Right. Warfare 101.

If only, in Afghanistan, we could unscramble all these folks with bold, interesting transformational political visions from the core problems---then solve those.

The latest perplexing interpretation I recently read as the basis for COIN was that since it is politically incorrect to challenge AWK and central government corruption and ineffectiveness, we should, instead, strengthen local governance so it can demand regional and national transformation. Sounds like a long, complex, and costly way around the barn. Whatever the problem is, COIN can solve it, I guess.

Of course, the Afghan consultative jirga (whatever that exactly is) resulted in a central government commitment to hold the "olive branch" to the "angry brothers" who, on paper, the US seems to think are the "bad guys." This followed by key anti-Taliban Defense/Intel dismissals, and plans to create amnesties and opportunities for the "brothers."

Brothers, Bad Guys...So hard to keep track.