of casualties may come from ignoring warning signs, children failing to recognize mines and UXO, use of ad hoc, inadequate clearance methods, etc.--there is much less that civilians can do to reduce IED risks. Moreover, the IED risk is neither fixed in time or space, whereas the mine and UXO challenge may be much more so (leaving aside displacement due to weather or construction/clearance, or fresh mine laying due to continued hostilities).

    What kinds and components of IED awareness education were you thinking might be effective, that aren't included in current mine awareness programmes (which typically include trip-wire type IEds and any suspicious ordnance)?
    Thanks. The purpose of the study is to actually examine this and figure out what, if anything can be added to/extracted from MRE and other types of awareness campaigns to reduce exposure, in addition to pushing the increased public health impacts of victimization. I'm not aware of anyone in the humanitarian community who's done a serious study of the targeting around civilians in high-threat countries to illuminate trends such as target locations, time(s) of day, groups being singled out, etc. We do that in our own way in the Humanitarian Mine Action arena, but tools such as IMSMA do not support this in an IED context for reasons that include what you said above - landmines/UXO are static, and IEDs are active. That's a major theme and discussion I've included in the proposal I'm finishing.

    Based on experience in Afghanistan and Iraq during the past six years, we've developed an analysis tool for the humanitarian community that does trend analysis of safety and security incidents, among a host of other things, and we're going to use this in our study to try and gel some targeting trends, and from those extract behavior modification that is doable.

    I guess the whole point is that the humanitarian community is leaving this issue alone because its perceived as too hard. That conclusion appears to me to be drawn from anecdotal as opposed to empirical evidence. If you can advise housewives in Baghdad to do their shopping in little shops on side streets instead of high-traffic common markets, or advise fathers that they're better off praying at home this month due to trend X, there may be a victim reduction outcome. However, no one knows because to date this is all based on assumptions, or data that's been looked at from a primarily tactical/military perspective. We realize that any successful future risk education effort around IEDs would need to be very nimble and fluid as trends shift, and bad guys start monitoring campaign efforts.

    Besides, why does more money go into Humanitarian Mine Action efforts in some places than into preventable disease? Few would argue that landmines/UXO claim more lives than a range of preventable maladies. Never been able to quite figure that out myself, but I suspect one reason is that its a lot simpler and easier to quantify landmines removed/destroyed than it is to quantify people who didn't get sick.

    Cheers,
    Joe

    Just because you haven't been hit yet does NOT mean you're doing it right.

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    Stan

    what is the pull today between demining and UXO disposal? I know that when setting up the demining op in Rwanda, I could get US monies for demining. I could not get them for UXOs--which were in fact the greater problem. has that tug of war changed?

    seems to me it would play in this idea as well. the lines between an IED, a UXO, and a "mine" are very semantic, distinguished by targeting or lack or targeting to a large degree.

    best

    Tom

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    Council Member redbullets's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Stan View Post
    I agree with Rex; the majority of our most recent IED awareness program was very similar to our current UXO campaigns. Only the target audience changed to include adults over 50. We had a 10-year long mad bomber indiscriminately placing IEDs in residential areas and without any apparent motive (even now after a year of hearings he has yet to fully disclose his reasons).

    The only commonalities were the general area where he liked to place his VOIEDs and the materials he used (thanks in part to our awareness campaign, one IED was rendered safe and recovered for forensics).

    There was little hope in changing 100,000 people’s daily routine in a 10 square-kilometer residential area, so we concentrated on making people more aware and set up CCTVs. We counted on the folks that live in the general vicinity to review the recordings for what they conclude ‘doesn’t fit in my neighborhood’.

    I’d be very interested in your four principles of humanitarian response to IEDs.
    Thanks, Stan. My response is similar in vein to what I said to Rex - in a humanitarian context, with such high victimization reported to be occcuring in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, the humanitarian community is currently clueless. All we know data-wise at the moment is that "its really bad" and we don't know if we can do anything about it, never mind what to do.

    A lone mad-bomber (I'm not familier with the situation in Estonia, so pardon my ignorance) can be tracked/monitored, I suspect, by using commonly available GIS-based crime tracking systems. There are ready-to-use application extensions available from ESRI and a range of other compaines that allow that. And, as you pointed out, that was a much smaller population at-risk in a much smaller geographic area. The situation in countries where the IED threat is very high is a bit different than scattered whack jobs, I reckon. Hell, it might be harder, too hard, in those high-threat countries, but our community doesn't actually know much at the moment.

    Our own IED Safety Training over the past few years has focused on what it sounds like yours did - signs to look for, things to avoid, who to report to, etc. Our organization has been somehow or another involved, victimized if you will, in five IED incidents in Afghanistan and Iraq, with serious injuries reulting from two of the incidents, so we take our safety and precautions very seriously. But, what I'm interested in learning with this effort is, if trends are able to be monitored and clarified, can large-scale behavior modification have some kind of positive impact.

    I'm not suggesting that this somehow falls outside the Humanitarian Mine Action community - they're the only ones who will be initially willing to take this on if there's more that can be done to reduce victimization than is currently the case.

    I'll send you my principles off line - I've tweaked them as much as I'm probably going to, but I'm reserving them to hopefully have a bit of impact among the relief/development folks.

    Cheers,
    Joe

    Just because you haven't been hit yet does NOT mean you're doing it right.

    "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist." President Dwight D. Eisenhower

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    Council Member redbullets's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    Stan

    what is the pull today between demining and UXO disposal? I know that when setting up the demining op in Rwanda, I could get US monies for demining. I could not get them for UXOs--which were in fact the greater problem. has that tug of war changed?

    seems to me it would play in this idea as well. the lines between an IED, a UXO, and a "mine" are very semantic, distinguished by targeting or lack or targeting to a large degree.

    best

    Tom
    The major US office that funds this sort of thing, the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at State has been taking a comprehensive approach to this for some years. They fund landmine/UXO mitigation efforts based upon reality on the ground, instead of focusing on landmines. They also have added Small Arms/Light Weapons (SA/LW) and MANPADS to their portfolio, and from the most recent donor workshop I attended with them a month and a half ago, are really taking this holistic approach seriously.

    Here's the link to their site - http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/
    Last edited by redbullets; 12-14-2007 at 02:08 PM.
    Joe

    Just because you haven't been hit yet does NOT mean you're doing it right.

    "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist." President Dwight D. Eisenhower

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    Hey Joe !

    Quote Originally Posted by redbullets View Post
    Thanks. The purpose of the study is to actually examine this and figure out what, if anything can be added to/extracted from MRE and other types of awareness campaigns to reduce exposure, in addition to pushing the increased public health impacts of victimization. I'm not aware of anyone in the humanitarian community who's done a serious study of the targeting around civilians in high-threat countries to illuminate trends such as target locations, time(s) of day, groups being singled out, etc. We do that in our own way in the Humanitarian Mine Action arena, but tools such as IMSMA do not support this in an IED context for reasons that include what you said above - landmines/UXO are static, and IEDs are active. That's a major theme and discussion I've included in the proposal I'm finishing.
    Glad you brought up IMSMA’s applications and inherent shortcomings when dealing with what Estonia considers ‘other aspects of Demining and UXO clearance’. More often than not, UXO are the lifeblood of our IED builders (our criminals scoop out the HE and sell the metal – a bit more refined and business savvy than their Iraqi brethren).

    Because Estonia’s structure here includes typical law enforcement duties (sweeps and post blast to name a few), we deal with both UXO and IED threats. We decided long ago to tailor the IMSMA platform to meet our needs in both arenas. That is, the trends you mention above. We have yet to ‘master’ the system, but what we do have in our DB helped us catch our last mad bomber. Granted, Estonia is far smaller than Iraq and Afghanistan, and the criminals far fewer.

    Regards, Stan

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    Tom, Joe was much faster on the keyboard

    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    Stan

    what is the pull today between demining and UXO disposal? I know that when setting up the demining op in Rwanda, I could get US monies for demining. I could not get them for UXOs--which were in fact the greater problem. has that tug of war changed?

    seems to me it would play in this idea as well. the lines between an IED, a UXO, and a "mine" are very semantic, distinguished by targeting or lack or targeting to a large degree.

    best

    Tom
    Basically, and just about the time you left Rwanda, State figured out Mines weren't the only problems, especially in the former east bloc.

    We, for example, just got in on the waterborne issue along with Vietnam (prior to that, rarely could we get funding for clearance of lakes and rivers). Sitting on Estonia's eastern border with one of (then) HDO's kingpins, DH was taking happy snaps when our divers surfaced with AT mines The Gods were watching over me that day !

    I ended up with funding for boats, motors, diving gear...you name it.

    WRA
    The Office develops, implements and monitors policy, programs and public engagement efforts that contribute to the prevention and mitigation of conflict, as well as post-conflict social and economic recovery. The focus is three-fold: to curb the illicit trafficking, availability and indiscriminate use of conventional weapons of war that fuel regional and internal instability; to pursue and help manage post-conflict cleanup of such weapons in areas needed for civilian use; and to engage civil society to broaden support for our efforts and enhance U.S. influence.

    The Office furthers U.S. foreign policy goals through the development and implementation of comprehensive solutions to the security challenges and harmful humanitarian effects caused by the illicit proliferation of conventional weapons of war, and the existence of public hazards from such weapons following cessation of armed conflict. Conventional weapons and munitions addressed by the Office include but are not limited to landmines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and other small arms and light weapons (SA/LW). The office strives to limit the access of terrorist or criminal groups to such weapons and munitions. At the same time, by addressing acute humanitarian needs, this office demonstrates the United States commitment to a set of values that respects human life. The Office works closely with other U.S. Government agencies as well as non-governmental organizations, international organizations and private enterprises. Innovation, strategic vision, responsible stewardship and cooperative team effort are all qualities that are encouraged by this office.

    The Office incorporates the functions and responsibilities of the Bureau's former Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs (PM/HDP), to include management of the multi-agency U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Program, the former Office of Mine Action Initiatives and Partnerships (PM/MAIP), to include encouraging public-private partnerships to reinforce the gamut of threats addressed by the Office, and the small arms/light weapons and MANPADS duties of the Bureau's Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis (PM/PPA).
    Regards, Stan
    Last edited by Stan; 12-14-2007 at 02:32 PM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Stan View Post
    Hey Joe !



    Glad you brought up IMSMA’s applications and inherent shortcomings when dealing with what Estonia considers ‘other aspects of Demining and UXO clearance’. More often than not, UXO are the lifeblood of our IED builders (our criminals scoop out the HE and sell the metal – a bit more refined and business savvy than their Iraqi brethren).

    Because Estonia’s structure here includes typical law enforcement duties (sweeps and post blast to name a few), we deal with both UXO and IED threats. We decided long ago to tailor the IMSMA platform to meet our needs in both arenas. That is, the trends you mention above. We have yet to ‘master’ the system, but what we do have in our DB helped us catch our last mad bomber. Granted, Estonia is far smaller than Iraq and Afghanistan, and the criminals far fewer.

    Regards, Stan
    Stan:

    Its funny, its been so many years since I've thought of landmines and UXO seperately in the macro sense that I forget that was how it used to be.

    I think we should show you the toy our uber-geeks came up with. We can do it over Skype, with a bolt-on application that allows live demonstrations kind of like WebX or Oracle.

    The Operational Activity Security Information System (OASIS) that we developed does a whole lot of things, but one of the most important is that it takes the geeks out of the loop - all of the analyses and queries are doable by the average operator. That was a direct result of our many years working with IMSMA and hearing the concerns of field operators.

    Cheers,
    Last edited by redbullets; 12-14-2007 at 03:31 PM.
    Joe

    Just because you haven't been hit yet does NOT mean you're doing it right.

    "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist." President Dwight D. Eisenhower

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    Quote Originally Posted by redbullets View Post
    Stan:

    Its funny, its been so many years since I've thought of landmines and UXO seperately in the macro sense that I forget that was how it used to be.

    I think we should show you the toy our uber-geeks came up with. We can do it over Skype, with a bolt-on application that allows live demonstrations kind of like WebX or Oracle.

    The Operational Activity Security Information System (OASIS) that we developed does a whole lot of things, but one of the most important is that it takes the geeks out of the loop - all of the analyses and queries are doable by the average operator. That was a direct result of our many years working with IMSMA and hearing the concerns of field operators.

    Cheers,
    Careful Joe, people could figure out just how old you really are

    Although we're supposed to be the heart of Skype here, most steer clear of using it (and the MOI server tends to block it).

    We also needed to take the geek factor out of using our DB, especially in the field. Unfortunately, I can't share or even access our server outside the intranet...we're working on that firewall issue though. We simplified IMSMA's system using our existing data base and then added Google Earth. We had to deal with Estonian laws and try to remain transparent too. 5 years later, I think we have a good product, but still can't share it with partners.

    We're looking at a visit from WRA early next year and more funding Maybe, this time, DH will attempt to visit when it's warm

    Regards, Stan

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