Local Defence in Afghanistan

[Rex Brynen]

From the Afghanistan Analysts Network:

Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives
by Mathieu Lefèvre
27 May 2010

In this latest AAN report, Mathieu Lefèvre unpacks the myths about local defense initiatives in Afghanistan. His analysis of three local defense initiatives shows the contradictions in the claimed successes and points at possible long-term security challenges posed by these initiatives.

In this report, Mathieu Lefèvre analyses three local defense initiatives in Afghanistan: The Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) and the Local Defense Initiative (LDI). The aim of the ANAP, launched by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) with international support in 2006, was to provide a ‘community policing’ function. The ANAP force was locally recruited and trained and the initiative was concentrated to the south and south-east of Afghanistan. Some of the challenges that faced the ANAP were inadequate logistical support, inadequate vetting, unclear command-in-control and issues of loyalty. According to Lefèvre lessons were not learnt from the shortcomings – and failures – of the ANAP, and consequently they have been reproduced in the AP3 and the LDI programs.

Lefèvre concludes that the three initiatives reproduce the same challenges: The relationship between the local defense initiatives and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is problematic, it has been difficult not to ‘pick sides’ when working with local militias, experimental in nature the programs lack proper accountability mechanisms and the programs run the risk of creating perverse incentives through rewarding criminal commanders rather than peaceful members of the community. Lefèvre also cautions against viewing these initiatives as a possible part of reintegration efforts.

[Jedburgh]

The 2nd Qtr issue of JFQ also discusses the subject in the Seth Jones article Community Defense in Afghanistan, this year's (published 26 May) Security Sector Reform Monitor - Afghanistan devotes a brief section to Local Defence Initiatives, and RAND has a lengthier piece on Community Defense Forces currently in the works.

[Jedburgh]

RAND, 26 Jul 10: Afghanistan's Local War: Building Local Defense Forces

Afghan and NATO officials have increasingly focused on protecting the local population as the linchpin of defeating the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Certain steps are important to achieving this objective, such as building competent Afghan national security forces, reintegrating insurgents, countering corruption, and improving governance. This document focuses on a complementary step: leveraging local communities, especially the use of traditional policing institutions, such as arbakai, chagha, and chalweshtai, to establish security and help mobilize rural Afghans against the Taliban and other insurgents.

Effectively leveraging local communities should significantly improve counterinsurgency prospects. Gaining the support of the population—especially mobilizing locals to fight insurgents, providing information on their locations and movements, and denying insurgent sanctuary in their areas—is the sine qua non of victory in counterinsurgency warfare. By tapping into tribes and other communities where grassroots resistance already exists, local defense forces can help mobilize communities simultaneously across multiple areas. The goal should be to help cause a “cascade” or “tip,” in which momentum against the Taliban becomes unstoppable. In 2010, a growing number of communities in Kandahar, Helmand, Paktia, Herat, Paktika, Day Kundi, and other provinces mobilized and fought against insurgents. These cases present significant opportunities for counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan.

Successful efforts to protect the population need to include better understanding of local communities. Indeed, the Afghan and NATO governments often present the struggle as being between the Taliban and the central government in Kabul. But this dichotomy is false and is not likely to persuade rural villagers, who have never relied wholly on state institutions for law and order. Rural communities tend to be motivated by self-interest and self-sufficiency, preferring to secure their own villages rather than have outsiders do it for them. A failure to adopt an effective bottom-up effort will likely cripple counterinsurgency efforts. This analysis documents three lessons about the viability of establishing bottom-up security in Afghanistan.

Complete document at the link.

[JMA]

Gen. Petraeus Runs into Resistance from Karzai over Village Defense Forces - - Joshua Partlow and Karen DeYoung, Washington Post.

As he takes charge of the war effort in Afghanistan, Gen. David H. Petraeus has met sharp resistance from President Hamid Karzai to an American plan to assist Afghan villagers in fighting the Taliban on their own. A first meeting last week between the new commander and the Afghan president turned tense after Karzai renewed his objections to the plan, according to U.S. officials. The idea of recruiting villagers into local defense programs is a key part of the U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan, and Karzai's stance poses an early challenge to Petraeus as he tries to fashion a collaborative relationship with the Afghan leader.

Of course Karzai will try to resist this plan. If the villagers can defend themselves against the Taliban they will be able to defend themselves against Karzai's forces in due course. Karzai knows that day will come.

[40below]

Gen. Petraeus Runs into Resistance from Karzai over Village Defense Forces - - Joshua Partlow and Karen DeYoung, Washington Post.



Of course Karzai will try to resist this plan. If the villagers can defend themselves against the Taliban they will be able to defend themselves against Karzai's forces in due course. Karzai knows that day will come.

I always noticed that Afghan villagers were armed to the teeth and not shy about fighting. They already have a militia and a local defence program there, the trick is getting them to use it against the proper enemy.

[JMA]

I always noticed that Afghan villagers were armed to the teeth and not shy about fighting. They already have a militia and a local defence program there, the trick is getting them to use it against the proper enemy.

That is a double edged sword is it not? Today they fight for you, tomorrow against and thereafter for the highest bidder. Karzai probably understands this.

[subrosa]

perhaps they should incorporate their militia it and call it something like x risk management or kaala-oba etc etc...

[Cannoneer No. 4]

What successful counterinsurgent did not employ indigenous irregular auxiliaries?

Legitimate sub-national paramilitaries under the effective control of village headmen, district chiefs, and provincial governors recruited from amongst the inhabitants of the battlefield won't be much to look at, won't have the appropriate tickets punched, won't be focused districtly developed enough to meet the high standards claimed by Afghan National Security Forces, but they are already there, already armed in most cases, with some retired Russian-killers for adult supervision.

[Mark O'Neill]

What successful counterinsurgent did not employ indigenous irregular auxiliaries?

Legitimate sub-national paramilitaries under the effective control of village headmen, district chiefs, and provincial governors recruited from amongst the inhabitants of the battlefield won't be much to look at, won't have the appropriate tickets punched, won't be focused districtly developed enough to meet the high standards claimed by Afghan National Security Forces, but they are already there, already armed in most cases, with some retired Russian-killers for adult supervision.

None.

[Bob's World]

Karzai himself took power through the employment of such forces, empowered by an outside source; so it is natural that he would be leery of the formation of the same now. A big portion of our difficulty in selling this program is that we have not effectively recognized that he will wisely fear that such a powerful tool could be used against him as well (he is not a foolish man).

Another aspect of our inability to sell this program is the insistence on focusing on the security / security force aspect of a program that is arguably 80% about extending the official governance of Afghanistan beyond the safe confines of the District and Provincial Centers out to newly empowered and protected local centers of Legitimacy among critical populaces in a few select, critical locations and fusing the two together.

Jimmy Gant's paper fired the imagination in similar ways to Lawrence’s "Seven Pillars"; but similarly the real story is lost in the excitement and romanticism.

There will be no great uprising of tribal forces( trained, enabled and led by a handful of Green Berets; or otherwise) sweeping across Afghanistan to remove the Taliban under this program.

It is no more, and no less than forming local militias to establish local security in order to allow the extension of formal governance to the people to draw upon their legitimacy; and to allow and empower the functioning of local governance as well. Empowering the local shura to bring in development projects and governance on their terms to address issues they see as important for their communities. It is a building of Hope. It is a recognition of Respect for historic systems. It is a transference of Legitimacy from the people to their government. It is NOT program to build private armies to wage COIN in parallel to GIROA.

We won't be able to sell this program until we ourselves understand what it really is that we are trying to sell.

[subrosa]

Bob's World cited in part:

There will be no great uprising of tribal forces( trained, enabled and led by a handful of Green Berets; or otherwise) sweeping across Afghanistan to remove the Taliban under this program.

What is your timeframe for this for not happening? now? or like a year after karzai strikes a deal with the taliban and pictures of animals are banned again? perhaps there will be even an uprising from the northern tribal forces(trained, enabled and led by a handful), again.

I dont think expanding power in the wali kandahar belt by fusing local and provincial powers is a good thing, specially if the taliban is going to be part of the official govt and this is their heartland. the shura plan sounds good but not the "fusing" part.

[wmthomson]

Hamid Karzai agreed to the creation of local security forces today. General Petraeus has supposedly been pushing for localized forces since he took command of Afghanistan operations earlier this month. (Press Release from Afghan Government)

This initiative certainly is a small step towards some decentralization of an absurdly over centralized government; thus it appears a positive step towards achieving success in Afghanistan. Neither the culture nor geography ever seemed to lend themselves to centralized government, at least not at the level Karzai has instituted.

As David Kilcullen said a few days ago on NPR, it is easier to convince a guy to fight for his town then go some place else and fight for some one else’s. Local police will certainly have a better understanding of the human terrain then national police could. The villages do have an opportunity to side step the Karzai government altogether, thus undermining its legitimacy, but it can’t get anymore illegitimate then it already is, so do we really care at all?

Appears like a positive step. Should we push for more decentralization? Or are we just opening up a greater opportunity for rampant warlordism? Are more armed groups the answer to countering a resurgent Taliban?

I certainly think so, much could go wrong of course, but you cannot govern and secure Afghanistan from Kabul anyway, so let’s give it a try.

[subrosa]

like i said above- all they had to do is change their name and karzai would accept!
"local police" sounds very nice and im glad this all worked out!

[40below]

So are these new local police forces part of, an adjunct to, totally separate from or a replacement for the ANP?

[wmthomson]

The new local police force will operate separately from the ANP but will still fall under the authority of the country’s Interior Ministry.

[JarodParker]

like i said above- all they had to do is change their name and karzai would accept!
"local police" sounds very nice and im glad this all worked out!

Reminds me of a little anecdote from one of the OIF books (Fiasco, Imperial Life..., or some other book)...

Sometime in 2003, it occurred to the CPA proconsul Paul Bremer that however much the Kurds had aided the toppling of the Ba'ath and any American-led effort to rebuild Iraq, they were not going to be allowed to maintain a standing "sectarian" militia of their own. This meant that the peshmerga, the well-armed and well-trained Kurdish army, would have to go. Bremer appointed a consultant from the RAND Corporation to negotiate its disbandment with Masour Barzani of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Irbil.

"Look, we'll let you have mountain rangers, a rapid reaction force and a counterterrorism strike force, but no Kurdish army," said the RAND consultant, proceeding to explain the problems of martial division in a federated democracy to a man who'd helped hold together the only democratic polity Iraq had ever known up to then.

Keep in mind that the peshmerga were for twelve years, along with the U.S. and British fighter jets patrolling the No Fly Zone, the only line of defense between the Kurds and Saddam's forces of genocide. After a few seconds' deliberation, Barzani agreed. Hand-shakes and wiped brows all around. But just as the RAND consultant was boarding the plane that would shuttle him back to the Green Zone, it occurred to him to ask what the Kurdish translation of "mountain rangers, rapid reaction force and counterrorism strike force" might be. With a wry grin on his face, Barzani replied: "peshmerga."

Link

[Jesse9252]

Some questions about this local police plan:

1) How are we going to prevent these "local police" from simply becoming the militia of whoever is the strongest powerbroker in whatever area they are operating in? I doubt the Ministry of Interior is really going to be keeping a tight leash on things considering the state it's in. Who is going to set the left and right lateral limits for these units and then supervise them to make sure they are adhering to their boundaries? For that matter, who is going to do the initial vetting to prevent the police from becoming filled with Taliban sympathizers from the start, thus invalidating the whole process?

2) The ANP is already notorious for its poor behavior, corruption, and tendency to abuse the general population. These local police seem even less accountable than the ANP--they will belong to a 'looser' institution and they will receive no training.

3) I am by no means an expert on the ANP, but I got the sense that most of the units were already local to begin with. After 5 minutes on Google I found the 2006 DoS IG's Assessment of Afghanistan Police which is quoted below. So how will these local police be different than the local police that already exist (or did circa 2006)?:

Although the Tashkil calls for recruiting officers in all five ANP regional areas, the assessment team was unable to verify their presence in the regions. Based on interviews with the RTC commanders, mentors, and police district chiefs, almost all recruiting occurs at the police district level.In effect, police are recruited locally to serve locally.

The MoI lacks a national assignment system for graduates of the training centers and the police academy. Presently, graduates of the RTCs return to the province from which they were recruited. According to a MoI official, this assignment system promotes corruption. The official said the corruption is systemic and is related to tribal relationships and local or provincial loyalties. Some MoI officials suggest that the only way to fight corruption of this nature is by adhering to a national recruiting and assignment system. Because Afghans are subject to strong tribal influences, officials believe the best method to ensure police loyalty to the central government is to minimize the provincial/ethnic allegiance by assigning them to provinces other than their own.

The MoI intends at some point to improve the assignment process and assign graduates to provinces other than their home areas. The Minister of Interior has appointed himself champion of nationalizing the ANP and has started a recruiting campaign based on national service.

Several Afghan trainees interviewed at the RTCs said they would be willing to move from their province. Those who thought otherwise, however, expressed a more realistic view. For example, one RTC deputy commander said many policemen would be unwilling to move. He recalled that 60 policemen from other provinces had been assigned to serve in his province, but only two arrived for work. Police prefer to serve in their own province because of ethnic affiliations, travel difficulties, and problems sending pay home to families. Young policemen are reluctant to work in a different province than their own because locals do not accept them due to ethnic, religious, and language differences. In Bamiyan province, for example, many local recruits only speak a language unique to their area, making assignment outside the region

I really do hope this works. Any plan for trying to solve the police problem--or really any problem--in Afghanistan is going to have lots of negatives associated with it. In this instance, though, I am not convinced the potential positives outweigh those negatives...

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den a pointer to a Human Rights Watch report on the Afghan Local Police (ALP).

Comment:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....s-failing.html

Cited HRW report:http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/fil...1webwcover.pdf

One chapter is entitled:

The Afghan Local Police:“Community Watch with AK-47s"