Is the U.S. Military Affordable

[slapout9]

OK, but what's a "strategic bomber?"

In the beginning, back when we new what we were doing, we had a National Policy of "Massive Retaliation at a time and place of our choosing". At the time the Air Force was the only one capable of creating a Strategy to support this Policy. And at that time no other had the atomic bomb and or the delivery method to hit the Continental USA. At that time only the USAF had a "vehicle" that could deliver an atomic weapon anywhere in the world, hence it was Strategic because it could implement our Strategy.

As more time went by and other services developed missiles Army,Navy(Polaris) and the USSR had the bomb and finally a missile to deliver it, the Air Force no longer had a monopoly on this Strategy so we moved to a National Policy of "Flexible Response" by any or all service(s). At which time we no longer had a Strategic Bomber but a more accurately described long range bomber. But the Air Force never got rid of the (SAC) Strategic Air Command structure for another what?? 40 years

[gute]

The USAF would shift more birds to the reserve and I would consolidate USAF reserve and air guard into the reserve. F-22 and F-15E would remain active while 15C and F-16C/D aircraft go to the reserve. Now, I have not mentioned numbers so if the numbers work out to be too few realistically, then keep an appropriate number of F-15C and F-16C/D aircraft on active duty. The B-2 remians in an active status while all B-52 are in the reserve on a rotational alert status. A-10 squadrons are split 1-2 active/reserve. C-17, C-27, and C-130J transports are active - C-5, C-141, and older C-130 aircraft are reserve (many are already). USAF Spec Ops would remain at the same level and the same distribution between active/reserve. Basically, older air frames go to the reserves.

I think the F-35 program should be terminated and more F-22's purchased along with an advanced F-15 (I believe McDonnell Douglas has talked to the zoomies about this aircraft). I understand the reasoning behind the F-35 and one plane for three services, but the cost overruns are ridiculus.

Navy coming next.

[Fuchs]

In the beginning, back when we new what we were doing, we had a National Policy of "Massive Retaliation at a time and place of our choosing". At the time the Air Force was the only one capable of creating a Strategy to support this Policy.

Hmm, I'm not sure which period you're thinking of exactly.

There was a time during the 50's when Navy and Air Force were competing for the strategic nuke bomber role. The USAF won with bombers and land-based missiles (USN got SLBMs and later cruise missiles instead).

see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P6M
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-3_Skywarrior
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_A..._A-5_Vigilante

[slapout9]

Hmm, I'm not sure which period you're thinking of exactly.

There was a time during the 50's when Navy and Air Force were competing for the strategic nuke bomber role. The USAF won with bombers and land-based missiles (USN got SLBMs and later cruise missiles instead).

see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P6M
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-3_Skywarrior
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_A..._A-5_Vigilante

From the late 1940's to the early 1960's..... Polaris came before SBLMs......my parents retired from the Martin company (Glenn L. Martin) now Lockheed Martin. I used to have all the "Artist Conceptions" on my bedroom wall. The USAF didn't win with land based missiles they stole them from the Army, this was key to them keeping their funding for big plane projects. The Army new how to shoot them down and keep them invulnerable by using the Strategic Interstate Highway System one of the main reasons it was built by the way. This is the same reason SCUDS were such a problem during Gulf War 1 mobile- erector- launchers are hard to hit and easy to hide. Shorter range Army missiles located in Orlando,Fl. had much more to do with us surviving the Cuban Missile Crisis than is generally known. Cuba could have been vaporized by Pershing 1 missiles in about 10 minutes.


Pershing decade of progress.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WOd87PO5ME8

[William F. Owen]

At that time only the USAF had a "vehicle" that could deliver an atomic weapon anywhere in the world, hence it was Strategic because it could implement our Strategy.

Yes, I know, but it's still a very poor/silly use of the word.

Mellinger tells people that "Air Power is inherently strategic" - when actually it can never be more than tactical. Air Power is applied via tactical actions, same as land and sea, and must always be applied in the context of the land and the sea.

[William F. Owen]

Basically, older air frames go to the reserves.

OK, but what does this achieve? How does it help?

[gute]

Now with the Navy:

11 carriers to six. The carrier is a power projection weapon, but do we really need 11? I'd move 2 of the 11 into a reserve status so three would be decommissioned.

12 cruisers. There are 2 cruisers for evry carrier so 12 for 6 carriers seems reasonable.

52 Arleigh Burke class frigates plus the three under construction and another planned. With pirates being a problem now and most likely into the future this seems a weapon well suited to dealing with this problem.

Move the 30 Oliver Perry class frigates to the Coast Guard.

Keep all subs.

Decommission the remaining two Tarawa class amphibs.

Move five of the eight Wasp to a reserve status.

Keep the one America class amphib and cancel the order for three more.

Move the four Austin class amphib dock to the reserve.

Maintain the four San Antonio class amphib dock ships, finishing building two and cancel the remaining four.

Move the eight Whidbey Island class dock landing ship to reserve.

Keep the four Harpers Ferry class dock landing ships on active duty.

All Navy aircraft squadrons would be reduced according to required carrier wings, fleet patrol, recon, surveillance and logistics needs. All newer model aircraft remain on active duty while the older models such as F-18C/D, E-6 go to the reserves.

SEAL Teams 1,2,3,4 and 5 along with SVDT 1 and 2 remain active. Deactive SEAL Teams 7, 8 and 10.

Keep DevGroup.

Keep SWCC.

[gute]

The Army:

Deactivate 2ACR, 3ACR, 11ACR, 170BCT, 171BCT, and 173BCT.

Combine division BCTs into two larger BCTs instead of four each. This will reduce the number of HQ positions.

The Army is moving away from divisions so I will lay out the numbers by Corps:

III Corps - six HBCTs, two IBCTs, four CABs, one Corps Engineer Brigade, one Corps Arty Brigade (all MLRS and HIMARS), one Corps MP brigade, one EOD group, plus 10 SFG.

I Corps & AK/HI - Transfer the HBCT from Korea to 3ID, eliminate 10th Mountain and 25ID HQS, 10th MTN becomes two IBCTs stationed in Alaska under I corps, the six SBCTs become four (if not sent to the NG - if sent to NG keep one IBCT in HI and three mechanized BCTs at Fort Lewis (CV90 vehicles organized like the SBCT). Keep one Corps Arty (HIMARS), one Corps Engineer, one Corps MP, etc. Keep two CABs. 1SFG.

XVIII Corps - Combine all airborne assets (82, 173, 4th IBCT AK and Rangers) into four BCTs with two CABs each assigned to 82 and 101. 3ID gets the HBCT from South Korea to form two HBCTs. Deactivate the one 3ID IBCT. Keep one Corps arty brigade (HIMARS + M777), one Engineer brigade (airborne), MP, etc. 3, 5, and 7 SFG.

V Corps - Deactivate.

All Corps arty, engineer, etc not on active duty go to the NG.

Keep CAG.

I've eliminated the 75th Ranger Regiment, but not Ranger school. I believe the airborne forces can fill the Ranger role.

1AD -

[William F. Owen]

The Army:

Deactivate 2ACR, 3ACR, 11ACR, 170BCT, 171BCT, and 173BCT.

Gute, OK, but you're not showing your working. How does any of this help? You're telling us stuff, with no indication of why this is supposed to be better or giving us anything to think about.

[Uboat509]

I have to ask, though, how much would the AF really complain if the Army got the ground attack aircraft assigned to them? I am talking specifically about the A-10s and perhaps some Harriers like the Marines have. From what I gather, the AF has never been overly fond of the A-10 and I have even heard that they tried to get rid of them.

[William F. Owen]

From what I gather, the AF has never been overly fond of the A-10 and I have even heard that they tried to get rid of them.

True, IIRC. They tried to make it an F-16 mission.
So basically the decision on who has what aircraft rests on what aircraft the air force like - not on the military utility of air power.

What ever the A-10 supporters say, historically the replacement for the Ju-87 Stuka was the FW-190F' and G's. There is very little logic in air power theory.

[slapout9]

Yes, I know, but it's still a very poor/silly use of the word.

Agree, but that was the reasoning behind it. Supposedly there is a quote from MacArthur about something similar when he was asked about Strategic Weapons and his response was that he thought The Army was a strategic weapon

[slapout9]

There is very little logic in air power theory.

Depends on which theory. The one I believe in, is the simple concept of gaining and maintain Air Superiority. Just because something moves through the Air does not make it an Air Force if that were true than the Air Force should be charge of bullets flying through the air.


Clear the skies, hold the skies and build an air bridge to the objective.

[William F. Owen]

Depends on which theory. The one I believe in, is the simple concept of gaining and maintain Air Superiority.

If by Superiority you mean "freedom of action to use the air," then that's a start. You personally have just made the top 5% of Air Power Theorists!!!

IMO, Air Power Theory - as in the employment of Aircraft, manned and un-manned - is basically "not good". It's either a set of opinions about targeting, or advocacy for independent air arms. To me, it seems that the actual Theory is almost non-existent. By Theory, I mean that which explains and informs practice.
There is plenty of "antiquarian/historic narrative" about the wonders of P-51 or the Sopwith Camel, and stories of daring do, but almost nothing, that I have found, that informs real theory.
If anyone can recommend a few books, I'm very open to suggestions!

[slapout9]

If anyone can recommend a few books, I'm very open to suggestions!

"The Air Campaign" by Colonel John Warden, hang on and I will find a link to free PDF.


Chapter 9 The Orchestration of War, simple and short and points out a lot things that are often misunderstood about Warden. One being that he is not Anti-Army he just believes that there are only certain times when it(ground forces) should be the "Key Force" or "Main Effort".

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/warden/wrdchp09.htm hit the back to contents button for the rest of the book.

[Fuchs]

If by Superiority you mean "freedom of action to use the air," then that's a start. You personally have just made the top 5% of Air Power Theorists!!!

IMO, Air Power Theory - as in the employment of Aircraft, manned and un-manned - is basically "not good". It's either a set of opinions about targeting, or advocacy for independent air arms. To me, it seems that the actual Theory is almost non-existent. By Theory, I mean that which explains and informs practice.
There is plenty of "antiquarian/historic narrative" about the wonders of P-51 or the Sopwith Camel, and stories of daring do, but almost nothing, that I have found, that informs real theory.
If anyone can recommend a few books, I'm very open to suggestions!

Warden wrote (EBO) air war theory, but I wasn't motivated enough to read it because of what I learned about it from secondary sources.

Both naval and air war lack the ability to really force an opponent to yield as a rifleman pointing his rifle at the enemy's chest can do. Air war theory is therefore much more about operations and tactics than about strategy.
The highly technical nature of air power (and as a consequence, the influence of technology on capability and the widespread misconceptions about air power) didn't help to push air power theory forward.


The thing I miss the most about air power theory is a good answer for the question of prioritization. Both the force structure and the operational emphasis (air combat first? SEAD first? attack airfields first? CAS from day one? interdiction from day one? race forward to intercept enemy AEW&C aircraft early on?) would profit a lot by a good theory on how to prioritize (depending on the situation, of course).

[William F. Owen]

The thing I miss the most about air power theory is a good answer for the question of prioritization. Both the force structure and the operational emphasis (air combat first? SEAD first? attack airfields first? CAS from day one? interdiction from day one? race forward to intercept enemy AEW&C aircraft early on?) would profit a lot by a good theory on how to prioritize (depending on the situation, of course).

Concur. I've never seen anything that seeks to address, "given X number of Aircraft on day one and this context, they do should do Y until A or B is reached." - that is is what I am missing.

[slapout9]

The thing I miss the most about air power theory is a good answer for the question of prioritization.

Read the whole book Warden talks a lot about that very subject.

[gute]

OK, but what does this achieve? How does it help?

older airframes will get less flight time (in theory. Sure, it would great replace all our USAF fighter aircraft with F-22s, but that's not economically possible. Moving older model aircraft to the reserves should extend the life of the aircraft. Now, if the F-22 is as a good as a squadron of legacy fighters then pull out the checkbook!

[gute]

Gute, OK, but you're not showing your working. How does any of this help? You're telling us stuff, with no indication of why this is supposed to be better or giving us anything to think about.

170th and 171st are stationed in Germany. IMO, bring em home and deactivate. The units are not needed. Combine the 173rd battalions with the 82 BCTs, then deactivate the BCT HQS. A separate HQS is not needed. I would shift the SBCTs to the NG. IMO this is a vehicle better suited for urban infantry operations, peace keeping, and disaster relief. With the shift to the NG the 2ACR is not needed. The 3rd ACR will not be required because the ARS in each HBCT will have its own ARS and the Corps will have its own RSTA Cav squadron(s).

Yes, this will cause a reduction in forces, but that's my point. It's not about having the military wewant, but what we can afford.