Didn't know I was on a hook...
Is what you argue for a strategic or an operational decision?Originally Posted by Pragmatic Thinker
Do you want a strategy or coherent commanders guidance and intent? Not a smart aleck question, really. I'm using the book definition of strategy (LINK). Not trying to be pedantic or a smart aleck. Just using the definition I'm familiar with.
How finitely do you want this end state defined? IMO, it pretty well has been defined as minimal violence in all aspects and a reasonably functional Iraqi government, thus allowing a significant drawdown in the numbers of US forces committed.
I'd also suggest that our failure to provide unity of command is a big disruptor of any effort toward coherence. The Prez says what he wants, that's strategy. DoD says do what the boss wants, the Army and the Corps generate forces and then CentCom sits in Tampa and decides who goes where with apparently little rhyme or reason and MNF-I gets to implement the resultant mess. For that kettle of worms, you can blame Goldwater-Nichols and the Congress. The Admin, DoD, CentCom and MNF-I can't really change that (well CentCom could -- but they won't)
I've been a pretty voracious consumer of the open source material plus I still have a few friends and acquaintances who been there since Day 1 -- two there now -- and a serving son with three tours so I get a tad more than many do. IMO, it is not the President's job to tell DoD how to suck eggs (nor was it DoD's job to tell the Army how to do that - but that's another thread; as is the Army's failure to forcefully tell DoD of all the pitfalls...). That said, I would broadly agree with your assessment, pointing out that our one size fits all personnel 'system' placed LTG Ricardo Sanchez in initial command of MNF-I, a classic case of the wrong man for the job. In his defense, he grew up in an Army that never thought about or trained for an occupation or for an insurgency. Still, he and his successor were, IMO, more concerned about the Army than they were about the mission. That obviously led to major problems. Thus we agree on the practical effect but differ on who was at fault.... I think if you looked at some open source information you would see that our senior leadership (President on down to MNF-I/MNC-I Commanders) have failed to provide a clear strategy for our forces operating in Iraq.
You may be correct but indications are that you are not. My assessment -- informed guess, really -- is that the 'strategy' was loose and open ended and the implementation is having to be made up as we go because no one involved had ever done anything like this before. I do know for a fact that senior career people at State have bureaucratically resisted Iraq from the get go and are doing as little as they can get away with....I am not so convinced that our strategy has a "bigger Middle East" theme and more of a "making it up as we go along" theme. I would be more convinced if the State Department could get its own foreign service corps to serve in Iraq and help implement this yet revealed Middle East strategy you refer to because I have scoured the internet looking for the POTUS and SECSTATE strategic vision for the Middle East, and how the forces currently in harms way are contributing to it.
I agree with all that. The surge was of marginal military value. FWIW, I didn't think it would make much difference and did not think the cost in several paramenters justified it.The current calm in Iraq (if you listen to the pundits) is all due to the successful surge of U.S. forces, but I would argue (from my sources) that it is more to do with the MAS initiated cease-fire from late August then U.S. forces taking it to the enemy across Baghdad. My sources tell me the Shia's are buying time and waiting for the U.S. forces to finally withdrawal so they can finish standing up the latest Shia Islamic Republic in the Middle East. They also tell me that MAS could turn the violence back on with the snap of his finger, which is why we're doing the slow dance with Maliki and the other Shia sympathizers within the "sovereign" government...
I agree with most of that. No question they had a short sighted and very unrealistic view of what would happen in Iraq. I think the initial plan involved a rapid withdrawal in the Aug-Sep 03 period and that something happened in early May to change that, thus the rapid (and bad) replacement of Garner by Bremer. Don't know what it was; it'll come out some day.... Now I am not trying to be a smart ass but was this part of the greater Middle East plan our administration had envisioned when invading Iraq? I find it peculiar that our senior leaders had a plan to overthrow Saddam but after that they didn't have a clue and when their assessments (Pearle, Wolfowitz, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and crew claimed the Iraqi's would welcome as liberators and quickly assume their own security and governing) failed to materialize they fell back and called it an insurgency. I would argue what we see in Iraq is less of an insurgency and more of a failed invasion with no real vision on how to correct it...
The insurgency in Iraq did not need to happen. The Intel community totally missed the planned insurgency even though Saddam announced his intentions. The Troops had no clue what to do after they got to Baghdad and some precipitate action by the troops and the absolutely stupid disbandment of the Iraqi Army and Police set in motion an escalation that need not have occurred.
Perhaps. I'm no ME expert but I know enough about the pragmatism and behind the scenes maneuvering to know that little is as it seems and things can shift in unexpected directions. We'll seeWe will see an invetiable civil war fought inside Iraq within the next 36-48 months with the victors most likely being the Shia's, and how this will play out in the greater Middle East has yet to be seen...
I'm not selling. You asked for my opinion and you got it, you don't have to take it or even like it.... Anyway, I am not buying the overall greater Middle East plan that is supposedly the answer for this protracted war...
It by the way is not the answer for this particular war -- it is the reason this particular war was started; the answer for this protracted war is for the Army, Marines (who bear significant responsibility for it being as protracted as it is) and other agencies to get their act together and fix it. The good news is that they have -- belatedly -- started doing that. And they all deserve Attaboys for doing that. Took 'em seven years to do that in Viet Nam, it's only taken three plus here.
True and another's on the way -- That's not a strategy effect; has nothing what so ever to do with strategy. That's a DoD typical reaction to a problem; throw money at it and try for a technological fix instead of training people and just getting on with the job. I spent 45 years in and around DoD, it was that way the whole time and in the 12 years I've been retired, nothing has changed.In regards to IED's there is something like four major task forces within theater, and according to my sources neither of them is synched or coordinated but yet their overall annual budgets run into the billions!!
Reply With Quote
Bookmarks