Small Wars in the "new" cash strapped Western economy

[William F. Owen]

my logic cops probe a little further, out of curiosity's sake.

I bet you say that to all the girls!

Doesn't your complete reliance on destruction limit your options? If you can defeat an enemy through deterrence, then that is legitimate is it not? Is there any meaning behind your insistence on 'destroy' that you would choose it above the more holistic, all-encompassing term of defeat?

It is only a reliance because that is what armed forces do.
I can only deter him, if I do stuff that does actually deter him.
Killing - and specifically killing - is a very necessary part of that. Capture also works if the period of detention is long enough to deter as well.

"Own KIA" is the most powerful policy driver I know of. That was why the US left Vietnam, the Lebanon, and Mogadishu. It was why the Soviets left Afghanistan.

You will not win if you kill/capture one bad guy a month. You have to kill in numbers and with a frequency that causes the breaking of will. I strongly believe that is it far from impossible and actually more doable than we wish to admit, because we wish to focus on being "a force for good," instead of the instruments of destruction to set forth policy.

Do not kill the population. You need to make sure the only folks doing that are the bad guys, and yes you can differentiate the population from the bad guys. It requires skill and intelligence. It has been done many time before. .
The population will support the winning side. They always do.

Yes, make alliances and allies, IF that helps you find and kill the enemy -

[Ken White]

..."Own KIA" is the most powerful policy driver I know of. That was why the US left Vietnam, the Lebanon, and Mogadishu...

True but all those departures were due to an (IMO) unreasoned -- and in hindsight, unnecessary -- fear of domestic political defeat by policy makers. That does not negate your point, it amplifies it and allows me to point out that domestic politics in all nations drive international actions.

That seemingly obvious point is important for strategic and operational planners who often either forget that factor or overemphasize it without attempting to counter and obviate it and thus provide policy advice or plans that are flawed...

[William F. Owen]

That seemingly obvious point is important for strategic and operational planners who often either forget that factor or overemphasize it without attempting to counter and obviate it and thus provide policy advice or plans that are flawed...

I may even have to quote you... with due attribution!

[Steve the Planner]

Wilf:

Thought it was interesting that at no time did you mention shoveling billions of unaccountable aid to "friendly" political allies, building roads, schools, etc...

Just killing bad guys, using intelligence (and perhaps wisdom) as a discriminator between good and bad guys. What an interesting new concept for cost effective small wars.

First off, however, there is an army of contractors to feed. What does your concept have to do with them?

Second, both Churchill and Saddam decided that the best way, for example, to cost effectively deal with the Kurds was to gas them, bomb them, and machine gun them from the air.

Their "enemy" was not a bad guy or group of bad guys in a sub-population, but the sub-population itself. Isn't the bad guy to be killed defined by the problem you are trying to solve?

So, isn't the first cost effective step to figure out how to keep the military's role in complex problems limited until you can identify a particular problem, and problem definition, to which costly military solutions can be applied effectively.

Saving money in small wars, in my book, would be by better focusing solutions to fit the problems presented rather than throwing costly solutions on the ground to then seek out problems they could solve.

Examples: Using local, indigenous, or closely related (language, religion, custom) civilian, governance and policing folks to solve as many problems as possible, backed up by relentless military retaliation if they are screwed around with, or something goes bad. That was how the Brits and Pakistanis, for example, had traditionally controlled tribal areas in and around the Durand.

Distilled down, it is not unlike what the Central Highland strategies were all about in Viet Nam (not the whole war).

How did we get into this bewildering situation of pouring billions in cash into countries to, in effect, create much of the problems that we then try to overcome by billions of more dollars, and, in the end, try to tens of thousands of soldiers into to try to unscramble.

Cost effectiveness and targeted killing of bad guys are not synonymous with COIN, nation building and large deployments. Are they?

[William F. Owen]

Steve The Planner Not sure if we agree, but in rough order>

a.) Yes, I want to kill bad guys and not the good guys. The discriminator is their actions. Their armed opposition to your policy.
b.) No contractors, and certainly not western ones. At best as few as possible, because there may be some requirements for them, for logistics.
c.) If there was not a problem, the Army would not be there. You do not deploy until you have a mission. You should not deploy in the hope of finding one. It isn't complex.
d.) Absolutely use indigenous and local assets and resources, across the board. Absolutely invest in your allies.

All this does require wisdom and skill. Building schools, conducting social work, and "Nation building" are not things that win wars. They are things you do once the war is won and it is done by folks that are not soldiers.

....but you can conduct some activity to alleviate suffering, and gain allies, but it has to be selective and it has to have a military purpose, so you do if for mutual benefit. You do not go around handing out rice that the locals will give to the bad guys.

This stuff really is Warfare 101. Nothing original or insightful.

[Steve the Planner]

Right. Warfare 101.

If only, in Afghanistan, we could unscramble all these folks with bold, interesting transformational political visions from the core problems---then solve those.

The latest perplexing interpretation I recently read as the basis for COIN was that since it is politically incorrect to challenge AWK and central government corruption and ineffectiveness, we should, instead, strengthen local governance so it can demand regional and national transformation. Sounds like a long, complex, and costly way around the barn. Whatever the problem is, COIN can solve it, I guess.

Of course, the Afghan consultative jirga (whatever that exactly is) resulted in a central government commitment to hold the "olive branch" to the "angry brothers" who, on paper, the US seems to think are the "bad guys." This followed by key anti-Taliban Defense/Intel dismissals, and plans to create amnesties and opportunities for the "brothers."

Brothers, Bad Guys...So hard to keep track.

[Dayuhan]

a.) Yes, I want to kill bad guys and not the good guys. The discriminator is their actions. Their armed opposition to your policy.

Again there seems to be a sort of reflexive assumption that anyone who opposes our policy is a bad guy who should be killed. What if people are opposing our policy because our policy is stupid? Is there any one of us who is prepared to say that our policies are by definition smart?

If we're going to address small wars from the perspective of economy, shouldn't the first and most necessary step be to review the policy?

To start with... in any given case, what are the objectives of the exercise? Are they clear, immediate, achievable, practical, and above all are they absolutely necessary? Are they sufficiently compatible with local objectives and beliefs that we aren't going to find ourselves fighting a whole pissed off populace who just doesn't want to be messed with?

If the answer to all of the above isn't a clear and unequivocal "yes", we can save a lot of money and trouble by just not going there, or not staying there, as appropriate..

[William F. Owen]

Again there seems to be a sort of reflexive assumption that anyone who opposes our policy is a bad guy who should be killed. What if people are opposing our policy because our policy is stupid? Is there any one of us who is prepared to say that our policies are by definition smart?

Huh? OK, it is their violent opposition to your policy that requires the application of armed force, and why would you set forth policy you know is stupid? Did anyone ever do that? Did anyone ever sort forth policy they knew or believed to be "un-ethical?"

Yes the policy maybe stupid. So what? Run for office and get elected.
They, the enemy, would not be opposing it if they thought it a good idea would they?

My concern in the setting forth of policy, via violence because the policy is violently opposed. If my policy maker says this is not a military problem, then why are we discussing it? The question has to be predicated on the need to set forth the policy and that policy is violently opposed.

Yes, I agree, you can save lots of money by simply doing nothing. How does that provide anything useful or any insight?