Storming the Beach

[William F. Owen]

Starting this as I think this worthy of our collective attention rather than resting in the Blog.

See here.

IMO, I think EFV and V-22 are just bad ideas for a non-existent problem, created from an imagined reality. Yes amphibious Operations will be a necessary part of future warfare, but I have doubts that current ideas actually deliver that in a useful way.

...BTW, I have a lot of time for the Corps (USMC). Slightly odd chaps, but I actually believe the rest of the world can learn some useful things from the USMC if it is in any way serious about expeditionary operations.

[Fuchs]

Both are over-engineered for sure.

A modern marine corps would be an ideal choice for the airborne, swamp operations and river/lake crossing niches.
Too bad, the USMC is redundant with army formations (101st, 82nd, and army in general as demonstrated in WW2 amphibious operations in the European theatre).

It makes sense to give a marine corps an amphibious AFV, but that doesn't need to be a high seas or high speed design. A winch and good climbing ability are more important (many rivers are between rather steep hills).

[slapout9]

This was scheduled to go into actual production but Vietnam budget priorities intervened. Not the idea ducted fan version but still pretty good IMO.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=buh7_xLG4ZE

[Infanteer]

I remember reading how amphibious warfare had suffered due to Iraq and Afghanistan as the Marine Corps had to pay its toll for wanting 3 full up divisions with tanks - the toll being taking a share in sustaining deployments on counter-insurgency operations. As Iraq/Afghanistan reach their nadir, it shall be interesting to see how the USMC chooses to oriet itself.

There were a few articles written in the Australian Army Journal on Amphibious Warfare and such that were really good and layed the concept out well. The topic is one that has always interested me as it is probably one of the most effective ways of sustainable force projection.

However, Wilf raises a good point with "storming the beach". I had the oppurtunity to work with the USMC, including an amphibious exercise aboard an LHD. Amazing in the capabilities they provide. In the exercise, we tried for two days to execute and amphibious assault out of the well deck. Once we got the well deck and broken landing craft sorted out, the seas were simply too rough to deploy. Eventually, we just hopped on helicopters and assaulted the objective (6 CH-53s lifted an entire Rifle Company at once from the ship).

Enemy air defence can be dealt with, Mother Nature can't. Other than that, the Gators were impressive. Between LCACs, landing craft and helos, there was a good mix of insertion ability. The C2, logistical and medical support that the ship contained makes these abilities.

I'm curious as to what is worse, 6 months in Afghanistan or 6 months afloat - after 3 weeks I was going stir crazy in those things.

[slapout9]

I remember reading how amphibious warfare had suffered due to Iraq and Afghanistan as the Marine Corps had to pay its toll for wanting 3 full up divisions with tanks - the toll being taking a share in sustaining deployments on counter-insurgency operations. As Iraq/Afghanistan reach their nadir, it shall be interesting to see how the USMC chooses to oriet itself.

There were a few articles written in the Australian Army Journal on Amphibious Warfare and such that were really good and layed the concept out well. The topic is one that has always interested me as it is probably one of the most effective ways of sustainable force projection.

However, Wilf raises a good point with "storming the beach". I had the oppurtunity to work with the USMC, including an amphibious exercise aboard an LHD. Amazing in the capabilities they provide. In the exercise, we tried for two days to execute and amphibious assault out of the well deck. Once we got the well deck and broken landing craft sorted out, the seas were simply too rough to deploy. Eventually, we just hopped on helicopters and assaulted the objective (6 CH-53s lifted an entire Rifle Company at once from the ship).

Enemy air defence can be dealt with, Mother Nature can't. Other than that, the Gators were impressive. Between LCACs, landing craft and helos, there was a good mix of insertion ability. The C2, logistical and medical support that the ship contained makes these abilities.

I'm curious as to what is worse, 6 months in Afghanistan or 6 months afloat - after 3 weeks I was going stir crazy in those things.

General Gavin thought and wrote that the mission of the Marine Corps should be to "Attack Across The Shore" not to just focus on beach landings.

[Pete]

The 6th of June is an auspicious day for starting this "Storming the Beach" thread. Today is the 66th anniversary of the Normandy landings. "Allies Driving Into France" is the headline for the lead story on the front page of my London edition of The Stars and Stripes for June 7, 1944, price 1D.

[Granite_State]

I'm curious as to what is worse, 6 months in Afghanistan or 6 months afloat - after 3 weeks I was going stir crazy in those things.

I had the same thought after spending just one night aboard one during our quick Amphibious Familiarization Exercise at TBS two months ago.

[Valin]

I had the same thought after spending just one night aboard one during our quick Amphibious Familiarization Exercise at TBS two months ago.

That's why I joined the Air Force. Although there were times when the cooks served red wine with fowl....yet somehow we managed to survive.

[Chris jM]

Enemy air defence can be dealt with, Mother Nature can't.

Amphibious/ ship-to-shore ops are very difficult, agreed. The thing to remember in the larger context of marine-type ops is that it's one thing getting ashore, it's another thing sustaining yourself once ashore.

Beach-heads and even established ports are a huge bottle-neck in the logistic support that needs to flow through, and tying up all your aviation assets in supply isn't an ideal solution if at all possible.

Further, as you stated, beach-heads are hugely vulnerable to both enemy action and mother nature. I've only had one experience of operating ship-to-shore and the fragility of the beach-head in anything other than near-perfect conditions is hard to believe. We had to have mass engineer recce and preparation of matting and berms so our vehicles could roll ashore - and this was in a completely uncontested, take-your-time environment. Once chance and friction comes into effect, I shudder to think of the difficulties.

[COMMAR]

Its important to keep in mind in all points of this discussion that Amphibious Ops are not relegated to loading troops on a AAV/EFV/LCAC & landing on a beach.

The Amphibious Assault is the most complex of military maneuver & involves alot of moving parts in a very fluid environment. It can flow from reconnaissance & sabotage to company sized clandestine raid for further sabotage/softening to vertical assault to beach head landing. In no particular order or necessity.

The flow from Beach Head to Build Up to Break Out is more Art than Science & is taught to the level of understanding to all from Colonel to Squad Leader. This is one of the major reasons the USMC stresses training for it.

Why is this Important?

Take the studies done on the Operation in Grenada. Subsequent studies showed that although all forces suffered serious set backs to initial assault plans, all forces eventually landed & began to build forces.

But it was the Marines understanding of Build Up to Break Out; Break Out-stresses sucking the Enemy/Attackers in during the Build Up phase to swell forces at their weakest point using that momentum to "Break Out" & fuel your Counter-Assault, that led to 400 Marines taking 80% of the Island.--Fluid.. Art not Science.

The 2 Coys fr/the 22nd MEU's role was initially very small; lead a Helo Raid to seize Port Pearl for potential Civ Evac to ARG. But were ordered to seize the rest of Island when the Main assault force was pinned down at Port Salinas.

Although this was not a classic Amphibious Assault all elements trained for proved essential in this & all other assault/raid type Operations. Its like training for the Decathlon b/c you don't which event you may be asked to run, training for Amphib Ops is nearly all encompassing.

[Entropy]

I'm curious as to what is worse, 6 months in Afghanistan or 6 months afloat - after 3 weeks I was going stir crazy in those things.

Since you ask and since I've done both (the benefit, I suppose, of being in two services), I'd say afloat is better. Keep in mind that I was a fobbit (though not by choice) so your mileage may vary. The reason I give the advantage to an afloat deployment is the port calls. I got to see Australia several times, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, Dubai, etc. You get to drink in port. You get to interact with women. That makes up for a lot of tin-can induced craziness which is, admittedly, pretty bad. But as I guy who loves to travel I thought the Navy was a pretty sweet deal.

[Entropy]

I'm reminded of something. When I was in the Navy during the 1990's we and the Marines had an expeditionary raiding mindest. We didn't do campaign-level planning - that was something left to the Army and Air Force. I've been out of the Navy for a while now and wonder if raiding is still a part of the culture and skill-set.