Storming the Beach

[Tukhachevskii]

...the following two papers examine OMFTS from logistics perspectives and contain many interesting observations.

An Analysis of STOM (Ship to Objective Maneuver) in Sea Based Logistics. Unfortunately, the paper's obervations are marred by an unfounded (and rather cheeky) methodological slieght-of-hand that assumes the MV-22's will not face any attrition. Nonetheless, it models the logistical problems quite well.


Operational Art and Amphibious Assault: Will OMFTS break the US amphibious assault sword?. This paper criticises some of the key conceptual assumptions behind the OMFTS concept from a logistical viewpoint and supplements the above rather nicely, especially with its focus on doctrine/theoria vs practice/praxis.

Logistics vulnerability is a key factor of incurring culmination; two accelerators of logistic culminiation are an untenable distance from base to objective and a lack of operational pause to regenerate combat power. the OMFTS-STOM construct runs dangerously afoul of these operational art by-laws. A significant piece of the OMFTS contruct is sea-basing, a logistic concept that places supply ships/mobile off-shore bases over the horizon, far away from the littoral threat. those supplies would then be airlifted directly to forces ashore, eliminating the need for a lodgement; however, the elimination of the lodgement has two potential negative effects: it increases the distance between base and objective, thus threatening overextension, and eliminates operational pause and with it the ability to regenerate combat power. A logistic construct that exhibits one of these traits should give the operational planner pause; a construct that exhibits both, as does OMFTS-STOM, should cause serious concern for the integrity of operational sustainment.(p.5)

And, another take on the V-22 Albatross, sorry, Osprey...
V-22: Osprey or Albatross

Instead of admitting that the V-22 progam has failed and using the money to buy proven helicopters for the same missions, the Marine Corps, with considerable help from Congress, has kept the program alive-continually try to fix various problems. But at least one problem-the vortex ring state (VRS)- can never be fixed or eliminated. And "flying around" the VRS problem by slowing the descent rate of the V-22 makes the Osprey more vulnerable that helicopters (despite claims that it is more survivable)(p.1)

[Rifleman]

I think tilt rotor technology has promise. Remember Operation Rhino? The raid force from 3d Ranger Battalion was inserted by parachute and withdrawn by helicopter. That works but it's an extra link in the plan.

With tilt rotors the drop aircraft could also be the extraction aircraft for parachute raids. At least sometimes. I know it's not the answer for every situation but it has application for some.

[slapout9]

I think tilt rotor technology has promise. Remember Operation Rhino? The raid force from 3d Ranger Battalion was inserted by parachute and withdrawn by helicopter. That works but it's an extra link in the plan.

With tilt rotors the drop aircraft could also be the extraction aircraft for parachute raids. At least sometimes. I know it's not the answer for every situation but it has application for some.

The Air Force version appears to be alot more robust and less complex than the Marine version because the wings and propellers don't have to fold up. The Rangers may like or already have access to that version.

[GI Zhou]

That's why I joined the Air Force. Although there were times when the cooks served red wine with fowl....yet somehow we managed to survive.

The catering officer at RAAF Base Tindal (Think Nellis without Las Vegas or an Alaska town in the desert) used to hold back a little of the daily mess budget for a once a month big lunchtime spread. It worked out to more than one lobster be person, not counting prawns, oysters, balmain bugs, hot scallops etc per person. The army engineers who had just spent two months in the bush eating ration packs were speechless, when they came in for lunch before flying back 'down south'. We just told them this was the normal spread for lunch. Best base I ever ate at followed by Darwin. Memories......

[slapout9]

I'm not sure if he really doesn't agree or if in his time he's learned that Marines work best under pressure. But he is subtly sparring w/them over Ideas in public.

Been thinking about this for awhile. Sometimes it makes more sense to just look at the person and see what his primary values/motivations are before you begin an interview/negotiation with that person. Because in the end it is a negotiation more than anything else.

Gates spent 30 years at CIA, he rose from Trainee to the top slot inside the Agency, that has never happened before. In his heart and soul he is CIA not military.

Your real problem may not be on how to debate him point/counter-point or to provide him with a better scenario. Your real problem may be to find out Who is giving him the information that is causing him to form his opinions to question equipment/concepts of the Marine Corps. Rest assured he is getting the information from somewhere and someone.

When you find that out, you may find yourself in a much better position to deal with him. Just my LE viewpoint on how I see it.

[COMMAR]

Beg to differ. It is criminally expensive and ridiculously complex.
For all that, all you actually get is speed. For the same given payload, helicopters can go just as far, by merely trading payload for fuel.
It's deck foot print is huge, and IIRC there is no manual reversion on the folding sequence.
Yes, cost versus relevant capability is not an exact science, but the cost here was squandered on a set of capabilities that are of dubious relevance compared to the operationally proven ones we can get from platforms like EH-101 for example.

Your still limiting the role of the V-22 to the confines of a static theater. That's not where the USMC has traditionally focused the bulk its attention & it won't be in future.

The USMC is involved in a Static Conflict once in a generation but Expeditionary Operations are a DAILY reality.

HQMC's plans stated publicly have them involved in A'stan, in any significant #s, for maybe another 5yrs. Fr/there its back to Exped. Ops & Crisis Response.

In ExOp/CR any Helo you'd suggest would be ADDITIVE atmost where the V-22 is TRANSFORMATIVE. To understand this you have to understand 1st the role the USMC plays in NatSec Globally & 2nd how it plans to Expand that capability in the coming years. Just 1 example:

• There will be multiple Company-based MAGTFs spread thru-out each theater with 1000s of miles of dispersion between them. Each Coy will dispatched Plt & even Squad-sized Dets w/various missions.
  
• With 1 overarching mission.. to stay engaged acting as human sensor nodes, gathering real-time HumInt for Crisis Response, with the ability to Consolidate to react quickly w/an appropriate response.

The USMC has a Vertical-Lift package that utilizes the V-22 not only as a Medium Lift Asset but as a intra-theater High Speed Connector, the CH-53 for Heavy Lift, & a Light/Medium Lift Cargo UAS, Greatly Reducing the Foot Print at the Coy-MAGTF Level.

What Helo only Package allows the USMC to act in their Expeditionary Role as efficiently?

[Cole]

A primary tilt rotor weakness, aside from cost/complexity, is lack of hover maneuverability and lift. Wilf’s RUSI reference at the bottom of page 2 has a footnote showing:

“A UH-60L helicopter can lift (fuel and useful load) over 5,600lbs at a takeoff altitude of 10,000 feet versus only some 2800lbs of equivalent load for the V-22 Osprey. The UH-60L can also carry 3000lbs of useful load at this altitude to some 250 nautical miles, a feat unmatched by the V-22.”

In addition, the hover-out-of-ground-effect ceiling (required for sling loads and hover maneuver well off the ground) is just 5400’ for MV-22 which isn’t particularly helpful in places like Afghanistan. For a UH-60M at ¼ the cost, it is a higher 6,000’. I'm also wondering why the 82nd CAB Army helicopters were used to air assault Marines into low altitude Marjah instead of MV-22. LZ size? Night LZ brown-out concerns? Are MV-22s well suited for desert landings at night given their tremendous downforce in a small disc-loading area?

The other point about the MV-22 is that most Army and Marine AOs are not so large that tilt rotor speed and range are essential. This is especially true when all you can carry with an MV-22 is foot infantry and a few growlers. There is little difference in times between a helicopter and tilt rotor flying from airfields to Now Zad or Marjah LZs. While tilt rotor advocates like to talk nautical miles, fighting AOs often involve lesser kilometer distances.

I think tilt rotor technology has promise. Remember Operation Rhino? The raid force from 3d Ranger Battalion was inserted by parachute and withdrawn by helicopter. That works but it's an extra link in the plan.

With tilt rotors the drop aircraft could also be the extraction aircraft for parachute raids. At least sometimes. I know it's not the answer for every situation but it has application for some.

Good point. There are contingencies where ship-to-AOR distance is extensive, as COMMAR points out. But if Wikipedia is correct, at Rhino, 200 Rangers parachuted from 4 MC-130s. Not sure room exists in a MV-22 for 20 paratroopers. Even if so, 10 tilt rotors would be required to match 4 MC-130 that have better jammers, terrain-following radar, etc.

Wikipedia also mentions that CH-53Es moved Marines to Rhino 372nm through Pakistan using aerial refueling. That, too, could have been a good MV-22 mission accomplished in only 1.5 hours. But MV-22s did not exist then, so the cited four CH-53E must have carried the Marines in around 3 hours, and other Cobras, Hueys, and CH-46 from several different landing ships used an en route FARP probably requiring 4 hours. However, C-17s and KC-130 moved the rest and tilt rotors would never substitute for that kind of extensive continuous lift.

The USMC has a Vertical-Lift package that utilizes the V-22 not only as a Medium Lift Asset but as a intra-theater High Speed Connector, the CH-53 for Heavy Lift, & a Light/Medium Lift Cargo UAS, Greatly Reducing the Foot Print at the Coy-MAGTF Level.

What Helo only Package allows the USMC to act in their Expeditionary Role as efficiently?

But as pointed out in my last sentence (above your quote) about the Rhino Marine expeditionary assault, intratheater high speed lift will always be primarily a large USAF C-17 and C-130/KC-130 function.

Plus, I've read that a San Antonio Class LPD can launch four helicopters or just two MV-22 from its open deck area...meaning an equal 40 Marines get to shore initially, and with H-60s another three aircraft could be moved out from inside the hangar area...which I believe holds just one MV-22.

So that suggests the Marines would be better off to station more numerous helicopters on LPDs and fly MV-22s in from centralized land locations in CENTCOM, PACOM, etc. rather than putting them on boats where maintenance for the few carried is still complex, time-consuming, and underresourced. That way a smaller total procured quantity of MV-22s could be maintained together at primary theater land bases while still able to support intratheater contingencies due to their speed/range. Helicopters would commence the air assault from on board LPDs, with MV-22 linking up just in time to pick up and move troops off now empty decks. Best of both worlds.

[William F. Owen]

Your still limiting the role of the V-22 to the confines of a static theater. That's not where the USMC has traditionally focused the bulk its attention & it won't be in future.

You can tell the future? OK, should have said that in the begining.

In ExOp/CR any Helo you'd suggest would be ADDITIVE atmost where the V-22 is TRANSFORMATIVE. To understand this you have to understand 1st the role the USMC plays in NatSec Globally & 2nd how it plans to Expand that capability in the coming years. Just 1 example:

Sorry but the idea that the "speed" of the V22 makes in TRANSFORMATIVE - is without evidence. Speed is all it has, and that comes at dubious operational relevance and huge cost.
It is actually EXPENSIVE, for little proven benefit, other than cherry picking items to fit. What is about the future that actually demands this?

What I do understand is the USMC had to secure lots of money to make the V22 case, and IMO, the arguments used are not to the credit of the USMC.

[COMMAR]

But if Wikipedia is correct, at Rhino, 200 Rangers parachuted from 4 MC-130s. Not sure room exists in a MV-22 for 20 paratroopers. Even if so, 10 tilt rotors would be required to match 4 MC-130 that have better jammers, terrain-following radar, etc.

Wikipedia also mentions that CH-53Es moved Marines to Rhino 372nm through Pakistan using aerial refueling. That, too, could have been a good MV-22 mission accomplished in only 1.5 hours. But MV-22s did not exist then, so the cited four CH-53E must have carried the Marines in around 3 hours, and other Cobras, Hueys, and CH-46 from several different landing ships used an en route FARP probably requiring 4 hours.

Well your talking about 2 different missions on the same patch of dirt a few weeks apart. The 1st was an in&out Intelligence gathering mission lead by an SMU supported by Rangers.

The Marine mission was a seizure to turn Rhino into a Beach Head, it was the 1st US held piece of A'stan. Launched fr/sea in CH-53's but due to distance they had to get permission to stage in Pakistan & make it a 2 stage raid.

The V-22 would have allowed for a direct raid, bypassing the need for the permission of the costly staging in P'stan.

However, C-17s and KC-130 moved the rest and tilt rotors would never substitute for that kind of extensive continuous lift.

I don't think you understand the concept of Expeditionary. It literally means there is nothing, you either bring it or build it.

There was nowhere for the C-130's & C-17s to land in A'stan. That was the purpose of the Marines' Mission, so they had to helo in to seize then build an Expeditionary Airfield.

Its here that the Blended Platform shines, you ARE a fixed wing EA for the initial force, & you can then build an EA for the larger follow on fixed wing.

But as pointed out in my last sentence (above your quote) about the Rhino Marine expeditionary assault, intratheater high speed lift will always be primarily a large USAF C-17 and C-130/KC-130 function.

Understanding various viewpoint starts w/not making leaps in what ppl are saying. I never said the V-22 would replace the C-130/C-17.

Companies of US Marines will be dispersed thru-out a Theater Command, linked by a single HQ. The V-22 will be used as "A" In-Theater High Speed Connector.

The Unit Commander will use the most efficient means, & mix, to transport troops.

In a time of Crisis, in a Expeditionary environment, & over great distances is what the V-22 was designed for.. That's also happens to be the mainstay of USMC missions both inbetween & during wars.





To keep giving Scenarios to ppl is pointless. Everything has its drawbacks, the key is have you found the most efficient use of it.

History shows the USMC is usually well ahead of its critics. It looked at Galipolli & saw a way to beat the Japanese, looked at the Plane & saw Tactical Bombing (CAS), looked at the Helo & saw Vertical Envelopment, the list goes on.

All of which were HEAVILY criticized in their day b/c ppl just didn't understand, now the best military minds couldn't imagine doing it any differently. Only time will tell.

[William F. Owen]

To keep giving Scenarios to ppl is pointless. Everything has its drawbacks, the key is have you found the most efficient use of it.

I would submit the question is to effectiveness, not efficiency. The V-22 is not effective, given the expenditure of resources.

History shows the USMC is usually well ahead of its critics. It looked at Galipolli & saw a way to beat the Japanese, looked at the Plane & saw Tactical Bombing (CAS), looked at the Helo & saw Vertical Envelopment, the list goes on.

All of which were HEAVILY criticized in their day b/c ppl just didn't understand, now the best military minds couldn't imagine doing it any differently. Only time will tell.

That's a very wide wave at the actual operational history. based on the examples provided, very many folks looked at the same thing and came to the same conclusions
The issue with V-22 is not the need for VTOL. Everyone knows that is useful. The issue is that it is a bad design of aircraft. It's bad helicopter! Concept wise it's a helicopter - just not a very good one.
Just going faster for slightly improved flight characteristics is not the leap forward supposed.