VBIEDs were popular...
in Vietnam both during the French war and ours. A particularly effective use of bicycles was made since they were everywhere and very easily just left in a crowded bistro or market.
A subset of VBIEDs would be to classify those used expressly as a suicide vehicle and those not.
Last edited by Umar Al-Mokhtār; 01-11-2009 at 07:17 PM. Reason: Grammer
"What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."
Yep on the bikes,
Vespas not so much; the Viet Namese were a thrifty lot.Originally Posted by Umar Al-Mokhtār
Grenades in the Baskets atop the heads of little old ladies probably don't count as VBIEDs. Particularly as the White Mice thought most were not aware of their added cargo.
Then there's the question on today's suicide variations; those with the driver strapped in and those where he or she is not...
Hey Van,
I'll be attending a Bomb Data Center conference in February with more than 50 countries in attendance. This will definitely be something to generate bar-stool discussions
I'll take notes and get back to you.
Regards, Stan
If you want to blend in, take the bus
The answer thus far is NO.
However, I lost patience waiting for my trip and decided to ask the Brits and Yanks involved with bomb data center research at both (locations withheld).
Of the 15 responses, 14 concluded and agreed with the following:
It should be noted (Ted pretty much made this clear already) that none of the respondents considered boats or bicycles as "vehicles" when utilizing the acronym VBIEDThe earliest reference of a VBIED was the attempted assassination of the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II by Armenian separatists on 21 JUL 1905! 80 keys of explosives were placed in a car and the explosives were timed to go off as the Sultan passed the vehicle during his regular visit to a mosque in Istanbul.
The first VBIED in the UK was on 22 FEB 72 at the Parachute Regiments Officers Mess at Aldershot Barracks. This device was attributed to the Official IRA (OIRA).
If you want to blend in, take the bus
As something of an aside, you might also find examples from some of the Chicago gang wars in the 1920s. Not 100% sure on that, but I do have some recollection of such things taking place.
If you exclude fire ships and other such implements, I think you're more likely to find examples of VBIEDs in the terrorist and criminal sphere than you are the purely military one...at least prior to the 1960s.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Regarding the criminal sphere, the targeting tends to be different. A pipe bomb or some other type of explosive device emplaced in a vehicle with the intent to kill a specific occupant(s) is very different from a vehicle stuffed with explosives intended to inflict general death and destruction upon a proximity target, whether fixed, like an adjacent building (or the crowd in a marketplace, etc.) or mobile - i.e. remotely initiated to hit a passing convoy. Criminal emplacement of explosives in automobiles targeting a specific individual has been a tactic almost since the first days of automobile ownership - and continues to be common today. Just my personal bias, but I wouldn't count that as a true VBIED - Guido wasn't killed by a VBIED, he was killed by a pipe bomb placed under the seat of his car.
Vertical envelopment and the IED
I try to stay abreast of the operation tempo and tactics in afghanistan but its hard for a person out of the military loop to know exactly what empolyments troops use. It seems that so many of our troops are killed by IED, rolling around in humvees.
Is there a lack of heliborne resources in the stan to carry out our missions ? I realize COIN involves being among the people but Im wondering if more casualties could be avoided by more use of helo's. I read an article by a south african about defeating the land mine and the decision to forgo as much as possible the use of convoys and instead use helicopters.
Also as a tracking, blocking and kill factor , it seems that airborne warefare would provide a quicker reaction and safer transport into a contact. Perhaps, this has been discussed and the reasons why its not being done as much but I'd like some professional opinions on this.
It seems that one would be trading IED attacks for RPG and AA attacks, with the latter offering up juicier headlines (fewer incidents, but more killed per incident). It would also further remove Soldiers from the operating environment, as if sealing them off inside MRAPs had not done this already.
The focus on avoiding IED strikes seems similar to the debate over airport security. If the bomber is at the airport, then something is wrong, regardless of what he faces in the screening line. Likewise the focus on avoiding attacks during movement (whether IEDs against wheeled convoys, AA attacks against aircraft, or ambushes at LZs) should be shifted to stopping them from occurring.
Depends on the mission
Air Assault (or Airborne or Airmobile) isn't the solution to Iraq or Afghanistan. Vertical envelopment has its place, of course. But for all the tradeoffs of vulnerability, the decision isn't just about RPGs vs. IED. It has to come down to the purpose of the mission. To connect with IPs and win some old-fashioned hearts and minds, you need to really see people and come into contact with them, not just drop in and lift out of the neighborhood. Aircraft can't linger to form alliances...grunts have historically been the most successful at that, and IMHO, that is what we need to do to begin working with locals and gain their respect.
Close combat with clearly defined enemy forces demands and rewards speed, power and audacity. Unfortunately, our enemy today is like the VC two generations ago...extremely difficult to distinguish from the IPs.
This was precisely what we did during Operation KHANJAR in July of last year. So to answer your question, when you look at that operation, along with other ops like ANACONDA, we have the ability to project combat power through vertical envelopment, but the question comes up concerning why we would want to do so. The reasons are often very specific and attuned to the situation at hand.I try to stay abreast of the operation tempo and tactics in afghanistan but its hard for a person out of the military loop to know exactly what empolyments troops use. It seems that so many of our troops are killed by IED, rolling around in humvees.
Is there a lack of heliborne resources in the stan to carry out our missions ? I realize COIN involves being among the people but Im wondering if more casualties could be avoided by more use of helo's. I read an article by a south african about defeating the land mine and the decision to forgo as much as possible the use of convoys and instead use helicopters.
This earlier thread highlights some details: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=strike+sword
Heliborne operations are difficult to sustain for a long duration, for a number of reasons. I wish I could post the photo of that mortarman carrying the baseplate and a load of other gear he shouldn't have. That highlights what happens when we try vertical envelopment but fail to fight light enough.
ETA: Just found it!
Last edited by jcustis; 01-12-2010 at 08:49 AM. Reason: found that photo
A Makeshift Hunt for IEDs in Iraq
5 Dec. Christian Science Monitor - A Makeshift Hunt for IEDs in Iraq.
... A 110-pound black German Shepard named Bingo works with Piacentini, sniffing suspicious holes in the ground, mounds of garbage, or debris placed a little too strategically.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams - equipped with signal-jamming radar, robots, and spacesuit-like protective gear - specialize in detecting and detonating IEDs. But most days there aren't enough Bingo's or EOD teams to go around. So, Marines on patrol tend to gently poke anything suspicious, and snip the wires of the bombs they discover themselves...
New IED TF Head
6 Dec. Reuters - U.S. Expands Effort to Counter Rebel Bombs.
The Pentagon, striving to blunt the deadliest threat posed by Iraqi insurgents, on Monday named a retired four-star general to head an expanded effort to defend against roadside bombs used to kill and maim U.S. troops.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld picked retired U.S. Army Gen. Montgomery Meigs, former commander of NATO's peacekeeping force in Bosnia, to replace the one-star general now heading a task force on so-called improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, often planted by insurgents on roads to attack U.S. vehicles...
Florida Base Set to Open School on IEDs
17 Dec. Associated Press - Florida Base Set to Open School on IEDs.
With more American soldiers dying in Iraq and Afghanistan from hidden bombs, the military hopes a new advanced explosives school will help troops to detect and disarm the deadly devices.
The military showed off X-ray cameras, chemical sensors and advanced robotics Friday, while the military's top bomb-disposal instructors demonstrated some of the latest techniques in combating deadly improvised explosive devices.
The new Advanced Explosives Device Disposal School at Eglin Air Force Base officially opens next month. Explosives experts from all military branches will attend the specialized training...
New Counter-IED Lanes Train Troops in Kuwait
New Counter-IED Lanes Train Troops in Kuwait
Soldiers arriving in Kuwait now receive a new situational training exercise to update them on enemy improvised explosive devices and other tactics before going into Iraq.
There are also new Counter-IED dismounted and mounted lanes for combat arms units, a route reconnaissance and recurrence lane for engineers and explosive ordinance disposal units, a C-IED fundamentals lane and multiple practice maneuver lanes.
IEDs: the home-made bombs that changed modern war
Improvised Explosive Devices
This thread was prompted by an IISS Strategic Comment, longer than most and I have used their title as the thread's title.
It opens with:And ends with:Sometimes called ‘the artillery of the twenty-first century’, these home-made bombs have been responsible for the majority (nearly 70%) of foreign military casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the same way that most battlefield casualties in the twentieth century were inflicted by artillery.Link:http://www.iiss.org/publications/str...ed-modern-war/Countering IEDs will remain a core requirement for land forces. Any force – whether state or irregular – seeking to combat Western forces will have observed the advantages that IED have given to insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. As IED are often similar in capability and employment to conventional land mines, armies may merge counter-IED efforts with broader counter-mine capabilities. It will be important for them to institutionalise approaches to countering IEDs, keeping knowledge and expertise current even in the absence of major operations.
I know SWC has discussed some of the issues around countering IEDs and SWJ has had articles too, most notably on the MRAP acquisition process. Oddly there are very few threads easy to identify as focussed on IEDs and all these will be closed - with a caption pointing to this main thread (Yes, the dreaded Moderator at work):
1) Wood box IEDS (re-titled The role of IEDs: Taliban interview):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=11322
2) Oldest Vehicle borne IED? RFI:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6538
These are both mainly historical and reflect members knowledge.
3) Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, a single post with 3.5k views: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6335
4) EFPs; the new AK-47?: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5414
5) Military Claims Victory with V-shaped Truck (more the response to IEDs):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2460
On 27th August 2012 merged into a new thread on MRAP.
6) MRAPs Can't Stop Newest Weapon (ditto above):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3055
On 27th August 2012 merged into a new thread on MRAP
6) Fighting Roadside Bombs (started in 2005, ended 2008): http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1055
7) Bombs in Iraq Getting More Sophisticated (mainly Iraq 2005-2007, a closed thread):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...read.php?t=131
8) Ambush, IEDs and COIN: The French Experience (not merged):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5585
There are a number of relevant posts (found 27th August): The role of IEDs: Taliban interview; Vertical envelopment and the IED How To Stop IEDs.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 08-28-2012 at 09:33 PM. Reason: Updated with x3 relevant threads
davidbfpo
There's nothing new or modern about mine warfare on land. We've had that for a couple centuries, see 17th century mineur troops (demolitions engineers).
The "modern" thing about it all is rather that the rebels are so vastly inferior and so much in danger in most other forms of warfare than mine warfare that their theoretically wide repertoire has almost entirely been reduced to minelaying, thuggery and occasional harassing fires.
Earlier capability asymmetries had a different face, but looked similarly. An Amazon tribe's poison arrow ambush, Germanic small warband raids in woodland were essentially the same.
Very little of OPFOR's repertoire still worked that the remaining active repertoire (usually a very, very careful action) was perceived way out of proportion.
It's as complaining that you're getting itched badly by the stiff stitching ends of a double amputee. A double amputee whom you've amputated and who happened to be the best boxer in his town before he faced you.
Does this make stiff stitching the important face of modern martial arts?
Not really.
It rather shows that humans adapt to almost everything, get used to almost everything. Even a little itch is a major issue if there's no other irritation.
I bet you'd instantly forget about the itching once you get into a brawl with a really good kickboxer who breaks your arms.
OK, this was a bit more graphic, but I basically wrote the same thing here before.
Fuchs,
I agree that the use of mines or IEDs is not 'new' in warfare. As a civilian I think there is something in the military-bureaucratic world that needs to label the re-appearance of an 'old' method as 'new' and so gain funding for example.
On a quick scan of the linked threads it was interesting to see so many previous historical examples given, such as the local use of bicycle IEDs in a WW2 IRA bombing campaign.
I am not aware of any comparisons made of the damage incurred in previous campaigns and more contemporary ones, so will agree with the IISS author the proportion of casualties has changed.
davidbfpo
C-IED in an first entry mission
I want to restart this thread by requoting from davidpfbo and the IISS article:In the Austrian Armed Forces we have for different reasons neglected the issue of C-IED battle drills for a long time.Countering IEDs will remain a core requirement for land forces. Any force – whether state or irregular – seeking to combat Western forces will have observed the advantages that IED have given to insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
For other reasons we now start with incorporationg them into our training.
I have the following questions to the Council:
How do you evaluate the IED-threat to the leading elements of an attacking InfBn when conducting a secured road march towards the line of depature during an attack?
Do you use the same battle drills (5/25, 4 C's, Isolation, VP or however you call them?
Who decides what is a danger and what not?
How far in advance can you plan those battle drills?
How do you deal with the expected delay when planing an offensive operation?
I hope that my inquiries are clear and understandable.
I do have some ideas and I want to share them with you as soon as I have formulated them into simpler sentences
Thanks in advance
L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace. (Napoleon)
It's always easier to ask for forgiveness than permisson.
It is disapointing, but there is a lot of truth in this assertion, especially when it comes to IEDs, but this is only part of the issue. Another key aspect is the media's focus and hype about IEDs, which the military in turn must dance to due to Congressional pressure (our want to be warfighters) to get after the IED problem.
The good news is that there have been some signifcant gains in the research and development world to help address the IED threat, and tactics in some cases have appropriately evolved. The bad news is despite our attack the network as one line of effort against IEDs, we have lost a lot by focusing on the trees instead of the forest. It is amazing how many man hours and analytical focus will get diverted to a relatively insignificant tactical capability of the enemy.
Get off the roads, control territory (can't do that from fire bases, you have to be out and about constantly), and defeat the adversary. We never would have defeated any adversary in history if we focused on defeating their rifles, their artillery, their planes, etc. We would have simply degraded their ability to fight until they adapted, unless we could have quickly pushed them to their culmination point (that isn't happening with most insurgencies). In some respects, as many have said, very little about warfare has changed over history, but our response to it has, often inappropriately.
'Aerial IEDs' Target U.S. Copters
16 Jan. Defense News reports - 'Aerial IEDs' Target U.S. Copters (not online).
Insurgents are attacking U.S. helicopters in Iraq with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that leap into the air and detonate when an aircraft passes nearby, said a U.S. Army aviation general.
Insurgents, who place these aerial IEDs along known flight paths, trigger them when American helicopters come along at the typical altitude of just above the rooftops. The devices shoot 50 feet into the air, and a proximity fuze touches off a warhead that sprays metal fragments, said Brig. Gen. Edward Sinclair, commander of the Army’s Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Ala.
The bomb-builders may be obtaining radio-guided proximity fuzes from old Iraqi anti-aircraft and artillery shells and mortar rounds.
Sinclair said these aerial IEDs have been used against multiple U.S. helicopters. He declined to say whether such IEDs had damaged any aircraft.
The new weapon is one way insurgents are taking on Army aircraft, which come under fire between 15 and 20 times a month, Sinclair said. Other methods include small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and advanced shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles...
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